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Resumo 
 
A dissertação analisa, teórica e empiricamente, a problemática das decisões 
(voluntárias) de estrutura de capital da empresa bancária, com o propósito de
promover o alargamento do conhecimento sobre o comportamento das empresas
quando definem e reajustam a sua estrutura de financiamento estratégico.  
Partindo da teoria geral da estrutura de capital, tipicamente associada com as
empresas não-financeiras, desenvolve-se um quadro teórico de referência que 
suporta a formulação das hipóteses que se submetem a teste empírico. Este estudo 
foi desenvolvido com base na metodologia de survey por entrevista pessoal orientada
por questionário estruturado. 
A investigação dos determinantes das decisões de estrutura de capital incidiu sobre a
população de os Presidentes (executivos) do Conselho de Administração de bancos
Portugueses em funções no período compreendido entre 1989 e 1998. 
Os resultados obtidos sugerem que a tomada de decisão de estrutura de capital pelos 
responsáveis das equipas de gestão dos bancos portugueses, durante o período em 
análise, é consistente com alguns dos determinantes teóricos tipicamente associados 
com a escolha da relação capital próprio / endividamento das empresas não-
financeiras, uma vez levadas em consideração as especificidades inerentes à sua
condição de intermediário financeiro. A evidência empírica produzida dá suporte às
hipóteses da fiscalidade ao nível dos bancos, dos conflitos de agência e de
governação e dos problemas de assimetria de informação como determinantes
relevantes na tomada de decisões de estrutura de capital dos bancos Portugueses no 
período 1989-1998.  
A dissertação está organizada como segue: 
No capítulo 1é introduzido e formulado o problema da estrutura de capital ao nível da 
empresa. No capítulo 2 discute-se a teoria geral da estrutura de capital analisando os 
seus fundamentos teóricos e as suas principais proposições. Em seguida aborda-se a 
questão da estrutura de capital da empresa bancária desenvolvendo o quadro
conceptual de suporte à elaboração do questionário utilizado no estudo empírico. O 
capítulo 4 contextualiza a selecção da amostra e dos dados bem como caracteriza o
desempenho financeiro recente de uma amostra de bancos Portugueses. No capítulo
5 abordam-se alguns dos problemas metodológicos e de método relacionados com a
investigação empírica neste domínio. Descreve-se em seguida o desenho da 
investigação e apresentam-se e discutem-se os resultados obtidos no survey
realizado. O capítulo 6 apresenta um sumário dos resultados, as conclusões do
trabalho e as pistas para investigação futura. 
Abstract 
 
The dissertation examines, at both the theoretical and empirical level, the problem of
the banking firm’s capital structure (voluntary) decisions aiming at broadening our
understanding about firms’ behavior when deciding about their strategic financing.  
We build on the general theory of capital structure, typically associated with the non-
financial firm, to develop a theoretical framework able to support the formulation of
testable hypotheses. Such hypotheses framed the theoretical underpinnings of the
empirical inquiry instrument. 
To perform the empirical study of the determinants of such decisions, a
comprehensive survey of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of Portuguese banks in
office during the 1989-1998 period, was undertaken. 
The findings indicate that Portuguese banks’ capital structure decisions are consistent 
with a number of theoretical propositions typically associated with the debt-equity 
choice of non-financial firms once we account, among other factors, for the
idiosyncrasy of their financial intermediary nature. Specifically, we provide empirical 
evidence supporting that taxation at the bank level, agency and governance conflicts
and asymmetric information considerations are relevant factors influencing capital
structure decision-making of Portuguese banks during the 1989-1998 time period. 
These results are consistent with the notion that the design of firm’s financial structure
may   
The dissertation is organized as follows:  
Chapter 1 introduces and formulates the capital structure problem at the firm level.
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive discussion of the general theory of capital
structure. Chapter 3 discusses the capital structure problem at the banking firm level
providing the basis for the development of the theoretical model that underlies the
survey instrument. Chapter 4 contains a brief characterization of the recent financial
performance of a sample of Portuguese banks and describes sample selection and
data. Chapter 5 examines some methodological issues related to our empirical study,
describes our survey design and reports the results of our survey. Chapter 6
summarizes and concludes the dissertation. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
CHAPTER 1 – Introduction 
 
Nonetheless, we are unlikely to ever be able to describe observed capital 
structures with scientific certainty, and every time a consensus seemed ready to 
emerge among capital structure researchers in the past, financial changes and 
innovations in the real business world conspired to render agreement impossible. 
While frustrating, this also makes the study of capital structure a fascinating 
and challenging pursuit. 
 
William Megginson, Corporate Finance Theory  
 
 
1.1. THE FIRM CAPITAL STRUCTURE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM  
It is a widely accepted notion that so-called modern finance theory encompasses the 
study of financial decision-making by individuals and firms, and the structure and operation 
of capital markets and financial intermediaries.1 Financial economists have long sought to 
understand the behavior of firms and individuals in allocating their financial resources to 
productive activities (e.g., Merton 1995). Within this (general) scientific concern 
substantial interest has been directed at the question of how firms select the financing 
structure of their asset-bases. This capital structure problem has been a source of intense 
debate among both, scholars and practitioners. At the core of the debate is the central 
question of the relevance of strategic financing decisions on firm’s valuation. Scientific 
curiosity about this issue has generated a truly large body of theoretical and empirical 
literature that collectively, address different aspects of the firm’s debt/equity decision.2 
Traditionally, one major focus of the literature has been on the (absolute and relative) 
demand and supply of the most conventional financing instruments issued by firms, i.e., 
debt and equity securities. A central question has clearly emerged, though, from all that 
immense research effort: the wealth effects of corporate capital structure choice.3 
Metaphorically, we could say that corporate capital structure is la pièce de résistance of the 
exquisite gourmet menu of corporate finance theory.  
Many studies have sought the optimal capital structure since the ‘first’ and certainly 
the most celebrated theoretical paper of modern finance theory was published by 
                                                          
1 The intersection with other fields of economic thinking is, as argued in Merton (1992, 3), “both 
permeable and flexible.” See, for example, Sharpe (1994), and Fischer and Merton (1984) for a 
discussion of topics in finance that intersect with macroeconomic theory. 
2 Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995), among others confirm this notion arguing that  “[o]ver the past 
several decades, finance scholars have engaged in extensive theorizing about 
factors that might be important in determining a firm’s leverage.” 
- 2 - 
Modigliani and Miller in 1958. Their pioneering work, which showed the implications of 
market equilibrium conditions for firm financing structure and valuation, remains one of 
the most robust and influential contributions to modern finance theory. In fact, it is 
frequently associated with the commencement of modern finance theory (e.g., 
Constantinides 1989 and Harris and Raviv 1991). 
Although these theoretical and empirical efforts are substantial in volume, the 
general view is that the topic lacks an empirically confirmed and accepted body of theory. 
Despite some contributions to our understanding of how managerial behavior shapes 
corporate capital structure, the research produced to date does not provide an unequivocal 
basis for establishing, in an unambiguous fashion, the empirical relevance of the different 
theoretical propositions. 
Thus, the most eclectic, prevalent and noncontroversial views about corporate 
capital structure theory are Myers’s puzzle argument,4 mirrored by Kamath’s (1997) 
enigma, Stiglitz’s dilemma,5 and The Economist’s mystery.6 Therefore, we still lack a 
comprehensive theory to satisfactorily explain for the determinants of the strategic 
financing choices made by managers. Nor have we achieved a conclusive understanding 
about the relationship between the firm’s capital structure and its valuation.  
1.2. THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PROBLEM: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A very substantial part of the theoretical and empirical literature on capital structure 
springs from the observation of North American firms, and from attempts to mirror their 
idiosyncrasies into theoretic models. In the words of Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1994) the “models of financial structure have been developed with the 
aim of explaining U. S. data” and “they are based on U. S. 
institutions.7 Consequently, the generalization of those results to other countries with 
                                                          
3 Throughout this dissertation we have adopted the conventional procedure to use interchangeably the terms 
capital structure, financing structure and long-term financing. 
4 See Myers (1984). 
5 Stiglitz (1989, 349): “as long as resources are spent on thinking about (and 
implementing) a corporate financial strategy, we cannot simultaneously hold to 
the view that firms are rational profit maximizing (shareholders are rational 
investors) and that debt-equity ratios (and financial policies more generally) 
are irrelevant.” 
6 See, “The Mystery of Corporate Debt,” The Economist, January 6 1996: 61.  
7 See also, e.g., Saá-Requejo (1996) who points out that“… most of the research on the 
determinants of capital structure have been done using mainly US data.” 
- 3 - 
(sometimes) remarkably dissimilar economic, financial, and institutional conditions might 
reveal scientifically inappropriate or imprudent. 
Consequently, in the absence of empirically testing the robustness of theoretical 
propositions outside their environmental contexts of space, time and productive activity it is 
difficult to determine if these findings are mere circumstantial functional relationships, or if 
they support any particular theoretic proposition.8 On the empirical front, this viewpoint is 
corroborated by Harris and Raviv (1992, 67) who observe that “it seems essential 
that empirical studies concentrate on testing particular models or 
classes of models in an attempt to discover the most important 
determinants of capital structure in given environments.” 
To mitigate the geographical bias there is a need to substantiate hypotheses about 
corporate capital structure in non-U.S. environments, as discussed in Rajan and Zingales 
(1995).9 These additional scientific examinations could help us to better understand the 
implications of environmental and behavioral factors on capital structure decisions. 
Research in this area should therefore contribute for broadening the explicative and 
predictive relevance of the theory. Therefore, the empirical investigation of corporate 
finance topics in general, and capital structure issues in particular, in a non-U.S. context 
represent an opportunity to both extend empirical evidence and develop new theoretical 
hypotheses, as suggested by, e. g., Rajan and Zingales (1995),10 and Saá-Requejo (1996).11 
The rationale behind this conjecture is found in the remarkable disparities among 
different countries’ market structures and institutional architectures and features. Factors, 
such as, firms’ characteristics (e.g., size), regulatory frameworks, governance systems,12 
cultural environments, accounting principles and practices13  may account for some 
                                                          
8 By implication, theories in those conditions could not fulfill Popper’s (1979) verifiability requirements. 
9 As argue in Boudon (1990): “the major part of the ‘macroscopic’ realities to which a 
general validity was attributed only have a local validity” (translation and emphasis 
mine). 
10 See footnote 9: "To the extent that other countries are similar to the United 
States, they provide an independent sample to test the received wisdom. To the 
extent that they have different institutional structures, they increase our 
ability to discriminate among alternative theories." 
 11 "... the study of decisions taken by firms operating in other financial 
environments should improve our understanding of the determinants of these 
decisions" (Ibid., ). 
12 As noted by Milgrom and Roberts (1992, 290) “… rights that come with ownership vary among 
countries and over time.” See Porter (1992) for a discussion of the impact of corporate governance 
structures on capital allocation, in U.S., Germany, and Japan. 
13 See, e.g., Delbreil et al. (1997) for an illustration. 
- 4 - 
sources of capital structure variance across space, time, and industry.  
Consequently, emphasis should be put on the identification of institutional and 
behavioral factors that may explain capital structure (dis)similarities. Those factors may 
include: (1) differences in fiscal systems;14 (2) financial systems design, regulation, and 
degree of development;15 (3) bankruptcy laws;16 (4) relations between banks and firms; (5) 
national savings levels; and (6) risk preferences of capital market participants.17  
There is compelling evidence that cross-national capital structures  either 
aggregated or at firm level  exhibit significant disparities, as Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1994), among others, report using empirical results for ten countries for the 
1980-1991 period.18 This same research focus on capital structure in international 
diversified settings can be found in the works of Remolona (1990),19 Prowse (1990),20 
Hodder and Senbet (1990),21 Borio (1990), Kneeshaw (1995),22 and Delbreil et al. 
(1997).23 
This trend is expected to prevail in the years ahead as Brennan (1995)  elegantly 
surveying the literature on the developments of theory of corporate finance over the past 
                                                          
14 Such as the taxation of dividends, debt instruments income and capital gains, either at firm and personal 
levels. 
15 One of the institutional features that permeates finance literature, as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1996, 47) accurately observe, is “the existence of liquid, well-functioning stock 
markets”. Furthermore, one can not take it for granted, that dissimilarities in allocative functions of 
financial markets across countries do not exist. Hence, the degree of development of capital markets is, 
arguably, “one possible determinant of corporate financing choices that theory has 
overlooked.” 
16 See, e.g., White (1996), Franks, Nyborg and Torous (1996) and Kaiser (1996) for comparative analysis on 
bankruptcy issues, among U.S. and some European countries. 
17 This view is recognized by Saá-Requejo (1996, 44), who studied the financing behavior of Spanish firms. 
He argues that "only by comparing the decisions taken by firms operating in different 
financial environments, can we full analyze the effect of these institutional 
features." 
18 Burgman (1996) and Shao (1995) also support this approach, explicitly recognizing interest in research on 
patterns of firm behavior in determining capital structures. Appendix 2.1 to Chapter 2 presents a summary of 
the empirical literature on capital structure. 
19 Using a sample of British, German, Japanese, and North American firms, tested Myers’ (1984) Pecking 
Order Hypothesis.  
20 Examined patterns of financial structure in Japanese firms between 1980 and 1984.  
21 They developed a capital structure model in an international setting; that model recognized both corporate 
and personal taxes. 
22 This study looks, at an aggregated level, at the financial structure of non-financial sectors in a sample of 
industrialized countries. An emphasis is put on the implications in terms of the mechanisms for monetary 
policy transmission. 
23A comparative analysis of German, Austrian, Spanish, French and Italian corporations during the period 
1991-1993 to compare financial autonomy of European industrial firms. 
- 5 - 
25 years  predicts. He argues that “the continuing trend towards the 
globalization of business activities suggests that transnational 
considerations will become more important in the future.” In fact the 
ever-increasing interdependence of world economies, of which the globalization and 
integration of markets and firms are only some of the most prominent and visible 
manifestations, justifies a greater deal of attention to the issues of the corporate financing 
structure in a transnational perspective. One way of attempting to achieve this goal is 
through the study of decision-makers’ behavior in different geographical settings, aiming 
at having more than “at most, a limited understanding of firm capital 
structure and financing decisions” Dowd (1996, 38).24 
There is also abundant evidence  both empirical and anecdotal  of a significant 
variance in firms’ capital structures across time. For instance, Taggart (1985) and Merton 
Miller, who, in his Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture25 acknowledged the “rise of 
corporate debt ratios generally in 1980’s”. Likewise, Opler and Hooks 
(1995) observed significant distinct patterns in the financing practices of corporations, 
mostly in the post World War II period.26 A number of circumstances accounted for this 
trend. According to Baskin and Miranti (1997) the most instrumental of these were 
“exogenous events” namely “changes in tax and regulatory policies 
and political events” and from “reduced risk perceptions” induced by 
differences in information available to investors and managers.27 
                                                          
24 As noted by as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1994) “testing the models with data from 
economies with less developed financial markets and very different institutions 
provide a test of robustness of these models”. On these grounds, Chen, Lensink, and Sterken 
(1998) argue that “a better understanding of the capital structure determinants in a 
relatively small yet open industrialized economy is essential not only for 
enriching empirical studies in this field, but also for the purpose of cross 
country asset evaluation” may be understandable. 
25 Presented, to the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in Stockholm on December 7, 1990. See Miller 
(1991). 
26 For this evolution the modernization of financial systems was of paramount importance. The scope of 
financial instruments available grew significantly during the last 25 years. Between the most prominent 
developments in this area on U.S. corporate financing were the so-called Leverage Buyouts (generally 
initiated from the outside of the firm), but also the voluntary recapitalizations or, as Miller (1992) call them 
“self takeovers.” 
27 Divergences in objective functions and differential information endowments are common sources of the 
conflicts that characterize the relationship between capital market participants and firm’s insiders. 
Contracting, monitoring agents’ behavior and enforcing, are effective (and costly) ways of mitigating the 
risks associated with agents’ opportunistic behavior and misalignment of principals and agents’ goals. 
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Empirical regularities across (industrial) firms’ financial structures are well 
documented in the literature. Among others, Bowen, Daley and Huber (1982), Boquist and 
Moore (1984), Damodaran (1997), and Megginson (1997), report similarities in choice of 
financial leverage28 at the firm level. Castanias (1983), and Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 
(1984), among others, found empirical support for the hypothesis of the existence of a 
positive correlation between leverage at the firm and the industry level. 
1.3. CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE: NEW CHALLENGES FOR RESEARCH 
Despite the voluminous literature produced on this subject to date, capital structure 
theory remains an unfinished work. Although we have some knowledge about some 
important aspects of long-term financing decisions by firms,29 does not imply that we (1) 
capture the entire picture, or (2) we were unable to add to that body of knowledge. One 
approach suggested in the literature for extending our knowledge of corporate capital 
structure theory, is to investigate of the determinants of financial leverage in sectors that 
represent polar-cases, i.e., “extreme leverage choices” (Masulis 1988). That 
would be the case, per Masulis’ argument, of banking firms, which are recognized in the 
literature to be highly leveraged.30, 31 Other authors, (e.g., Dowd 1996), emphasize the 
usefulness of comparing financial structures of banks and non-financial firms. Dowd argues 
that the “traditional banking literature tends to overemphasize the 
difference between banks and non-financial firms, and therefore 
overlooks important similarities between them.” 
However, literature is generally rather cautious on its discussions of financial 
intermediaries’ capital structure issues. In the milieu, it is not hard to find capital structure 
                                                          
28 Webster’s New World Dictionary & Thesaurus define leverage as “to speculate in (a business 
investment) largely through the use of borrowed funds, or credit, with the 
expectation of earning substantial profits.”  
29 What Stewart Myers called the tactical level of the capital structure problem in one of his interventions at 
the “Vanderbilt University Roundtable on the Capital Structure Puzzle” (1998). 
30 Throughout this work I will use the terms “banking firm,” “bank,” “financial intermediary,” and “deposit 
institution” interchangeably. Because banking firm model prevalent in the U.S. and Portugal have 
substantive differences, both in terms of scope and scale, each is an entity that “(1) accept[s] deposits 
that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand and (2) engages in the 
business of making loans” (from the 1970 Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956). 
31 According to Flannery (1994a, 320) U.S. banks’ equity capital equaled 6.5 percent of total assets at year-
end 1990. For U.S. non-financial firms, that ratio was 55 percent, at the same point in time. These results are 
consistent with Lewis’ (1991) report that “non-financial enterprises which for the USA and 
UK typically have ratios of equity capital to assets around 50 per cent, banks … 
are remarkably highly leveraged”. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue in the same direction in 
attempting to explain “why regulated industries such as public utilities or banks will 
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theory papers including cautionary reminders about the non-financial nature of its object. 
Usually, two main justifications are offered for the inclusion of such remainders. The first, 
is rooted in the notion that banks are regulated entities managed “under significant 
regulatory constraints on book capital that may restrict their 
capacity to change leverage” Damodaran (1999, 280). The second, is based on 
the separation between financing and operational/marketing decisions, which is 
contentious and raises measurement problems in the estimation of a banking firm’s balance 
sheet’s debt-financing.32  
Miller (1995), asked the question “Do the M&M Propositions Apply to 
Banks?” Other observers of the North American banking scene,33 like Orgler and Taggart 
(1983), have suggested that corporate capital structure theory  generally associated with 
non-financial companies  could be “a useful framework for analyzing bank 
capital structure.” Thus, it is clear that there is still no agreement about whether 
capital structure theory is an appropriate theoretical foundation to rationalize the strategic 
financing behavior of banking firms’. 
Another crucial issue underlies the scientific examination of the determinants of 
banks’ capital structure decisions: the organizational model of the banking firm. The 
boundaries and the organization of bank’s activities, and its institutional framework are 
decisive forces that  whatever perspective we may espouse regarding the theory of the 
firm  require careful examination in order to develop of a theoretical construct that could 
support an empirical investigation. This means finding an answer to the question: what 
banking firm model is most appropriate to conceptualize, characterize, describe and predict 
its capital structure decisions? 
According to Sharpe (1995, 97) both theoretical and empirical literature has shown 
“considerable interest in … the determinants of capital structure 
of US banks.” Several articles, among them, Peltzman (1970), Mayne (1972) and 
                                                          
have higher debt equity ratios for equivalent levels of risk than the average 
nonregulated firm.” 
32 Rajan and Zingales (1995) explain the elimination of financial intermediaries from their sample arguing 
that “their leverage is strongly influenced by explicit (or implicit) investor 
insurance schemes such as deposit insurance. Furthermore, their debt-like 
liabilities are not strictly comparable to the debt issued by non-financial 
firms. Finally, regulations such as minimum capital requirements may directly 
affect capital structure.” 
33 See, Dietrich and James (1983), Santomero (1984), Chen and Mazumdar (1994), Wall and Peterson 
(1996). 
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Mingo (1975), looked at the financing structure problem of banks but focus primarily on 
the effects of regulation and supervision activity on capital adequacy requirements.  
Other investigations that look into the problem of banking firm capital structure 
include, among others, Orgler and Taggart (1983), Wall and Peterson (1987, 1988), Wall 
and Peterson (1991, 1996) Flannery (1994), Osterberg and Thomson (1996). However, the 
focus of these studies is not the investigation of banks’ discretionary capital structure 
choice.34 On this perspective Marcus (1983), Arshadi (1989), Cornett and Tehranian 
(1994), Sharpe (1995), Cornett, Mehran and Tehranian (1996, 1997), and Hasan (1997) are 
among the mainstream of the relevant literature.35  
The majority of studies in this area of the banking literature are based on data from 
U.S. banking firms. One exception is Sharpe’s (1995) examination of the determinants of 
capital structure of Australian trading banks.  
Despite these significant research efforts “The bank capital structure 
debate” to use the words of Chen and Mazumdar (1994, 284) “remains 
unresolved.”  
From this preliminary and necessarily contained literature examination, we 
conclude that the problem of banks’ capital structure decision is a promising topic for 
further scientific inquiry. It offers an opportunity to formulate interesting research 
questions about the capacity of corporate capital structure theory to explain and predict the 
strategic financing decisions of banking firms. 
1.4. MOTIVATION, PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE INVESTIGATION 
The object of this research is the study of the determinants of capital structure 
decisions by Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of Portuguese bank during the decade 1989-
1998. Building on previous theoretical and empirical literature, a conceptual framework is 
developed to identify and explain the motivations of capital structure decisions by those 
executives. To empirically test the ability of current capital structure models in explaining 
the Portuguese banks long-term financing behavior during the 1989-1998 period, CEOs of 
chartered Portuguese banks operating were surveyed. 
Because the surveyed CEOs run firms that are regulated entities, namely in terms of 
their capital bases, their capital structures decisions are variously voluntary and 
                                                          
34 Banks may be compelled to take (involuntary) capital structure decisions in order to comply with 
mandatory capital adequacy requirements. 
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involuntary.36, 37 The former takes the form of the standard security offerings. The latter 
type is determined by regulatory constraints that aim to eliminate any gap between a 
bank’s capital condition and the prevailing capital adequacy requirements.38 Although the 
importance of involuntary capital structure decisions is recognized, we confine our 
investigation to the voluntary capital structure decisions made by Portuguese banks’ CEOs. 
The importance of empirically testing corporate capital structure hypotheses in a 
specific geographical setting seems logical as a means to extend their explanatory and 
predictive power. That is the purpose of this research. We focus on a different 
geographical reality while at the same time empirically analyzing the determinants of 
Portuguese banks’ financial leverage. 
As shown in an interesting paper by Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997) banks in North 
America, United Kingdom and Japan are arguably different from their counterparts 
established in continental Europe, in a number of important of dimensions. The most 
significant differences relate to banking market structures, the scope of lawful banking 
activities, regulatory structure, deposit insurance schemes, and supervisory practices. 
Many of these differences surface in any comparison of the U.S. and Portuguese banking 
systems. First and foremost, the market structures are different. In Portugal there is a much 
smaller number of banking market participants. Secondly, the process of liberalization and 
deregulation of the Portuguese financial system39 only gained momentum in the late 1980s 
in the aftermath of joining the (at the time) European Economic Community in 1986. 
Thirdly, in Portugal, the universal bank model is the prevailing form of banking firm 
organization in contrast with the bifurcated model that has prevailed in the U.S., at least 
                                                          
35 A discussion of this literature is included in Chapter 3. 
36 The rationale for the regulation of banking firms is related, typically, to the negative externalities 
associated to failures of banks in performing their crucial role as providers of liquidity to the economy and in 
administering the payment system. See Chapter 3 for a discussion in greater depth. 
37 See, among others, Cornett and Tehranian (1994) for evidence on US commercial banks wealth effects of 
voluntary and involuntary issuances of external equity. 
38 Mota (1994) analyzes descriptively the impact of capital adequacy regulatory framework on the 
Portuguese banking system. 
39 The Portuguese banking industry experienced dramatic structural change in the past 20 years. Following 
April 1974 political revolution, all Portuguese private banks were nationalized in 1975. New entries to the 
industry were severely restricted, and the management of banks and banking activity was heavily regulated. 
In the second half of the 1980s, and coinciding with the integration in the European Economic Community, a 
period of economic liberalization began to unfold, and the banking industry was reopened to the private 
investors. In 1989, a process of reprivatization was initiated. Financial markets that had been closed since the 
1974 revolution were revamped and reopened in a new regulatory and operational framework. 
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until very recently.40 Fourthly, banking activities of UE members are not bound by 
geographical restrictions.41 Finally, the features of the Portuguese regulatory environment 
are different from those of the United States (e.g., deposit insurance rules).  
The time frame under observation in this study, 1989-1998, represents additional 
challenges for research, because of the important events that unfolded, at both the firm and 
macro levels, during that decade. At the firm level, privatizations, hostile takeovers, 
mergers, others forms of restructuring, and internationalization, were among the 
phenomena that emerged in Portuguese banking. At the macro level, the consequences of 
global deregulatory trends were coupled with a process of compulsory restructuring 
dictated by the integration into the European community.   
1.5. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH METHODS ISSUES  
The amplitude of the debate and the magnitude of the disagreement over 
methodological issues involved in economic research has also permeated the emerging 
literature on corporate finance in general, and capital structure, in particular. One of the 
central issues of this problem is related to the fact that investigation of finance questions 
cannot follow the traditional scientific method since submitting hypotheses to repeated 
testing under strict control conditions is not feasible. Hence, if the context of the research 
problem cannot be experimentally replicated we must attempt to model it based on its 
idiosyncrasies.42 This creates a number of concerns. The first concern relates to the ability 
of generalizing results from empirical research when such results were obtained using data, 
predominantly, from one geographical area. The second concern is associated with the 
dominant methodological paradigm in corporate finance empirical research. 
 It is generally agreed that theoretical models of capital structure incorporate a 
“large number of potential determinants of capital structure” 
(Harris and Raviv 1991).  However, we must recognize that the empirical evidence has not 
                                                          
40 Boyd, Chang, and Smith (1997) suggest that under the universal banking model “banks can make 
equity investments as well as loans, vote their equity shares, and even hold 
seats on the boards of directors of non-financial firms. In general, they can be 
actively involved in all aspects of firm decision-making.” 
41 In the United States, passage of Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 restricted investment-banking activities to 
commercial banks. Also geographical restrictions, both at intrastate and interstate level, were in place. The 
former, constraining the ability of banks to branch within the state, was gradually but cautiously liberalized 
(Saunders 2000). Nevertheless, in 1995, nine U.S. states still had this type of restrictive branching regulation 
(Ibid.). Interstate restrictions were enforced through the McFadden Act of 1927 and its amendments. For a 
discussion of geographical restrictions see, among others, Saunders ( Ibid.). 
42 See Chapter 5 for a broader examination of methodological issues in this framework. 
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yet validated their contextual relevance, and it is often a source of contradictory43 results.44 
The method of scientific inquiry in corporate finance has also been a source of concern.45 
Some authors point out that few investigations take into account the behavioral features of 
managerial decision-making.46 This may be viewed as a limitation in reflecting salient 
feature of agents’ observed behaviors in model structures.47  Since it is widely accepted 
that financial economics is concerned with the behavior of agents’ in allocating resources 
(e.g., Fama and Miller 1972), it is arguable that empirical research designs should 
incorporate this aspect. This suggests a greater emphasis on the use of field-based 
methodologies in corporate finance investigations.48 The aforementioned arguments were 
instrumental in shaping the research design of this investigation.  
1.5.1. Research Design 
Given the empirical setting of Portuguese banks, we decided that a survey-based 
research was an appropriate method to collect data for this investigation, and represented 
an uncommon opportunity to convey, understand and rationalize the managerial 
perspective of actual banks capital structure decision-makers. To that end we designed our 
survey aiming at mitigating some of potential debilities associated with this specific 
research method in order to enhance the significance of our results and findings. We 
conducted the survey via person-to-person interviews (supported by a detailed 
questionnaire) with the aim of achieving a high response rate and thus minimizing non-
response bias. This survey design also contributed to eliminate the potential for response-
                                                          
43 Opler and Titman (1996) give an example: “in dynamic models like Fischer, Heinkel and 
Zechner (1989), a firm issues equity after its share price declines and 
repurchases equity after its share prices increase to adjust towards an optimal 
capital structure. […] existing research indicates that firms actually do the 
opposite.”  
44 Frankfurter and Philippatos (1992) argue that the “weak correspondence to facts” is a non-trivial 
problem of corporate finance theory. Different factors, such as, identification problems, measurement 
problems, and model mispecification problems are often identified as potential contributors to this problem 
(see chapter 5 for further details). 
45 See, among others, Frankfurter and Philipattos (1992), and Frankfurter and McGoun (1996). 
46 See, e.g., Simon (1997). Chapter 5 gives a closer look into this question. 
47 A standard example relates to the difficulty in specifying (problem-free) empirical tests having the ability 
to account the influence of behavioral factors such as divergences in stakeholders’ objective functions or 
opportunistic behavior due to differentially informed parties. 
48 Interestingly, two of the most enduring and influential contributions to corporate finance theory, John 
Lintner (1956) and Gordon Donaldson (1961) hypotheses on dividend and financing corporate policies, 
respectively, were both obtained in field-based investigations. 
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bias.49 The target population of the survey was defined as the CEOs of all the banks 
incorporated as autonomous entities under the Portuguese law that were in office during 
the period 1989 to 1998 for, at least, two consecutive years.50 Because we were surveying 
the whole population we can presume that sampling bias is not a problem. 
The use of field-based research methods in this area was recently advocated in a 
conference organized by the Harvard Business School and sponsored by the Journal of 
Financial Economics.51 The author anticipates that information collected directly from 
bank CEOs may provide an important opportunity to understand the perspective of 
decision-makers in determining bank capital structure. 
1.6. OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION 
The main objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the capital structure 
theory. It also aims to extend the literature review, incorporating more recent contributions, 
particularly, empirical findings from non-U.S. locations. Empirical testing of capital 
structure hypotheses in an uncommon corporate and geographic setting, and using a 
survey-based method, can improve our understanding about of the explanatory and 
predictive power of existing hypotheses. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge no other research study has attempted to exam 
capital structure decisions in the banking field using a similar research design. Also 
research on capital structure and banks strategic financing in Portugal is very scarce. 
A better understanding of the determinants of banks’ capital structure would be 
helpful for future developments in a (comprehensive) banking firm capital structure theory. 
Moreover, it can offer an opportunity for banks’ stakeholders  investors, customers, 
regulators, managers, policy-makers  as well as academics and practitioners to better 
understand the thinking behind banks’ strategic financing behavior. Lastly, the author’s 
expectation is that this study increases the awareness of the importance of capital structure 
decisions, and stimulates future research and debate at academic, industry, and policy-
making levels.  
The study itself is organized as follows. Chapter 1 has offered an introduction to the 
                                                          
49 The anomaly arising from having someone not belonging to the target population filling out the 
questionnaire. 
50 The CEO population was identified through an examination of banks’ annual reports. 
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problem of capital structure decision and has framed it in current mainstream of theoretical 
and empirical literature. It also identifies the motivation of the research, gives a brief 
discussion of some methodological concerns, and presents the rationale for the research 
design choice. The objectives of the study, as well as its contributions, and the structure of 
the dissertation close the chapter. Chapter 2 presents a discussion of corporate capital 
structure theory. A review of relevant findings of empirical literature in the field, including 
evidence from non-U.S. firms and results from survey-based papers on capital structure 
research is appended to this chapter. Chapter 3 discusses the theory of banking firm capital 
structure. This discussion creates the foundations for formulating the hypotheses included 
in the survey questionnaire. Chapter 4 describes briefly the Portuguese banking system and 
provides analysis of 1998 performance of a sample of 43 banks operating in Portugal. 
Chapter 5 discusses some methodological problems related to corporate finance empirical 
research. It also addresses the research design, survey development, administration 
underlying the author’s investigation. Finally, it presents the theoretical model used to 
develop the questionnaire, the data and the findings of the investigation. Chapter 6 presents 
a summary and final conclusions as well as suggestions for future research. ■ 
51 Conference on “Complementary Research Methodologies: The Interplay of Theoretical, Empirical and 
Field-Based Research in Finance” held at the Harvard Business School on July 8-9, 1999. See Chapter 5 for 
further details. 
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For a long time after the publication of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) classic 
paper there was a dearth of coherent explanations of the firm’s choice of capital 
structure; there is an abundance of alternative theories today. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to discuss of the central building blocks that 
shape capital structure theory. Here the discussion of theoretical and empirical literatures is 
treated separately.  
Because the literature on capital structure is remarkably broad, an exhaustive 
review is beyond the scope of this work and will not be attempted.52 Instead we build on 
previous research, review the more influential theoretical papers and attempt to interweave 
them in a manner that produces a coherent picture of the capital structure theory as it 
stands today. We will also highlight major unresolved questions.53 
Finally, this examination of the literature concentrate on the choice between debt 
and equity financing ignoring, for the sake of parsimony, the possibility of issuing hybrid-
financing instruments. 
This chapter has fourteen sections. The first looks into some of the relationships 
between financing activity and the theory of the firm. The second section gives a 
perspective on the theory of finance and firm financing behavior. Section three examines 
the capital structure decision problem in a “perfect markets” setting, and makes a 
“digression” on the capital structure irrelevance controversy.  Section four outlines the 
implications of relaxing the taxless economy and riskless debt assumptions. The impact of 
                                                 
52 For enlightening surveys of both theoretical and empirical corporate literatures on capital structure, see 
among others, Myers (1977), Masulis (1988), Copeland and Weston (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), and 
Megginson (1997). Cools (1993) reviews empirical literature until the beginnings of the 1990s. Among them, 
Masulis and Harris and Raviv’s analyses are, most probably, the more acclaimed. Albeit their 
comprehensiveness neither of them is a complete survey of the literature. The former is naturally somewhat 
dated concerning empirical literature and theoretical contributions. In what the latter is concerned, its authors 
(arguing with their noncompetitive advantage) explicitly and “[a]rbitrarily exclude [from their 
review] theories based primarily on tax considerations” as a major determinant of capital 
structure choice. 
53 The literature that relates to the issues of banking firms’ capital structure is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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the agency conflicts and differential information on the capital structure decision comes 
next. Finally, we examine the influence of corporate governance and product-market 
considerations on the debt/equity choice problem. This sequence of topics has two 
purposes: (1) to “isolate” the impact of each determinant of the capital structure equation; 
and (2) to show the interaction of different determinants and the need of an integrative 
approach. In Appendix 2.1 we included a table containing a summary of a number of 
empirical studies to substantiate both the explanatory and the predictive relevance of this 
discussion of the firm’s  capital structure theory. 
2.2. FINANCING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Physical capital  both productive and managerial resources  is pivotal for the 
fulfillment of the productive function of the firm. To acquire this essential capital, 
however, the firm must devise effective ways of attracting financial capital it needs to fund 
the real assets required by its investment opportunities and current operating requirements 
(e.g., Arrow 1974).54 
Unfortunately, as suggested by Jensen (1983), this (neoclassical) theoretical 
perspective of the firm55 “is not a positive theory of the firm, but 
rather a theory of markets” and therefore it is of little help in deriving 
implications for firm financial behavior.56 
According to the neoclassical paradigm the firm is viewed as a production function 
(a black-box)57 in which “there are no ‘people’ problems or information 
problems” (Jensen 1983). In this view the neo-classical firm is portrayed as a single 
economic agent (or a unanimous group) whose actions follow specific and pre-determined 
decision-making criteria.58 Moreover, by (implicit or explicit) assumption, these agents 
                                                 
54 This model is consistent with the standard economic theory, which portrays the firm as a potential 
investment opportunity set, from which some projects are chosen. In this framework, as pointed out by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992), among others, “the questions to be studied concern which 
investments ought to be undertaken, how the funds needed to pay for the 
investments ought to be raised.” 
55 For a comprehensive review on the theory of the firm see, e.g., Holmström and Tirole (1989). 
56 According to (Jensen 1983) “research based on this model has no implications for how 
organizations are structured or how they function internally.”  
57 Gavish and Kalay (1983) provides a similar view observing that “the firm as been viewed as a 
black “black box,” namely, as one homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to 
maximize its market value.” Additionally, as pointed out by (Hart 1995) the neoclassical theory of 
the firm ignores all incentives problems within the firm. 
58 As noted by Auerbach (1992, 475) the neoclassical theory of economics “does not distinguish 
managers from owners.” 
- 17 - 
  
have free, complete and perfect information for their resource allocation decisions. 
However, the way neoclassical theory rationalizes the firm fails to account for important 
aspects of real world economic behavior by firms.59 Hart (1995) identifies three main 
weaknesses of the neoclassical paradigm these relate to: (1) its unawareness of the firm’s 
(endogenous) incentive problems; (2) its “silence” about organizational issues;60 and (3) 
the absence of a convincing explanation for firm boundaries.61 This suggests that we need 
a more robust theoretical framework, one that helps us to explain the financial behavior of 
actual real-world firms. 
An alternative paradigm for that purpose is the so-called contractual theories of the 
firm. Although they differ  sometimes substantially  they all agreed on the importance 
of property rights,62 asymmetric information, and some behavioral assumptions that extend 
the usual self-interest assumption  such as ‘opportunism’ or ‘moral hazard’. Absence of 
such notions renders worthless potential explanations of why there should be firms in a 
market economy. In fact, the combined notions of property rights (and therefore 
incentives), asymmetric information and extended self-interest are recognized as necessary 
to rationalize the existence of firms in a market economy. 
Economic conceptualization of the firm as a nexus-of-contracts is an insightful 
approach pioneered by Coase (1937) and more recently suggested by Alchien and Demsetz 
(1972).63 This nexus-of-contracts view of the firm has received so widespread support 
                                                 
59 We may look at a firm from a broad range of theoretical perspectives, such as: an investment vehicle, a 
production function, a nexus of contracts, a trade-off between the costs of transacting and the costs of 
contracting (a choice between market and hierarchy), agency theory, incomplete contract approach and 
probably an handful more (e.g., Williamson 1985, Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Holmström 1982, and 
Grossman and Hart 1986). Besides their disagreements, these theories share a common contractual base, and 
an emphasis on the importance of property rights, asymmetric information, and some behavioral assumption 
that extends the usual self-interest assumption (such as ‘opportunism’ or ‘moral hazard’). Interweaving the 
notions of property rights (and therefore incentives), asymmetric information and extended self-interest is 
crucial for explaining why there are firms in a market economy. 
60 Arguing in the same direction, Jensen (1983) contends that because in the neoclassical model of the firm 
“there are no ‘people’ problems or information problems, […] as a result the 
research based on this model has no implications for how organizations are 
structured or how they function internally.” 
61 For a similar point of view see, among others, Salanié (1997, 1) who argues that “strategic 
interactions between agents indeed are heavily constrained in that [general 
equilibrium] model.” He also contends that “the very existence of firms is difficult to 
justify in the context of general equilibrium models, since all interactions take 
place through the price system in these models.” 
62 See, e.g. Hart (1995 for an excellent discussion of the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. 
Furubotn and Pejovich provide a synoptic although somewhat dated survey of this literature. 
63 In Webster’s New World Dictionary & Thesaurus nexus is “a connection, tie, or link between 
individuals of a group, members of a series, etc.” 
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(e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Jensen and Smith 1985; and Jensen and Meckling 1976), 
that Allen and Winston (1995) claim that it is the dominant paradigm in modern corporate 
finance. In their meticulous examination of Coase’s argument, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
fully develop the concept that a firm is a “legal entity that serves as a nexus 
for a complex set of contracts (written and unwritten) among 
disparate individuals.”64 The conceptual foundation of this theory, a corporation, 
is a legal entity embodying a network of a far-reaching and complex set of (explicit and 
implicit) contracts among disparate stakeholders.65 The notion that firms are legal fictions66 
characterized by a system of bilateral contracts is increasingly well established in 
economics.67 The ability to enter contracts (as well as reforming, redesigning, and 
abandoning the organization by rearranging contractual terms) is critical to one of the 
major approaches to the economic analysis of organizations. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
are particularly emphatic about this “essential contractual nature of firms.” 
Thus, in terms of the economic theory of the firm most scholars now recognize the 
pivotal role of the intricate and massive web of contractual commitments that firms enter 
into, and the role that these commitments perform in the co-ordination of individual 
economic and productive inter-relationships. 
This contracting approach to organization theory emphasizes the voluntary nature 
of people’s involvement in (most) organizations, and assumes that markets and hierarchies 
are just two extreme forms of organizational contracting.68  
  Ownership is one fundamental element of the network of contractual relationships 
that nurtures the concept of firm.69 Economists, in their analyses of firm ownership70 have, 
                                                 
64 See Williamson (1990) for a general discussion. 
65 A similar view is supported by Zingales (1998) for whom “the corporation, in principle, is 
just an empty legal shell” (emphasis mine). In the same direction Milgrom and Roberts (1992) 
claim that “[o]ne theory views the firm as a legal fiction — a contracting entity 
that serves to economize on the number of bilateral contracts that are needed to 
coordinate activity.”  
66 Jensen and Meckling (1976) conceptualize legal fiction as “[…] the artificial construct under 
the law which allows certain organizations to be treated as individuals.” In the 
same vein, Williamson (1990) arguing that the notion is “somewhat broader,” offers the view of a firm 
as a nexus of treaties. John and Senbet (1997) propose a network of contracts. 
67 This notion is also shared by Blair (1995) who asserts that “corporations are legal devices for 
assembling and organizing capital, labor, and other resources to produce and sell 
goods and services.” 
68 Market-oriented organizations are characterized by voluntary bargaining, while hierarchy–based 
organizations are characterized by strict lines of authority. 
69 A manifestation of the importance of ownership, as argued by Stiglitz (1989) “is that the market 
puts a value on control.  In some instances there are two kinds of shares that 
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typically, focused their attention on two key issues: (1) the allocation of residual rights of 
control71 and (2) the appropriation of residual returns (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1992; 
Hansmann 1988). One reason for this particular emphasis may be related to the argument 
put forward by Hart (1995), who suggests that ownership provides more power72 in an 
economic relationship since it grants all residual rights of control. 
Moreover, and as explained in Jensen and Meckling (1976), it is the 
“specification of individual rights [that] determines how costs and 
rewards will be allocated among participants in any organization.” 
However, and because that very specification is shaped  either implicitly or explicitly  
in a contractual arrangement, the “individual behavior in organizations, 
including the behavior of managers, will depend upon the nature of 
these contracts” (ib.). 
If ownership can be associated with holding residual control, then its importance 
must derive from the difficulty of writing contracts that, ex ante and comprehensively, 
stipulate all these control rights, as well as payoffs and penalties for each contracting 
party.73 In this environment, and further assuming that it is both inexpensive and effortless 
                                                 
are identical in their claims on the profits of the firm, but one of which is 
nonvoting (or has fewer voting rights).  These shares often sell at a large 
differential.” 
70 Hart and Moore (1990) and Grossman and Hart (1986) have provided some important contributions  
generally known as the property rights paradigm. Their view of the nature of a firm’s ownership is 
consubstantiated by the right residual control rights owners have over the use of the firm’s non-human assets. 
In this approach, ownership is synonymous with control. Contrastingly, Berle and Means (1932) implicitly 
define ownership as claims on residual cash flows. In Grossman-Hart-Moore’s approach shareholders are the 
“owners” because they have the voting power to determine how assets are deployed, whereas for Berle and 
Means shareholders are the “owners” because they have the rights to residual cash flows. 
71 That is having the right to make any decisions concerning the asset’s use that are not explicitly controlled 
by law or contractually assigned to another part (see, among others, Grossman and Hart (1986). 
72 Because of ownership rights’ diffuseness a significant amount of both power and rents is concentrated at 
the top of the organizational hierarchy of the firm (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Berle and Means (1932) 
conceptualize owning and controlling a firm as an expressive array of highly specialized non-human assets. 
Thus, ownership of unique non-human assets is, perhaps, the primary source of power in the corporation. 
However, in market economies, ownership is offered legal protection in the sense that the owner also is given 
the right to specify how the asset should be used in situations not covered by voluntary contracts. “This 
may seem inconsistent, […] with the view that power should refer to the rights of 
control over resources that are not specified in voluntary contracts. The 
apparent inconsistency is resolved when we recognize that contracts are typically 
incomplete, and do not specify rights and duties in all contingencies. The law, 
however, through some legal mechanisms, offers parties control rights in 
eventualities that are not covered through contract” Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
 
73 A plausible explanation for this inefficiency, not usually accounted in the literature, relates to the bounded 
rationality faced by economic agents in their decision-making. Williamson (1990) supports this view arguing 
that “[g]iven bounded rationality, all complex contracts are unavoidably 
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to write and enforce a complete contract,74 then there would be no unforeseen 
contingencies. Therefore, no eventualities (for which plans had not been prepared) would 
occur unexpectedly. Likewise, no unpredicted adverse outcomes would ever happen, and 
no difficulties would arise in ensuring that the contracted actions (and distribution of 
income) would materialize. In this particular set of circumstances, residual rights would be 
totally meaningless. In addition, because no rights would be left unspecified, everything 
would become residual. 
However, if the contracting parties could costlessly write a non-renegotiable 
contract contingent upon all possible states of the world and enforceable, for instance, in a 
court of law,75 then the allocation of power in such contractual relationship would be a 
matter of irrelevancy. As a matter of fact, if every contingency could be anticipated and 
unambiguously contracted in advance and fully enforced through the legal system, then 
there would be little room for the exercise of power. In such a world all relevant decisions 
would be made ex ante, and the allocation of power would have distributional 
consequences but no efficiency consequences.  
But, as asserted by Williamson (1990), writing ex ante all-inclusive voluntary 
contracts did not prove to be an effective governing mechanism for economic relationships 
between parties whose transactions were contingent on some future state of the nature. 
Thus, the acknowledgement of this ineffectiveness may be at the origin of the 
considerable effort made to develop an incomplete contract theory over the past ten to 
fifteen years.76  
One of the distinctive features of incomplete contracts is the intrinsically embedded 
uncertainty inherent to their very nature. This feature, being a source of serious concerns 
regarding the opportunistic behavior of parties (Bolton and Scharfstein 1998), represents a 
promising analytical tool for framing the financial contracting behavior of firms. Among 
                                                 
incomplete.” As a consequence bounded rationality is the “operative behavioural assumption 
out of which the economics of contracting increasingly works” (ib.). 
74 One that specifies what everyone is to do in every relevant eventuality at every future date and how the 
resulting income in each such event should be divided. Thus, an arrangement with the ability to explicit 
procedures governing the behavior of contract participants in determining outcomes as well as the allocations 
resulting from those outcomes. 
75 Renegotiation would be superfluous any way. 
76 Although its development it is a contemporary endeavor, according to Hart (1988) the “insight that 
the firm as an institution takes on importance only in a world of incomplete 
contracts” has to be credited to Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. Hart and Moore (1998) and Bolton 
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other types of effects, incomplete contracts allow for ex-post opportunism in situations 
characterized by asset specificity. Furthermore, they raise the possibility of hold-up 
problems when there are relationship-specific investments (Bolton and Scharfstein 1998; 
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978).77 
2.3. AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACT VIEW OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PROBLEM 
The theory of capital structure is concerned with why financial contracts appear in 
certain patterns and why these patterns differ across industries and across countries (Hart 
1987). According to the traditional property rights school, capital structure is not a matter 
of indifference.78 Financial instruments in its view confer residual rights of control in 
addition to rights to share the economic rents.79 Thus, its primary concern has been the 
identification of ownership and control rights and the effects on economic efficiency when 
these two types of rights are separated. However, the property rights school has little to say 
about debt and the relative importance of debt and equity, since ownership rights are, by 
definition, vested in the owners of the firm and no distinction is made between control in 
different states of world. 
As seen earlier, the property rights school recognizes that shares of corporate stock 
confer rights to both return streams and control. The incomplete contracting perspective, 
differently, emphasizes the state-contingent nature of control rights (i.e., contractual 
stipulations make the allocation of control dependent on a future state of the world). The 
foundation here is that contracts are necessarily incomplete, in that they do not stipulate the 
parties’ obligations for every conceivable eventuality. Incompleteness gives rise to the 
problem of how to allocate control in situations not covered by the initial contract, the so-
                                                 
and Scharfstein (1998) proclaim similar viewpoints. For comprehensive and rigorous account of the state of 
the art in incomplete contracts theory, see Tirole (1999), and Hart and Moore (1999). 
77 The hold-up problem was firstly explained by Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1975, 
1977 and 1979). These authors emphasized the importance of asset specificity and contracting costs on 
ownership and business relationships, arguing that relationship-specific assets create the potential for 
“holdup” costs between the firms involved in the relationship. Hart and Moore (1988) hypothesized that the 
hold-up problem will lead to underinvestment. For a hold-up to occur two conditions are necessary, 
”[f]irst, parties to a future transaction must make non-contractible specific 
investments prior to the transaction in order to prepare for it. Second, the 
exact form of the optimal transaction (e.g., how many units if any, what quality 
level, the time of delivery) cannot be specified with certainty ex ante” (Rogerson 
1992). 
78 For a rigorous, elegant, and illuminating analysis of this topic, see Hart (1995). 
79 Financial contracts returns’ allocation is endogenously contingent on investment policy and operating 
decision-making. Also Harris and Raviv (1992) observe that financial contract designing encompasses both 
the “assignment of control rights as well as the allocation of cash flow.” 
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called residual control rights. Indeed, control is void of meaning if all future actions and 
states can be specified ex ante.  
Financial contracts are defined in the incomplete contract literature in terms of how 
they allocate residual control rights. Applying this theoretical framework to capital 
structure decisions of firms provides both a descriptive model and an analytical tool, with 
the potential to generate a number of interesting research hypotheses. 
The standard financial instruments, debt and equity, are viewed through the 
incomplete contract “lens” as conferring rights to both control over managerial decision-
making and cash flow streams. Thus, looking at the firm’s capital structure decisions in an 
incomplete contract approach provides insightful views into the underlying corporate 
governance framework, which is essential for consistent allocation of residual control and 
claims. According to Berglöf (1990) “a firm’s capital structure can be 
viewed as describing the allocation of risk and control among 
investors.” Lastly, Garvey and Hanka (1999) suggest that “corporate managers 
have discretion over capital structure choices, as the firm’s 
founding shareholders cannot write a comprehensive ex ante 
contract specifying all future financing decisions.” 
Another weakness of the traditional neo-classical paradigm relates to the role 
ascribed to investment in a firm’s securities, which are viewed as pure financial assets 
void of any underlying power of economic decision which, autrement dit, is not regarded 
as an economic good. This view is supported by Milgrom and Roberts (1992) who contend 
that “the classical theory regards financial securities as claims on 
streams of net receipts whose magnitude and variability are 
exogenously given.” Berglöf (1990) is another example of the wide support provided 
to this criticism of the neo-classical paradigm: “in modern finance literature à 
la Modigliani and Miller (1958) […] financial instruments only 
entitle their holders to return streams.” 
However, if we want to build a corporate financing framework with the ability to explain 
financing behavior of actual firms, we do have to incorporate the notion that an equity 
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instrument grants property rights over the actions of corporate governance of the firm, and 
establishes a mechanism for the transfer of corporate control (Cobbaut 1994).80 
2.4. FINANCING IN THE CONTEXT OF CORPORATE FINANCE THEORY  
Firms have been making financing decisions for a long time, and financial 
economists have shown a great deal of interest in understanding the supply and the demand 
of the array of financing instruments issued by firms.81 
The sources of financial capital required to fund the acquisition of risky assets 
needed to implement competitive and operational firm strategies are both internal and 
external. The former depends on the firm’s ability to generate cash flows and the rate at 
which it retains it, and therefore reflects the firm’s dividend payout policy.82 The latter 
(external financing) is provided by investors who acquire equity and debt securities83 
through the capital markets and financial intermediaries84 receiving, in return, residual 
claims on future cash flows streams, and management control rights.85 Thus, issuing 
securities is, simultaneously, a source of capital and a process for exchanging the economic 
agents’ different profiles of (intertemporal) consumption and investment, determining (as a 
by-product) securities’ aggregate demand and supply. 
Equityholders86 receive shares of stock in exchange for their financial investment 
on the firm. As previously noted, these securities (within a limited liability environment)87 
                                                 
80 Those rights tend to be residual because the actions its holders may actually undertake are constrained, 
among other things, by the law, and other parties’ rights. 
81 As noted by Auerbach (1992, 574), firms are making capital structure choices “dating back to the 
industrial revolution.” Moreover, one of its most prominent characterizing factors  the (implicit) 
risk / return trade-off  was recognized by Adam Smith as early as in 1776 (Ibid.). 
82 Technically, internal equity financing, which is obviously provided by existing shareholders) is retained 
earnings. As Modigliani and Miller (1958, 266) observe, “as long as management is presumed to 
be acting in the best interests of the stockholders, retained earnings can be 
regarded as equivalent to a fully subscribed, pre-emptive issue of common stock.” 
The preference, suggested by some authors (e.g. Myers 1984), for its prior exhaustion as a financing source, 
is rooted on an opportunity cost advantage over common stock issues derived from lower transactional and 
informational costs. 
83 Throughout this dissertation we use the terms security, financing instrument, and financial asset 
interchangeably. 
84 Actually, firms issue hybrid securities also with both features of debt and equity financial instruments. 
Thus, in addition to these two basic categories of claimants, there are others such as holders of convertible 
debentures, leases, preferred stock, nonvoting stock, and warrants. 
85 As pointed out by Jensen and Smith (1985, 98) “[t]he risks of residual claims are 
restricted only by limited-liability provisions, but even these provisions are 
not universal.” 
86 Throughout this dissertation we refer to shareholders, stockholders, and equityholders as synonymous. The 
same applies bondholders, debtholders, and creditors. 
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entitle them to both a residual claim on the firm’s cash flow and the ultimate control over 
its assets, if the firm does not default and after all creditors are fully paid.88 Debtholders, in 
their turn, are contractually promised a specified return in non-default states, and a 
preemptive (risky) claim against the firm’s assets in default states determined by the 
indentured provisions. Equityholders retain control of investment decision, while 
debtholders have no direct control except insofar as equityholder decisions are constrained 
by bond indenture provisions.89 
In summary, financing a business firm may be viewed as a continuous process of 
contracting security issues, which are distinct in a number of ways. Among them, 
contractual arrangements related to investors’ returns, control rights, and ease of claim 
transferability. Thus, differences among corporate securities are of paramount importance 
as they embody property and corporate control rights. 
2.5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORY 
Prior to the seminal contribution of Modigliani and Miller (1958),90 the mainstream 
literature on corporate capital structure was built “in large part on ad hoc 
theories and institutional detail” (Smith 1984), and was “largely 
institutionally oriented and a descriptive (in its broadest sense) 
subject” (Ryan, Scarpes, and Theobald 1992). Financial economists vacillated 
between several different approaches to valuation:91 the net income approach (NI), the net 
operating income (NOI) approach, and the so-called classical (or traditional) approach.92,93 
                                                 
87 Limited liability is recognized as a distinguishing feature of corporate law, which is in its very nature a 
contractual device. For an extensive discussion of the limited liability mechanisms see, among others, 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1991). 
88 As accurately emphasized by Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) “[t]he distinctive aspect of the 
publicly held corporation  delegation of management to a diverse group of 
agents and risk bearing by those who contribute capital  depend on an 
institution like limited liability.” 
89 According to modern economic theory, in a loan, the lender acquires a contingent claim, a promise by the 
borrower to pay an amount that can depend in any arbitrary, prespecified way on future events (Lacker 
1991). In a debt contract, the payment is generally non-contingent in that the amount does not vary with 
future circumstances, such as the borrower’s wealth. Of course a debt contract is contingent to the extent that 
the lender does not receive full repayment if the borrower defaults. Default is then of crucial importance for 
this type of financing arrangement (ib.). 
90 From now on I will use indistinctly throughout the dissertation, “Modigliani and Miller”, and “M-M”. 
91 What Karl Popper (1983) qualified as ad hoc theories. 
92 For the ‘Net Income’ model and the ‘Net Operating Income’ model see, e.g., Williamson (1982), or David 
Durand, “Cost of Debt and Equity for Business: Trends and Problems of Measurement,” Conference on 
Research on Business Finance; New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952 (also reprinted in 
Archer and D’ Ambrosio 1967).  
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These traditional paradigms of corporate capital structure, were anchored on common sense 
arguments about the dividend capitalization rate, as a function of financial leverage 
(Cobbaut 1993). All predicted an interior optimal capital structure and a relationship 
between leverage and the value of the firm.94 
Although recognizing this starting point, we share Taggart’s (1985) view that 
“Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) analysis of corporate capital 
structure is the logical place to begin.” In their work, Franco Modigliani 
and Merton Miller made a formal proof  both logical and mathematical  that, under a 
specific set of restrictive and artificial assumptions, the capital structure decision of the 
firm was irrelevant to its market valuation. Inherent to this view was the belief that only 
decisions on the (real) asset portfolio had a determinant effect on a firm’s market value.  
To derive their celebrated theorem, Modigliani and Miller (M-M) started by 
assuming the presence of the assumptions that characterize the perfect capital market 
paradigm95 Furthermore, they assumed the investment in the firm’s assets invariant. 
                                                 
93 In a world with a taxless economy, the ‘Net Income’ approach hypothesizes constant interest cost on debt 
and equity capitalization rate, and prescribes an all-debt optimal capital structure, point of value 
maximization. The ‘Net Operating Income’ suggests independence between value, cost of capital and capital 
structure. The ‘Classical’ model supports the existence of an optimal capital structure, which minimizes the 
cost of capital specified as a U-function. 
94 For a discussion of this perspective see, e.g., Van Horne (1998), or Williamson (1982). 
95 Conceptualizes a capital market with frictionless demand and supply. For Beaver (1989, 50) “the 
concept of perfect markets means that (1) trading of commodities and claims take 
place at zero transaction costs, (2) no firm or individual has any special 
advantage or opportunity to earn abnormal returns on its investments, and (3) 
prices are invariant to the actions of any individual or firm.” Megginson (1997) 
characterizes a perfect capital market as requiring: “(1) a large number of fully informed 
buyers and sellers, no one of whom has the power to influence market prices; (2) 
the absence of market frictions such as taxes, fees, information-acquisition or 
other transactions costs; (3) unanimity of opinion concerning the future value of 
asset prices, interest rates, and other relevant economic factors (this 
assumption is often called "homogeneous expectations"); (4) perfectly competitive 
product and factor markets that are always in equilibrium; and (5) costless and 
instantaneous market access for all potential buyers and sellers.” 
Copeland and Weston (1988, 331) require the following necessary conditions for perfect capital markets to 
hold: (1) “Markets are frictionless; i.e., there are no transaction costs or 
taxes, all assets are perfectly divisible and marketable, and there are no 
constraining regulations.” (2) “There is perfect competition in product and 
security markets. In product markets this means that all producers supply goods 
and services at minimum average price, and in security markets it means that all 
participants are price takers.” (3) “Markets are informationally efficient, i.e., 
information is costless, and it is received simultaneously by all individuals.” 
(4) “All individuals are rational expected utility maximizers.” 
In a circular fashion, Brealey and Myers (1996, 462) quote a Ezra Solomon’s comment saying, "a perfect 
capital market should be defined as one in which the Modigliani-Miller theory 
holds." 
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Besides the aforementioned (crucial) assumption of perfect capital markets,96 to obtain 
their results, M-M also made use of (riskless) arbitrage97 equilibrium conditions and of  
risk class98 and homemade leverage concepts.99, 100  
Although Modigliani and Miller derived three propositions: Proposition I (value 
proposition); Proposition II (cost of capital proposition); and Proposition III (investment 
decision proposition), the contribution recognized as the most important is Proposition I 
which states that:101  
“The market value of any firm is independent of its capital 
structure and is given by capitalizing its expected return at rate 
ρk appropriate to its class.” 
Hence, within their environmental framework, M-M conclude that the capital 
structure of the firm has no relevance for its market valuation. Furthermore, they conclude 
there is no relationship between financing and investment decisions, which implies that 
financing and investment policies are independent,102,103 and that internal and external 
financing are perfect substitutes. 
                                                 
96 Some authors, e.g., Milne (1975) and Ho and Robinson (1994), argue that there is also an implicit 
assumption of complete capital markets in the Arrow-Debreu sense. According to Beaver (1989, 50): “the 
concept on complete markets means that exist for all commodities or claims, and 
hence the market price for any commodity or claim is publicly observable.” For a 
comprehensive discussion see, among others, Flood (1995). 
97 The practice of arbitrage in the marketplace by rational investors precludes two different assets in the 
same risk class and with equal expected returns, from selling at different prices (Law of One Price). For 
Hirshleifer and Riley (1992), arbitrage represents “commitments taking advantage of momentary 
price differentials over space or time, under conditions of market 
disequilibrium.” For an authoritative discussion of the arbitrage concept in financial economics see, e.g., 
Varian (1987). 
98 If two firms belong to the same risk class then, they have similar pattern of returns across the states of 
nature and their expected risky operating cash flows should differentiate only by a scale factor. This implies a 
perfect positive correlation between the two cash flow streams.  
99 The concept of homemade leverage explains the process by which an individual replicates a firm’s 
financial leverage offsetting any particular debt-equity combination. In Modigliani and Miller (1958) is 
assumed that, both individuals and firms, debt issues face the same riskless interest rate, with no 
discrepancies between borrowing and lending rates. 
100 In Bhattacharya (1988) viewpoint, the introduction of these concepts in the analysis of capital structure 
represents “key methodological contributions” of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller. 
101 Copeland and Weston (1988), and Cobbaut (1994), among others, provide derivations of the Modigliani 
and Miller’s propositions. 
102 According to Santos (1992) and Smith (1984), this result has been anticipated by Williams (1938).  
103 Under the same conditions we may argue that firm’s real and financial decisions are independent, and 
consequently may be formulated separately. However, since the investment and operating or decisions are 
completely separable from the financing decisions, then a corollary follows the MM theorem, that corporate 
bankruptcy is inconsequential to the firm’s value. 
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Using a discrete time/discrete outcome approach104 the argument of Miller and 
Modigliani can be shown as follows: Let X(s) ≥ 0, be the state contingent cash flows of a 
firm, and let D be, for the sake of simplicity, the outstanding face value of a single debt 
contract. Let Ω be a random variable denoting the set of all possible states of the nature 
and ω one of its elements, ω ∈Ω.105 It follows that in any stateω, the payoffs for the firm’ 
equityholders can be defined as Max {X(ω) – D, 0}, and the bondholders’ payoffs as Min 
{D, X(ω)}.106 Therefore, the value of an unlevered firm (all-equity financed firm), VU, is 
the value of the firm’s equity when D = 0 can be represented by following state price 
vector: 
( ) ( )∑=
ω
ωω pXVU ,  
where p(ω) is the price of a pure security,107 which pays $1 in state ω and $0 otherwise. 
For levered firm, VL, the value its equity, VLE, is then defined as:  
( ){ }∑ −=
ω
ωω pDXVLE 0,Max ( ) , 
and the value of its debt, VLD, as: 
( ){ }∑=
ω
ωω pXDVLD ,Min ( ) . 
Because of the Value Additivity Law, we can determine the value of a levered firm, 
VL, as the sum of the value of its equity and debt, i.e. VL = VLE + VLD, or: 
( ){ } ( ){ }[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )ωω=ωω+−ω= ∑∑
ωω
pXpXDDXVL ,Min0, Max . 
Assuming an absence of arbitrage opportunities, the value of a levered firm equals 
the value of an identical but unlevered firm. This result shows that, in a taxless economy 
                                                 
104 Often denominated the time-state paradigm or the Arrow-Debreu paradigm, after the two authors who 
developed its basic characteristics. The “’time-state-preference’ framework is a generalized 
version of that used in articles by Arrow, Debreu, and Hirshleifer” (Myers 1968). 
105 “A state of the nature is a complete description of the uncertain environment 
[…]” (Huang and Litzenberger 1988). Since the payoff of a financial security will depend on the state of the 
nature, and since investors do not know what it will be at the time of the investment, their payoff is uncertain. 
106 One way of incorporating uncertainty about the conditions of future periods, alternatively to a mean-
variance framework, “is to say that one of a set of possible states of nature will 
occur at that time” (Myers 1968).  
107 Arrow and Debreu conceptualized a primitive security (a pure security, or a time-state claim) as a special 
kind of contingent contract (a contract "for delivery of goods or money contingent on the occurrence of [a] 
state of affairs) which provides one unit of money  or some notional commodity  at one date if and only 
if one of the many possible states of the world at that date obtains. A complete market is one in which all 
such claims may be purchased or sold explicitly or synthetically at stated prices. 
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with perfect capital markets, the only effect of capital structure decisions is upon the 
reallocation of cash flows among the firm’s claimants, and therefore, the value of the firm 
is unaffected. Meanwhile, total cash flows remain unchanged. 
2.6. THE CONTROVERSY OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IRRELEVANCE  
Despite its analytical elegance, rigor and scientific relevance, Modigliani and 
Miller’s irrelevancy theory was received with some criticism. The central focus of that 
criticism was the implication that “financial policy does not matter.“108 
Authors, like (e.g.) Baskin and Miranti (1997) claimed that M-M’s “underlying 
suppositions […] are expressed as rules that state how the model’s 
elements correspond to circumstances in the real world.” This 
contention may well represent the primary source of debate caused by what some authors 
viewed as an oversimplification of the model’s underlying assumptions versus the real 
world. 
The relevant question to ask is whether or not M-M’s set of assumptions are an 
accurate description of firms and markets in real world situations. Are these (so-called) 
simplifying assumptions “at such significant odds with reality that they 
invalidate the use of MM model as an abstraction from real-world 
operational behavior” (Archer and D’Ambrosio, 1972)? Several authors specifically 
addressed this question. Among them is Megginson (1997)109 who very instructively 
contrasts environmental conditions in scientific inquiry between physics and finance, 
particularly in respect to systems frictions. Merton Miller (1992) himself came forward 
(perhaps a little too late) to answer that same criticism. And he did so with unquestionable 
elegance, acknowledging that “[t]he view that capital structure is 
literally irrelevant or that “nothing matters” in corporate 
finance, though still sometimes attributed to us, is far from what 
we ever actually said about the real-world applications of our 
theoretical propositions” (emphasis in the original). And he admitted that 
“[l]ooking back now, perhaps we should have put more emphasis on 
                                                 
108 See, among others, Durand (1959) and Brewer and Michaelson (1965). 
109 “Like the ideal gas laws of physics, the M&M model describes how a system will 
work without frictions, such as gravity in physics and transactions costs 
(brokerage fees, taxes) in finance. While this idealized world clearly does not 
reflect objective reality, it is possible to add elements of the ‘real world’ one 
by one and see how the theory's predictions will change until a working model of 
reality emerges.” 
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the other, upbeat side of the “nothing matters” coin: showing what 
doesn’t matter can also show, by implication, what does” (emphasis 
on the original). 
Conceptually, perfect capital markets can be viewed as a gravity-free environment 
which allows us to exam financing decisions of firms unaffected by environmental 
frictions. Therefore, analyzing the capital structure problem in such conditions sheds light 
over the determinants that potentially underlie those decisions, i.e., taxes, transaction costs 
and other market frictions and imperfections.110 Stewart Myers (1993) corroborates 
Miller’s view, arguing that “it seems that financial leverage matters more 
than ever.” He concludes that Modigliani and Miller practical message is “if 
there is an optimal capital structure, it should reflect taxes or 
some specifically identified market imperfections.” 
In summary, we can say that a firm’s optimal capital structure can only exist in a 
world where market frictions and imperfections, which include transaction costs, 
asymmetric information and opportunistic behavior, are present. As pointed out by Ross’ 
(1988, 127) the M-M analysis “was designed less to verify some 
mathematical truism than to capture a live and elusive scientific 
intuition.” 
2.7. EXTENSIONS TO MODIGLIANI AND MILLER’S (1958) MODEL 
Although this thesis will not attempt of extend the Modigliani and Miller theorem, 
a self-contained digression on this theme is present for the sake of completeness. 
As previously shown, Modigliani and Miller offered a formal proof that  under 
frictionless, perfect, and competitive capital markets  the value of a firm is independent 
of its capital structure; therefore its market value is unaffected by its financing choices. 
Despite the wide support for the theory (e.g., Ross 1988) the acclaim was not unanimous111 
                                                 
110 Forty years after the publication of their landmark paper (Miller 1998) addresses the real epistemological 
problem underlying the irrelevancy debate when he states that “the minute you start questioning 
the assumptions underlying a model you leave the world of pure logic behind. You 
have gone from deduction to induction, from an ideal world to the empirical world 
where terms like true or false no longer apply.” 
111 Miller (1988) asserts that M-M theorem generated “three decades of intense scrutiny and 
often bitter controversy.” 
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and some concerns with the framework required by the M-M’s model were brought 
forward.112, 113 
Not surprisingly, some authors made successful attempts to extending the M-M 
theory either by using a less stringent set of assumptions 114 (e.g., Baron 1974; Smith 
1972)115 or by a specifying different environmental framework (e.g., Stiglitz 1969). These 
generalizations show that under perfect competitive and frictionless markets, the 
irrelevance of corporate financing policy obtains even in the presence of risky debt and 
hybrid securities. Further, it is shown that the theorem also holds both in single and 
multiperiod setups, which makes the firm value unrelated to the structure of debt maturity, 
as well. 
As discussed earlier, Modigliani and Miller based their propositions on a large set 
of assumptions. In addition to perfect and competitive capital markets, they assume the 
following: (1) risk class homogeneity; (2) no bankruptcy risk; (3) homemade leverage 
transactions;116  (4) perfect, complete, and costless information; (5) a taxless economy;  (6) 
perfect substitution between firm’s and investors’ borrowing; and (7) invariant scale of the 
firm’s investment. These assumptions represent, as indicated in the literature, some of the 
major sources of concern. In 1969 Joseph Stiglitz undertook the formal proof that the M-M 
theorem obtains under more general conditions. Specifically, Stiglitz shows that, in a 
general equilibrium state preference framework, the validity of the theorem does not 
                                                 
112 See, e.g., Milne (1975), Lintner (1977), Mossin (1977), and Ho and Robinson (1994). For these authors 
the main sources of disagreement were essentially the assumptions required to obtain M-M’s results.  
113 Mossin (1977, 83) provides an eloquent description of the reaction of M-M to theory: “such conclusions 
were naturally met with incredulity among financial practitioners and skepticism among their academic 
counterparts.” 
114 Stiglitz (1969) provides his views on the limitations of the proof of Modigliani and Miller's theory: (1) it 
is conditional to the existence of risk classes; (2) seems to demand objective rather than subjective 
probability for outcome distribution specification; (3) develops within a partial equilibrium framework; (4) it 
is unclear if whether or not requires a competitive market setup; and (5) the theorem, under the presumption 
of  firm’s bankruptcy, appears to obtain only in specific instances. 
115 As Fama (1978, 272) observes a great deal of the controversy “centered in large part on which 
of the peripheral assumptions are important to the validity of the theorem.” 
116 The arbitrage argument under an M-M setup develops within the following framework: assuming there 
are two firms belonging to the same risk class, with identical cash flow streams, firm U all-equity financed, 
and firm L financed with both equity and debt securities. Further is assumed that market valuation of firm U 
is higher than firm L. In this instances, buying the same percentage of the equity and the debt of firm L would 
be cheaper than buying the same fraction of firm’s U equity, although both ownership claims entitled to 
identical amount of cash flow. Capital market would exposed this arbitrage opportunity and prices of both 
firms would be adjusted, upwards and downwards respectively, until reaching a new price of equilibrium, 
identical for both firms. Assuming now that firm L is overpriced in relation to firm U. Then with a portfolio 
of U firm’s equity and borrowing (the so-called homemade leverage) an investor can replicate the return on 
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depend on the existence of risk classes,117 on the competitiveness of the capital market, or 
on the agreement of individuals about the probability distribution of outcomes.118 The 
author, however, acknowledges other assumptions as necessary conditions for his proof, 
namely that: (1) borrowing either by levered firms or by investors are perfect substitutes; 
and no-bankruptcy risk. 
Stiglitz (1974) provides a more general proof of the M-M theorem, based on the 
presence of a costless financial intermediary that can reconstitute the firm and alter its 
financial leverage (as measured by the debt-equity ratio). Thus, the value of the firm must 
be unrelated to capital structure as long as a costless financial intermediary can be 
established to maintain the opportunity set available to individual investors. Under this 
framework, Stiglitz proves that individual wealth and consumption opportunities are 
unaffected by firms’ capital structures. Moreover, he demonstrates that the finite 
probability of costless bankruptcy has no effect on the value of the firm.119  
Vernon Smith (1972) also attempted to replicate M-M’s results but under less 
restrictive conditions. He relaxed the assumption of riskless debt  i.e., assumed a 
positive probability of (costless) bankruptcy.120 Additionally, he “focused on 
preferences of risk averse, expected-utility maximizing investors 
for various debt-equity ratios for firms.” Smith’s major focus was the 
assumptions that related to a positive probability of bankruptcy,121 and to independence 
between the firm’s cash flow and an invariant scale of firm’s investment (which, in this 
formal setup is unavoidably “independent of capital market 
considerations”). The homemade leverage argument is proved to hold under a no-
default risk premise. Otherwise, assuming a positive default risk on debt the theorem does 
                                                 
Firm L but at a lower cost. (This strategy implies necessarily that investors are able to borrow personally in 
the same terms as levered firms). 
117 In a distinct though not unrelated perspective, Hamada (1971) showed that the assumption of 
homogeneous risk class is not necessary to derive the capital asset pricing model. 
118 Except that agents must on a zero probability of bankruptcy. 
119 This proof develops within a general equilibrium setting. 
120 Baxter (1967, 395) argues that the "risk of ruin" is equated as "a rising average cost of 
capital is perfectly consistent with rational arbitrage operations." “Allowing 
for the possibility of bankruptcy is tantamount to relaxing the assumption that 
the anticipated stream of operating earnings is independent of capital 
structure." 
121 According to Vernon Smith arising from the prospect of the rate of return on bonds becoming lower than 
the interest rate on debt. The likelihood of a (certainly high) degree of financial leverage could warrant this 
state. 
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not obtain.122 Furthermore, in equilibrium, and allowing for unconstrained margin equity 
investments, individuals are not indifferent to financial leverage.123 Lastly, it is 
demonstrated that if an individual margin investor is able to collateralize personal 
borrowing only with his shareholdings, then a putative lender will prefer to invest in 
corporate bonds himself, unless the personal borrowing rate exceeds the debt interest 
rate.124 Smith’s argument raises a number of issues. First, it brings out the important fact 
that return patterns for limited liability borrowing and lending depend on the composition 
of the portfolio that serves as collateral. If a firm goes bankrupt, pure equity collateral is 
worthless, whereas a collateral portfolio including some bonds might still earn a positive 
return because these securities have a privileged claim on the firms’ remaining assets.125 
Second, it calls attention to the disincentive created by the increased exposure to default 
risk of individual investors when borrowing at the personal level versus acquiring debt 
securities of a levered firm. This becomes a disincentive for investors involve themselves 
in arbitrage, leading to different equilibria.126 
Baron’s (1974) paper discusses the effect of (1) abandoning the assumption of 
riskless debt (and therefore introducing a positive probability of default) and (2) assuming 
distinct (nominal) interest rates for the borrowing of firms and individuals.127 In his 
derivation, Baron uses a stochastic dominance argument128 to show that, provided investors 
and firms borrow in the same conditions or equity investors in levered firms also hold debt 
                                                 
122 Actually, investors "will prefer an increase or decrease in the corporate debt-
equity ratio according to whether that ratio is greater or less than the 
investor's ratio of [debtholdings] to shareholdings." 
123 Investors, in equilibrium, will prefer an increase (decrease) in the corporate debt-equity ratio if his 
personal-account-borrowing rate is greater (less) than the corporate borrowing rate. 
124 Vernon Smith argues that a margin loan secured by a pure equity capital has a different return pattern 
from a direct loan to the firm and consequently they are not perfect substitutes as required by M-M's set of 
assumptions. See also David Baron. In a similar vein Stiglitz 1972. 
125 To illustrate his viewpoint the author discusses the case of a margin loan fully pledged with 100 percent 
equity securities. Within this arrangement, the return pattern of the loan is contingent on the firm’s 
probability of bankruptcy, which in turn depends on the firm's financial leverage measured by its debt-to-
equity ratio. If the firm's financial leverage rises, its probability of bankruptcy will increase, and the collateral 
will turn valueless. 
126 The differential in the exposure to default risk arises due to the absence of the limited liability feature 
when borrowing at individual level. 
127 His set of assumptions include: (1) stochastic gross earnings; (2) positive probability of bankruptcy, and as 
well as the probability of default on firm debt; (3) stochastic returns to scale; (4) investors are clustered 
around classes of expected-utility maximization; and (5) investors may (or may not) be risk averse. 
128 A risky asset A dominates risky asset B in the sense of (first degree) stochastic dominance, if all 
individuals having utility functions in wealth that are increasing and continuous either prefer A to B or are 
indifferent between A and B. For a formal discussion see, e.g., Copeland and Weston 1988, 92-95, and Huang 
and Litzenberger 1988, 39-55. 
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securities of the same risk class, "[t]he values of the levered and the 
unlevered firms will be equal if all economic agents are risk 
neutral.” However, if risk aversion is present among investors and lenders, financial 
leverage may become relevant for the value of the firm. 
Robert Merton (1974) produces a demonstration that the M-M theorem obtains even if the 
no-default risk assumption is relaxed. Further, he claims that, unlike Stiglitz (1969), his 
proof “did not require a specialized theory of capital market 
equilibrium (e.g. the Arrow-Debreu model or the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model) to prove the theorem when bankruptcy is possible.” 
In 1976 Baron rejoined the discussion to address the problem of the variability of 
the scale of the firm’s investment. He then suggested that “if the financing-
investment alters the space of available returns in the capital 
market, the implicit prices will depend on the firm’s decision 
[…].” Furthermore, he argues that whenever fixed-scale investment and financing choices 
do not affect available patterns of return in capital markets (and therefore security implicit 
prices) then investors “are indifferent to an alteration in the capital 
structure […], and the value of that firm is independent of its 
capital structure.” Otherwise, shareholders of variable-sized firms (in terms of 
their total investment) are most likely to prefer more leveraged investments if, and only if, 
they enhance shareholders wealth. 
Hagen (1976) reexamined Baron’s (1974) proof of the M-M theorem under default 
risk. The major concern in his analysis appears to be the “assumption that 
investors are able to borrow at the same nominal interest rates as 
firms.”129 His underpinning arguments relate to the ability of investors who borrow to 
replicate the pattern of returns obtained by levered firms. If these investors can replicate 
firm returns, as Baron (1974) suggests, “lenders would be indifferent between 
lending to the investor and buying the risk bonds.” This conjecture, 
however, does not ensure the validity of the theorem.130 Although it is not questionable 
                                                 
129 However, as pointed out by the author “[i]t is not sufficient for the theorem to be valid 
that all equity investors in the levered firm also holds bonds in that firm, 
unless it would be optimal for each investor to hold the same fraction of the 
equity and bonds in that firm.” 
130 To achieve such result “investors must be able to create any conceivable return 
pattern which the firm could have created itself by issuing different amounts of 
risky bonds, and for the lenders it must be immaterial whether these return 
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that, under the perfect capital market assumption, firms with similar cash flow streams 
should show identical market valuations, “this does not prove that the market 
values are independent of the way firms are financed.” 
Still other scholarly works have grappled with the M-M theorem and its many 
assumptions. Miller and Fama (1972), for example, demonstrate that the theorem “holds 
when debt is risky as long as stockholders and bondholders protect 
themselves from one another with [...] ‘me-first-rules’.” Later, Fama 
(1978) “shows that the me-first rules are also unnecessary.” 
Hellwig (1981) also examined the results of the M-M theorem in the presence of 
bankruptcy. He shows his doubts about the validity of the assumption of levered firms and 
investors borrowing in the same terms “when there is a positive probability 
that either the firm or the individual who borrows to invest in 
the firm goes bankrupt.” As Hellwig points out, both, Stiglitz (1969) and Merton 
(1974) argued that M-M theorem holds under the presumption of no-default risk, provided 
investors have the ability to limit their margin borrowing liability to the collateral required 
by lenders. Additionally he observes what Smith (1972) hypothesized: that pure equity 
collateralized loans and straight loans to firms are not perfect substitutes because of 
intrinsic asymmetries in their return patterns. Whether or not this problem is relevant for 
the M-M theorem is viewed as an open question as far as Hellwig is concerned. 131 
Hellwig claims to identify “a gap in the standard proof of the M-M 
theorem.” He argues that the arbitrage argument used by investors in adjusting their 
equity and debt security holdings in response to the firm leverage disregards other related 
securities, such as, the “[…] margin loans that serve to finance those 
margin investments.” In his conclusions Hellwig emphasizes that the validity of the 
M-M theorem in the presence of a positive probability of bankruptcy depends on the 
composition of the margin borrowing collateral, and whether or not short selling is 
allowed. Therefore, he stresses that the conditions required for M-M theorem to obtain in 
the presence of bankruptcy “are so strong that the set of returns 
                                                 
patterns are created by individuals or by firms.” By modifying its capital structure the firm 
would simply “create an investment opportunity which is already available in the 
market and hence the feasible income space and firms’ market values would remain 
unchanged.” 
131 May be it “might be enough, if some appropriate margin loan could be used as a 
substitute for lending to the firm” (Ibid, italicized in the original). 
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patterns that are available to individual investors under these 
conditions is practically the same as in a complete system of 
contingent securities market.” It is not surprising that these last considerations 
inspire a similar skepticism as the presumption that securities markets are complete. 
More recently, Dybvig and Zender (1991) provided a proof of the M-M irrelevancy 
propositions (on capital structure and dividends) in the context of frictional markets. In 
their framework frictions arise because of the presence of differential endowments of 
information among market participants. Their proof requires the presumption that 
managerial compensation is chosen optimally.132  
2.8. INCOME TAX EFFECTS ON FIRM’S CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
As noted earlier, initial debate about the proposed irrelevance of firm capital 
structure focused on the assumptions of the Modigliani and Miller theorem and what 
would happen if these assumptions were relaxed. The first of the assumptions to be 
scrutinized was the absence of income taxation on costs of firms debt financing. 
Specifically, it was recognized that the tax-deductibility of interest payments were 
“potentially an important consideration in a firm’s financing 
decisions” (Fama and French 1998) and incorporated in the capital structure problem. 
In their former analysis (1958) Modigliani and Miller disregarded the effects of 
income taxes on firm financing behavior, implicitly assuming an economic environment 
with generic income tax neutrality in relation to equity and debt financing. However the 
observation of (real world) tax systems shows that fiscal neutrality does not prevail.133 In 
the United States, for example, firms are allowed to deduct the interest payments they incur 
in using debt financing from their tax liabilities. Dividend payments to shareholders, 
however, are not deductible expenses. The income tax laws of a number of other countries 
share this same feature.  
                                                 
132 However, as argued by Fluck (1999, footnote 5), “the indifference result of Dybvig and Zender fails to 
hold if equity holders are granted the unconditional right to dismiss management.” 
133 According to Swoboda and Zechner (1995, 767) “the tax systems currently adopted by most 
industrialized countries can be classified into classical systems and imputation 
systems.” In the first kind of system, interest payments are tax deductible at the corporate level, whereas 
the dividends are not. At the personal level dividends and interest are taxed at the same rate. In the second 
kind, double taxation of dividends is reduce or eliminated by granting a tax credit to recipients of dividends 
equal to some fraction of the corporate tax paid on the dividends. 
Examples of Classical Tax Systems are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the US. Examples of Imputation Tax Systems are Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Norway, Spain, and UK. Source: Swoboda and Zechner (1995). 
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Typically, differential tax treatment of equity and debt securities creates an 
incentive for, under specific circumstances, a preference for debt financing.134 A lack of 
neutrality in the taxation regime with respect to cash flow distributions to claimholders 
supports the development of a hierarchy of preferences in firm financing.135 Thus if 
effective tax rates are exogenous and common at the firm and the individual levels, firms 
will tend to resort to the most tax-advantaged source of financing. The peculiarities of this 
behavior seem to be closely related to the idiosyncratic characteristics of particular tax 
systems.136  
In 1963, Modigliani and Miller corrected their 1958 paper waiving the presumption 
of a taxless economy, and deriving a corner solution for the firm’s optimal capital structure 
problem, which leads to an unambiguous (almost) infinite debt-to-equity ratio. The kernel 
of M-M’s arguments is that, by making interest expense tax deductible, the government is 
subsidizing firms that finance their operations and projects by issuing debt securities. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, firms would try to maximize their share of the government 
subsidy when choosing their capital structure. 
Thus, when income-tax deductibility of interest payments at the firm level is 
present, the market value of the firm is an increasing function of its financial leverage. 
Therefore, the value of the firm is maximized with an all-debt capital structure.  
As Modigliani (1988, 152) points out, M-M’s (1963) result rests on the assumption 
that the tax saving stream137 “is constant, perpetual, and absolutely 
certain like the coupon of a government bond." Modigliani and Miller 
recognized that "some uncertainty attaches [...] to the tax savings." 
The sources of this uncertainty, according to them, are (1) the likelihood of future changes 
                                                 
134 According to Faig and Shum (1999, 144) an “asymmetric corporate tax system is one in 
which the government does not treat firms' gains and losses equally.” The recent 
decision of US government disallowing interest deductibility on very-long-term bonds (maturities of 40 and 
more years) and reclassifying them, for tax purposes, as equity is an example of reducing tax asymmetries 
between debt and equity securities. 
135 See, e.g., DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Miller (1977), Stiglitz (1973), and Modigliani and Miller (1963). 
For more recent discussions of the tax effects on firm’s investment and financing policies see also Faig and 
Shum (1999), and Gentry and Hubbard (1998). 
136 According to structure of U.S. Tax Code prior to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, internal equity (retained 
earnings) was tax-advantaged over new share issues. 
137 τcrD, where τc stands for the firm’s income tax rate, r the interest rate on debt, and D the outstanding debt. 
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in tax rates, and (2) the possibility of an erosion (or even an exhaustion) of taxable income 
to offset interest payments on debt.138 
A much more disturbing problem, however, is raised by the presumption that 
capital structure policy is a once and for all (fixed) decision on the amount of debt to issue. 
As Modigliani (1988) observe “[t]his assumption seems untenable in a world 
in which the movement of expected profit and size of the firm is 
widely supposed to follow something like a random walk (or a 
martingale).”139 
Retaining the notation previously introduced to derive M-M 1958 results, let τc 
represent the marginal tax rate on corporate income. We assume moreover, as a 
simplifying assumption (but without loss of generality) that all payments to debtholders are 
tax-deductible. In this case the payoff to equityholders in state s can be represented as Max 
{X(s) – D, 0}(1-τc), and the payment received by the bondholders can be represented as 
Min {D, X(s)}. The value of an unlevered firm, VU, can be represented as follows: 
( )( ) ( )∑ τ−=
S
cU spsXV 1  
Further, the value of a levered firm can be represented as 
( ){ }( ) ( ){ }[ ] ( )spsXDDsXVVV
S
cLDLEL ∑ +τ−−=+= ,Min10,Max  
( ){ }( ) ( ){ }( ) ( ){ }[ ] ( )spsXDsXDDsX
S
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S
c
S
∑∑ τ+τ−= ,Min1  
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( ){ } ( ) 0,Min ≥τ=− ∑ spsXDVV c
S
UL  
                                                 
138 Modigliani (1988) confirm that in his 1963 paper with Merton Miller they already made an allusion to 
“some limitations to the validity of the assumption, on account of the 
possibility of changes in the tax code as well as profits falling below 
contractual interest.” 
139 Martingales and random walks are theories of the time-series behavior of asset prices. A martingale is a 
fair game (which, on average, and across a large number of sample provides an expected return on an asset 
equal to its actual return) where tomorrow’s price is expected to be the same as today’s price. The random 
walk theory predicts that there is no difference between the distribution of returns conditional on a given 
information structure and the unconditional distribution of returns. For further details see, e.g., Campbell, Lo 
and Mackinley (1997), Copeland and Weston (1988), and Huang and Litzenberger (1988). 
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But   ( ){ } spsXD c
S
∑ τ,Min ( )
                                                
 is just the present value of the interest tax shield. This implies 
that the value of a levered firm is greater than the value of an otherwise identical but 
unlevered firm. The above expression shows that a firm’s value increases as its leverage 
increases, therefore implying that the firm can maximize its government subsidy by 
maximizing its leverage ratio.140 
This addition to the firm’s market value resulting from incorporating debt financing 
in its capital structure will be approximated by τcD, if the firm’s unlevered cash flows are 
capitalized at the opportunity cost of capital relevant to their risk class.  
The all-debt debt financing optimality condition141 implicit in the M-M 1963 
analysis represents a corner solution determining a unique capital structure, which is 
clearly contradicted by the empirical observation of financial leverage levels of real-world 
firms.142  
As argued earlier, the economic benefit associated with the income tax relief 
granted to borrowing costs should induce firms to leverage to the hilt. However, firms 
display capital structures showing a conservative use of financial leverage143 and this 
pattern of financing behavior is consistently observed across time, countries and industries. 
Myers 1984 coined the term the capital structure puzzle to describe the disparity between 
the theoretical predictions and the observed reality. 
2.9. CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN A FIRM AND PERSONAL INCOME TAXES FRAMEWORK 
Taxation has significant implications on capital structure decisions made by firms, 
both in theory and (to a lesser extent) in practice. But those decisions are not made in a 
vacuum; they are also affected by the decisions of the investors who supply the capital. 
What impact do tax rules have on their decisions? 
 
140 In the absence of constraints on leverage ratios, this would imply that the firm would choose to be 100% 
debt financed, which would imply that it is 100% equity financed, causing it to lose its government subsidy. 
141 Typically, the first explanation offered in the literature for real-world firms not having an all-debt capital 
structure is rooted on the existence of nontrivial bankruptcy costs. This argument will be pursued later in this 
chapter. 
142 This observation show, however, a substantively contrasting panorama with M-M 1963 optimal capital 
structure theoretical prediction, suggesting that firms’ financing behavior is at odds with the shareholders 
value-maximizing paradigm. See, among others, for international evidence, Delbreil et al. 1997, Rajan and 
Zingales 1995, Remolona 1990. Taggart 1985, e.g., provide U.S. evidence. See Appendix 2.1 to this chapter 
for a summary of some studies on this area. 
143 Parrino and Weisbach (1999), among others, argue that “[f]irms use surprisingly large 
amounts of equity in their capital structures even though the deductibility of 
interest payments at the corporate level gives debt a tax advantage over equity.” 
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In his 1977 Presidential address to the American Finance Association, Merton 
Miller provided an answer to this question. In this important contribution to the capital 
structure theory he extends the M-M's’ 63 model by incorporating income taxes at the 
individual investor level and develops an equilibrium analysis of firm’s optimal capital 
structure policy. He called attention to the dissimilar treatment of debt and equity securities 
at the level of personal taxation, and questioned the importance attributed to the firm’s 
income tax deductibility of the cost of debt financing.144 In his study, Miller reinstates the 
capital structure irrelevancy proposition but at an aggregated level. He shows that one 
firm’s capital structure is irrelevant for its market valuation under the assumptions of (1) 
riskless debt; (2) no transaction costs; (3) and no taxation for equity income. He offers the 
explanation that the corporate tax advantage of debt is exactly offset by personal taxation 
of interest income. His argument develops as follows: the ability to deduct interest expense 
when computing taxable income at the firm level provides a subsidy for issuing debt 
securities. On the other hand, individual investors pay higher effective taxes on interest 
income than they do on income from owning equity. This disparity results from the lower 
tax rate on capital gains, as well as the ability of investors to defer the realization of capital 
gains.145 Thus, at the individual level, there is a subsidy to owning equity, making it 
preferable for investors to invest in equity. To induce investors to invest in debt, firms have 
to pay investors a higher return on debt than on equity, i.e. they must concede part of their 
subsidy to investors. Miller demonstrates that in equilibrium, to induce investors to hold 
more bonds, firms may be required to share up to their entire tax subsidy with investors, 
leaving firms indifferent between issuing debt or equity. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) extended Miller’s (1977) model obtaining an 
interior solution for the firm’s optimal capital structure in the presence of personal income 
taxes. In deriving their results they assume that (1) corporations either pay a constant tax 
rate on positive taxable income (no progressiveness in firm’s income tax rates) or pay no 
taxes if taxable income is less than or equal to zero; (2) debt-related tax shields, 
                                                 
144 As noted by Scholes and Wolfson (1989) “the premium required by bondholders in 
equilibrium to cover the tax penalty on interest income they earned on holding 
corporate bonds” was one material cost of issuing debt that had been neglected. They further suggest that 
“[t]o induce these individuals to hold bonds rather than tax-favored stock, 
issuers must pay a higher before-tax rate of interest.” Lastly, they argue that 
Merton Miller made the proof that “the resulting corporate after-tax cost of debt 
finance could be exactly the same as the risk-adjusted after-tax cost of equity 
finance.” 
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investment-related tax-shields (such as depreciation) tax credits, are (or may be) used to 
reduce taxable liability; (4) net operating tax-loss carry-backs and carry-forwards and 
markets for transferring tax losses are absent; and (5) investment scale is invariant while 
outstanding debt is allowed to vary. 
As pointed out by Modigliani and Miller (1963), Brennan and Schwartz (1978), and 
others, firms are subject to transient and asymmetrical taxation regimes, and risk losing (at 
least partially) the value of some tax shields in years of low operating income. Therefore, 
the expected corporate tax advantage of borrowing is a monotonically declining function of 
financial leverage. Consequently, in the DeAngelo-Masulis framework, the probability of a 
firm being deprived of the economic benefits of interest expense tax-deductibility increases 
(holding before-tax earnings constant) as more debt and non-debt tax shelters become 
available. Therefore, the theory predicts that firms in these conditions are expected to use 
relatively less leverage in order to reduce the risk of losing the tax benefits of its interest 
deductions (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980, hypothesis 3). DeAngelo-Masulis model 
incorporates uncertainty and recognizes that tax laws at the firm level, besides the tax-
deductibility of the costs of debt financing, provide also (1) investment-related tax-shelters, 
such as, fixed assets depreciation; and (2) input / product markets tax-shelters, such as 
provisions for bad debts. They argue that the marginal benefit of tax shields will differ 
across firms, due to differences in cash flow patterns and non-debt tax shields. On the other 
hand, all firms will incur the same marginal cost when issuing debt. Because all firms 
determine their capital structures by equating the marginal cost and marginal benefit of 
debt, each firm will have a different optimal debt level, i.e. the level of debt at which 
marginal cost equals marginal benefit of debt will vary across firms. Thus, firms will have 
different capital structures. Further, as non-debt tax shields reduce the marginal tax benefit 
from debt tax shields, a firm’s debt level will be inversely correlated with the magnitude of 
its other tax shields. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) postulates, thus, a positive relationship between non-
debt tax shields (arguably, investment-related tax shields) and the likelihood of losing the 
income-tax benefits associated with the interest expense. Hence, the model yields the 
testable hypothesis that, cross-sectionally, firms with greater investment-related tax shields 
                                                 
145 This was the U.S. case in 1977, and may be again some time in the future. 
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should, ceteris paribus,146 carry lower debt in their capital structures. The DeAngelo-
Masulis model therefore predicts that a substitution effect might occur resulting in an 
inverse relation between debt and investment-related tax shields. 
The assessment of the effects of income taxes, both at firm and personal levels, on 
capital structure is a very intricate problem to study due to the severe difficulties as pointed 
out by several academics.147 Hamada and Scholes (1985), for example, argue that firm 
financing transactions reflect the complexity of an (worldwide) economic environment of 
ceaseless convolution and interaction. Firms and investors, in this setting, are confronted 
with (1) a growing number of tax provisions and rules; (2) many different (and more 
integrated) markets for the many different securities; and (3) extended mobility of agents 
searching for different tax liabilities. Therefore, agents can either supply or demand 
different financial assets in the various markets searching for after-tax profitable 
opportunities. Hamada and Scholes argue further that “because of this 
complexity, what is most important is to consider simultaneously 
the effects of seemingly many different tax provisions and the 
equilibrium requirements across many different markets.” 
Faig and Shum (1999) point to other sources of the difficulties in handling the 
problem of the tax effects on capital structure. A first difficulty is related with the 
restrictions to the full tax-deductibility of firms’ opportunity cost capital. A second 
difficulty is associated with the asymmetry of corporate tax systems, “in the sense 
that taxes are payable immediately if taxable income is positive 
whereas losses are not refundable at the full corporate tax rate.” 
Lastly, firms may be impelled to an undesired capital structure (for example through the 
influence of regulatory discipline) which will exert an upward pressure on the firm’s 
opportunity cost of capital, which is not fully tax-deductible.148 
Another major source of concern in studying the relationship between income taxes 
and a firm’s capital structure problem relates to the likelihood that the firm’s pre-tax 
                                                 
146 Namely, holding before-tax earnings constant. 
147 Also Faig and Shum (1999) argue that “[...] the US corporate tax, as in most countries, 
is not a simple tax on economic profits, and a number of issues complicate the 
assessment of its effects.” 
148 A firm’s capital-base takes time to build, but once build, Faig and Shum explain, “most costs cannot 
be recovered, so firms may be 'stuck' with more than they later desire. With 
uncertainty, such investment irreversibility increases the opportunity cost of 
capital. And the presence of a corporate tax further exacerbates this effect 
because the cost of capital inflexibility is not a deductible expense.” 
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income might be lower than its interest expense, what brings the issue of the firm issuing 
risky, instead of riskless, debt securities. In this circumstance, the firm will suffer 
(incremental) costs commensurate with the risk of its security issues, and which will 
partially or entirely offset the income tax benefits associated with debt financing. This is 
the problem of financial distress and bankruptcy addressed in the following section. 
2.10. FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND BANKRUPTCY ARGUMENTS 
Not surprisingly, the debate that surrounds the relevance of financial distress149 and 
bankruptcy as a determinant of capital structure choice is, indisputably, rooted in the 
inspired work of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963).150 The existence of debt-favoring 
biases and the intuition that bankruptcy states are costly provided fertile ground for new 
hypotheses to sprout. The first theoretical developments in this area were conceptual 
departures from the Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) framework,151 and were achieved 
through the relaxation of some of its assumptions. They focused, primarily, on the 
perplexing inconsistency between the capital structure optimality conditions described in 
M-M (1963) and empirical evidence of the use of financial leverage by real business firms. 
In short, new hypotheses attempted to solve the capital structure “puzzle”.   Among those 
hypotheses are: (1) the interrelation between financial insolvency states and a firm’s capital 
structure policy; (2) the economic and financial implications of reorganization processes 
following financial distress and bankruptcy; and (3) the reciprocal influence of strategic 
behavior on product/input markets, dividend policy and corporate governance structures.152 
Each represents a different branch of inquiry. In an effort to control the scope of this study, 
no attempt is made here to survey all three branches of the literature. 
                                                 
149 John (1993, 61) provides a “natural definition of financial distress” (author’s emphasis): 
“A firm is in financial distress at a given point in time when the liquid assets 
of the firm are not sufficient to meet the current requirements of its hard 
contracts.” The author conceptualizes hard contracts as the contracts that upon firm’s violation “the 
claimholders have specified and unspecified legal recourse to enforce the 
contract." By opposition, soft contracts are the ones missing that enforcement mechanism. 
150 Under Modigliani and Miller theorem, bankruptcy is a plausible but costless event, therefore, specifying 
the existence of bankruptcy costs violates the theorem’s set of assumptions. Although yielding remarkably 
insightful contributions, their model ignores costs arising with incremental debt financing, which increase the 
financial risk of the firm. 
151 As shown in Myers and Robichek (1966) this conclusion still holds even dropping the assumption of 
absence of bankruptcy risk, but provided bankruptcy is costless. 
152 For a comprehensive and insightful account of theoretical and empirical literatures on financial distress 
and bankruptcy effects on capital structure see Senbet and Seward (1995). 
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There are no clear-cut boundaries between these three branches. Plainly, there are 
conspicuous spillovers between them, such as agency problems between stockholders and 
bondholders related to debt financing.  
 Alternatively, the first topic  the relationship between bankruptcy and corporate 
capital structure policy  is structured around two major setups. The first discusses the 
static trade-off model developed, either by the relaxation of some of its underpinning 
assumptions or by hypothesizing relationships with other considerations, such as 
managerial and owner incentives for risk taking and investment strategy. The second line of 
inquiry examines challenges to the both sides of the trade-off model’s cost/benefit 
equation.153 
Static Trade-off Models of Firm Capital Structure 
Bankruptcy is a complex interaction of a multitude of financial and real factors. It is 
widely believed that the probability of bankruptcy is an increasing and positive function of 
financial leverage. Another potentially significant factor in helping to explain bankruptcy 
problems is related to the level of economic performance of the firm which is affect, 
among other, by technological reasons, product/input market considerations, or 
macroeconomic adverse effects (e.g., Kale and Noe 1987; Green and Talmor 1985; and 
Castanias 1983).154, 155 A economically non-performing firm, ceteris paribus, is unlikely to 
fulfill all its contractual financial obligations vis à vis its creditors; it will become 
financially distressed and, eventually, bankrupted and even liquidated.156 Firms in this 
distressed situation can expect to incur nontrivial losses of economic efficiency 
(bankruptcy costs).157,158 Formal bankruptcy proceedings  reorganization and 
liquidation159  are the arrangements used to overcome this problem.160  
                                                 
153 This inescapable option restrained the examination of some non-trivial issues, such as details of the 
dichotomy between financial distress and economic distress and between bankruptcy and liquidation. Or the 
resolution of bankruptcy, either through a court-based process, or privately handled. This is the price to pay 
in avoiding a pervasive tendency for dispersion. 
154 Others suggested factors might be, among others, dishonest behavior, natural catastrophes. 
155 Competing theories attempt to explain firm's performance. Dominant paradigms in this area are, typically, 
the Mason-Bain’s Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, and the Michael Porter’s Five Forces 
Competitive Model.  
156 This problem results from an increased exposure to “business failure, insolvency, default 
on creditor claims and filing for bankruptcy” (Altman 1998). 
157 Throughout this work I adopt the conventional procedure to use interchangeably the terms financial 
distress costs, insolvency costs, and bankruptcy costs.  
158 Expected bankruptcy costs may be defined “as a product of the probability of bankruptcy 
and the [value of] direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy” (Damodaran 1998, 229), where 
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A key point for analyzing financial distress and bankruptcy is the acknowledgment 
that (1) financial contracts are inherently incomplete (Aghion and Bolton 1992), and (2) by 
implication, only in a incomplete contract framework is there a role for bankruptcy 
arrangements.  If all debt-financing transactions could be made through the writing of 
complete (and costless) contracts, then every such instrument would stipulate, ex-ante, 
“what should happen if a firm could not meet its debt obligations” 
(Hart 1995). In such a case, bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings would be totally 
useless, and it is hard to see what role would be left for bankruptcy courts. 
It is trivial that the probability of servicing contractual obligations of debt financing 
is an inverse function of financial leverage. But because cash flow streams are assumed 
invariant (at least in the short-term), then leveraging up the firm commits a larger part of 
cash flow to debt claimholders. Many firms are not able to fulfill these contractual 
commitments, triggering default. In such circumstances, shareholders may see their 
ownership rights severely constrained, either through a dilution (or even a transfer to 
creditors) of their residual control rights, or a reduction on their residual claims. 
Static tradeoff capital structure theory aims to equate the advantages and 
disadvantages of financial leverage.161 It suggests, as shown by Scott (1976), that the 
probability of bankruptcy associated with leveraging the firm leads to an optimal capital 
                                                 
“the probability of bankruptcy is the likelihood that a firm’s cash flows will be 
insufficient to meet its promised debt obligations” (Ibid.). Masulis (1988, 31) rationalizes 
the probability of bankruptcy as “a positive function of firm leverage.”  
159 Bankruptcy and liquidation are sometimes related to each other in the literature. However, as pointed out 
in Haugen and Senbet (1978) they are separate and independent events. Liquidation, they argue, is a capital 
budgeting decision. 
160 Nonetheless the objectives of, both, the liquidation process and the reorganization process be consensual 
and shared among many countries, the actual legal framework “differs markedly from country to 
country” (Altman 1998). Under the U.S. Federal Bankruptcy Code, liquidation is regulated in chapter 7, 
and reorganization in chapter 11. In Portugal, liquidation and reorganization are regulated under the Decree 
of Law 132/92 from 23 of April 1992. Nonetheless the indisputable relevance of formal bankruptcy 
proceedings we do not describe in this work the details of the respective procedures. For a comparative 
analysis of US, UK, and German Insolvency Codes see Franks, Nyborg, and Torous (1996). 
161 The first use of this designation is, consensually, attributed to Myers (1984). 
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structure at the firm level.162 Thus, the downside of using debt financing in the capital 
structure must be balanced with its alleged income tax benefits at the firm level.163  
Trade-off models of capital structure confront both the expected value of 
bankruptcy costs and the expected value of tax benefits (e.g., Robichek and Myers 1966, 
and Baxter 1967). In this perspective, a firm should be adding debt to its capital structure 
until the present value of increased expected distress costs outweighs the expected value of 
the tax advantage of using additional debt. The theory predicts that an optimal capital 
structure exists at the point where these costs and benefits are in equilibrium, formally: 
V = VU + PV τC - PV KB, 
where V stands for market value of the firm, VU for the value of the unlevered firm, τC for 
the value of the debt tax shield, KB for the value of the bankruptcy costs, and PV for value 
present value. 
In this context, value-maximizing firms obtain an optimal capital structure at the 
point where the present value of the tax advantage of using additional debt financing 
equals the present value of the bankruptcy costs (among others Robichek and Myers 1966, 
and Baxter 1967).164This view implies that when bankruptcy is costly there should exist an 
optimal debt ratio, beyond which the tax advantage of additional debt is outweighed by the 
present value of increased bankruptcy costs. 165 
The presence of one or more of the various intrinsic features of these models, such 
as a one-period horizon, the presumption of risk-neutral economic agents, and the absence 
of optimal capital structure adjustment costs, diminish their ability to realistically portray 
some characteristics of real world firms.166  
                                                 
162 The complexity of the model did not permitted to produced closed-form solutions for the optimal debt 
policy. Therefore the author presents numerical solutions showing the trade-off between the tax advantages 
of debt and the increased bankruptcy costs associated with higher leverage. Firms will employ debt up to the 
point where the marginal tax advantage of debt is equal to the marginal costs of bankruptcy. 
163 A number of authors (e.g., Baxter 1967, Hirshleifer 1970, 264) have noted that bankruptcy costs might 
provide an economic rationale for the existence of finite optimal capital structure, and therefore contributing 
for a reconciliation between the M-M theorem and the real-world firms’ observed financing behavior. 
164 Other authors that followed this conceptual framework to introduce formal bankruptcy considerations in 
capital structure models were Kraus and Litzenberger 1973, Scott (1976), and Kim 1978, Lee and Barker 
(1977), and Chen (1978, 1979). 
165 As previously shown, in a economy where M-M (1963) results obtain, financing decisions are not a matter 
of indifference to the equityholders. As long as firm’s debt securities are fairly priced, the entire value of the 
additional tax shield generated when the firm, at the margin, increases its financial leverage accrues, 
unambiguously, to the equityholders. 
166 In the absence of adjustment costs and under the static tradeoff framework, firms’ actual leverage ratios 
are optimal. Therefore, as appropriately pointed out by Myers (1984, 577) “there should be some 
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Their common argument was that the actual intensity of debt financing in firm 
capital structures was lower than predicted by theory, because of the expected costs 
associated with potential financial distress and bankruptcy. The theory prescribes that firms 
leverage their capital structures up to the point where the marginal tax benefits of debt 
financing equals the marginal bankruptcy costs. Therefore, an optimal, finite debt-equity 
ratio should exist as the result of trading-off the present value of the expected bankruptcy 
costs and the present value of the tax savings associated with the deductibility of interest 
payments. 
One weakness of this theory relates to the qualitative nature of the arguments used 
to explain how the tax advantages of debt financing were offset by increased cost of 
financial distress. Baxter (1967) provides an early example of the use of this argument in 
suggesting the existence of an optimal interior capital structure. 
Bankruptcy Costs 
Earlier trade-off models provided an optimal interior solution for the capital 
structure problem in the presence of material bankruptcy costs. However, these models did 
not satisfactorily explain the presence of such costs. Thus, one might conjecture that such 
costs are either a consequence of some (unspecified) form of market imperfection or that 
there is no economic rationale for its exogenous determinations (Baxter 1967, Robichek 
and Myers 1966).167 According to Lemma Senbet (New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and 
Finance, 173) we lack “economic justification for the existence and the 
relevance of significant bankruptcy costs in the determination of 
the firm’s optimal capital structure.”168 
Typically, the explanation offered in the literature for real-world firms having 
equity in their capital structures is rooted on the nontriviality of costs of financial distress 
and bankruptcy.169 The magnitude of expected bankruptcy costs, however, as pointed out by 
                                                 
cross-sectional dispersion of actual debt ratios across a sample of firms having 
the same target ratio” as firms are unable to countervail the random chocks that make them diverge 
from their optimal leverage. Bankruptcy cost models proposed by Chen (1978, 1979) and Lee and Barker 
(1977) incorporate the desirable elements of multi-period horizon and risk-aversion. 
167 It has been shown in the literature (see, e.g., Higgins and Schall 1975, and Van Horne 1977) that 
bankruptcy costs are non-existent in perfect and frictionless economic environments. 
168 For Williamson (1988) “the early bankruptcy argument was […] a rather narrow, 
technical construction.” 
169 Diamond (1994) argues that bankruptcy costs “can sometimes be negative (so bankruptcy 
becomes a net benefit), when bankruptcy allows claim holders to prevent a 
borrower from undertaking an unprofitable investment.”  
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Senbet and Seward (1995) depends, among other factors, on the efficiency of resolution of 
financial distress.170, 171 
An important question to raise concerning expected bankruptcy costs is related to its 
empirical measurement. The concept of bankruptcy costs is firmly predicated on the elusive 
nature of an economic opportunity cost and on the unobservable suboptimality of 
managerial decision-making. Both are hard to grasp and difficult to measure empirically. 
Bankruptcy costs are typically categorized in the literature as either direct or indirect. The 
former represent explicit (out-of-pocket) expenses incurred in bankruptcy procedures 
(reorganization/liquidation process), such as filing, lawyers and accounting/auditing fees, 
and managerial costs of administering the bankruptcy. The latter, which are hard to estimate 
are mainly opportunity costs related to losses of market power in contractual arrangements 
with customers, suppliers and employees, as well as business and profits, associated with 
the firm’s financial insolvency.172 Other sources of indirect bankruptcy costs relate to lost 
sales, profits, valuable investment opportunities, and tax shields, as well as having 
managerial efforts distracted from value-enhancing strategic management to survivorship 
management. 
Theoretical Issues Related to Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Costs 
 As discussed earlier, the financial distress and bankruptcy problem carries the 
burden of the expected costs that are likely to arise, ceteris paribus, as a result of excessive 
financial leverage. In these instances bankruptcy costs might become substantial in relation 
to the value of the firm.173 A highly leveraged firm is very likely to end up unable, at least 
partially, to honor its contractual payments to debtholders. In such instances, it must either 
renegotiate its obligations to creditors or declare bankruptcy. Bankruptcy can be voluntary 
or involuntary. In either case, once bankruptcy is declared, the future of a firm it is in the 
hands of the bankruptcy court, which will consider the trade-off between the value of the 
firm as a going concern and its value in liquidation. 
                                                 
170 This implies that models for empirical testing on this issue should be specified aiming at uncovering 
statistically significant causal relationships between bankruptcy costs and financial leverage. 
171 Grinblatt and Titman (1998, 494) argue that “[w]hen a firm goes bankrupt, control of the 
firm’s assets move costlessly from the equity holders to the debt holders.” 
However, it is our belief that this argument has to be, strictly, understood within the boundaries of the 
equityholders / bondholders relationship. 
172 Typically these costs are a direct consequence of reluctance of, for example, customers, suppliers, and 
employees to transact with a financially distressed firm unless they are opportunities for improving their own 
utility at the expense of the firm. 
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Several authors developed theoretical models to examine the implications of 
bankruptcy problems of capital structure. Brennan and Schwartz (1978), for example, used 
numerical methods to provide an examination of optimal capital structure using an option-
pricing model174 where the value of the assets follows a diffusion process with constant 
volatility.175 They show that, at low levels of financial leverage, firm value is an increasing 
function of financial leverage, as the firm’s income tax savings overweigh any bankruptcy 
costs. There is, however, a critical threshold (although not unambiguously defined by the 
authors) beyond which an increase in leverage reduces firm value. The authors suggest that 
raising the probability of bankruptcy increases the incertitude about tax savings 
materializing. They further argue that this is sufficient to lead to optimal capital structure 
even when bankruptcy costs are absent.176 In the Brennan and Schwartz model, tax savings 
and the probability of bankruptcy both rise with increasing leverage, and, conjointly 
increase the likelihood that those tax savings will be lost. In these instances, the value of a 
firm will be an increasing/decreasing function of the prevailing outcome. This model rests 
on the underlying presumption that low leveraged firms can leverage up without 
substantial increase in the likelihood of becoming insolvent.177 Thus, a firm will experience 
a positive net effect from increasing its leverage since its tax benefits overweigh any 
bankruptcy costs (first outcome prevails). For highly leveraged firms, in contrast, taking in 
additional debt will increase (an already large) probability of bankruptcy. In those 
instances, a firm increasing its leverage will see its probability of bankruptcy increase and 
will suffer the inherent loss in value (second outcome prevails). Because the Brennan and 
Schwartz results, as previously noted, are not in a closed form but rather are numerical 
solutions, their comparative statics may not have general validity. 
                                                 
173 However, how substantial still remains an empirical question. 
174 Brennan and Schwartz relax the assumption that debt-related tax shields constitute a “sure stream”. Their 
rationale relates to the fact that a bankrupted firm cans no longer profit from the income tax benefits 
associated with the costs of debt financing. The authors incorporate in their model the uncertainty of debt tax 
shields due to the possibility that, in some future date, a firm may not have taxable income to offset with the 
interest payments on debt. As previously noted Modigliani and Miller in their 1963 paper made a remark on 
this issue but without any other analytical consequences. 
175 Brennan and Schwartz modeled the value of a levered firm, VL as a function of: VL = f(VU, D, r, t), where 
VU = value of unlevered firm as a random variable following a Brownian motion (a Gauss-Wiener process); 
D = face value of the debt outstanding;  r = coupon rate; and t = time to maturity.  
176 In their numerical solutions the authors assumed the value of expected bankruptcy costs (as a fraction of 
the firm value at bankruptcy) as zero. 
177 Miller (1990) points out that “aggregate risk might be unaffected by modest changes of 
leverage some might willingly concede, but not when leverage is pushed to the 
point that bankruptcy becomes a real probability.” 
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Leland (1994) derived closed form solutions for the value of the long-term risky 
debt and yield spreads when the asset value of the firm follows the same diffusion process. 
He determined the optimal capital structure in the model in which shareholders 
endogenously decide when to declare bankruptcy. In addition, Leland determined the 
optimal capital structure when a positive net worth covenant triggers bankruptcy.178  His 
results extend the work of Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976) in terms of the 
valuation of risky debt by the inclusion of taxes and bankruptcy cost variables. 
DeAngelo-Masulis’ (1980) model provides results that are consistent with the 
notion that debt-related net tax savings and bankruptcy costs associated to financial 
leverage are, typically, a relevant factor in firm’s financing decisions. Not surprisingly, in 
their model the expected debt tax-shield equals the expected marginal cost of insolvency. 
One of the predictions of the model is, ceteris paribus, that firms with lower insolvency 
costs are expected to evidence higher financial leverage.179 
Grossman and Hart (1982) provide a normative agency theoretic approach to 
modeling firm financial leverage as a mechanism to constrain managerial discretion and 
curtail agents’ propensity to behave opportunistically.180 Given that increased financial 
leverage in a widely held corporation (1) exacerbates the likelihood of bankruptcy and (2) 
produces harmful consequences on managers’ wealth, Grossman and Hart’s model predicts 
that the threat of bankruptcy provides the appropriate incentives for managers to adopt a 
firm’s value-maximizing behavior. In this framework a firm’s leverage becomes a 
management quality certification implement. 
Titman (1984) analyzes the impact of the firm’s capital structure choices upon the 
decisions to liquidate. He argues that, ex post, liquidation may be beneficial for creditors 
and shareholders in the sense that it may allow disentangling from both explicit and 
implicit commitments with customers, suppliers, and employees.  
Titman and Shapiro (1985) argue that bankruptcy costs provide an incentive for a 
value-maximizing firm to attempt to adopt low risk investment and financial policies, 
particularly if its core business concerns unique and specialized products / services. With 
                                                 
178 As in Brennan and Schwartz (1978). 
179 For example, firms with lower operating income volatility, a small number of creditors, and partial 
overlapping between creditors and shareholders. 
180 The following section addresses the problem of conflicts of interests related to the firm’s capital structure 
decisions arising in a principal-agent relationship environment. 
- 50 - 
  
this pattern of behavior, firms avoid incurring excessive contracting costs with customers, 
suppliers and creditors.181  
Webb (1987) shows, in a framework with rational agents and with perfect and 
complete information about the economic superiority of informal settlement over formal 
bankruptcy proceedings, that the informal settlement is a Pareto-efficient solution for the 
bankruptcy problem.182 
The Question of the Magnitude of Bankruptcy Costs 
 For bankruptcy costs to be helpful in explaining the capital structure problem, they 
must be significant. Several authors claim that available empirical evidence provides 
support for the hypothesis that bankruptcy costs are a relevant consideration for capital 
structure decisions (e.g., Altman, 1998). In contrast, other authors like Warner (1977), 
Miller 1977, and Haugen and Senbet (1978)183 argue that the empirical estimates of 
bankruptcy costs seem insufficiently significant to be a factor in the capital structure 
equation. According to Senbet and Seward (1995) “direct bankruptcy costs are 
unlikely to be significant determinants of the firm’s capital 
structure when debt was originally issued.” The authors also observe that 
the “evidence on the indirect costs of bankruptcy is 
inconclusive.”184 In contrast, Litzenberger and Sosin (1979) suggest that although 
direct bankruptcy costs are found to be very low, indirect costs in the form of operating 
inefficiencies due to reduced maintenance costs and/or loss of sales tend to be significant. 
Haugen and Senbet (1978) also support the notion that the indirect costs associated with 
the transfer of ownership (i.e. disruptions in the firm’s relationship with its suppliers and / 
or customers) are insignificant. This stems from the assumption that customers are rational 
and their decisions are based on their perceptions about the viability rather than the 
ownership of the firm. Finally, they suggest that the costs that are attributed by others 
(Kraus and Litzenberger (1974), Scott (1976)) to bankruptcy should be attributed to 
                                                 
181 These contracting costs may be regarded as a special type of agency costs. 
182 See Webb (1987) for a formal demonstration of the implications of complete and incomplete information 
cases in explaining firm’s bankruptcy. 
183 The authors argue that under perfectly competitive capital markets where participants are rational price 
takers, bankruptcy costs can be minimized by informal reorganization (also popularized as private workouts). 
Alternative arrangements could the purchase, at market prices, of the outstanding debt by the shareholders, or 
the purchase of the equity by creditors, or outsiders purchasing the firm all together. 
184 For an account of some empirical evidence on financial distress and bankruptcy see the table appended to 
this chapter of the dissertation. 
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liquidation. They argue that liquidation is a capital budgeting question and therefore it 
should be considered independently of the bankruptcy problem.185 
Despite an intense research effort on this topic, the empirical evidence gathered so 
far cannot establish unambiguously the magnitude of the deadweight direct costs of 
bankruptcy. However, the significance of the costs resulting from the formal proceedings, 
including formal reorganizations, should not imply that they are relevant to the theory of 
optimal capital structure. If impediments to the privatization of the bankruptcy process did 
not exist, then a private workout or another informal reorganization mechanism achieved 
through the financial market could mitigate those costs.186 As the literature suggests, the 
free rider problem is a potential obstacle to pure market solutions or private workouts of 
financial distress and bankruptcy. 
In summary, all the theoretical progress accounted for in developing the trade-off 
theory of capital structure does not yet provide a satisfactory elucidation about firms’ 
strategic financing behavior in practice (e.g., Allen and Morris 1998). 
If an the examination of the firm’s capital structure policy under a static trade-off 
framework does not provide us with satisfactory answers, one should look elsewhere to 
ascertain the relevance of financial distress and bankruptcy arguments for capital structure 
decisions. One potentially promising route seems to be the search for linking bankruptcy 
with other considerations, such as agency relationships, strategic behavior in input/product 
markets, corporate control contests, and corporate governance transactions. Blair (1995, 
23-24), for example, analyzes the interrelation between financial distress and bankruptcy 
and corporate governance, concluding that it is of utmost relevance for capital structure 
policy. As a matter of fact, bankruptcy law makes a major contribution to illuminating the 
problem of the firm’s management and control under financial distress states. It also helps 
to bring some clarity to the difficult question of priority in claims. This aspect is of utmost 
relevance since the rights and power of disparate claimants affect their bargaining position 
vis-à-vis the firm. Another example is Grossman and Hart’s (1982) bankruptcy model. In 
                                                 
185 Bankruptcy and liquidation are independent economic phenomena. The former concerns the transference 
of ownership from stockholders to bondholders, the latter configure dismantling the firm’s assets and its sale 
piecemeal. The rationale for the liquidation decision is the net present value rule of capital budgeting 
irrespective of the financial state of the firm (bankrupt or non-bankrupt). Liquidation results from a context 
of financial distress, provided that the going concern value of the firm is lower than the liquidation value. 
186 See Haugen and Senbet (1978, 1988), Jensen (1989) and Giammarino (1989) for discussions in informal 
reorganizations and privatization of bankruptcy. 
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state of insolvency states stakeholders should be concerned about the value of the firm as a 
going concern. Well-diversified, atomistic equityholders will, however, have no incentive 
to invest in monitoring managers’ actions, as they attempt to keep the firm running. These 
equityholders have a negligible upside potential although an almost nonexistent downside; 
even assuming managers pursue increasingly risky policies. Creditors, on the other hand, 
will liquidate the firm if continuing operations represents a serious threat to the value of 
their claims. Therefore, both shareholders and creditors lack incentives compatible with the 
firm’s ability to survive and improve its long-term value. Managers, in contrast, because of 
the low diversification of their human capital investment  likely suffering a “hold-up” 
problem inherent to the specificity of that investment  will be better off in attempting to 
improve the going concern value of the firm.187 
As argued by Cornelli and Felli (1997), bankruptcy legal procedures attempt to 
maximize efficiency both ex-ante  concerning “the choice of what to do with 
the firm”  and ex-post  regarding the effects on incentives of the parties involved. 
Concerning the latter they see bankruptcy procedures as (1) providing the managers / 
owners of the bankrupted firm “with the right incentives to manage the 
firm so as to avoid ending up in financial distress;”188 (2) performing 
a protective role for “creditors’ interests” and therefore contributing to lowering 
the overall costs of the firm’s debt financing.189 
 In a different direction, Opler and Titman (1996) argue that “the most 
important costs associated with financial distress arise because 
of changes in the way that stakeholders view a firm as it moves 
towards financial distress.”190 Non-financial stakeholders  e.g. workers, 
                                                 
187 Amihud and Lev (1981) formalize the argument that the higher is managerial firm ownership, the more 
likely is for managers to pursue diversification strategies (at the firm level) because of their increased need 
for personal risk reduction. 
188 For example by providing them with the appropriate disincentives for undertaking risky strategies. For an 
account of the effects of bankruptcy incentives see, among others, Aghion and Bolton (1992), Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1996). 
189 According to the authors, the protection of creditors’ claims include, both, the attempt to maximize the 
proceeds to the creditors from the reorganization  (revenue efficiency rule) and the respect of the relative 
seniority of creditors’ claims (absolute priority rule). 
190 Opler and Titman (1996, 2): “in most cases major capital structure changes do affect 
how firms […] are perceived by their customers, suppliers, employees, and 
competitors. This is particularly true when the amount of debt leads these 
important stakeholders of the firm to question the firm’s future financial 
viability.” 
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suppliers and customers  are likely incur in spillover costs imposed upon by a firm in 
liquidation. The authors argue that financial distress resulting from increased leverage, 
affect competition  e.g., for market share  insofar as it may be rationalized as a capital 
budgeting problem. We could expect that highly leveraged firm, ceteris paribus, to 
underinvest as its debt tends to increase the discount rate the firms uses in making its 
capital budgeting decisions. Thus, a firm in this setup is likely to show a lower propensity 
to invest than it would if it were less levered. Hence, the discount rate will lower the firm’s 
incentive to undertake investments to increase its market share. They further hypothesize 
that there is an interaction between the dynamics of competitive behavior of the firm and 
the financial distress costs imposed upon non-financial stakeholders. They expect these 
considerations to be especially important for those firms with products that need future 
servicing, or for which the quality of their products is both very important and difficult to 
observe. Financial distress costs can also be high for firms that require their employees and 
suppliers to invest in product-specific training and physical capital. Differently, firms that 
produce non-durable goods or provide services that are not particularly specialized are 
expected to have very low financial distress costs.  
 Titman and Wessels (1988) report empirical evidence consistent with the view that 
the more leveraged firms do in fact lose market share compared to their more 
conservatively financed competitors in industry downturns.191 Despite, the impressive 
amount of work done on financial distress and bankruptcy considerations so far, we are 
still far from having a comprehensive, broadly explanatory and consensual theory on this 
matter. The sources of criticism of existing hypotheses are several. For example, Miller 
(1977) argues that costs associated with bankruptcy are not large enough to counterweight 
the tax benefits associated with debt-financing. Suvas (1997, 14) points out “the 
realism of several of these [bankruptcy] models is reduced by 
assuming a one-period horizon, risk-neutrality, or both.” Other 
authors are concerned with the static features of most bankruptcy models, which are not 
able to capture the dynamics of financial distress and bankruptcy processes (e.g., Fisher, 
Heinkel, and Zechner 1989). 
                                                 
191 Similarly, highly leveraged firms will be pinched during business cyclical downturns and are unlike to be 
able to respond when competitors launch strategic offensive moves to grab market share. 
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2.11. AGENCY THEORY CONSIDERATIONS AND CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE 
As earlier suggested, Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theoretical propositions on 
capital structure are deeply anchored in the neoclassical paradigm. In this theoretic 
perspective, the firm is viewed as a production function (or a black-box) without any 
consideration of any of the behavioral features that characterize actual firms. Thus, 
inherent to its positioning, the M-M model reflects the same weaknesses192 that are 
ascribed to the paradigm where its roots are embedded. Consequently, it is lacking the 
behavioral features that would enable it to describe satisfactorily the role managers play in 
the decision-making process of actual firms. One non-trivial problem associated with the 
neoclassical model of the competitive firm is related to the assumption that the owners 
have an effective part in controlling the use of firms’ assets.193 The implication of this is 
that the management team has no productive role in the neoclassical theory.194  
                                                
2.11.1. Shifting from the Neoclassical Paradigm 
The ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ Paradigm 
Undertaking contemporary types of projects and productive activity demand 
increased pooling of, among others, financial resources (capital). To deal with this 
requirement firms organize under larger and more complex legal designs of business 
organization than sole proprietorships and partnerships. And since the allocation of funds 
implied by the increased scale of projects and activities is, typically, out of reach for those 
more primitive forms of business organization, the modern corporation emerges as a much 
more open vehicle for pooling capital, and with less restricted residual claims.195 This 
notion is consistent with Hansmann’s (1996) contention that the “large-scale 
enterprise will be organized in the form of investor-owned firms.” 
This notion is also corroborated by Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) who claims that 
“[p]ublicly held corporations dominate other organizational forms 
when the technology of production requires firms to combine both 
the specialized skills of multiple agents and large amounts of 
capital.” 
 
192 See chapter II section 2 for an account. 
193 Henceforth we use owners/managers as insiders. Investors and outsiders are also assumed as synonyms. 
194 The neoclassical firm reflects the imperatives of the price system, not those of its management. 
Consequently, if the price system works well, resources are efficiently allocated. 
195 As point out by Fama and Jensen (1983), “the residual claims of different organizational 
forms contain different restrictions.” 
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Underlying this rationalization of the modern corporation, nowadays widely 
supported in the literature of the theory of the firm, are distinctive contractual features, 
such as, the limited liability provision, and the specialization in ownership and 
management (Eggertsson 1990). 
The observation (and acknowledgement) that large firms are not owned and 
operated by individual entrepreneurs is a viewpoint that was firstly identified by Adam 
Smith (1776) (see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999, Baskin and Miranti 
1997, and Fama and Jensen 1983).196, 197 Thus, Adam Smith recognized that the separation 
of the power committed to professional managers over the firm’s decision-making process, 
and the controlling power assigned to residual claimants, is a source of economic 
inefficiency due to the potential misalignment between their objective functions. This 
conflict of interest is at the genesis of the so-called agency problem.  
The Nexus-of-Contracts Theory of the Firm 
In 1932, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means198 hypothesized that in large 
corporations the ownership199 is separated from control,200 giving a formal expression to 
that important dichotomy, which is, indisputably, a central hypothesis in the theory of 
corporate finance.201 This remarkable contribution became the structural underpinning of 
                                                 
196 Auerbach (1992, 475) acknowledges that neoclassical economics “does not distinguish managers 
form owners since, at the time of its foundations were laid in the 1870’s, the 
dominant form of corporation ownership was still the single proprietorship.” This 
argument does not seem consistent with the observation that Adam Smith, nearly one century earlier, brought 
forward the intuition for the problem. 
197 Ricketts (1994, 218) claims that in his view, and according to Adam Smith, managers “look with 
less ‘anxious vigilance’ over the shareholders’ wealth than they would do over 
their own. Only if granted a monopoly or ‘exclusive privilege’, argued Smith, 
could the joint stock form of enterprise hope to prevail over the ‘private 
adventurer’” (The Wealth of the Nations, Edwin Cannan, ed. Methuen, London, 4th ed. vol. 2, 233). 
198 “The split between ownership and control in the widely held corporation is 
often virtually complete, with ownership vested in a large and diverse population 
of stockholders and control wielded by a small group of professional managers. 
For this kind of corporation, it is no longer realistic to regard management as 
the hired hand of the owner” (Berle and Means 1932).  
199 The “[t]heory of ownership addresses the question of how […] residual control 
rights are allocated efficiently” (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
200 Berle and Means used control as meaning to perform the functions and exercise authority over the 
management of a firm. See Williamson (1964) for a discussion of the separation of ownership and control in 
the corporation 
201 According to (Bolton and Scharfstein 1998) “[u]nderstanding the agency costs stemming 
from the ‘divorce of ownership from control’ is now the central issue in 
corporate finance, and has been for some time”. Allen and Winston (1995) are also very 
assertive when claiming that “the nexus of contract model is the dominant paradigm in 
modern corporate finance.” 
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what would develop as the agency theory, and indirectly, as an essential requirement for 
the understanding of corporate governance problems.202 
The Berle and Means hypothesis, postulating the separation of a firm’s ownership 
from its control, suggests that the firm has thereby to be viewed as a complex nexus of 
contracts among claimholders, making the firm a kind of a legal fiction.203 Jensen and 
Smith (1985) support this notion, arguing that it helps to understand that organizations do 
not have rational behavior, in the sense that they do not have preferences, make choices, 
like individuals. Otherwise, “[t]he behavior of an organization is the 
equilibrium behavior of a complex contractual system made up of 
maximizing agents with diverse and conflicting objectives.” 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983) the rationale for the phenomenon of 
separation between ownership and control should be looked for in “the unrestricted 
nature of the residual claims of open corporations” which, typically, 
determine an “almost complete separation and specialization of 
decision functions and residual risk bearing.”  
Fama and Jensen (1983 a, b) argue that the separation of decision-making functions 
from residual risk-bearing  the ubiquitous problem of the separation of ownership and 
control  is a recurrent pattern observed across (large) organizations, whatever legal 
format they choose to structure their organization, and despite an unequivocal 
predominance of open corporations. Additionally, they suggest that the explanation for the 
persistence and the magnitude of this phenomenon may found in “the benefits of 
specialization of management and risk bearing” and to “an effective 
                                                 
202 In their analysis, Berle and Means, also provided empirical evidence showing that a substantial amount of 
assets of firms in their sample were under the control of management teams with scarce ownership holdings 
in these firms. However, recently this theory started to be empirically challenged (e.g., Demsetz 1983, 
Demsetz and Lehn 1985, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988, Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan 1999, and 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). These latter authors present evidence on ownership structure 
of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies. Their findings do not support Berle and Means (1932)’s 
separation of ownership and control hypothesis, and they argue that the “principal agency problem in 
large corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of 
minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders.” 
203 A stakeholder is a vested claimant, of any sort, on the firm. John and Senbet (1998, 372) categorize as 
stakeholders of a corporation equityholders, creditors, other financiers, employees, consumers, suppliers, and 
the government. See Chapter 2 section 3 for a discussion of the nexus-of-contracts view of the firm. 
- 57 - 
  
common approach to controlling the agency problems caused by the 
separation of decision and risk-bearing functions.”204 
2.11.2. Agency Theory in a Corporate Finance Environment 
The agency theory addresses the problem of contractual relationship in which one 
party  the principal  delegates work to another party  the agent  who is 
empowered with some decision-making power in order to perform that work (see Smith 
1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976; and Ross 1973). Hence, agency theory attempts to 
explain this agency relationship using the metaphor of a contract (Eisenhardt 1989).205 Not 
surprisingly, one of the agency theory’s primary concerns relates to the design of the 
efficient contractual arrangements. Underlying this contractual mechanism is a complex set 
of assumptions associated with behavioral, organizational and informational 
considerations. Concerning the former, agency theory works out of individual’s self-
interestedly behavior, bounded rationality,206 and risk aversion. Conflicts of interest among 
participants, efficiency as the effectiveness criterion, and differential information 
endowments between principal and agent, are the organizational assumptions. Finally, 
information is assumed to be a purchasable commodity. 
When firms’ characteristics are unobservable, outside investors may be at a 
disadvantage because insiders (owners/managers) have the incentive to behave 
opportunistically.207 As suggested by Bolton and Scharfstein (1998, 100) “[t]he 
diffuse equity ownership structure implied in Berle and Means’ 
argument gives managers effective control of the firm, raising 
concerns about the possibility of managers to run the firm to 
their own benefit, possibly at the expense of investors.” Therefore, 
residual claimants (principals) need to exercise their ownership control rights and monitor 
agents’ decision-making. In this framework, principals bear the major part of the risk, 
trading it off for the economic surplus generated in the firm’s productive undertakings 
                                                 
204 The same authors further hypothesize that “contract structures of all of these 
organizations separate the ratification and monitoring of decisions from 
initiation and implementation of the decisions.” 
205 See, e.g., Eisenhardt (1989) for a most thoughtful and insightful discussion of the agency theory. 
206 Implies that individuals are utility maximizers, but do not have the computational ability to estimate, 
rationally and unbiasedly, all the expected effects of an agency relationship on the future value of his/her 
wealth. They are not fully rational in Simon’s (1997) sense. At best, and given a set of alternatives, and a 
utility function, they are able to compute the alternative that maximizes utility or, in the case of uncertainty, 
the subjective expected utility (Simon 1997).  
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(Fama and Jensen 1983a). Because decision-agents do not bear a substantial share of the 
potential adverse wealth effects of their decisions, principals’ wealth may be at risk in 
adverse states of the world. Therefore they naturally engage in hedging strategies, 
attempting to diversify away their risk. As an individual principal gets his/her portfolio 
adequately diversified he loses the incentive to exercise his (costly) ownership control 
rights (e.g., Fama 1980). 
Agency theory developed in the literature along two different, though related, 
theoretical paths: the normative (principal-agent) and the positive.208 
The positive approach has been mostly concerned with describing the governance 
mechanisms209 that are hypothesized to alleviate agency problems, emphasizing the 
associated contracting costs.210 Among the most influential contributors to the positive 
agency theory are Jensen and Meckling (1976).211 Other important contributors to this 
strand of agency literature are, e.g., Fama and Miller 1972, Jensen 1983, Barnea, Haugen 
and Senbet 1985, Jensen and Smith 1985, Jensen (1986), and Stulz 1991. 
The principal-agent theory is based in models whose foundations are the 
hypotheses concerning structure preferences, information structures and the nature of 
uncertainty. Like any other formal theory, it involves the careful specification of 
assumptions, logical deduction and mathematical proof. The theory attempts to explain 
which of the available contracting alternatives is more efficient in shaping agency 
relationships under (random) uncertainty, risk aversion, and information asymmetry.212  
                                                 
207 Eggertsson (1990) defines opportunistic behavior as a “breach of contract involving 
strategic manipulation of information.” 
208 Williamson (1988) and Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1985) make a similar point. For them the agency 
theory also has to branches: the economic agency theory and the financial agency theory. The first one 
corresponds to the Jensen (1985)’s normative branch and the second the positive. 
209 Eisenhardt (1989) formalize two propositions that capture the essence of the governance mechanisms 
identified with the positive agency theory. Proposition 1: “When the contract between principal 
and agent is outcome based, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests 
of the principal.” Proposition 2: “When the principal has information to verify agent 
behavior, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal.” 
210 See, e.g., Charreaux (1987) for a review of the literature on the positive theory of agency.  
211 Methodologically, the positive agency theory builds on an inferential hypothetical-deductive model and 
on behavioral and optimal incentive contracting. Its arguments are deeply interwoven with the property rights 
view of economics (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976) and are complementary to transaction costs economics 
(e.g., Williamson 1988). 
212 The argument behind the presumption that agents are more risk averse than principals results from the 
former being underdiversified human-capital investors, and the idiosyncratic nature of its associated risk. As 
pointed out, among others, by Friend and Hasbrouk (1988, 2) “management’s stake in the firm, 
reflecting both holdings of marketable securities and firm-specific human 
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Major fields of inquiry include optimal risk sharing problems, incentives in contracting, 
characteristics of optimal contracts and properties of equilibrium solutions in a general 
equilibrium framework (welfare analysis) (see, e.g., Ross 1973, Harris and Raviv 1979, 
and Grossman and Hart 1983, Sappington 1991, and Rajan 1992). 
Agency Relationships 
A very simple setup will help to frame the problem of an agency relationship. An 
entrepreneur (or a manager) is endowed with an investment opportunity but lacking the 
resources required to undertake the project, needs to raise these funds from investors.213 
The financiers need the owner/manager’s specialized human capital to generate the returns 
on their funds.214 This illustration shows that, in a framework of separation of financing 
and management or in more standard terminology of ownership and control, at the heart of 
an agency problem there is an agency relationship between a principal and an agent.215, 216  
Agency Problems 
The agency problem is an essential element of the so-called contractual view of the 
firm developed by Coase, Williamson, Jensen and Meckling and Fama and Jensen, among 
others. An understanding of this agency problem is pivotal to the concept of agency 
relationship which is, as seen in the previous section, essentially a contractual arrangement 
(Ross 1973). Thus, it is not surprising that agency problems at the firm level arise basically 
because contracts between managers (decision or control agents) and owners (risk bearers) 
cannot be costlessly written and enforced. 
Several conditions should be present for an agency problem to arise in an agency 
relationship. Firstly, a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent must 
                                                 
capital, is both large and largely nondiversifiable.” Otherwise, principals’ risk neutrality 
preference it is a direct implication of their assumed ability to hold well-diversified portfolios.  
213 In the agency arrangement the principal is compelled to engage an agent because he is lacking the 
specialized skills and / or knowledge needed to perform the tasks involved in a given undertaking. 
214 In broad terms, external capital suppliers and the management team contract over (1) the control rights on 
how to manage the supplied funds, and (2) the allocation of parties’ claims on future cash flow stream. 
Ideally, a (complete) contract specifying faultlessly all parties’ actions, payoffs and penalties in all (possible 
future) states should be written. A complication arises, however, as it is widely recognized that it is 
“practically impossible to list the entire range of outcomes and contingencies 
that might affect contractual performance” (Al-Najjar 1995, 432). Therefore, complete 
contracting is technologically impracticable. 
215 Under the neoclassical theory of the firm the ownership of equity capital is without consequences 
concerning its (property) rights to residual control (see chapter II, section 3, p.14). 
216 This separation between owners and managers, is no more no less than a particular case of governor 
(principal) and representative (agent) relationship, designated in the literature by agency relationship. For a 
insightful discussion see Pratt and Zeckhauser (1985, 1:24)  
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develop. This condition, though necessary, is not sufficient, because in a world without 
uncertainty  with perfect observability of agent’s actions  it would be possible, ex 
ante, to write an incentive contract to induce the agent to act in the principal’s best 
interest.217 Assuming that a binding contract laying down each party’s obligation and 
payoffs for any conceivable eventuality in every possible future state of the world could be 
written at no cost, then the agency problem would disappear. So, the existence of the 
agency problem is also associated with the uncertainty  the imperfect observability of 
agent actions  and the costs of writing and executing contracts.  
Agency Costs 
Earlier we explained that agency problems arise because contracts are not 
costlessly designed, written, executed and enforced. In a world à la Modigliani Miller 
where transaction costs are assumed away, agency costs would naturally be nonexistent. 
However, as pointed out by the incomplete contract literature, transaction costs incurred in 
unforeseen future contingencies, and in writing and enforcing contracts are non-trivial 
(e.g., Tirole 1999, 743-4). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were more specific in suggesting that agency costs are 
the sum of the out-of-the-pocket costs of structuring, administering, and enforcing 
contracts (both formal and informal) plus any residual losses involved.218 Enforcing costs 
include both monitoring and bonding costs.219  
Summarizing, agency costs include all costs frequently referred to as contracting 
costs, transaction costs, moral-hazard costs and information costs. 220Generally, legal and 
institutional arrangements and capital structure transactions are devices suggested in the 
literature as helpful to mitigate the magnitude of agency problems and consequently ease 
its associated costs.221 
                                                 
217 It is equivalent to writing a complete contract. See, e.g., Tirole (1999) for further details and references to 
the related literature. 
218 According to Jensen and Smith (1985, 96) “[t]he residual loss represents the opportunity 
loss remaining when contracts are optimally but imperfectly enforced.” 
219 Copeland and Weston (1988, 20) observe that “in most agency relationships the owner will 
incur nontrivial monitoring costs in order to keep the agent in line.” 
220 Namely includes the costs associated with bankruptcy, the so-called asset substitution and 
underinvestment problems. 
221 Bolton and Scharfstein (1998, 101) argue that “[o]ne can interpret certain corporate 
governance arrangements and capital structures as attempts to mitigate agency 
problems” See, e.g., John and Senbet (1998) for a similar argument. 
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2.11.3. Capital Structure Decisions in a Positive Agency Theory Framework 
In the last 20 years a significant research effort was undertaken in building a body 
of literature focusing broadly on the conflicts of interest between firm claimholders.222 The 
intellectual foundation of this stream of literature is widely recognized to be associated 
with the pioneering work of Fama and Miller (1972) and the influential paper of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). 
As discussed earlier, agency problems arise in a separation of ownership and 
control framework in the sense of Berle and Means (1932).223 Managerial self-interest 
behavior induced by managers’ ownership holdings is thus of paramount importance as a 
potential source of economic inefficiency stemming from their decision-making behavior 
and congruity with owners’ objective function. 
Conflicts of interests do not arise exclusively from manager-shareholder agency 
relationships. Other claimholders, such as debtholders, also have vested interests in the 
firm. However, in this positive agency theoretical approach to corporate capital structure 
problems, we will be focusing on the more emblematic agency problems arising between 
managers and shareholders, and between shareholders and debtholders.224 
Capital Structure Agency Problems 
The most conspicuous agency problems related to capital structure decision, in both 
the academic and practitioner’s literatures, are associated with incentive conflicts that stem 
from (incomplete) contractual arrangements among shareholders and managers, and 
shareholders and debtholders.225, 226 These problems engender economic inefficiencies, 
                                                 
222 See Harris and Raviv (1991) for a survey of this literature. 
223 In this context, whenever professional managers, entrepreneur, and other corporate insiders are in control 
of the decision-making process of the firm we refer to them collectively as ‘managers’ or ‘insiders’. 
224 We acknowledge the existence of other kinds of agency problems such as the ones resulting from conflicts 
of interest between controlling and minority shareholders, old and new shareholders. However the nature of 
their impact on corporate capital structure choice do not make them a primary concern for this study. 
225 Agency theoretical framework has also the ability to handle the conflicts of interests arising within the 
agency relationship between headquarters’ managers and divisional managers established in an internal 
capital market setup. This issue is referenced in the literature as the internal capital market agency problem 
(see Bolton and Scharfstein 1998, Williamson 1985, 1975, among others). 
226 We adopted in this setting “debtholders” instead of (perhaps) the more traditional “bondholders”, to 
acknowledge the ability of positive agency theory to, generally, address capital structure choices of firms of 
all sizes and issuing financing instruments in unequally developed financial systems, independently of being 
publicly traded or not. Several authors (see, e.g., Hand, Lloyd and Rogow 1982) suggest that agency theory is 
relevant in explaining small and medium firms’ financial policy. Berger and Udell (1998, 629) express an 
opposing viewpoint arguing that, contrastingly, empirical evidence of the “1993 National Survey of Small 
Business Finances” is consistent with the argument that “agency problems […] in choosing capital 
structure […] that are driven by the separation of ownership and control are often 
irrelevant for small firms.” 
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where adverse wealth effects have an influence on investors’ valuation of firm securities 
and their willingness to supply funds. 
Shareholder-Manager Agency Problems 
Sources of Shareholder-Manager Problems 
Typically, the most prevailing causes involved in shareholder-manager agency 
problems are: (1) managers’ level of effort; (2) managers’ decision horizon preferences; (3) 
differential risk preferences between managers and shareholders; (4) managerial self-
interested behavior; (5) overinvestment policy; and (6) firm’s asset use (see, e.g., Bird, 
Parrino, and Pritsch 1998, Jensen and Smith 1985, and Barnea, Haugen and Senbet 1985).  
Concerning the level of effort in carrying out their managerial duties, it is well 
explained in the positive agency theoretic literature (see, e.g., Fama 1980, Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, and Ross 1973) that managers may have the incentive not to exert the 
appropriate (and expected by shareholders) level of effort.227 The rationale for this 
managerial behavior might relate to managerial fractional ownership holdings, which 
allows them to capture (merely) the correspondent proportion of the economic surplus 
generated by the firm.228 
Under current corporate laws, firms are incorporated aiming at a perpetual 
existence. Therefore, they exhibit longer time horizons than their managers whose personal 
tenures are shorter. Thus, managers may feel some pressure to achieve investment results 
sooner than stockholders. This problem may affect a firm’s investment policy, particularly 
because of the potential to forego profitable investment opportunities with long expected 
maturities (see, e.g., Narayanan 1996; Jensen and Meckling 1979; and Furubotn and 
Pejovich 1973). 
Managers, typically, are undiversified investors (of firm-specific human capital). In 
contrast, shareholders are assumed to hold well-diversified (financial asset) portfolios. By 
implication, managers tend to behave with risk aversion, while investors show risk 
neutrality (e.g., Amihud and Lev 1981; and Fama 1980).229 These differential risk 
                                                 
227 Dybvig and Zender (1991, 215) assert that "usual agency-model trade-offs between 
incentives and risk sharing imply that the manager will not, at the 
entrepreneur's optimum, expend a first-best level of effort."  
228 Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the smaller the manager’s ownership holdings, the greater the 
incentive to shirk, or exert less than full effort in shareholders’ value-enhancing activities. 
229 As suggested by Reagan and Stulz (1983) managers are indeed concerned with the firm’s total risk even 
the component that can be diversified away. 
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preferences are the consequence of managers having so much of their own wealth tied up 
to the ongoing viability of the firm.230  
Managers may pursue their own objective function, acting in their own self-interest 
instead of that of the owners. Attempts to insulate themselves from takeovers (e.g., by 
proposing changes in corporate charters and/or adopting golden parachutes) is an 
illustration of such behavior.231 Another particularly acute agency problem is related to 
discretion of entrenched managers over a firm’s capital structure.232 Managers may show a 
preference for underleveraging because they (1) “desire to reduce firm risk to 
protect their undiversified human capital” (e.g., Fama 1980); (2) 
“dislike of performance pressures associated with commitments to 
disgorge large amounts of cash” (e.g., Jensen 1986). In contrast, Harris and 
Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) suggest that managerial entrenchment may induce 
overleverage as an attempt to increase voting rights and reduce the likelihood of takeover 
threats.233 
Finally, managers may divert firm resources to their own personal ends misusing 
firm’s assets or consuming unreasonable amounts of non-pecuniary resources, such as, 
luxurious offices, unnecessary jets and yachts, expensive company cars, memberships in 
clubs, and the like.234 The incentive for managers to exhibit this type of behavior is a direct 
consequence of their fractional contribution to the costs inherent in their self-servicing 
conduct.235 Monitoring is likely to be a solution for this problem. However, this kind of 
                                                 
230 Recently Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) hypothesized that managers’ concern about (their) job security 
“creates an incentive for managers to smooth earnings in consideration of both 
current and future relative performance.” This activity is anticipated by shareholders who incur 
in monitoring costs (auditing, for example) to mitigate the magnitude of this agency problem. Chaney and 
Lewis (1998) provide empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis in a sample of 489 firms 
documenting a positive association between a surrogate for income smoothing and firm performance. 
231 According to Furubotn (1972, 1151) it “[…] seems true that the observed behavior of 
managers does deviate from the pattern that would insure profit maximization.” 
232 Berber, Ofek and Yermack’s (1997, 1411) conceptualize management entrenchment as “the extent to 
which managers fail to experience discipline from the full range of corporate 
governance and control mechanisms, including monitoring by the board, the threat 
of dismissal or takeover, and stock- or compensation-based compensation 
incentives.” 
233 Berber, Ofek and Yermack (1997) suggest that entrenched managers may also overleverage a firm’s 
capital structure as a signal of their willingness to restructure and therefore to preempt takeover threats. 
234 According to Furibotn and Pejovich (1972, 1151) the “manager's consumption of nonpecuniary 
goods was incorporated formally into the [economic] theory” after Becker's (1957) 
foundational contribution. 
235 As suggest by Wall (1988, 14), among others, “[t]he costs of overspending on nonpecuniary 
benefits are ultimately borne by the owner-manager as potential shareholders 
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behavior is not easily, readily and costlessly, observable. Therefore, in large corporations 
with widely dispersed ownership, where individual atomistic owners lack the incentive to 
expend the large (when compared with his investment) amounts of resources required to 
monitoring the behavior of managers, this problem may be more severe.  A similar effect 
stems from new outside equity issues because insiders’ ownership holdings are reduced, 
contributing to exacerbate self-serving behavior. In these instances, however, external 
investors anticipate future losses in value due to expected agency costs, and consequently 
adjust their valuations by the amount of those costs. This reduction in the firm’ value is 
inevitably borne by the owner-manager, who has his wealth tied-up with it. 
Mechanisms to Mitigate Shareholder-Manager Agency Problems 
A number of organizational devices and market mechanisms are available to help in 
controlling agency costs inherent to the misalignment between shareholders and managers’ 
objectives that lead to the exercise of managerial discretion (see, e.g., Agrawal and 
Knoeber 1996). 
External Mechanisms / Competitive Markets Mechanisms 
Extant competition in product markets exerts a disciplinary role over managers not 
running the firm in the shareholders’ best interest. The suggestion, by Demsetz (1983, 
379:380) that firms may become less price competitive if because too much cash flow was 
drained out of firm’s prices escalate illustrates the argument.236 
As pointed out by Fama (1980), among others, competitive managerial-labor 
markets by play a significant part in managers’ human-capital valuation and therefore 
might be influential in lessening firm’s agency problems. The value of managers’ human-
capital is typically contingent on their performance, and consequently tends to be tied up to 
compensation through such devices as bonuses and executive stock options plans.237 
                                                 
reduce the price they pay for the new stock in recognition of management’s 
increased incentive to spend on perks.”  
236 Jensen and Meckling (1976, 22) although acknowledging that “it is frequently argued that 
the existence of competition in product (and factor) markets will constrain the 
behavior of managers to idealized value maximization,” claim that their analysis does not 
support the hypothesis. See also Jensen (1986) for further considerations on the managerial disciplinary role 
of product and factor markets. 
237 Because in labor markets à la Fama (1980) managers bear their own reputation, equilibrium wages reflect 
managers’ performance reputation. Besides the monetary compensation they earn from the firm, managers 
may also advantage (disadvantage) from labor market recognition as a source of enhancing (reducing) the 
value of their human capital, which may also be firm-specific leading to the correlative hold-up problems. 
According to Blair (1997, 8) “[…] firm-specific human capital is an important factor in 
determining the structure of many employment relationships.” Additionally, reputation 
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Hence, writing managers’ compensation contracts indexed to firm performance provides 
an incentive for managers to align themselves with shareholders’ objective function.238  
Financial markets play an important role in mitigating capital structure agency 
problems for three different reasons.  First, security markets allow investors to liquidate 
their security holdings if the firm is not run to their best interests. Sell-offs by unsatisfied 
shareholders are likely to drive share price down, hurting managers’ wealth through the 
link of compensation to stock performance. Additionally, new journeys to market may 
become unpredictably more hazardous.  
A second major external factor in resolving agency problems is the market for 
corporate control.239 This is a market where competing management teams, perceiving an 
opportunity to create value, bid for decision-making rights, while owners accept or reject 
the offers (Jensen and Ruback 1983). Substandard decision-making adversely affects share 
price and attracts bidders, increasing the likelihood that managers will be dismissed 
following an acquisition. This discipline is less effective when managers control large 
blocks of the firm’s stock. 
 Lastly, and as argued by some scholars, the market for contingent claims can be 
useful in lessening some shareholder-manager problems through the use of specially 
designed financial securities. Notably, certain types of financial contracts which have 
embedded in them some particular contractual options-like features may contribute to 
solve and/or mitigate agency relationship (and asymmetric information problems) (see, 
e.g., Nöldeke and Schmidt 1995, DeFusco, Zorn, and Johnson 1991, Agrawal and 
Mandelker 1987, and Haugen and Senbet 1981).240 
The banking literature has highlighted the distinctive monitoring function of banks.  
Several studies have advanced the unique monitoring role of banks and conclude that 
                                                 
effects may provide managers perceived as more effective with more job opportunities and more highly 
rewarded, resulting in an incentive for the alignment of managers’ and owners’ objective functions. 
238 The effectiveness of tying managerial compensation to shareholders’ wealth in aligning managers / 
equityholders objectives is a consequence of  rendering managers residual claimants on the firm’s future cash 
flow stream. 
239 Manne (1965) has to be credited for having coined the expression. Literature in the field includes, among 
others, Manne (1965), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Grossman and Hart (1980a, 1980b, 1981), and Harris and 
Raviv (1988). 
240 As hypothesized by Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995, 163) writing option contracts could be helpful in 
overcoming the Hart-Moore’s (1988) underinvestment problem arising in a hold-up setting. 
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banks have a comparative advantage in serving this purpose. Stiglitz (1985), among others, 
argues for this disciplining role of banks.241  
Internal Mechanisms / Direct Contractual Provisions 
As suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), among others, managers’ (residual) 
claims on residual return are likely to affect the magnitude of the agency costs of equity. 
Thus, arguably, managerial ownership of a firm’s stock helps align the interests of 
managers with those of stockholders by increasing the costs to managers of shirking and/or 
excessive assets use. It also helps to reduce the horizon problem if share prices quickly 
adjust to reflect changes in corporate value. Large stock ownership by managers can create 
problems, however, if managers use the control to block beneficial takeovers or to exert 
some form of influence over the selection of the firm’s directors. 
Dispersed residual claimants in publicly held corporations are entitled to voting 
rights, a device through which they exert (either in person or by proxy) ownership control 
rights.242 Exercising control in corporations by voting is required because someone must 
have the residual power to act (or delegate) when contracts are not complete. Managers’ 
perception that shareholders’ “claims could be aggregated and votes 
exercised at any time” complements monitoring as a device to provide the 
appropriate incentives to promote the alignment between managers and shareholders.  
Monitoring managers is a popular alternative for controling managerial 
discretionary behavior. The monitoring mechanisms most frequently used include: (1) 
competition among managers for recognition and personal advancement; (2) monitoring by 
compensation committee; (3) managers’ reciprocal monitoring (see, e.g., Jensen and Smith 
1985, 102, and Furubotn and Pejovich 1972, 1151); and (4) monitoring by the board of 
directors (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). Managerial compensation contracting defines 
the vector of payments to managers. It therefore performs a crucial role in attempting to 
minimize the misalignment of managers’ and shareholders’ objective functions.243 Periodic 
                                                 
241 See also Diamond 1996, 1984, Lummer and McConnell 1989, Boyd and Prescott 1986, Stiglitz 1985, and 
Fama 1985. 
242 The right to vote in shareholders’ meetings has a economic value, because voting shares generally trade at 
higher prices than non-voting shares (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1977). 
243 Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) formalize two underlying principles of an economic theory of 
compensation (1) “models of compensation generally assume that higher performance 
requires greater effort or that it is in some other way associated with 
disutility on the part of workers;” and (2) “In order to provide incentives, these 
[compensation] models predict the existence of reward systems that structure 
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performance reviews and incentive compensation (beyond the base salary) in the form of 
accounting-based bonuses, grants of stock options, performance shares, stock appreciation 
rights, or restricted stock can alleviate a variety of agency conflicts.244 However, the design 
of compensation plans is likely to lead to additional sources of conflict of interest between 
residual claimants and managers because of the structure of their respective payoffs. 
A strong and independent board of directors can limit the divergences of managers 
and shareholders as to wealth maximization by closely monitoring managerial decision-
making. In the most recent years blockholder and shareholder activism flourished steadily 
and broadly. Owners of large blocks of share holdings show greater incentive than small 
shareholders to monitor the activities of managers (e.g., Bolton and Von Thadden 1998). 
Similarly, institutional investors became more and more concerned about corporate 
governance problems, consistently exerting their influence in designing managers’ 
compensation arrangement and in implementing monitoring solutions, both aimed at 
curtailing managerial discretion and making managers’ payoffs sensitive to shareholders’ 
wealth (e.g., Chakraborty and Baum 1998). 
As suggested by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990), among others, financing and 
dividend policies are also helpful to inducing managers to run the firm in the owners’ best 
interest. Because leveraging up the capital structure increases the likelihood of financial 
distress245 and forces managers to distribute cash, it may provide the appropriate incentive 
for inducing managers to (1) raise their level of effort on managerial duties; (2) decrease 
the over-consumption of the firm’s resources; and (3) avoid suboptimal investment 
policies. Buying back shares also contributes to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. 
Finally, dividend payments (including specially designated dividends, see Gombola and 
Liu 1999) reduce internal funds subject to managerial discretion and force managers to 
                                                 
compensation so that a worker’s expected utility increases with observed 
productivity.”  
244 Consistently with Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) and Weisbach (1988) Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) 
hypothesize that “accounting measures of performance are better predictors of 
management turnover than stock-price performance.” The intuition behind this prediction is 
that whereas (accounting) earnings pertain to incumbent management team, stock returns, additionally, 
reflect investors’ expectations about the performance of future management teams.   
245 Financial distress is costly for managers because they risk (1) losing their control rights; and (2) being 
adversely affected in their reputation in the managerial labor market, and therefore be deprived of  the private 
rents associated to controlling the firm decision-making and to their own reputation on the labor market for 
managers (Grossman and Hart 1982). 
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finance growth with external funds, and therefore to subject themselves to greater capital 
markets scrutiny (e.g., Easterbrook 1984; and Rozeff 1982).246 
Shareholders-Debtholders Agency Problems 
Conflicts of interest between equityholders and debtholders are a consequence of 
the various forms of opportunistic behavior that allow owners to attempt to add to their 
own wealth at debtholders’ expense. The opportunity for such behavior arises because 
debtholders, when designing their investment strategies, price their claims ex-ante based in 
pre-contractual assumptions related, for example, to leverage and dividend policies as well 
as to levels of financial and business risks. It is reasonable to assume that rational 
investors, aiming at maximizing their expected utility, will try to anticipate wealth effects 
arising from the incentives driving managers’ decision-making. Since debtholders are able 
to anticipate, on average, the value effects of equityholders future decisions, they will not 
suffer losses unless they systematically underestimate effects of such future actions. 
However, if after debt has been issued, debtholder expectations about those future policies 
prove wrong, then debtholders are not able to reprice their claims in order to reflect 
increased marginal risk. Therefore, wealth transfers beneficial for equityholders will occur.  
However, because debtholders tend to anticipate firm future policies and 
incorporate such expectations into the way they price their claims, the firm (and hence its 
equityholders) will incur agency costs from all those suboptimal decisions motivated by 
anticipated wealth transfers by debtholders. Therefore, writing contractual mechanisms 
that might control the severity of equityholder-equityholder conflicts could help in 
reducing these agency costs and therefore be value-enhancing at the firm level. 
As we said earlier, various forms of opportunistic behavior might be able to create 
equityholder-debtholder agency problems. The so-called claim dilution problems are a 
consequence of equityholders either being able to liquidate the firm’s assets and therefore 
increasing the risk (and reducing the value) of outstanding bondholders’ claims, or as 
indicated by Jensen and Smith (1985), to issue additional debt with the same (or higher) 
priority. Furthermore, when there is (risky) debt outstanding, equityholders have risk 
shifting incentives since equity has a convex payoff structure that makes it benefit by 
                                                 
246 It should be noted that dividend payouts are not definite commitments from managers to return cash flow 
to shareholders in the sense that these payments may be reduced or even eliminated. 
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shifting into higher risk projects even when the incremental NPV is negative (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). 
Unexpected increases in dividend payments, at the expense of reducing investment 
and/or issuing additional debt, represent another form of wealth transfer from debtholders 
to shareholders (e.g., Kalay 1982). 
Suboptimal investment policies are another important source of equityholder-
debtholder agency problems. As explained (Jensen and Smith 1985, 111) “the value 
of the stockholders’ equity rises and the value of bondholders’ 
claim is reduced when the firm substitutes high-risk for low-risk 
projects.” Thus, equityholders can transfer value at debtholders expense by increasing 
investment risk after debt financing has been issued. This is known in the agency literature 
as the asset substitution problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Galai and Masulis 1976; and 
Jensen and Smith 1985).247 Equityholders of firms with outstanding (risky) debt have 
incentives to forego profitable investment opportunities because a portion of the profits 
from investment projects accrues to debtholders while the costs of such projects are borne 
by equityholders. This type of opportunistic behavior has been popularized as the 
underinvestment problem (Myers 1977, 1984). Another problem arises when partial 
ownership and limited liability is present and equityholders are able to fully benefit from 
successful projects, but may not bear the total cost of negative NPV investments. This 
creates an incentive for overinvestment (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
As suggested by Gavish and Kalay (1983), among others, agency costs of debt are 
also positively related to financial leverage, and therefore the total agency costs of debt can 
be described as a monotonically increasing function of the firm’s leverage ratio.248  
Mitigating Mechanisms of Shareholder-Debtholders Agency Problems 
Among the various mechanisms suggested to mitigate this kind of agency problem 
is (intensive) monitoring by debtholders.249 However, because debtholders are assumed to 
                                                 
247 Gavish and Galay (1983) questioned this argument arguing that “shareholders’ wealth increase 
from (following) an unexpected increment in the investment’ risk, […] is not 
increasing monotonically with the firm’s leverage ratio.” 
248 Agency costs of debt include, in addition to the costs associated with the asset substitution problem, 
bonding, monitoring, and bankruptcy costs, as well as the costs associated with the underinvestment problem. 
249 A substitute monitoring device highlighted in the banking literature is the unique monitoring role of banks 
(e.g., Diamond 1984, Fama 1985, Boyd and Prescott 1986, and Lummer and McConnell 1989).  
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holding well-diversified portfolios and likely to incur free-riding they might not have the 
inappropriate incentives to engage in monitoring.250  
An alternative mechanism to control conflicts inherent to financing policy is to 
impose restrictive covenants in debt contracts affecting financing, dividend, investment, 
and production policies (Smith and Warner 1979). However, as noted by several authors 
(e.g., Smith and Warner 1979; Malitz 1986) despite their effectiveness, writing covenants 
in debt contracts is costly and does not ensure the elimination of all agency problems.251 
Stulz and Johnson (1985) suggest collateralizing assets as a useful device to mitigate asset 
substitution and under-investment problems. However, when collateralization is not a valid 
option then a greater degree of monitoring might be appropriate. Firms that are intensive 
users of intangible assets are expected to carry less debt and to use short-term debt. 
As suggested by Mikkelson (1981), Haugen and Senbet (1981), Barnea, Haugen 
and Senbet (1980) Smith and Warner (1979), Bodie and Taggart (1978), and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), among many others, issuing hybrid financing instruments, such as 
convertible bonds, callable bonds, and bonds with warrants attached, might be helpful in 
lessening agency costs of debt. 
Other mechanisms, such as using short-term debt, progressive debt payments, 
leasing arrangements, (Myers (1977) as well as monitoring mechanisms, such as the 
market for corporate control and delegated monitoring, are often suggested in the literature 
as complementary instruments to curb this kind of agency costs. 
2.12. AN ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION APPROACH TO THE FIRM’S CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
DECISION 
Introduction 
One of the instrumental assumptions required by the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
capital structure irrelevance theory refers to the homogeneity of expectations of capital 
market participants with respect to the firm’s future cash flow stream. This assumption, 
which is a necessary condition for the M-M theory to hold, requires an economic 
                                                 
250 The following section describes the free-rider problem. 
251 Costs of writing covenants include bonding and enforcement costs and legal liability to bondholders if a 
firm breaches contractual arrangements with third parties in an attempt to comply with covenants. 
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environment where investors possess complete, perfect and costless information about the 
true value of the firm.252  
It is widely accepted that in financial contracting the parties typically do not have 
complete knowledge of everything they should know to make optimal decisions. 
Additionally, besides being incompletely informed, parties  insiders and outside 
investors  are in general also unequally informed.253 This phenomenon of an unequal 
distribution of information among the contracting parties is well known in the literature as 
the asymmetric information problem. Furthermore, it is well established that the market 
failure in symmetrically distributing information flows among agents is not, first, costless 
and, second, introduces incentive problems in financial contracting. These incentives are 
potential impediments preventing prices from fully reflecting available information and 
therefore affecting the firm market valuation.254 Thus, asymmetric information problems 
affect the distribution of wealth among market participants, and do play a role in resource 
allocation.  
Asymmetric Information and the Firm’s Financial Policy 
Asymmetric information problems affect the firm’s capital structure choice in 
several distinct ways. First, in the presence of asymmetric information, financial 
contracting tends to become more complex and, ceteris paribus, to increase transaction 
costs and thereby the firm’s cost of capital. Second, a firm may be unable to reach  or 
have to withdraw  from its perceived optimal capital structure. Moreover, a firm seeking 
to maximize its shareholders’ wealth may be lead into suboptimal investment decisions. 
Third, under asymmetric information, particular forms of financing contracting and 
monitoring mechanisms are required in order to minimize the costs accruing to financing. 
                                                 
252 Asymmetric information is conceptually distinct from incomplete information. If two market participants 
are endowed with similar information sets, they both are symmetrically informed. However, if in those 
information sets there are any “random variables whose exact value is unknown” (Macho-
Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 1997, 17) then these agents are incompletely informed.   
253 As acknowledged Leland and Pyle (1977) “[n]umerous markets are characterized by 
informational differences between buyers and sellers”, and “[i]n financial markets, 
informational asymmetries are particularly pronounced”  
254 Disagreements among contracting parties are likely to arise when: (1) contract environment is uncertain 
and information is incomplete, imperfect, and costly; and (2) outcomes are non-observable. As Ricketts 
(1994, 128) explains “[a] firm is a particular type of contractual environment, and its 
characteristics would be, ultimately, expected therefore to be molded by the 
sorts of considerations as an institutional consequence of uncertainty, 
opportunistic behavior resulting from imperfect information.” 
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However, these arrangements are not costless and naturally affect (adversely) the firm’s 
cost of capital. 
In the absence of M-M’s (1958) homogeneous expectation assumption it is 
reasonable to presume that firm insiders, arguably, are endowed with more information 
(private or inside information) about the firm than their counterparts, the outside investors. 
In this framework, the firm’s financial policy  financing and dividend choice  emerges 
as a matter of relevance. It has been shown (e.g., Ross 1977, and Leland and Pyle 1977) 
that financial policy, when used to reveal private information to capital markets,255 
contributes to eliminate (or mitigate) the severity of the informational gap between firm’s 
insiders and outsiders.256 This behavior becomes crucial if value-maximizing insiders 
attempt to preclude the investor mispricing of the firm’s securities, which would increase 
the cost of capital. If, because of their informational deficit, investors cannot, ex-ante, 
discriminate good quality firms from bad quality firms, they would not be willing to price 
securities higher than the one that reflects the average quality of issuing firms. In this 
setting, a better than average quality firm will refrain from issuing because its securities are 
underpriced (in the sense that their price is lower than its perceived intrinsic value). Only a 
bad quality firm will be willing to issue, because its securities are overpriced (in the sense 
that their price is higher than its perceived intrinsic value).257 Consequently, in the absence 
of an information transfer that rebalance the level of information between insiders and 
outsiders, the market may perform poorly or not work at all.258 Thus, asymmetric 
information is potentially a significant deterrent to competitive market equilibrium. 
The emergence of asymmetric information problems does not necessarily require a 
principal-agent environment,259 although they both may, eventually, overlap in certain 
                                                 
255 Typically, the main purpose referred in the capital structure literature for insiders to engage in signaling 
activity is to convey their perspectives about the firm’s future cash flow stream, and therefore its valuation. 
256 The insight that there is an information content in firm’s financial decisions and that these decisions are a 
mechanism to convey information from insiders to capital market participants is generally credited to Miller 
and Modigliani (1961). 
257 A related but peripheral subject relates to the approach used by managers to price firm’s securities. It is 
relatively indisputable that the intrinsic value is consistent with the tenets of modern corporate finance 
theory. 
258 This line of reasoning reflects Ackerlof’s (1970) argument he presented in his landmark paper as the 
“market for lemons”. It is referred to as the “lemons problem” since it resembles the problem of lemons in the 
used car market. As a result of this adverse selection problem, very few (if any) ‘good’ used cars will come to 
the market leaving ‘lemons’. Therefore, the used car market will then function poorly and, indeed, may not 
function at all. Another example relates to insurance buyers. Adverse selection deters low risk insurance 
buyers from the market, leaving only high-risk buyers.  
259 This is certainly the case of a setting in where the management team holds a 100 percent firm ownership. 
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circumstances. As previously discussed,260 financial contracting arrangements underlying 
agency relationships are inherently incomplete (Aghion and Bolton 1992) and, generally, 
presume the presence of unevenly distributed information among the parties. If in this 
setting a conflict of interest over (assumed diverging) objective functions of principal and 
agent arises, then an important verifiability feature of their contractual arrangement should 
be based in terms of verifiable actions, otherwise it may not be enforceable by an impartial 
entity, say, a court of law.261 In a shareholder-manager framework, if principal and agent 
are dissimilarly informed, with the latter having an informational advantage, then the latter 
will have “a certain leeway in order to enhance their own utility 
instead of that of the shareholders.” (Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 
1997, 6). However, if the parties in an agency relationship obtain the appropriate incentives 
and their objectives converge (lessening the severity of their conflict of interest), “then 
all relevant information will be automatically revealed, and so 
any asymmetry in the distribution of information becomes 
irrelevant.” (Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 1997, 6). 
Asymmetric Information Problems in Financial Contracting 
Pioneering contributions of Ackerlof (1970),262 and Spence (1973),263 and more 
recently of Crawford and Sobel (1982), fostered the development of informational 
asymmetry-based theories.264, 265 266 These authors offered the breakthrough insights that 
                                                 
260 See the prior section. 
261 As suggested by Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1997, 6) “information is related to the 
set of variables that are verifiable in a contractual relationship.” 
262 Akerlof (1970) shows that a market may function very badly, or not function at all, if the informed party 
has no way to signal the quality of the good it is selling. 
263 Spence (1973) asserts that the signal that it is sent by the informed party has a cost that depends on its type 
so that, roughly speaking, higher types are more likely to send stronger signals. This signal may help then the 
uninformed party to distinguish the different types. 
264 Crawford-Sobel (1982) show that even if the signal is purely extrinsic (if it has no cost for the informed 
party) and thus constitutes cheap talk, both parties may still coordinate on equilibria that reveal some 
information. 
265 It is generally acknowledged in the literature, that Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1974) developed the 
underpinnings of the signaling theory approach. Akerlof studied the behavior of buyers and sellers in second-
hand car market, the so-called market for lemons. Spence characterized signaling for labor market. Spence 
defines a signal as a “manipulable attribute or activity which conveys information.” Ross 
(1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) pioneered the adoption of the signaling theory framework to corporate 
financial structure problems. Two important papers that have applied the lemons problem analysis to 
financial markets are Myers and Majluf (1984) and Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss, (May 1984). 
266 Harris and Raviv (1991) were very assertive when assessing the prospects of new asymmetric information 
theory to explain corporate capital structure choice: “the asymmetric information approach [with 
regard to further theoretical work] has reached a point of diminishing returns.” 
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information is neither costless nor evenly distributed among economic agents, and this fact 
is consequential in terms of the economic wealth of contracting parties. 
Differential distribution information among buyers and sellers of financial 
instruments limits their ability to ascertain the true characteristics of firms, entrepreneurs, 
and projects. This situation has the potential to induce behavior to opportunistically take 
advantage of informational superiority. The prototypical problems of asymmetric 
information are the adverse selection problem, the moral hazard problem, and the free-
riding problem. 
The Adverse Selection Problem in the Security Markets 267, 268 
Assume several wealth-constrained entrepreneurs were endowed with investment 
opportunities all costing, C, and promising a random expected return, R, drawn from some 
probability distribution. Assuming that probability distributions are different across 
entrepreneurs, then financiers may face a selection problem if they have a preference for 
investing in projects with a specific return probability distribution.269 However, they do not 
have that information. This problem is an ex ante form of information asymmetry, because 
it arises before the parties are engaged in any kind of binding contractual arrangement.270 
This is the prototypical lemons problem,271 occurring in debt and equity markets, 
when potential investors are unable to discriminate between good quality and bad quality 
issuers.272,273 As briefly noted earlier, in this setup, an investor will only be willing to pay a 
price that reflects the average quality of issuing firms — a price that lies between the value 
                                                 
267 As suggested by Hubbard (1998) “With imperfect information about the quality or 
riskiness of the borrowers investment projects, adverse selection leads to a gap 
between the cost of external financing in an informed market (which contains a 
“lemons” premium) and internally generated funds.” 
268 An excellent survey of the literature on information and financial structure that expands on the topics 
discussed in the rest of this section is contained in Gertler (1988). 
269 Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1997, 11) suggest than adverse selection problems “appears when 
the agent holds private information before the relationship is begun” (italicized in 
the original). In these instances agent’s behavior is observable and verifiable. The basis for the study of 
adverse selection problems is the theory of mechanism design is so much that some authors also call adverse 
selection models “mechanism design problems”. Other terms sometimes used are “self-selection” and 
“screening”. 
270 Potential allocational effects of adverse selection have been addressed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1975) 
and Ryley (1975, 1976). Jaffee and Russel (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) applied it to loan markets, 
and Myers and Majluf (1984) to equity markets. 
271 Described and formally characterized by Ackerlof (1970). 
272 On the basis of expected cash flows and risk. 
273 This type ex ante asymmetric information is at the outset of the phenomenon of adverse selection on the 
credit market (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). In this setting, the interest rate is not a good regulating mechanism 
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of securities from bad and good issuers. If the owners or managers of a good issuing firm 
have better information than investors and know that they are a good issuer, and therefore 
they know that their securities are undervalued and they will not want to sell them to the 
investor at the price he is willing to pay. The only firms willing to sell securities will be 
bad issuers because the price is higher than the securities are worth.274 Investors do not 
want to hold securities in bad firms and thus will decide, ultimately, not to purchase 
securities at all.  
Thus, adverse selection problem arises when the lesser-informed participant in a 
transaction assumes that the better-informed participant intends to exploit his/her 
informational advantage, given that one contracting party characteristic(s) is (are) 
imperfectly observed by the other party. Hence, adverse selection problems are, in general, 
resolved by conveying private information that signal to less well-informed parties the 
intrinsic characteristics of the issuer. 
In adverse selection problems were present in debt markets, then potential 
borrowers who are the most likely to produce an undesirable (adverse) outcome — a lemon 
— are the ones most actively seeking a loan and thus are most likely to be selected. Since 
the adverse selection problem makes it more likely for bad credit risks (lemons) to get 
loans, lenders may decide not to make any loans at all, even though there are good credit 
risks in the marketplace. 
Security markets then, like Ackerlof’s used car market, will not be allocationally 
efficient because few firms will be able to sell their securities and raise capital, hence 
preventing debt and equity markets from being effective and efficient in allocating 
resources to consumption and investment.275 Moreover, adverse selection provides an 
                                                 
for the market. A rise in rates may induce low-risk borrowers to leave the market, remaining only the high-
risk borrowers. 
274 Bad quality issuers have therefore an incentive to misrepresent their quality as issuers since this conduct 
would enable them to earn economic rents. 
275 The adverse selection argument is helpful in explaining why in no country in the world are publicly traded 
securities the primary source of firm’s financing. Additionally it also helps to explain at least partially, why 
equity capital is not the predominant source of financing for firms. Lastly, the argument can provide a 
rationalization for the break down in debt markets, too. It is well known that investors willing to buy a bond 
require an expected rate of return commensurate with the average default risk of the good and bad bond 
issuers. In these instances, a good bond issuer soon realize that he will be paying an higher interest rate than 
he should and therefore he is unlikely to borrow in this market. Actually, only the bad issuers will be willing 
to sell their bonds. However, and since investors are not anxious to buy these bonds, they will probably will 
stay away of this market. 
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explanation for the pervasive underinvest problem, which may preclude firms from 
undertaking profitable investment policies. 
Solutions to Adverse Selection Problem 
With evenly distributed information adverse selection problems would be absent, 
and as investors could, then, distinguish good quality from bad quality issuers, and be 
willing to pay the true value of securities issued by good firms, and good firms would 
consequently be willing to sell their securities in the market. The securities market would 
then be able to move funds to the good firms that had the most productive investment 
opportunities. The solution, then, to the adverse selection problem in security markets is to 
release information that eliminates asymmetric information and allows market participants 
to have full information about the individuals or firms seeking to finance their projects.  
One way to get this information to market participants is through the private 
production and sale of information. However, this can not completely eliminate the adverse 
selection problem in security markets, in part because of the so-called free-rider problem. 
This occurs when investors are unwilling to expend additional resources to acquire 
information and attempt, instead, to take advantage of information that other investors have 
paid for. Such free riding behavior discourages the private production and sale of 
information as a solution to adverse selection.276  
An alternative solution to the adverse selection problem might be for government to 
intervene by either supplying free information or by structuring regulation so as to induce 
issuers to reveal their true characteristics.277 Both mechanisms may work to curtail the 
informational asymmetry and reduce the potential for adverse selection behavior, but will 
not be able to entirely remove it from security markets. 
The presence of an intermediary, as in the earlier used-car market example, with 
unique expertise in gathering, processing and disseminating information about the quality 
                                                 
276 A rational investor spends resources in acquiring information, on good quality and bad quality firms, if 
that investment promises an expected positive NPV. Therefore, our knowledgeable investor believes that the 
information set is worthwhile because we will end-up purchasing good quality firm’s securities that are 
undervalued. However, a free-rider may just replicate the same buying behavior without having paid for the 
information set. Recurrent free-riders will shift demand for good quality firm’s securities upwards, and the 
new equilibrium price will eliminate security undervaluation. Then, is no longer possible to buy securities 
under their true value, and therefore no abnormal returns from investing in the information set are available. 
Additionally, demand for information is likely to decline and this may impair the private production and sale 
of information, worsening the severity of adverse selection problems in security markets. 
277 For instance, requiring firms selling their securities in public markets to adhere to standard accounting 
principles and to disclose information about their operations, assets, and earnings. 
- 77 - 
  
of firms may be another effective device for mitigating adverse selection problems. It has 
been shown, e.g., by Diamond (1984), that this role is performed in financial markets by 
financial intermediaries (such as banking firms) who are increasingly seen as delegate-
monitors and serve in a certification role in financial markets.278  
Because of its lending business, banks are heavily engaged in producing 
information for which activity they are able to earn rents from economies of scale. An 
important element in the ability of the bank to profit from the information it produces is 
that it avoids the free-rider problem by making primarily private loans rather than by 
purchasing securities that are traded in the open market. Because a private loan is not 
traded, other investors cannot watch what the bank is doing and bid up the loan's price so 
that the bank receives no compensation for the information it has produced. The bank’s 
role as an intermediary that holds mostly non-traded loans is the key to its success in 
reducing asymmetric information in financial markets. 
Our analysis of adverse selection also explains which firms are more likely to 
obtain funds from banks and financial intermediaries rather than from the public security 
markets. The better known a corporation is, the more information about its activities is 
available in the marketplace. Thus it is easier for investors to evaluate the quality of the 
large corporation and determine whether it is a good or a bad firm. Because investors have 
fewer concerns about adverse selection with well know corporations, they will be willing 
to invest directly in their securities. It could thus be hypothesized that the larger and more 
mature a corporation is, the more information investors have about it and the more likely it 
is that the corporation can raise funds efficiently in security markets. 
Collateral, which is property rights promised to the lender in case of borrower 
default, reduces the consequences of' adverse selection because it reduces the lender's 
losses in the event of a default. The presence of adverse selection in credit markets thus 
provides an explanation for why collateral is an important feature in many debt contracts. 
Equity capital performs a role similar to dedicated collateral. In default states, a 
high equity capital implies a higher ratio of assets to liabilities and an increased likelihood 
of the firm being able to pay off its loans without resorting to asset fire-sales. Hence, when 
firms seeking credit have high net worth the consequences of adverse selection are less 
important and lenders will be more willing to make loans.  
                                                 
278 See the chapter 4 for further details. 
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Moral Hazard and Debt and Equity Contracting 
Moral hazard behavior occurs whenever (after the parties are committed to 
financial contracting arrangement) the seller of a security has incentives to hide 
information and engage in post-contractual activities that are undesirable for the 
investor.279 Moral hazard is a material impediment to the dependable flow of information 
between market participants, making the verification of true characteristics by outside 
parties costly or even impossible. Hence, moral hazard has important efficiency 
consequences for a firm interested in raising funds through debt contracting rather than an 
equity offering. 
As suggested by Greenbaum and Thakor (1995, 228) the most notorious and 
recurrent moral hazard problems in firms’ capital structure transactions are (1) the asset 
substitution problem; (2) underinvestment problem; and (3) the managers’ inadequate 
effort supply problem. In general, incentives (and disincentives) resolve moral hazard 
problems and preclude subsequent opportunistic behavior.280 
Moral Hazard in Equity Contracts: The Principal-Agent Problem 
Equity security contracts are exposed to a particular type of moral hazard that is 
called the principal-agent problem. As previously described, a diffuse ownership structure 
leads to the separation of ownership and control. In this setting and with risk averse 
managers, moral hazard behavior arises when financiers are unable to observe insiders 
behavior, and when agents pursue their own interests, rather than those of principals. In 
this situation managers have less incentive to maximize stockholders’ wealth. These 
principal-agent problems can be severe. Managers over-spending the firm’s resources on 
perquisites for themselves provide an illustrative example. In addition, managers might 
pursue growth strategies that would enhance their own reputation and / or power but not 
increase the firm’s value. These problems would not emerge if principals were endowed, 
ex ante, with complete information about agents’ actions, or could costlessly observe and 
                                                 
279 Salanié (1997, 107) characterizes a moral hazard occurrence when “(a) the Agent takes a 
decision (‘action’) that affects his utility and that of the Principal; (b) the 
Principal only observes the ‘outcome’, an imperfect signal of the action taken; 
and (c) the action the Agent would choose spontaneously is not Pareto-optimal.” 
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1997, 9) emphasize the non-verifiability of agent’s actions and the ex 
post allocation of his private information. See also Milgrom and Roberts (1992). Prescott (1999) provides 
recent and comprehensive survey of moral hazard models. 
280 As suggested by Kreps (1990, 577) moral hazard problems can be handled by “structuring a 
transaction so that the party who undertakes the action will, in his own best 
interests, take actions that the second party would prefer.” 
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verify their behavior. Thus, in this setting the principal-agent problem only arises because 
of an asymmetrical distribution of information. 
As we have already discussed the unequal distribution of information favoring the 
firm’s insiders (agents) and their unobservable behavior underlie the principal-agent moral 
hazard problem. Principals, however, may attempt to lessen the severity of the problem by 
engaging in (costly) information production, by monitoring agent’s actions and by 
contractual performance. Hiring an auditing firm to frequently check what the management 
is doing is a feasible strategy to for pursuing effective monitoring.281  
As with adverse selection, free-riding behavior adversely affects the amount of 
information produced which could reduce the intensity of the principal-agent problem. 
Consequently, the free-rider problem decreases the level of monitoring, which worsens the 
moral hazard problem in equity security contracting making it harder for firms to raise 
capital efficiently. As has been pointed out, financial intermediaries are an alternative 
mechanism with the ability to avoid the free-rider problem when there is moral hazard.282 
Lastly, the government does play a role in providing incentives aimed at reducing 
the moral hazard problem created by asymmetric information. It is widespread practice for 
governments to promulgate binding norms to force firms to adhere to standard accounting 
principles and disclosure requirements aimed at making information verification easier, 
more transparent and more informative. 
Moral Hazard in Debt Contracts 
Because of its contractual compulsory payment schedule, a debt contract is 
typically designed to curtail opportunities for debtor’s moral hazard behavior and to reduce 
the effectiveness lender’s monitoring activities.283 This unique feature of the debt contract 
can make it, under these instances, an optimal contract. Within this framework, the 
lender’s verification concerns are likely to become acute only when the perceived 
                                                 
281 Costly state verification makes the equity contract less attractive and it explains, at least partially, why 
external equity is not a major source of firm financing. 
282 A venture capital firm is a particular kind of financial intermediary, which is helpful in mitigating moral 
hazard arising in a principal-agent setting. In venture capital contracting, provisions of performance 
verification are likely to be structured in order to allow the financier to monitor and secure information about 
insiders’ non-publicly observable behavior and ascertain about the firm’s activities and performance. 
Because firm’s securities publicly trading is severely constrained under venture capital financing 
arrangements other market participants are unable to free-ride. Therefore, the venture capital intermediary is 
able to reap the full benefits of its informational investments. 
283 Furthermore, the diversification effects of lender portfolios provide another incentive to lowering 
monitoring activities. 
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likelihood of a default-state arising becomes material.284 Hence, debt contracts imply 
implying less intense monitoring requirements and consequently diminished costs of state 
verification.  
As seen in the prior section, debt contracts are subject to moral hazard behavior to 
the extent a firm’s shareholders have an incentive to incur risk-shifting behavior, either by 
asset substitution or by (2) claim dilution (e.g., see previous section). 
Solutions to Moral Hazard in Debt Contracts 
A borrower is less likely to engage in moral hazard behavior if he has some of his 
wealth tied up in the debt contract arrangement. Such a contractual provision makes the 
debt contract incentive compatible, i.e., aligns the incentives of the borrower to that of the 
lender. Hence, writing (restrictive) covenants, which preclude undesirable behavior or 
encourage desirable behavior, is helpful in reducing the moral hazard risk in financial 
contracting, although it cannot eliminate the problem entirely.285 As argued by Hart (1995), 
it is almost impossible “to anticipate all the many things that may 
happen” and writing them in detailed contracts, including a full range of covenants to 
would rule out every potential risk-taking activity. Furthermore, borrowers may have the 
ability to find loopholes in the restrictive covenants, rendering them ineffective. 
Additionally, borrowers’ compliance with restrictive covenants must be monitored and 
enforced.286 Because monitoring and enforcement of restrictive covenants are costly, the 
free-rider problem is also likely to arise in debt markets in the same fashion as it does in 
equity markets.287  
As previously explained, financial intermediaries, particularly banks, have the 
ability to avoid the free-rider problem as long as they focus on private loans. Private loans 
are not traded, so no one else can free ride off of the intermediary’s monitoring and 
enforcement of the restrictive covenants. The intermediary making private loans thus 
                                                 
284 If such a state occurs and bankruptcy is present, the lender then tends to exhibit an equityholder-like 
behavior, as he becomes a residual claimant too. 
285 Covenants may be categorized in four classes: (1) covenants restraining the borrower from engaging in the 
undesirable behavior of undertaking risky undertakings; (2) covenants inducing the borrower to engage in 
desirable activities to make it more likely he fulfills his contractual obligations; (3) covenants to motivating 
the borrower to keep the collateral in good condition and in his possession; (4) covenants requiring the 
borrower to provide information about its activities periodically. 
286 A restrictive covenant is meaningless if the borrower can violate it because he knows the lender is not 
checking up on him or is unwilling to pay for legal proceedings started if the covenant is violated. 
287 It is unsubstantiated that, within actual legal system, enforcement is always possible. 
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receives the benefits of monitoring and enforcement and will work to shrink the moral 
hazard problem inherent in debt contracts. 
Asymmetric Information Theories of Firm’s Capital Structure 
The incorporation of the asymmetric information problem into the firm’s capital 
structure choice has developed, essentially, along two major approaches.  
 The Signaling Hypothesis 
In his 1977 and 1978 papers, Stephen Ross developed an incentive signaling 
approach to the determination of the firm’s capital structure problem.288  He makes a 
compelling argument that the market value of a firm depends on perceived cash flow and 
thus, the perception of investors is important. By adjusting the firm’s capital structure, 
insiders may be able to alter the market’s perception of the firm’s risk class, thereby 
maximizing its market value and consequently achieving a unique optimal capital 
structure. Ross’ model describes and explains insiders’ behavior in using financing policy 
to signal their beliefs to the market, and thereby encourage fair pricing of the firm’s 
securities. A key requirement for insiders to effectively transmit information signaling the 
characteristics of the firm is that the signal they transmit to market participants is credible. 
Arguably, the credibility of the signaling activity should be strongly and positively 
correlated with its cost. Otherwise, bad quality firms could render it totally ineffective (and 
even counterproductive for value-maximizing good quality firms) once insiders of bad 
quality firms could easily replicate the signal and mimic god quality firms’ signaling 
behavior.289 
Furthermore, he hypothesizes that firms issuing external equity securities are more 
likely to have poor prospects, otherwise they would be issuing debt securities. Hence, firms 
with poor prospects will want to share their downside with other new claimants, whereas a 
firm with good prospects will not want to share its upside with new claimants.290 
In addition Ross hypothesizes that good quality firms will issue more debt, as has 
already been discussed. Furthermore, he demonstrates a positive relationship between risk 
                                                 
288 Signaling is similar to an adverse selection problem in the sense that an agent, after learning his type and 
before contractually committed, “can send a signal that is observed by the principal” 
attempting to “influence the principal’s beliefs about the agent’s identity” Macho-
Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1997, 12). Italicized in the original. 
289 The qualification as a money burning signal is contingent on the verification of two conditions criteria: (1) 
the pure dissipative nature of the signal and  (2) its cost evenness among signaling firms (see, e.g., Daniel and 
Titman 1995). 
290 This problem could also be viewed as an agency problem between existing and future shareholders. 
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and level of debt (the latter being driven by his assumption of uniformly distributed 
expected returns). 
In Hayne Leland and David Pyle’s (1977) model, an entrepreneur seeks additional 
equity financing for a single new project. In the model, a moral hazard problem limits the 
free flow of information between market participants. Moreover, insiders cannot be 
expected to be entirely straightforward about the firm’s characteristics or about the project 
in question, since there may be substantial rewards for exaggerating positive qualities. 
Additionally, verification of ‘true’ characteristics by outsiders can be costly.  Insiders 
know the project’s expected return, but investors do not.  
In their setup Leland and Pyle suggest that an entrepreneur in a high quality firm 
should use his retained share of ownership to signal the firm quality type. In result, the 
entrepreneur might be unable to hold a well-diversified portfolio because of the retained 
share of ownership he used as a signal. This loss in diversification, however, is costly and 
thus credible making it difficult and unattractive to be mimicked by bad quality firms. 
Leland and Pyle argue that the fraction of project’s ownership that the entrepreneur 
is willing to hold “can serve as a signal of project quality.” The inverse 
relationship between insider ownership and the variance of the expected returns, and that 
of debt and risk (unlike Ross’ result), leads the authors to conclude that firms with high 
inside ownership are more likely to sustain high levels of debt because of the greater 
demand for funds by (insider) managers. 
There are wo testable predictions of Leland and Pyle’s signaling hypothesis: (1) 
“is that if the original founders of a company going public decide 
to keep a large fraction of the stock, then these firms should 
experience greater price earnings multiples;” (2) if the firm’s 
value is positively related to the fraction of the owner’s wealth 
held as equity in the firm, then the firm will have greater debt 
capacity and will use greater amounts of debt.” Although debt is 
not a signal in this model, its use will be positively correlated 
with the firm’s value.” (Copeland and Weston 1988, 503). 
Lee, Thakor, and Vora (1983) posit that both the capital structure of the firm and 
the maturity of its debt serve as signals of the firm’s future earnings. This study differs 
from Ross (1977) in that the former use both the size and the maturity of debt as signals, 
and allows for costly information. Moreover, the study demonstrates that, even in the 
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absence of stochastic term structure of interest rates, debt maturity is important because it 
conveys information about the firm’s future earnings. Unlike Flannery (1986), the authors 
argue that good quality firms will issue long-term debt in order to signal the long life of 
their assets and thus of their associated cash flows. 
Bhattacharya (1979) assumed that outside investors have imperfect information about the 
firm’s profitability and that cash dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains.  He 
demonstrated that dividend policy may be effectively used as a signaling device.  In the 
absence of an explicit cash payout, ex-post cash flows cannot be communicated without 
moral hazard.  Higher dividends are favorably valued. On the negative side, higher taxes 
on dividends are the cost of signaling.  The costs and benefits of signaling with dividends 
lead to an optimal level of dividends. 
Flannery (1986) hypothesizes that corporations can successfully signal their true 
value to the potential investors by choosing the appropriate maturity for their debt issues. 
High quality firms, according to the author, have an incentive to provide correct 
information about their investments' profitability so as to avoid overpaying interest to the 
debtholders. In order to accomplish this, high quality firms will choose to issue short-term 
debt. Low quality firm cannot mirror this behavior because of the high transaction costs 
associated with successive issues of short-term debt.291 
Flannery (1987) examined informational asymmetry in risky debt maturity choices. 
He argued that maturity choice is irrelevant when information is shared between outside 
investors and insiders. However, if the firm’s insiders have better information than 
outsiders do then debt maturity decisions can be used as a signal of the firm’s future 
prospects. He showed that issuance of short-term risky debt may be viewed as a positive 
signal because it reflects the confidence which inside managers have regarding the firm’s 
future cash flows. In contrast, long-term debt is viewed as a negative signal. The type of 
equilibrium, whether pooling or separating, will depend upon the quality of the firm under 
scrutiny and debt underwriting costs. 
In a model with asymmetric information about borrower’s type, Diamond (1991) 
                                                 
291 For a discussion on determinants of debt maturity see Kraus (1973), Stiglitz (1974), Morris (1976), 
Brennan and Schwartz (1978), Boyce and Kalotay (1979), Kane, Marcus and McDonald (1985), Brick and 
Ravid (1985, 1991), Lewis (1990), Brick and Palmon (1992). Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer 
(1996), Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay and Smith (1996) 
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shows that higher quality firms (with higher credit ratings) should choose short term debt 
because they will be able to take advantage of the revelation of future good news. This 
positive information effect outweighs the risk of not being able to refinance oneself and 
running the risk of being liquidated by the lender (the liquidity risk). The opposite is true 
for firms with lower credit ratings. However, still lower rated borrowers can only issue 
only short-term debt, so that the relationship between length of maturity and credit rating is 
non-monotonic.292  
The Myers and Majluf (1984) model frames, in a differential information setting, 
the implications for the investment and financing policies of limited internal funding.293 
The authors assume that the transmission of information is costly, managers are (existing) 
shareholders’ wealth maximizers, and firms have to issue equity to undertake new 
profitable investments. It is shown that old shareholders may or may not benefit from the 
new investment decision. The final outcome depends on whether the market 
underestimates or overestimates the value of the investment. In particular, if the market 
underestimates the value of the new investment, the new shareholders will own a higher 
percentage of the corporate earnings than they deserve. When the truth about the "intrinsic" 
value of the firm is revealed, the old shareholders will find themselves in a worse position 
because their ownership is diluted. If, however, the market overestimates the value of the 
new investment, the opposite occurs, with old shareholders expropriating wealth from the 
new ones. In this case, the old shareholders will receive the majority of the proceeds, 
although their participation in the investment outflows is low. Since firms gain the most by 
issuing equity when the firm is overvalued, new equity issues are perceived as negative 
signals by the market and are followed by decreases in the stock prices. This analysis 
shows why firms rely extensively on retained earnings to finance new investments. If 
internal funds are depleted, corporations will choose to issue debt rather than equity to 
invest in a profitable project, a result that illustrates the “pecking order hypothesis”. 
                                                 
292 The prediction of a positive association between firm quality and the amount of short-term debt issued is 
also found in Kale and Noe (1990). In equilibrium, better firms will issue more short-term debt and worse 
firms more long term debt. 
293 The model assumes that risk-neutral investors need new equity capital to fund a profitable investment 
opportunity. Additional equity capital is required, perhaps because of existing restrictive debt covenants or to 
avoid higher bankruptcy costs. Firm’s management is also assumed to maximize shareholders’ wealth and to 
know the firm type, while investors do not. These are presumed to retain their equity holdings and do not 
purchase any part of the new offering. Risk-free rate is zero and equity markets price new equity issues at 
their intrinsic value. 
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The Pecking Order Hypothesis 
This theoretical argument was formalized by Myers (1984) but first put forward by 
Gordon Donaldson (1961).294, 295 In the Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) 
papers, managers have an informational superiority about the prospects of the firm 
compared to capital markets participants. In this framework they will be unwilling to issue 
equity to fund investment projects if the equity is undervalued. Otherwise, they will show a 
preference for issuing overvalued equity securities. Thus, an equity issue has to be 
regarded as a bad signal. Myers (1984) uses this kind of rationale to develop a pecking 
order theory of financing. Instead of using equity to finance investment projects, it will be 
better off using less information-sensitive securities. Internal equity is most preferred, with 
debt coming next and, finally, equity.  
The results of these papers and the subsequent literature (such as Stein 1992 and 
Nyborg 1995) are consistent with a number of stylized facts concerning the effect of 
issuing different types of security on stock price and the financing choices of firms. 
However, in order to derive them, strong assumptions must be made, such as managers’ 
overwhelming bankruptcy aversion. 
In Noe (1988) the pecking order also breaks down. His model differs from Myers 
and Majluf in that insiders observe the firm’s cash flows imperfectly. Brennan and Kraus 
(1987) and Constantinides and Grundy (1989) show that if the set of securities that the firm 
can issue to finance a new project can be expanded, the pecking order hypothesis no longer 
holds. 
                                                 
294 Gordon Donaldson (1961) suggests that managers prefer internal funds because “internal financing 
is the line of least resistance” and “are funds over which management has complete 
control.” Using internal financing “avoids the glare of publicity...which accompanies 
the decisions and actions of management if [investment is] externally financed” 
(Donaldson, 1961, 54). William Baumol (1965, p.74) also suggested a “financing hierarchy” 
argument, arguing that “[i]t would appear that the bulk of business enterprise should 
finance its investment insofar as possible entirely out of retained earnings 
because that is, characteristically, the cheapest way to raise additional funds. 
Only when it becomes impossible to provide enough money from internal sources 
should the firm turn to the stock market or to borrowing for resources” (emphasis in 
original). 
295 Baumol (1965, p.74) argue that “[i]t would appear that the bulk of business enterprise 
should finance its investment insofar as possible entirely out of retained 
earnings because that is, characteristically, the cheapest way to raise 
additional funds. Only when it becomes impossible to provide enough money from 
internal sources should the firm turn to the stock market or to borrowing for 
resources” (emphasis in original). The author, however, neither explains why internal equity is “the 
cheapest way to raise additional funds,” nor indicate the source and magnitude of the economic 
burden that render external equity and debt financing cost disadvantageous. 
- 86 - 
  
Megginson (1997) pecking order hypothesis is based on two key assumptions: (1) 
managers are better informed then outside investors about the investment opportunities 
faced by their firms (the standard asymmetric information assumption); and (2) managers 
act in the best interests of existing shareholders. This model has won converts because it 
can explain: (1) why debt ratios and profitability are inversely related; (2) why markets 
react negatively to all new equity issues and why managers seem to make such issues only 
when they either have no choice (following an unexpected earnings decline) or they feel 
the firm's shares are over-valued; and (3) why managers of even highly-regarded firms 
choose to hold more cash — and issue less debt — than either the trade-off theory or 
common sense suggest they should. Whereas the trade-off theory explains observed 
corporate debt levels fairly well, the pecking order theory offers a far superior explanation 
for observed capital structure changes — especially those involving security issues. 
2.13. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Corporate governance is a relatively recent phenomenon that gathered intense 
notoriety both at the corporate claimholders level and at the academic level.296,297 
However, this is hardly a new topic in corporate finance. As we saw earlier, a corporation 
may be seen as a legal fiction (served by network of contractual arrangements), or an 
empty legal shell, in Zingales 1998 parlance. In this view, the value of the corporation is 
contingent, among others factors, on the structure of ownership rights which are ex ante 
residual claims of the legal fiction on the underlying economic entity we call as the firm.298 
However, the unavoidable incompleteness of contracts does not eliminate the possibility of 
ex post disputes over those claims arising within contractual relationships established 
among claimholders of diffusely and publicly held firms.299 These post contracting 
governance problems are potentially detrimental to claimholders’ wealth. 
                                                 
 In this context, Zingales (1998) defines corporate governance as “the complex set of constraints 
that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by a firm.” 
296 As pointed out by Zingales (1998) although “some of the questions have been around since 
Berle and Means (1932), the term ‘corporate governance’ did not exist in the 
English language until twenty years ago.” The awareness gathered by corporate governance 
during the recent decades is linked, at least partially, to major financial restructuring deals, takeover 
transactions and investors’ activism. 
297 See the Financial Economists Roundtable Statement on Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance 
endorsed by prominent financial economists, such as, Franco Modigliani, Stewart Myers, William Sharpe, 
and Fred Weston. John and Senbet (1998) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide two excellent and 
comprehensive surveys of the academic literature on corporate governance. 
298 By residual claims we refer to residual decision rights and allocation of residual returns. 
299
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This approach to the governance of contractual relations model clearly overlaps 
with the principal-agent model whose focus is the design of ex ante incentive-alignment 
contractual arrangements (e.g., Keasey, Thompson and Wright 1997; Williamson 1988). 
Further, Williamson suggests that transaction-costs economics should be viewed as 
complementary to agency theory in addressing corporate finance problems in general and 
capital structure in particular. He builds his argument on the fact that both theories share a 
common framework characterized by the features of managerial discretion and efficient 
contracting.300 Concerning the contractual focus, agency theory directs its attention 
primarily to ex ante incentive-alignment point of view while TCE is more concerned with 
designing ex post governance structures within the contractual arrangement. 
Using Williamson own words, “agency problems, as investigated 
under agency theories, seem to be the same as corporate governance 
problems, as investigated under transaction-cost economics.” Thus, 
we assume that our discussion on the mechanisms to eradicate or lessen agency conflicts 
over capital structure play a parallel role in governance problems. In this sense, capital 
structure decisions can be conceptualized as a governance mechanism because they affect 
the process through which residual claims are allocated.301 Capital structure decisions of a 
diffusely and publicly held firm may be seen as an internal corporate control mechanism 
because of the disciplinary role of leverage, bankruptcy and financial contracting.   
A pure capital structure transaction, such as an equity-for-debt exchange offer, 
provides an insightful illustration of our argument. From the point of view of the agency 
theory, this type of transaction is a source of incentives for a better alignment between 
managers and shareholders’ objective functions. Therefore, it is a helpful mechanism to 
reduce this kind of agency costs. On the other hand, in the governance perspective, such 
transaction is a mechanism that helps to lessen problems arising in residual claims 
allocation process. This becomes even clearer when we recognize that the allocation of 
                                                 
300 Consequently, “both work out of substantially identical behavioral assumptions” 
Williamson (1988, 570). The most noticeable differences between the agency theory and transaction-costs 
economics stem to a great extent from (1) the unit of analysis adopted by each one of the theories  the 
individual agent for the agency theory and the transaction for transaction-costs economics; and (2) the choice 
of the organization form. These two divergences are broadly explanatory of the incentive/governance 
dissimilarities between both theories. 
301 Other governance mechanisms include inter alia the allocation of ownership, managerial incentives, 
corporate control transactions, boards of directors’ monitoring, shareholders activism (such as, block 
- 88 - 
  
ownership rights among inside and outside residual claimants is one of the determinants of 
corporate governance. Moreover, when corporate ownership gets increasingly separated 
from its control rights, the ineffectiveness of corporate governance structure leads to a 
greater likelihood of agency problems to arise. The wider the separation, the more likely 
are the agency problems to follow. 
2.14. INPUT / PRODUCT MARKETS INTERACTIONS WITH FIRM’S CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Since the work of Hite (1977), later extended by Dotan and Ravid (1985), that 
financial economists have dedicated “a great deal of attention to the 
analysis of implications of firms’ financial structure choices and 
their incentives to produce and invest” (Harris and Raviv 1991).302 This 
attention seems justified because standard agency models typically are unable to handle the 
strategic interactions between the firm and its customers, suppliers and competitors, 
thereby we could be missing some implications of the capital structure choice. 
This body of the capital structure theory developed, according to Maksimovic 
(1995) systematization, along four lines of thought. The first related to the influence of 
competitor investment decisions on the firm’s capital structure and its implied incentives. 
The second based on the effects of capital structure strategic use on product market 
competition.303 The third linked to the effects determined by changes in leverage on firms' 
incentives and industry equilibrium.304 The fourth associated with the interplay of rivals 
with the agency conflicts arising in the firm’s external financing activity. This setup 
provides a useful framework to assess (1) the value implications of the strategic 
interactions between capital structure decisions and product market behavior; and (2) the 
reactions of other product market participants to the financing choices of the firm.  
The potential for strategic behavior in product market  such as collusion and 
predation  may determine, as pointed out by Ravid (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1991), 
                                                 
shareholders and institutional investors), product-input market competition, and managerial labor market 
competition. 
302 Maksimovic (1995) provides a comprehensive and thoughtful survey of this literature. For two other 
excellent (although not as recent) reviews see Harris and Raviv (1991, 1988). Summaries of some relevant 
empirical papers are included in Appendix 2.1 to this chapter. 
303 It was shown that firms may have incentives to use their capital structures to commit to particular product 
market strategies. Brander and Lewis (1986, 1988) argue that debt financing commits firms to more 
aggressive output strategies. Other models find that leveraging helps to sustain higher equilibrium prices in 
product market competition (Schargrodsky 1997, Showalter 1995). 
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important consequences for capital structure. Brander and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic 
(1988) and Brander and Spencer 1989, among others, developed the pioneering theoretical 
work on this front, demonstrating that capital structure could be strategically chosen to 
influence the behavior of competitors in the industry. 
Two relevant lines of inquiry developed in this literature: the limited liability effect 
and the strategic bankruptcy effect. The first is analyzed by, e.g., Brander and Lewis 
(1986) and Maksimovic (1988). It shows that the limited liability enjoyed by equityholders 
provides incentives to increase output because, ceteris paribus, this could raise profits and 
increase firm value. The second was studied by, e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) 
showing that more liquid and less leveraged competitors in an industry, may expand 
production and reduce prices to drive highly leveraged rivals into bankruptcy. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Titman (1984) showed that the liquidation of a 
firm is costly for its customers and suppliers, such as the inability to obtain the product, 
parts, and/or service or the back out on previous implicit agreements. He claims that these 
costs are particularly relevant for customers of durable goods, and ultimately transferred to 
equityholders in the form of lower prices.305 Titman shows that capital structure can be 
used to commit equityholders to an optimal liquidation policy.306 Furthermore, Titman 
suggests that reputation (e.g., for being a reliable high quality service provider) is lost 
when the firm goes bankrupt. Therefore, one should expect, all other things being equal, 
that firms producing high quality products/services to be less leveraged. 
Capital structure decisions may also affect the rivalry within an industry. Firms that 
aggressively compete for market share, by either lowering prices or increasing advertising 
expenses, are likely to trade-off lower earnings in the short-term for larger earnings in the 
long-term. Thus, competing for market share may be seen as a capital budgeting problem 
(e.g., Dasgupta and Titman 1995). In this framework, the incentive to gain market share will 
depend on discount rate, which is linked to capital structure (e.g, Clayton 1996). 
                                                 
304 In this context, it is accepted that leveraging up incentives requires the presence of strategic interaction. 
Because, monopolistic or perfectly competitive firms lack those incentives, the theory makes the prediction 
that oligopolies should be more highly leveraged compared to these firms (Schargrodsky 1997). 
305 Maksimovic and Titman (1991) show that producers of non-unique and non-durable goods may also be 
subject to a similar effect. 
306 Specifically, a firm will default only when the net gain of liquidation exceeds its cost to customers. It is 
shown that firm for which this effect is more important, e.g., banking and healthcare should be less 
leveraged, ceteris paribus, than firms for which this effect is less important, e.g., hotels and supermarkets. 
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Financial leverage can also be strategically used to strengthen the contracting 
power of the firm in dealing with its input suppliers. Therefore, it may be predicted that, 
ceteris paribus, highly unionized firms and/or employing workers with highly transferable 
skills will be more highly leveraged (Sarig 1988). 
It has been suggested that more leveraged firms in an industry, on average, charge 
higher prices. However, has shown by Dasgupta and Titman (1998) that might not be 
always the case, notably, when the firm’s competitor is relatively unleveraged. Moreover, 
because of its valuation implications, capital structure decisions also determine significant 
consequences for the prices under the jurisdiction of regulators, as it is the case of public 
utility firms (Spiegel and Spulber 1994). 
It is widely accepted that product market structure and the type of competitive 
interaction across firms are industry specific. Thus, to the extent that the effect of capital 
structure decisions on firm to enter into implicit contracts with rivals (Maksimovic 1988) 
or to maintain reputation (Maksimovic and Titman 1990) is also firm specific, then capital 
structures should vary systematically intra- and inter-industry. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 As previously noted, with this discussion of the capital structure theory we aimed 
primarily to put in perspective some of the theoretical foundations that contribute to shed 
light on the firm’s strategic financing decisions. Nonetheless the extension of this 
literature, we still lack a comprehensive and empirically confirmed theory.307 One of the 
unsatisfactory aspects of the theory is its inability to handle the capital structure decisions 
of financial intermediaries, such as banking firms. As we described in Chapter 1, the 
empirical part of this dissertation includes an examination of the Portuguese Bank CEOs’ 
capital structure decisions. In Chapter 3 we develop the theoretical framework that enabled 
the formulation of testable hypotheses to structure the survey questionnaire.■ 
 
                                                 
307 Appendix 2.1 to this chapter includes a summary of relevant capital structure empirical literature. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Summary of Empirical Literature on Capital Structure 
Harris and Raviv’s (1991, 297), cautionary note “we simply take the empirical results at face value and do not review 
or criticize the methods used in these papers” also applies to the following table. Thus, we are unable in building this 
summary to account for the unavoidable differences arising from, e.g., accounting principles and practices, market structures, and legal 
frameworks. These differences do interfere with methodological choices and are a source of technical problems, such as, identification, 
measurement, and results interpretation. Harris and Raviv (1991) and Masulis (1988) provide two excellent survey of capital structure 
empirical literature. 
Study Sample Description Main Findings 
Tests of M-M’s Irrelevance Proposition  
Miller and 
Modigliani (1966) 
1947-1948 data of a sample of U.S. 
electric utilities and oil companies 
Failed to find statistical significance in their regression and therefore were unable to 
reject the null hypothesis that the weighted average cost of capital is unrelated to 
capital structure. 
Smirlock and 
Marshall (1983) 
Annual data on dividends and investment 
of a sample of U.S. 194 firms, from 1958 
to 1977 
Performed Granger causality testing of the M-M irrelevance hypothesis. Failed to 
reject the null hypothesis that no Granger causality existed for the aggregate sample of 
firms. 
Mougoue and 
Mukherjee (1994) 
 Granger causality testing of the M-M irrelevance hypothesis. Inverse (Granger) 
causality between dividend and investment growth rates is shown, as well as a positive 
causality between long-term debt and investment growth rates, and between debt and 
dividends. Conclude for the rejection of the M-M irrelevance hypothesis 
Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Petersen (1988) 
Large panel of Value Line data for U.S. 
manufacturing firms two-digit SIC codes 
between 20 and 39, inclusive. 
Look at the choice between internal and external financing in U.S., showing that 
investment of firms that firstly exhaust their internal financing are more sensitive to 
fluctuations in cash flow than mature firms with less availability of that particular type 
of financing (perhaps due to higher dividend payout ratios policies). Further evidence 
is provided suggesting that the influence of firm’s financing policy on firm’s 
investment is positively correlated with the severity of capital markets’ informational 
problems. Concludes for the Interdependence between investment and financing 
policies. 
Patterns, Regularities and Determinants of Capital Structure  
Aswath Damoradan 
(1999a) 
Value Line sample of 5792 U.S. firms 
(data used is as of June 30, 1999). 
Average debt ratio of 19.8 percent (market value), and 51.3 percent (book value). 
Wiwattanakantang 
(1999) 
Cross-sectional data for non-financial 
Thai listed firms. 
Firms’ profitability, asset tangibility, taxes, growth and governance are found to be 
significant factors in capital structure choice of Thai firms. Managerial ownership 
holdings have no significant effect on debt-equity choices.  
Hackethal and 
Schmidt (1999) 
Flow-of-funds data from official 
statistics of Germany, Japan and U.S. for 
the 1970-1996 period. 
There are significant differences in relative importance of external and internal 
financing in the three countries. Empirical results are in contrast with prior studies 
(e.g., Mayer 1988). Differences are attributed to methodology. 
Wald, John (1999) Sample of 4.404 non-utility non-financial 
firms, which 313 French, 316 German, 
1,350 Japanese, 1,096 U.K., and 1,329 
U.S. The analysis focuses on either1991 
or 1992.  
Found patterns of similar leverage across countries what is consistent with Rajan and 
Zingales (1995). Variables associated with moral hazard, tax deductions, R&D, and 
profitability, exhibit the expected signs and are consistent across countries, other 
variables, such as those associated with risk, growth, firm size, and inventories, show 
different effects in different countries. This result indicates that institutions may be 
significant determinants of capital structure, and that agency and monitoring problems, 
while existing in every country, may create different outcomes.  
Liu (1999) Chinese listed firms during the 1992-
1997 period. 
Industry is a discriminating factor.  Firm and tangible asset-base size are positively 
related to financial leverage. Profitability and asset’ growth rates are inversely related 
to tangible asset-bases. According to the author the evidence does not confirm the 
importance of ownership structure for the debt-equity choice of sampled firms. 
Chen, Lensink, and 
Sterken’s (1998) 
Panel data of 51 Dutch firms from 1984 
through 1995. 
Support for the pecking order model. Agency costs and corporate control 
considerations appear to be relatively unimportant. 
Barry (1997) U.S. firms with four-digit SIC codes 
between 2000 thorough 3990 during the 
1977-1993 period. 
Found support for the hypothesis that industry-related factors determine target debt 
ratios. Furthermore, industry average debt ratio would be a suitable surrogate for a 
target capital structure. 
Very strong support for the pecking order theory for firms increasing and decreasing 
leverage, is reported. 
Delbreil et al. (1997) Austrian, French, Italian, German, and 
Spanish manufacturing companies during 
the 1991-1993 period. 
The impact of corporate size varies widely from country to country. There are greater 
variations between the small companies of the different countries than between the 
very large companies. The above findings do not appear to be related to the industry 
composition of each sample. Capital structure of firms in these countries is 
differentiated no matter the measure used.  
Hussain and 
Nivorozhkin (1997) 
Panel data of firms listed on The Warsaw 
Stock Exchange (Poland) during the 
1991-1994 period. 
The authors report that firms in the sample exhibit “extremely low leverage 
levels.” Ownership structure is found to be a factor in explaining financial leverage. 
It is also reported that large, newly incorporated, and foreign-owned firms, as well as 
firms holding strong cash reserves or exercising high earnings retention rates are more 
highly leveraged. 
Berger, Ofek and 
Yermack (1997) 
Sample of 434 non-financial and non-
utilities U.S. firms in the 1984-1991 
period 
Average financial leverage of 24.7 percent and 26.5 percent, in terms of book value 
and market value, respectively. See also Marsh (1982), and Schwartz and Aronson 
(1967). 
Augusto (1996) Sample of Portuguese manufacturing 
firms draw from Banco de Portugal 
database. 
Reports support for the hypothesis of firm’s historical profitability explaining actual 
financing structure. Results are consistent with the hypothesis of existence of a size 
effect in the debt maturity structure choice. 
Saá-Requejo (1996) Sample of 82 Spanish listed firms. Data 
drawn from the “Central de Balances del 
Banco de España” database for the 
period December 1984 thorough 
December 1988.  
The evidence suggests that for Spanish firms besides the debt-equity choice the private 
or public nature of external financing is a relevant consideration in capital structure 
policy. Results are consistent with MacKie-Mason (1990b). 
Requejo and 
Rodriguez (1996) 
Panel data of non-financial firms listed at 
Madrid (Spain) Stock Exchange during 
the 1990-1993 period. 
Results provide support  for the agency hypothesis and contradict signaling and tax 
propositions. 
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Cornelli, Portes, and 
Schaffer (1996) 
Hungarian and Polish non-financial firms 
at the end of 1992, and for a sample of 
Czech non-financial firms at the end of 
1994. 
For the former sample, the average debt ratio (book value) is 32% and 41% for 
Hungary and Poland respectively. For the latter sample the ratio is 44%. 
Barclay, Smith, and 
Watts (1995) 
6780 industrial firms included in the 
Compustat database between 1963 and 
1993.  
Report that investment opportunities seem to be the most important determinant of 
financial leverage. Effects of regulation were also found significant. No support was 
found for the tax and the signaling hypotheses. 
Shabou (1995) Panel of both quantitative and qualitative 
data for 104 Tunisian firms during the 
1974-1988 period. 
Ownership structure is an important determinant of leverage. Found support for Leland 
and Pyle (1977) signaling hypothesis. 
Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) 
Sample of firms from the G-7 countries,  Firms’ financial leverage, at aggregate level, across the G-7 countries is fairly similar. 
Sample firms in German and in the U.K. appear to be less leveraged than firms in 
other countries. Differences in accounting principles and practices may explain some 
of the variance in leverage, but to level playing field seemed problematic. 
Singh (1995) Extends Singh and Hamid (1992) by 
using a larger panel data of larger firms 
and longer time series. The study 
examines accounting data: Brazil, India, 
Jordan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey and 
Zimbabwe. 
A central conclusion of this report is the finding that capital structures in those 
developing countries differ in important ways from the capital structures of firms in 
developed countries. These differences are particularly marked with respect to the use 
of external finance and the use of equity finance; both of which are much higher in 
developing than in developed countries.i 
Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1994) 
800 firms of ten developing countries 
during the 1980s. 
Capital structure determinants of U.S. firms appear to be similar to the ten countries 
included in the sample. More profitable firms and that are making large payouts to 
owners firms are less leveraged, what is consistent with Michael Jensen’s free cash 
flow hypothesis 
Chaplinsky and 
Niehaus (1993) 
Sample of 286 U.S. firms with data taken 
from Fortune 500 Corporate Data 
Exchange (CDE), Value Line Investment 
Survey, COMPUSTAT and CRSP files. 
Strong inverse relationship between leverage and free cash flow. This finding is 
inconsistent with Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, but supportive of Myers’ 
(1984) pecking order hypothesis. Further, they report weak support for the hypothesis 
that leverage and insiders’ ownership are conjointly explained. This finding is 
consistent with Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992), and Holthausen and Larcker (1991), 
but contradicts Crutchley and Hansen (1989). 
Thies and Klock 
(1992) 
Large U.S. manufacturing firms from 
1935-1941 through 1977-1983. 
Taxes, bankruptcy, agency and information costs are recognized as influencing capital 
structure. Leverage ratios and debt policy both vary across time and firms. 
Singh and Hamid 
(1992) 
Large corporations accounting and 
market data from: India, South Korea, 
Pakistan, Jordan, Thailand, Mexico, 
Malaysia, Turkey and Zimbabwe. 
Capital structures in those developing countries differ in important ways from the 
capital structures of firms in developed countries. Differences relate to the use of 
external finance and equity. Both are much higher in developing than in developed 
countries. 
Allen and Mizuno 
(1989) 
Sample of 125 Japanese industrial and 
commercial companies from 14 different 
industries for the period 1980-1983. 
Results suggest that profitability and industry factors play an important part in the 
determination of Japanese company capital structures. However, the influence of the 
theoretical variables on Japanese company capital structure is not clear cut at all. 
Bernanke and 
Campbell (1988) 
U.S. data Moderately low debt ratios (20 - 30%) are prevailing for the most part of the XX 
century. See also Wall (1988), Taggart (1985), and Gordon and Malkiel (1981). 
Titman and Wessels 
(1988) 
Data from the Annual Compustat 
Industrial Files from 1974 to 1982. The 
quit-rate data are from the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
Document an inverse relation between financial leverage and the "uniqueness" of a 
firm’s line of business. Evidence suggests that transaction costs may be important 
factor in the determination of capital structure. Short-term debt ratios appear to be 
negatively related to firm size, arguably, because of the presence of economies of scale 
in long-term financing. Findings do not provide support for hypothesized relations 
between leverage and non-debt tax shields, volatility, collateral value, or future 
growth. 
Friend and  
Hasbrouk (1988) 
Non-financial, non-utility U.S. firms 
possessing financial statements through 
l983. Primary sources of data were the 
Compustat database and SEC filings. 
Documents a relationship between insider holdings and capital structure. Additionally, 
found no correlation between dividend payouts and the size of insider holdings. 
Titman and Wessels 
(1988) 
 Intra-industry it appears that leverage is inversely related with profitability, and asset-
intensiveness. See also Long and Malitz (1985, and Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), 
among others, for similar empirical results. 
Michel and Shaked 
(1985) 
Matched sample of 130 Japanese and 130 
U.S. firms, belonging to ten different 
industries. 
Results suggest that the Japanese firms are more highly leveraged than the U.S. firms. 
Bradley, Jarrell and 
Kim (1984) 
 Debt ratio is (1) inversely related to the volatility of operating earnings; (2) positively 
related to the level of non-debt tax shields; (3) negatively related to the advertising and 
R&D expenses used as surrogates for agency costs. Overall they document asset 
structure, liquidity, and industry classification show the stronger explanatory power of 
the determinants of capital structure. Size, growth opportunities and income tax 
consideration follow. Capital structures across countries show an industry effect. 
Found evidence of little intra-industry variability of debt ratios 
Sarathy and 
Chatterjee (1984) 
1979 accounting data of 368 U.S. and 
573 Japanese large firms. 
Results show that Japanese firms in the sample have significantly lower equity-to-
assets ratios compared to U.S. sample firms. 
Bowen, Daley and 
Huber (1982) 
Data selected from the Compustat 
Annual Industrial files from 1951 
through l969. 
Firms exhibit a statistically significant tendency to move toward their industry mean 
over both five and ten year time periods. Industry average debt ratios tend to remain 
stable. Furthermore, provide evidence supporting DeAngelo and Masulis’ (1980) 
proposition III that non-debt tax shields are an important consideration in the 
determination of the optimal level of debt in the capital structure. 
March (1982) Sample of 748 issues made by UK listed 
firms between 1959 and 1970.  
Firms’ pattern of financing behavior seem to de determined by, both, a target long-
term debt ratio and a target ratio of short-term to total debt 
Taxation and Capital Structure Choice 
Graham (1999a) U.S. sample data from Compustat (1973-
1994 period) and state tax information 
from Fiscal Federalism (1981–1995). 
Documents that the present value the benefit of tax interest deductibility is 
approximately 10 percent of firm value, decreasing to 4.3 percent when income tax at 
the personal level is accounted for. If firms were to lever up to the point where their 
interest-deduction benefit functions first become downward sloping, they would obtain 
additional gross tax benefits equal to about 15% of firm value. These results suggest 
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that either the expected costs of incremental leverage are quite large, or else that firms 
use debt too conservatively.  
Graham (1999b) U.S. sample data from Compustat (1973-
1994 period) and state tax information 
from Fiscal Federalism (1981–1995). 
Used simulated marginal tax rates to account for uncertainty of, e.g., taxable income 
and tax-loss carrybacks and carryforwards. Cross-sectional regressions show, 
controlling for personal taxes, that financial leverage is positively correlated with tax 
rates in each year 1980-1994, with significant coefficients in almost every year. 
Results contradict Miller’s (1977) tax hypothesis. Evidence suggests that income tax at 
the personal level reduces, but does not eliminate the incentives for debt financing. 
Gordon and Lee 
(1999) 
U.S. Statistics of Income (SOI) 
Corporate Returns, SOI Individual 
Returns from 1950 through 1995. 
Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that corporate income taxes provide a 
strong and significant effect on financial leverage. Tax incentives appear to vary 
according to actual or future tax losses. The results also indicate that small firms’ 
reliance on debt financing is higher than in the case of large firms. Corporate tax rates 
differentiate across firm size. Given the current levels of these rates the U.S.  for large 
and small firms, the authors estimate that the former group of firms could increase 
their debt ratio by 8 percentage points. 
Lie and Lie (1999) Samples of 213 self-tender offers and 
433 special dividends announced in U.S. 
from 1991 to 1994; 987 open market 
repurchases and 5590 regular dividend 
increases announced in U.S. from 1980 
to 1990.  
Examine the impact of personal taxation on the managerial choice between share 
repurchases and dividends as means returning cash to investors. Findings indicate that 
that managers are more likely to choose a share repurchase if the firm has a low 
dividend yield, if the firm’s stock has experienced losses or small recent capital gains, 
and if the payout occurred before the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Results are consistent 
with the notion that personal taxation influences the choice of disbursement method,. 
Gropp (1997)   Sample of 929 U.S. manufacturing firms 
listed at the NYSE and AMEX with data 
available on Compustat files from 1979 
to 1991. 
Documents a strong and statistically significant positive relation between expected 
effective tax rates and financial leverage. Some support is reported for agency and for 
bankruptcy costs explanations of capital structure choice. The evidence is considered 
inconsistent with the signaling hypothesis. 
Cloyd, Limberg and 
Robinson (1997) 
Sample of closely held corporations 
derived from the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System 1988-89 
National Survey of Small Business 
Finances. 
Tested tax and tax substitution hypotheses. Regression results provide support to both 
hypotheses. a significant positive relationship between tax rates and leverage is found. 
Evidence is consistent with the proposition that taxes, at both the individual and the 
corporate level, significantly influence capital structure decisions.  
Shih (1996) U.S. Internal Revenue Service corporate 
tax return annual data from 1950 to 1989. 
Provides evidence supporting the proposition that the risk of tax exhaustion is 
negatively related to firms’ financial leverage. Additionally, reports that was found 
evidence suggesting that income tax at personal level is likely to affect firm leverage. 
Davis (1994) Sample of 250 non-financial Canadian 
firms with data from 1966 to 185 
available on Compustat. 
Provides an empirical examination of the three competing versions of the substitution 
hypothesis (inverse relationship between debt and non-debt tax-shields).  In general, 
results do not support DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Dotan and Ravid (1985). 
Versions of the proposition.  Some support is documented, however, for Dammon and 
Senbet’s (1988) substitution hypothesis. 
Givoly et al. (1992) Sample of 995, 892, 873 and 860 U.S. 
firms for 1987, 1986, 1985, and 1984 
respectively.  Data from Compustat. 
Tested the tax hypothesis around the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Findings suggest that 
corporate taxes and non-debt tax shelters both are influential for capital structure 
decisions. Additionally, report that indirect evidence supporting the proposition that 
income taxes at the personal level also affect capital structure choice. 
Dhaliwal, Trezevant 
and Wang (1992), 
Sample of 1,045 U.S. firms with data 
available for the period 1972-1986 from 
Compustat. 
Report empirical support for the substitution hypothesis (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980) 
and the tax exhaustion hypothesis (MacKie-Mason 1990a). 
MacKie-Mason 
(1990a) 
Sample of 1747 registrations of public 
seasoned security offerings made by U.S. 
firms since 1977. Data from Compustat. 
Finds “clear and substantial” tax effects on financing choices. Evidence 
suggests should consider looking to incremental financing decisions, rather than to 
aggregate leverage ratios. Taxes influence capital structure although not in decisive 
manner. Firms with tax loss carry forwards are less likely to issue debt. 
Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Issues 
Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998) 
Sample of 31 firms that went through 
highly leveraged transactions (HLT) and 
became financially distressed. Data 
covers the period from the time of the 
HLT transaction to the resolution of 
financial distress.   
Provides a 10 percent estimate for the costs of financial distress (with an upper bound 
of 23 percent). Selection bias, however, may have contaminated the evidence if sample 
firms with low costs of financial distress are more likely to be highly leveraged. 
Campbell (1997) Data from 36 closely held firms that 
successfully completed the Chapter 11 
process. 
Direct bankruptcy costs were estimated, on average, at 8.5 percent of book value of 
total assets at the bankruptcy filing date, therefore supporting the non-triviality of 
those costs. It is also reported the presence of significant scale economies in 
bankruptcy costs. 
Alderson and Betker 
(1995) 
Sample of 88 U.S. firms drawn from 
firms that completed Chapter 11 
bankruptcies during the 1982-1993 
period. 
Firms bearing higher liquidation costs emerge from Chapter 11 with relatively low 
debt ratios. Further, these firms’ debt is more likely to be public and unsecured and 
having less restrictive covenants. These firms are also likely to raise new external 
equity capital. Authors conclude that high liquidation costs drive firms to adopt capital 
structures that make financial distress less likely. 
Weiss (1990) Bankruptcy filings made between 1979 
and 1986 by 37 U.S. listed industrial 
firms. 
Reports that direct costs of bankruptcy in his sample of industrial firms averaged 3.1 
percent of the total assets value in the fiscal year-end prior to bankruptcy, and that the 
average time spent in Chapter 11 was 2.5 years. No evidence supporting the returns to 
scale hypothesis was found.  
Litzenberger (1986) Sample of U.S. oil companies Found a negative effect on the market value of extensive changes in capital structure. 
Additionally, the evidence supports the hypothesis that bankruptcy costs are 
substantial and affect firms’ capital structure decisions. 
Altman (1984) Data of bankruptcy reorganization filings 
(antedating the implementation of the 
Bankruptcy Code) of 12 retail firms, and 
seven industrial firms. 
Direct bankruptcy costs for the retailer sample was, 2.8 percent (1.4% for Warner 
1977) five years prior to bankruptcy filling, and 4.0 percent (5.3% for Warner 1977) 
just prior bankruptcy. For the industrial sample, was 6.0 percent (1.4% for Warner 
1977) five years prior to bankruptcy filling, and 6.0 percent (5.3% for Warner 1977) 
just prior bankruptcy. For the sample of retail firms estimated direct bankruptcy costs 
were, on average, 4 percent of firms’ value in the year of bankruptcy. For the sample 
of industrial firms these costs were, on average, to 9.8 percent of firm value in the year 
of bankruptcy. Evidence is consistent with Warner (1977) argument of a scale effect in 
direct bankruptcy costs. 
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Warner (1977)ii Data of 11 railroads that were in 
bankruptcy reorganization proceedings 
between 1933 and 1955. 
Found that direct bankruptcy costs averaged 1.4 percent five years prior filling for 
bankruptcy, rising to 5.3 percent of the firm’s value in the year of bankruptcy. 
Estimated bankruptcy costs were estimated at 9.1 and 6.6 percent for the two smallest 
firms in the sample and at 2.7 and 1.7 percent for the two largest. Thus, direct 
bankruptcy costs were characterized as a concave function of firm size suggesting the 
presence of economies of scale. In face of the results, the importance of bankruptcy 
costs as a determinant of capital structure might be overstated. 
Agency and Governance Problems 
Ang, Cole and Lin 
(2000) 
Sample of 1708 small corporations from 
the Federal Reserve Board /National 
Survey of Small Business Finances 
database. 
Found evidence supporting several predictions of agency cost theory. Agency costs are 
found to be: i) significantly higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the 
firm; ii ) inversely related to the manager's ownership share; iii) increasing with the 
number of non-manager shareholders, and iv) to a lesser extent, lower with greater 
monitoring by banks. 
Parrino and 
Weisbach (1999) 
Data to calibrate simulation models were 
collected from Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat database far all years in the 
1981-1995 period. Others data sources 
were Ibbotson and Associates databases.  
Used numerical methods to examine the importance and magnitude of agency costs of 
stockholder-bondholder conflicts in capital-structure choice. 
Roth and 
Saporoschenko 
(1999) 
Sample of 142 large managerial purchase 
announcements from 139 firms for each 
week of the 1993- 1995 period. 
Announcements were identified in the 
Wall Street Journal’s weekly ITS column 
(lists by market value the ten largest 
insider purchases). Return data from the 
Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP).  
Look at investors’ reactions to large insider stock purchases. Findings suggest that 
investors react positively to announcements of large purchases by firm managers. This 
result is consistent with Leland and Pyle´s (1977) hypothesis that insiders increasing 
their ownership holdings as a reducing effect on the informational asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders. 
Nohel and Tarhan 
(1998) 
The sample, drawn from a wide variety 
of industries, includes 48 tender offer 
stock repurchase announcements from 
1978 and 1979, 122 announcements from 
1980 to 1987, and 72 announcements 
after 1987.  Data from COMPUSTAT 
and CRSP. 
Provide evidence in support of the free cash flow explanation of investor positive 
reaction to share repurchases. Additionally, the authors claim that find supporting 
evidence that “repurchases do not appear to be pure financial transactions meant to 
change the firm’s capital structure but are part of a restructuring package meant to 
shrink the assets of the firm.” 
Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) 
Sample of 450 (370) open-market share 
repurchase programs announced in The 
Wall Street Journal Index during 1981 to 
1990. 
Examines the signaling effects of share repurchases. Report an average abnormal 
return of 2.69 percent on the announcement of an open-market share repurchase 
program (over a three-day event window starting the day prior to announcement). 
Found that open-market share repurchase program announcements are inversely 
related to prior stock price performance. This result suggests that firms repurchasing 
activity depends on the degree of perceived stock price undervaluation. 
Fen and Liang 
(1997) 
Panel data of all non-financial firms on 
Compustat during 1984 1995 period, 
with total assets greater than 50 million 
(1994) dollars. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that firms use open market repurchases to reduce the 
agency costs of free cash flow, we find that repurchases are positively related to 
proxies for free cash flow and negatively related to proxies for marginal financing 
costs. 
Berger, Ofek and 
Yermack (1997) 
Data from a sample of 452 industrial 
firms between 1984 and 1991. The panel 
was drawn from annual Forbes magazine 
rankings of the 500 largest U.S. public 
corporations. 
Document cross-sectional relationships between various corporate governance 
variables and debt-to-equity ratios.  The evidence provide strong support for the 
argument that firm's observed capital structures are influence by managerial 
entrenchment. Significantly lower leverage is documented when: (1) managerial 
entrenchment is present; and (2) CEOs do not appear to face strong monitoring. It is 
reported that capital structures experienced significant leveraging up after events that 
represent negative a shock to managers’ security, such as a takeover threat. Consistent 
with the disciplinary role of managerial compensation is documented a positive 
relationship between increases in stock option holdings and leverage. 
Denis, Denis and 
Sarin (1997) 
Sample of 933 non-regulated utilities and 
non-financial firms selected in with data 
available on COMPUSTAT for the 1985 
fiscal year. 
Document a strong and inverse relationship between the extent of firm diversification 
and managerial equity ownership. 
Safieddine and 
Titman (1997) 
Sample of 207 of 315 targets that 
remained independent for, at least, one 
year after the initial termination date.  
The median level of total debt scaled by the book value of assets with a one-year lag, 
of the unsuccessful takeover attempt is 59.8 percent, increasing, on average, to 71.5 
percent on year afterward. 
Fenn and Liang 
(1997) 
Panel data set of all U.S. non-financial 
firms on Compustat during 1984-95 with 
total assets greater than 50 million (in 
1994 dollars). 
Document a positive relationship between share repurchases and (proxies) for free 
cash flow and an inverse relation between share repurchases and (proxies) for marginal 
financing costs. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms use open market 
share repurchases to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. Signaling is ruled out 
as a possible motivation for making open market share repurchases.  
Comparing our cross-sectional regression results for repurchases with those obtained 
for dividend increases, we conclude that the latter likely are not motivated primarily by 
the agency costs of free cash flow and that firms generally do not treat repurchases and 
dividends as close substitutes. Report evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
managerial stock option holdings are related to the substitution of share repurchases 
for dividends payments. 
Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1995) 
Sample of 1239 open-market share 
repurchases announced from January 
1980 to December 1990. 
Similarly to earlier empirical studies, report a 3.5 percent average market reaction to 
the announcement of an open-market share repurchase. This result is viewed as 
inconsistent with managerial arguments of undervaluation to engage in repurchase 
transactions. Average market underreaction to open-market share repurchase is 
estimated at 15 percent when announcement and four-year abnormal returns are 
combined. Further evidence suggests that the full impact of announcements can extend 
for several years. 
Lasfer (1995) Non-financial companies which have 
their accounting data available for 
the1972-l983 time period in Exstat, Extel 
Cards and Datastream. 
Firms with few growth options have more long-term debt in their capital structure. 
Low free cash flow problems are associated with reduced level of debt in capital 
structures. Results suggest that debt potentially play a role in lessening manager-
shareholder conflicts. 
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Asymmetric Information Factors on Capital Structure 
Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1999) 
Straight and convertible debt offerings 
by non-regulated utilities or financial 
institutions included in Investment 
Dealers’ Digest Directory of Corporate 
Financing during the 1975-1989 period. 
Report substantial long-run post-issue underperformance by firms making straight and 
convertible debt offerings from 1975 to 1989. This long-run underperformance is more 
severe for smaller, younger, and NASDAQ-listed firms, and for firms issuing 
speculative grade debt. Strong evidence that the underperformance of issuer of both 
straight and convertible debt is limited to those issues that occur in periods with a high 
volume of issues is also found. Results are consistent with the idea that debt offerings 
(like equity offerings) may signal firm overvaluation. 
McLaughlin, 
Safieddine, and 
Vasudevan (1998) 
Sample of 1,967 equity offerings and 960 
debt offerings of U.S. firms during the 
period 1980-1993 with data available in 
the Securities Data Company database. 
Findings are consistent with the asymmetric information hypotheses. Results show that 
the greater the information asymmetries the more pronounced the decline in operating 
performance. Issuing firms with higher market-to-book ratios and smaller size, 
experienced larger post offering performance declines. 
Tsangarakis (1996) Common stock rights offerings by firms 
listed in the Athens Stock Exchange 
during the 1981-1990 period. 
Examines stock price reaction to rights offerings. Documents positive abnormal stock 
returns on the announcement day of rights offerings in Greece. Furthermore, abnormal 
returns are found to be inversely related to the level of stock ownership diffusion. 
Evidence suggests that rights offerings in Greece convey positive information about 
future prospects of issuers.  
Shah (1994) 175 leverage-increasing and 191 
leverage-decreasing transactions, both 
occurring during the period 1970-1988. 
Examines the nature of information conveyed by financial leverage changes. The 
information conveyed by the announcement of these by pure capital structure changes 
is qualitatively different for leverage-increasing and leverage-decreasing offers. His 
results suggest that the two types of offers reveal qualitative differential information 
about firms’ performance. 
Denis, Denis and 
Sarin (1994) 
Sample of 6,777 large dividend changes 
(5,992 dividend increases and 785 
dividend decreases) over the period 
1962-1988. Data from COMPUSTAT, 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), Wall Street Journal Index and 
CRSP. 
Report that their findings are supportive of the cash flow signaling and dividend 
clientele hypotheses but inconsistent with the overinvestment hypothesis. 
Dierkens (1991) Seasoned primary equity offerings made 
by U.S. industrial firms during the 1980-
1983 period and reported in the 
Investment Dealers’ Digest Directory of 
Corporate Financing. 
Provides cross-sectional evidence of a significant positive relation of asymmetric 
information increases at stock price decline at the announcement date of equity issue. 
Timing tests suggest that firms time the announcement of their equity offerings when 
information asymmetries are relatively low.  
Korajczyk, Lucas 
and McDonald 
(1990) 
Firms listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and on the American 
Exchange (AMEX). Firms with shares 
trade over-the-counter (OTC) were also 
included. 
Common stock price reactions adjusted for general market price changes (abnormal 
returns) in the 500 days preceding and 100 days following the issue announcement for 
primary issues and mixed primary and secondary issues (i.e. equity issues that add no 
capital to the firm). Empirical evidence shows: (1) In the 500 days prior to the equity 
issue announcement NYSE/AMEX firms exhibit an overall 43.8 percent abnormal 
return (for primary and combined primary and secondary issues) and a 29.3 percent 
abnormal return for secondary issues. Corresponding abnormal returns for OTC firms 
are 68.8 percent and 44.5 percent, respectively. 
(2) The overall abnormal return on the two days on and preceding the equity issue 
announcement is –3.0 percent for NYSE / AMEX firms and – 2.8 percent for OTC 
firms. Abnormal return for secondary issues is –2.8 percent for NYSE / AMEX firms 
and – 1.7 percent for OTC firms. (3) The pattern of price behavior is generally similar 
for pure secondary and other issues, though primary issues announcements are 
preceded by a larger price run-up. (4) OTC and for NYSE / AMEX firms also have 
qualitatively similar stock price patterns, with a larger rise for OTC firms. (5) Equity 
issues follow rises in the market as a whole. These results are consistently and 
significantly confirmatory of the findings reported in earlier surveys of this literature 
(e.g., Smith 1986; Masulis 1988; and Harris and Raviv 1991). 
Smith 1986 Summarizes studies of Asquith and 
Mullins (1986), Kolodny and Suhker 
(1985), Masulis and Korwar (1986), 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986), and 
Schipper and Smith (1986). 
Two-day common stock price reactions adjusted for general market price changes 
(abnormal returns) to announcements of public issues of common stock, preferred 
stock, convertible preferred stock, straight debt and convertible debt by industrial and 
utility firms.Reports an average (weighted by sample size) -3.14 percent abnormal 
return in two-day following the announcement of common stock issues. 
Four generalizations are suggested: (1) the average abnormal are non-positive; (2) 
abnormal returns associated with announcements of common stock sales are negative 
and larger in absolute value than those observed with preferred stock or debt; (3) 
abnormal returns associated with announcements of convertible securities are negative 
and larger in absolute value than those for corresponding non-convertible securities; 
and (4) abnormal returns associated with sales of securities by industrials are negative 
and larger in absolute value than those for utilities. 
Kim and Sorensen 
(1986) 
Sample of 168 U.S. firms divided in two 
subsamples of 84 firms each: insider-
owned firms and outsider-owned firms, 
with 43 percent and 2 percent of insider 
ownership respectively. 
Study the presence of the agency costs and their relation to the debt policy. Document 
that firms with higher insider ownership show greater debt ratios than firms with lower 
insider ownership. Evidence is explained by the presence of agency costs of debt and 
equity. Further, evidence support the argument that high-growth firms tend to be less 
leveraged than low-growth firms, and high-operating-risk firms tend to be more 
leveraged than low-operating-risk firms. Finally, firm size does not show a statistically 
significant correlation with financial leverage. 
Capital Structure and Product Markets Interactions 
Showalter (1999) Sample of 1641 U.S. manufacturing 
firms that in 1994 were operating for at 
least 11 years. Data from COMPUSTAT 
Annual Reports over the period 1975 to 
1994. 
Documents that “manufacturing firms increase debt as demand 
uncertainty grows, but reduce debt as costs become more uncertain.” 
Evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that financial leverage may be used as a 
strategic device in price competition. 
Schargrodsky (1997) Sample of 21 firms from the U.S. 
newspaper industry from 1964 to 1995. 
Results show that financial leverage is reduced as the extent of competition (i.e. the 
degree of strategic interaction) falls. The effects are statistically and economically 
significant. 
Chevalier (1995a, b) Sample of 3 U.S. supermarket leverage Findings suggest that when supermarkets increase leverage, investment decreases and 
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buyouts (Safeway, Supermarkets 
General, and Stop & Shop) and 1 
leveraged recapitalization (Kroger). 
prices rise. High leverage seems to be perceived as detrimental to competitiveness. It is 
also suggested that less leveraged firms were more likely to fight for market share than 
the more highly leveraged LBO firms. This might be explained because cash 
constrained LBO firms need to charge higher prices than their more capitalized rivals. 
Kovenock and 
Phillips (1995) 
Sample includes 40 leveraged buyouts, 
management buyouts and public 
recapitalizations of U.S. firms. Data from 
10 commodity industries during1979-
1990 period. 
Find that when industry concentration is high, firms which recapitalize are less likely 
to invest and more likely to close plants. 
Phillips (1995) Fiberglass, tractor-trailer, polyethylene, 
and gypsum industries. 
Evidence supports the proposition that capital structure is influenced by product 
market decisions at the industry level. In three industries financial leverage is inversely 
related with output.  Low financial leverage of rivals and low relatively low barriers to 
entry might explain the positive relationship found in the other industry between 
leverage and output. 
Found that in three out of four industries, as leverage increases, investment decreases 
and industry prices increase.  
Guedes and Opler 
(1994) 
Panel of U.S. firms biannual data during 
the 1981-1989 period from 
COMPUSTAT and TRINET databases. 
No evidence was found in support of the hypothesis that firms’ strategic behavior in 
product markets is cross-sectionally related to financial leverage. Weak evidence is 
also reported that intra-industry the determinants of leverage differ when the potential 
for strategic interaction is high. Financing decisions at the margin are affected by the 
degree of industry concentration, however the effect is economically insignificant. 
Denis (1990) Defensive payout announcements (49) 
mentioned in Wall Street Journal Index 
under the headings "Mergers and 
Acquisitions" or "Reacquired Shares" 
from 1980 to 1987. 
Reports average negative announcement of defensive share repurchases is associated 
with an average negative impact on the share price of the target firm. In contrast 
dividend payments generally increase the wealth of target firm shareholders. 
Spence (1985) Sample of 1,183 U.S. firms. Product 
market data are from 1972. Financial 
data are 5-year averages for 1970-1974. 
Report very little evidence that deviations of observed from calculated optimal capital 
structure (industry mean debt ratio) are affected by product market considerations. 
Ceteris paribus, diversified firms tend to be more leveraged and large (as measured by 
assets) and labor-intensive firms less. Capital structure appears to be related to product 
market attributes, competitive conditions or firm’s financial situation. 
Pecking Order Hypothesis  
Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) 
Sample of 157 non-regulated utilities 
non-financial  firms with that available in 
COMPUSTAT database from 1971 
through 1989. 
uses a simulation methodology to test the pecking order versus the static tradeoff 
theory finding strong support for the pecking order theory and, consequently, rejecting 
the target capital structure theory. This is consistent with Myers’ (1993) argument that 
the pecking order theory is predictively superior to the static tradeoff theory. 
Ghosh and Cai 
(1999) 
256 manufacturing firms belonging to 
Fortune 500s during the 1974-1992 
period. 
Found that capital structure measures show strong reversion to the industry means. 
Found also strong support for the pecking order hypothesis and that for its coexistence 
with the optimal capital structure hypothesis. 
Helwege and Liang 
(1996) 
Data on the IPO security offerings of 367 
U.S. firms with financial data available 
from Compustat or Compact Disclose 
during the 1983-1992 period. 
Results do not support the hypothesis that firms follow a pecking order of financing 
once that greater asymmetries of information do not lead to a higher probability of 
debt issuance. 
Klein and Brian 
(1994) 
All non-financial, non-regulated 
industrial firms listed on the Compustat 
database for the 1983-1988 period. 
Firm size and sales growth rate important determinants of financing choice. These 
results are seen as supportive of the pecking order hypothesis 
Jensen, Solberg and 
Zorn (1992) 
Sample of 565 firms with data available 
on COMPUSTAT database and listed in 
the Value Line Investment Survey in 
1982 and 1987. Regulated utilities and 
financial firms were excluded from the 
sample. 
Document that profitability, growth, and investment spending are related to debt and 
dividend policies. Results are consistent with the pecking order theory. Furthermore, is 
reported evidence consistent with the hypothesis that financial decisions and the level 
of insider ownership are interdependent. 
Baskin (1989) 378 surviving (still available on 
Compustat in 1984) firms from the 1960 
Fortune 500s with data covering the 
1960-1972 period. 
Document strong support for the pecking order theory suggesting that capital structure 
in practice tend to respond passively to financing needs determined by the investment 
strategy. Evidence also shows that financial leverage is positively related to past 
growth and negatively with past profitability. 
Survey-based Papers  
Graham and Harvey 
(2001) 
4400 FEI firms. 1998 Fortune 500s, from 
which 313 were also FEI firms. 
Financial slack and bond ratings were found the most relevant factors for debt policy. 
Responses also suggest that recent stock price performance is an influential factor in 
timing a new equity issue. Other factors include the degree of stock undervaluation 
and fear of earnings dilution. Moderate support is reported for the target capital 
structure policy. Evidence is not entirely consistent with the adverse selection 
problems associated with the pecking order hierarchy of financing. 
Babu and Jain (1998) Sample of 1300 companies selected on 
the basis of stratified random sampling 
from the official directory of the Bombay 
Stock Exchange. 
Achieving financial flexibility and long-term survivability is indicated as an important 
corporate financial objective. A preference for internal to external financing is reported 
and this is viewed as support for the pecking order hypothesis. 
Jong and Dijk (1998) CFOs of 168 non-financial firms listed 
on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in 
May 1997.v 
Free cash flow agency problems are likely (overinvestment) are potentially relevant. 
Kamath (1997) CFOs NYSE (Dec 31, 1988) firms 
excluding Fortune 500’s industrial firms 
of 1989 and all financial intermediaries. 
Survey participants were found to be more likely to follow a financial hierarchy than 
to target a capital structure. Those who declared following a target capital structure 
policy, considered that the industry average debt ratio was an important factor in 
determining such policy. Respondents who indicated following a pecking order of 
financing, related debt ratios with past profitability and growth. Further, it appears 
they are unlikely to engage in signaling activity with long-term financing decision-
making. Only a minority (20 percent) admitted that takeover threats might influence 
capital structure choice. A similar percentage was likely to underinvest if financially 
constrained. In contrast, almost all respondents would avoid dividend payout cuts not 
to forego attractive new investment opportunities. 
Kester et al. (1997) CEOs CFO’s sample of firms listed on Survey responses suggest that Lintner’s dividend model is a relevant description of 
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Australian Stock Exchange, Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange, Jakarta Stock 
Exchange, Philippine Stock Exchange, 
Stock Exchange of Singapore. 
corporate behavior in this area. In addition, signaling and clientele effects of dividend 
policy are also acknowledged. Respondents indicated their preference for internal 
equity what is seen as supportive of the pecking order of financing in detriment of the 
target capital structure. Results were mixed in relation to the preferences for external 
financing.  The long-term survivability of the firm was considered the most relevant 
consideration for financing decision-Making. 
Trahan and Gitman 
(1995) 
Fortune 500 largest industrial companies 
and Forbes 200 best small companies. 
The authors report that “overall the respondents appear to have little 
interest in the current state of academic research in corporate 
finance.” Moreover, it is concluded that respondents deemed that “existing 
academic research can be better explained and operationalized.” 
Jog and Srivastava 
(1994) 
CFOs TSE-300 Canadian firms and large 
foreign-owned and private firms 
operating in Canada (April 1991). 
Findings reveal that financial slack, not the lack of profitable investment opportunities, 
is viewed by respondents as the primary obstacle to the undertaking of new investment 
opportunities. This result is consistent with the underinvestment hypothesis and 
indicates that the survey participants perceive the relevance of equity capital adverse 
selection costs. Thus, results provide a strong support for asymmetric information 
hypothesis concerning its impact on firm's financing and investment decisions. 
Kester, Chang and 
Tsui (1994) 
A potentially severe limitation of the 
investigation results from the survey 
being conducted in Hong Kong and 
Singapore in the early 1990s while in the 
U.S. were conducted in 1983 and 1987. 
Hong Kong and Singapore survey participants favored following a pecking order of 
financing hierarchy rather than a target capital structure. Consistent with that answer, 
respondents in all three countries ranked internal equity as their first choice for long-
term financing. United States respondents scored debt ahead of new common stock, 
whereas Hong Kong respondents ranked new common stock higher than debt and 
respondents in Singapore preferred new common stock sold through rights offerings 
ahead of debt. This may indicate that corporate financial structure might evidence 
unique features in Hong Kong and Singapore when compared to the U.S. 
Hittle, Haddad and 
Gitman (1992) 
CFOs of Over-the-Counter 500s firms.iv Findings provide support for the asymmetric information hypothesis suggesting that 
managers of firms with greater asymmetric information are more likely to believe their 
stock is mispriced, leading them to follow the pecking-order model of financing. 
Norton (1991a) 1984 Fortune 500s firms Although taxation was deemed as an important consideration for financing decision-
making bankruptcy costs was not. Thus, the static trade-off model was generally not 
supported. Results are not consistent with the agency cost explanation of capital 
structure decisions.  Similarly, financial clientele effects were not detected. Little 
support was found for asymmetric information/signaling theories. However, some 
(weak) support is reported for the pecking order hypothesis. 
Norton (1991b) CFOs of publicly held small firms.iii The survey results provide weak evidence in support of bankruptcy costs, agency 
costs, or information asymmetries theories. Some support is reported concerning the 
pecking order model as well as a desire to avoid the debt overhang. Further, evidence 
shows that the effects of market factors and managerial preferences, particularly the 
strong aversion to debt, are relevant considerations in determining capital structure 
policy. 
Pruitt and Gitman 
(1991) 
CFOs 1987 500s firms plus second 500 
largest firms drawn from Compustat 
industrial files.  
Findings suggest that financing policy is not independent of investment decisions. 
Further, dividend policy was indicated as not being determined by the firm's 
investment and financing decisions. 
Pinegar and 
Wilbricht (1989) 
1986 Fortune 500s firms Indicate that the pecking order theory is more descriptive of how financing decisions 
are made in practice than Miller and Rock’s (1985) model or the static tradeoff model. 
However they point out that their results “are unlikely to support any 
of the models above to the exclusion of the others”. 
Norton (1989) 1984 Fortune 500s firms Factor analysis identified nine determinants of capital structure choice of survey 
participants, which explain 66.7 percent of the variation in their responses. Those 
determinants are: taxes and market concerns, financial flexibility, agency costs, 
information asymmetries, and signaling.  The last three determinants may be of limited 
importance in their affects on respondents’ capital structure decisions. 
Scott and Johnson 
(1982) 
1979 Fortune 1000’s Survey results suggest that survey participants adhere to the optimal capital structure 
concept. Further, respondents seem to subscribe to the principle that financial leverage 
affects common stock price. 
Baker, Gallagher and 
Morgan (1981) 
Two random samples of 150 NYSE’s 
listed firms. 
Major reasons indicated for undertaking share repurchase are the investment of idle 
cash or using it in managerial compensation programs. Undervalued stock and excess 
cash are deemed as necessary conditions for successful stock buyback programs. Other 
findings include the disagreement of respondents that share repurchases and dividend 
payments are substitutes., and that stock repurchases may be detrimental for the firm’s 
capital structure. 
Stonehill et al. 
(1975) 
87 manufacturing firms in electronic, 
paper, food, and chemical industries, in 
France, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and 
U.S.A. 
Financial risk appears to be the most important determinant of firm’s financial 
leverage policy. Other determinants are financial flexibility and capital market 
conditions. Industry effects were not found. 
i These conclusions seem diametrically opposed to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1994) what is in our view inexplicable once both papers used the same data set. 
ii His analysis is prior to the Bankruptcy Code enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and applicable to cases filed after October 1, 1979, which revoked the 
former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, among others, by the Chandler Act. 
iii Firms were sampled from Inc. 100 (May 1987), Financial World 500 (August 1987), Forbes 200 (November 1987), and Business Week 100 Best Small Growth 
Companies (May 1987). Criteria for firm inclusion in the sample were differentiated across periodicals. 
iv Largest 500 OTC industrial firms selected from CRSP files sorted based on December 1988 market value of equity. 
v The investigation was designed to collect questionnaire data and to use confirmatory factor analysis with structural equation modeling. 
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 CHAPTER 3: The Theory of the Banking Firm Capital Structure 
 
One means of expanding on the previous evidence is to study the determinants of 
leverage in an industry exhibiting extreme leverage choices. Some of the best examples 
of this situation are commercial banks and savings and loan associations, which 
typically have leverage ratios of 95 percent debt to assets or higher. 
Ronald Masulis, The Debt/Equity Choice 
 
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades the question of banking firm’s capital structure308 emerged 
as a matter of generalized concern gathering considerable scrutiny and fostering a vivid 
debate among academics, public policy-makers, banking community, capital market 
participants, supervisory and regulatory authorities alike. Not surprisingly, an extensive 
body of literature has developed as a result of the attention dedicated to the matter by both 
scholars and practitioners.309 
Plausibly, the awareness gathered by the problem of the banking firm’s capital 
structure, is related to the apparent inconsistency between the well-known prediction  
supported by the Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theory  that firms’ capital structures 
should vary randomly across firms and industries,310 and the acknowledged empirical 
regularity that banks tend to exhibit clustering capital ratios and high levels of financial 
leverage.311 Yet, we still have a limited understanding of why banks are so extremely 
                                                          
308 As observed in Kane (1992) “in the field of financial institutions, capital means 
corporate capital” (emphasis in original). 
309 See, for example, the special issue (Volume19, 3-4) of the Journal of Banking and Finance dedicated to 
"The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions". The recent high level of share repurchases in the U.S. banking 
industry (see, e.g., Hirtle 1998; and Davis and Lee 1997). In the non-academic literature see, among others, 
The Economist (October 17th 1998, 15): “The case for toughening capital requirements is 
particularly strong for banks that are implicitly backed by taxpayers, whether 
through deposit insurance or because they are judged too big to fail.” In a recent 
report on European Banks Schroders (1997, 12) suggests that “the pursuit of an efficient 
capital structure has […] become a priority.” See also Davis and Lee (1997) for “A Practical 
Approach to Capital Structure for Banks.” 
310 It is generally accepted that there is an interindustry effect in the observed capital structures of the real 
world firms due to the uniqueness of each industry’s business. This intraindustry variance is commonly 
attributed to the idiosyncratic business and financial risks of individual firms. Within the banking industry, 
which is widely recognized as exhibiting low capital-to-assets ratios, nonetheless, management of an 
individual bank still has to decide upon the level of financial leverage targeted as the optimal for maximizing 
the present value of the cash flow stream generated by its operations.  
311 Both Leland and Pyle (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide arguments in support of banks 
being more highly leveraged than other industries. As pointed out by, e.g., Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995) 
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 levered, and therefore we lack a plausible and comprehensive explanation for what 
considerations drive their capital structure decisions. The evidence contradictory with the 
randomness hypothesis of banks’ capital structure has been theoretically interpreted as the 
result of the departure from the presumptions of the Modigliani and Miller’s ideal 
economy. However, when we abstract from an environment characterized by the presence 
of frictional, incomplete and imperfect capital markets, it can be shown that the existence 
of banking firms becomes irrelevant for social welfare in the same fashion capital structure 
turns immaterial to a firm’s value.312 This result would be obtained as a consequence of in 
such framework economic agents being able to create their own homemade financial 
intermediation. 
According to mainstream academic banking literature it is arguable that the 
substantive questions of the determination of the optimal level and the optimal composition 
(mix) of banking firms capital are susceptible of being handled within the framework of 
the corporate capital structure theory (e.g., Dowd 1996, and Merton 1990).313 This view is 
consistent with Wall and Peterson (1996) argument that, theoretically, “taxes, 
deposit insurance, bankruptcy costs, and managerial incentives may 
play a significant role in determining the optimal level of bank 
capital”. One possible explanation for the actual ambiguity, according to Dowd 
(1996), is the excessive emphasis that traditional banking literature has put in stressing the 
dissimilarities between banking firms and non-financial firms, somewhat neglecting their 
similarities.  
In this study we adopt the point of view that a banking firm, because of the 
idiosyncratic nature of its financial intermediation activity, must be seen, simultaneously, 
as a firm, a financial intermediary, and a regulated entity. As a firm, a bank’s capital 
structure choice tends to resemble its non-financial counterparts, and therefore is likely to 
                                                          
it is a tradition in the banking industry using the capital ratio  as measured by the relation between total 
equity and total net assets  to gauge a bank’s financial leverage. Capital ratio is also known as capital-
assets ratio and leverage ratio (see, Saunders (2000, 453). We adopt the same viewpoint. The subject will be 
developed further in this chapter. 
312 Coase (1960) suggests the notion of frictionless market. 
313 For Dowd (1996) “it is also useful to compare banks to other (i.e. non financial) 
firms that issue debt and equity.” In the same vein Merton (1990) posits that “like business 
firms, financial intermediaries raise capital for operations by issuing stock and 
debt to investors.” 
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 be handled according to the (non-financial) firm’s capital structure theory.314 Because of its 
role as financial intermediary a bank’s capital structure should also reflect the inclusion of 
considerations that are industry specific.315  Finally, as a regulated entity because the 
structure of incentives induced by regulatory and supervisory jurisdiction determines a 
unique interaction between bank’s capital base and various instruments of the regulatory 
intervention. 
This last argument implies that, given the mandatory requirements for banks’ 
capital standards, banking firms are likely to be confronted with both voluntary and 
involuntary capital structure decisions (e.g., Besanko and Kanatas 1996, Cornett and 
Tehranian 1994, and Keeley 1989). The first ones are taken in the very same setting as 
non-financial firms and, arguably, under the same determinants that are hypothesized in the 
capital structure theory for those firms. The involuntary capital structure decisions are 
enforced by compliance prescriptions dictated by violations of the mandatory regime of 
capital adequacy requirements issued by regulators.316 As explained earlier in this 
investigation, we are predominantly concerned with banks’ voluntary capital structure 
decisions, which have been largely overlooked in this literature. 
The examination performed in this chapter focus on the capital structure problem in 
a banking habitat, and aims at being the theoretical foundation of our empirical 
investigation conducted in chapter 5. More specifically, of the set of testable propositions 
embedded in the survey instrument. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we analyze the 
implications of modern banking theory for banks’ capital structure. Section three presents a 
discussion of the banking firm’s capital structure theoretical framework  under a perfect 
and frictionless capital markets approach, and under an imperfect and frictional capital 
markets perspective  aiming at identifying the main (structural) features of model of the 
banking firm appropriate for developing hypotheses for empirical testing.  
                                                          
314 Wall and Peterson (1998) argue that “[t]he theory of security issuance for U.S. banks 
incorporates both the theory of capital structure for nonfinancial corporations 
and the unique features of banks.” 
315 As observed by Wall and Peterson (1998) “[b]anks are private corporations that operate 
in a special regulatory environment. As private corporations, their capital 
structure decisions are subject to the same influences as other corporations. 
These influences include factors that would lead to an optimal equity-to-debt 
ratio in a static setting as well as dynamic adjustment costs such as the costs 
of issuing new equity.” 
316 Or candidate to regulators’ prompt corrective action (see, e.g., Saunders 2000, 454). For a recent survey of 
theoretical literature on banks capital regulation see Santos (2000).   
102 
 3.2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE BANKING FIRM’S CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
DECISIONS 
The debate on the (optimal) capital structure for banking firms parallel the 
ubiquitous dissension perceived in the capital structure problem of non-financial firms. 
Both are, recognizably, controversial fields of inquiry, and sources of interrogation, doubt 
and even perplexity.317 
The problem of choosing the appropriate amount of capital to carry on the balance 
sheet of a banking firm is not a trivial one. Carrying little capital is costly, not only because 
of the disciplinary effects of capital markets, but also because it increases the probability of 
regulatory intervention. This interference might, for example, restrict (or even prohibit) 
paying dividends, disallow entering in new corporate control transactions, require disposal 
of assets, or even reshuffling the management team. Likewise, carrying excessive capital 
on a bank balance sheet is also costly and should be returned to shareholders. 
Generally it is accepted that the link between the different considerations that 
converge in a bank’ capital structure decisions is multifaceted. Therefore, as we suggested 
earlier, the problem of the banking firm capital structure might be advantageously 
investigated using a multiple simultaneous approach, which seems to be helpful in order to 
allow the development of a realistic and robust environment for the analysis. In line with 
this viewpoint, the banking literature suggests that such an approach should encompass the 
distinct (although related) perspectives of a bank, as a firm, as a financial intermediary, and 
as a regulated entity. Moreover, the analysis should start with the relaxation of the 
considerations that are hypothesized as relevant for the valuation of non-financial firms. 
Subsequently, we should attempt to incorporate regulatory features to the model. 
Thus, the study of the role of a banking firm as a financial intermediary and its 
implications for its capital structure lead us, firstly, to inquire about the more general issue 
of why banks do exist. Answering this question may shed light on the question of whether 
or not banks’ capital structure decisions are influenced by the idiosyncratic nature of the 
banks’ role as financial intermediaries.318 
                                                          
317 As Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) interrogate: “How should banks be financed?” Or Miller 
(1995) question: “Do the M&M propositions apply to banks?” 
318 Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993, 3) characterize financial intermediaries as “providing brokerage 
and qualitative asset transformation services. A broker brings together providers 
and users of capital without changing the nature of the claim being transacted, 
whereas a qualitative asset transformer processes risk in altering the attributes 
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 It is well documented in the literature that in an Arrow-Debreu economy, with 
complete, perfect and frictionless capital markets, and complete contracting, financial 
intermediaries have no role in the resource allocation. In this kind of world, capital markets 
participants are able to achieve Paretian allocative efficiency319 on their own and, 
therefore, financial intermediaries are ineffective in improving agents’ welfare (e.g., 
Santomero and Wilson 1997). In such a frictionless world  resembling the one depicted 
by Modigliani and Miller 1958  characterized by the presence of complete and perfectly 
competitive markets, free and full information, and homogeneous expectations among all 
market participants, economic decisions are shown to be independent upon the financial 
structure.320 In such an environment, economic agents can construct portfolios which offset 
any position taken by an intermediary, since individuals and firms can produce their own 
homemade financial intermediation at little or no cost. Thus, financial intermediation 
activity cannot create economic value.321 This implies that financial intermediaries are 
inconsequential for the valuation of real productive agents, and that no actual or potential 
benefits emerge from the existence of intermediaries, such as banks (e.g., Lewis 1991).322 
 The existence of the banking firm has been justified in the literature on the grounds 
of a healthy panoply of arguments. The most prominent explanations are rooted on 
considerations related to transaction costs, to divergences in agents’ objective functions, 
and to informational asymmetries.323  
Thus, the rationale for the emergence of a banking firm as an endogenous response 
to market and contracting incompleteness and imperfections, should be seen as 
economically advantageous in, reducing transaction costs (e.g., Allen and Santomero 
                                                          
of the claim”. Tobin (1989, 39) conceptualizes financial intermediaries as “enterprises in the 
business of buying and selling financial assets.” 
319 Arrow (1974) associating the notion of efficiency (or optimality) to Pareto points out that “we speak of 
allocations or of systems as being efficient […], when there is no other system or 
allocation which is better in this strong sense, which is better in the sense of 
making everybody better off.”  
320 In this setup contracts are inevitably complete. Technical indivisibility is an additional required 
assumption to obtain market completeness. 
321 As explained by, e.g., Allen and Rai 1996, and Fama 1980 the assumption of perfect capital markets is 
inconsistent with the existence of financial intermediaries. 
322 As observed by Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995, 394) “financial institutions […] lack any 
plausible rationale in the frictionless world of M&M.”  
323 Other authors have argued that banking firms are special. The core of their argument is the interaction of 
three functions of banks: (1) the supply and administration of transaction and payment services; (2) liquidity 
and credit providers; and (3) transmitters of the impulses of monetary policy to the economy. 
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 1998; Benston and Smith 1976),324 resolving or mitigating moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems (e.g., Leland and Pyle 1977), producing and processing information 
(e.g., Diamond 1984; Campbell and Kracaw 1980), providing monitoring services as 
delegated monitors (Diamond 1996, 1984), or supplying liquidity services (e.g., Diamond 
and Dybvig 1983; Bryant 1980). 325, 326 Overall, it is reasonable to assume that under an 
incomplete and imperfect market setting financial intermediaries have a role  they 
improve the allocation resources.  
The analysis of a banking firm capital structure in this framework can be twofold. 
First, the convergence of the set of incentives determined by its role as a financial 
intermediary.327 Second, the implications of relaxing some of the market frictions and 
imperfections  such as income taxes, costs of financial distress, transaction costs, 
asymmetric information, and regulation  in the economic environment that characterizes 
the banking market.328 
Under the traditional theory of financial intermediation, a banking firm is portrayed 
as an asset transformer329 (see, e.g., Gurley and Shaw 1960), which pools resources in an 
                                                          
324 Rajan (1998) emphatically points out that the banking firm  in its actual institutional form  emerged, 
in part, to improve transaction possibilities over what was contractible through the market place, which were 
affected by contractual incompleteness and property rights unsatisfactory enforcement problems. In this 
sense, the presence of regulatory environment may be seen as a reinforcing mechanism to achieve contracting 
efficiency. 
325 For substantive contributions for this strand of the banking firm literature see, e.g., Allen and Santomero 
(1998), Freixas and Rochet (1997), Swank (1996), Greenbaum (1996), Greenbaum and Thakor (1995), 
Merton (1995), Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Lewis (1991), and Fama (1985, 1980). 
326 Support for the former theory is built on the argument that banks enjoy a superiority in providing debt 
with inside information which makes them benefit from economies of scale and/or comparative advantages in 
the provision of information about borrowers vis-à-vis capital markets (e.g., Fama 1985). Besides enjoying 
economies of scale as information producers, banks establish long-term relationships with their customers, 
that allow them to gain private information on the true characteristics (and therefore risk) of their borrowers. 
This information is not readily available to other bank or non-bank competitors (e.g., Demsetz, Saidenberg, 
and Strahan 1996; and Petersen and Rajan 1995), and therefore is relevant in explaining why banks “play 
an important role in mitigating information problems and other capital market 
frictions that make external financing costly” (Houston, James and Marcus 1997). These 
relationships are economically advantageous in the sense that they allow lowering the costs of loan 
origination and consequently increasing the profitability of lending activity. 
327 Flannery (1994, 311) observes that although “less routinely acknowledge, at least within 
the banking literature, is the fact that […] incentives toward asset substitution, 
high leverage, and moral hazard characterizes any credit relationship in which a 
firm’s claimants differ in their information and control rights.”  
328 Santomero (1984, 593) suggests that to “[…] derive an optimal capital structure [for a 
bank], one must determine, first, the role played by the financial institution 
and, second, the extent to which one wishes to deviate from the perfect market 
paradigm in explaining its operation.” See also Berger, Herring, and Szegö (1995) for an 
argument in the same direction. 
329 In this asset transformation activity resulting from deposit-taking and lending banking firms, arguably, 
benefit from economies of scale in its contracting technology, which determines allocative efficiency 
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 attempt to match / intermediate economic agents’ profiles of consumption and 
investment.330 Under this approach, the banking firm’s most prominent function is to 
intermediate between savers and borrowers, receiving (commonly, short-term maturity) 
deposits, and investing in (typically) less liquid and longer maturity assets, implying that 
banks are likely to present a congenital mismatched balance sheet (e.g., Calomiris and 
Kahn. 1991).331 This view of the financial intermediation activity performed by banks  
deposit-taking and lending  expose them to several (idiosyncratic) risks,332 and 
determine the emergence of a structure of incentives that is hypothesized to be influential 
for the capital structure decisions of a bank. In this framework, the financing structure of 
the banking firm is likely to suffer the influence of such environmental factors, and hence 
exhibit a potentially unstable and unpredictable trajectory.333 Additionally, as a result of 
the fierce competition developed in banking markets during the last quarter of century, 
banks experienced significant erosion in their traditional deposit-taking and lending 
activity. These unfolding events carry noticeable implications for banks’ financing 
structures.334 
Leland and Pyle (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasize the 
informational asymmetries and agency problems that are present in financial 
intermediation contracting to, simultaneously, provide a robust argument in favor of the 
existence of financial intermediaries, and an explanation for them to be highly leveraged.  
As observed by Greenbaum and Thakor (1995, 49) “there is no compelling 
distinction between F.I.s [financial intermediaries] and others on the 
                                                          
superiority over market price mechanism. In the sense, transaction costs advantage is then crucial to explain 
why banks do have a role in the economy (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975, 1979, 1981, 1985). 
330 More recently, Merton (1995a) proposed a functional theory of financial intermediation. In this paradigm, 
in which functions performed by financial intermediaries prevail over their institutional, architecture, those 
functions are: (1) transferring resources across time and space; (2) managing risk; (3) clearing and settling 
payments; (4) pooling resources and subdividing shares; (5) providing information; and (6) dealing with 
incentive problems. 
331 This mismatching exposes a depository institution to both interest rate and liquidity risk. 
332 Such as, credit risk and market risk concerning the primary securities issuance, liquidity risk related to the 
secondary securities issuance and insolvency risk (mainly) in less favorable states of the world. Liquidity 
risk, in particular, may become a severe problem because of the embedded put option featured by deposits, 
which gives their claimants the right to immediate redemption. 
333 Payoffs to bank leveraged equity resemble a call option whose value can be enhanced by expanding the 
volatility of the bank value thus providing incentives to choose riskier policies. For example, investing in 
assets generating more volatile cash flow profiles or by dynamically mismatching asset-liability duration 
gap. Moreover, insiders can also increase the financial risk of the bank incurring in, e.g., risk shifting, asset 
substitution or claim dilution behavior. 
334 Edwards and Mishkin (1995, 27) note in this regard that “as a source of funds for finance 
intermediaries, deposits have steadily diminished in importance.” 
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 right-hand side of the balance sheet, except that F.I.s tend to be 
more leveraged”. Further, they assert that “[b]oth [industrial firms and financial 
intermediaries] finance their assets by selling their own debt and 
equity.” In the same vein, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argue that capital structures of 
banks and non-banking firms show substantive resemblance concerning the role played in 
each kind of institution by demandable debt and debt financing, respectively. They 
substantiate their argument pointing out to what they view as similarities between absolute 
priority rules commonly applied to short-term senior debt claims in non-financial firms and 
monitoring activity developed by deposit’s claimants in a bank. 
Summarizing, banking firms arise thus in a setting characterized by the presence of 
incomplete and imperfect markets, imperfect contracting, and imperfect and asymmetric 
distribution of information among financial markets participants. Markets incompleteness 
and imperfections provide an explanation for both, the existence of the banking firm and 
the relevance of its capital structure, and therefore become la raison d’être of banks. 
Additionally, we should not exclude the hypothesis that financial intermediaries, such as a 
bank, decide their capital structure within decision patterns similar to those of non-
financial firms. Consequently, we may argue that the theoretical and empirical literatures 
associated with the capital structure problems of non-financial firms, once taken into 
account the adjustments implied by the specificity of their financial intermediation 
function and the effects of regulation, are able to help explain banks’ capital structure 
decisions. 
3.3. THE BANKING FIRM CAPITAL STRUCTURE PROBLEM IN AN IMPERFECT AND INCOMPLETE 
CONTRACTING FRAMEWORK 
As pointed out earlier Modigliani and Miller established the conditions under 
which the firm’s capital structure is irrelevant.335 As pointed out by Berger, Herring and 
Szegö (1995) and others, there is a growing strand of the banking literature that supports 
the notion that the departure from Modigliani and Miller’s frictionless framework is to 
rationalize the existence of the banking firm, and to explain why “financial 
institutions may be able to enhance their market values by taking 
on an ‘optimal’ amount of leverage.”336 
                                                          
335 See Miller (1995) for a discussion of the relevance of Modigliani and Miller’s propositions to banking. 
336 Further, Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995) suggest “[t]hese considerations apply quite 
broadly to all firms.” 
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 Under the environmental, operating and economic conditions of the Modigliani and 
Miller’s (1958) model, one can argue that having or not having equity capital is a matter of 
indifference. However, just like it is empirically documented for non-financial firms, this 
concept of a banking firm’s capital structure is not consistent with banks’ capital structures 
observed in the real world.337 If M-M’s irrelevance proposition holds, then by implication 
financial leverage distribution (both at industry and firm level) should be, inherently, 
random. Therefore, the empirical observation of any form of financial leverage clustering 
is not consistent with the theoretical prediction.  
A number of authors338 provide arguments in support of the hypothesis that the 
problem of the banking firm’s capital structure choice can be approached and explained 
within the framework of the corporate capital structure theory typically associated with the 
non-financial firms. This viewpoint receives the support from, among others Dowd (1996) 
and Osterberg and Taggart (1983).339 In addition, the literature also recognizes that the 
capital structures of financial and non-financial firms tend to reflect the dissimilarities of 
their respective productive activities, just in the same fashion as among non-financial 
firms. A propos, some authors conjecture that one possible explanation for this situation 
may arise from the fact that the main theoretical propositions offered for non-financial 
firms have not yet been incorporated into the banks’ capital structure decisions literature. 
                                                          
337 Saunders and Wilson (1997) provide empirical evidence on the U.S., Canada and U.K. banks the secular 
evolution of capital ratio (as measured by the book value of equity capital and to the book value total assets) 
suggesting the existence of empirical regularities on the distribution of the capital ratio. These results are 
consistent with Lewis (1991, table 4.1) who document evidence on the (equity) capital-to-(total) assets ratio 
of U.K. and U.S. banks during the period 1880-1988, and Kock (1992) who document that capital ratios in 
U.S. banks "rarely exceed the 10 percent mark.” Hasan (1997) report that “historically, 
while these ratios […] averaged around 20 percent at the turn of the century, 
comparable ratios today are closer to 7 percent.” Hirtle (1998) acknowledges that the U.S. 
bank holding companies “have significantly increased their capital ratios since the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.” Furthermore, the author documents that “at the close of 1997, 
average capital ratios for all U.S. bank holding companies were 9.0 percent, 12.5 
percent, and 7.1 percent for tier 1 capital, total capital, and leverage ratios, 
respectively.” “The average tier 1 and total capital ratios for all U.S. bank 
holding companies had declined about 50 basis points from their end-of-1996 
levels. These drops were even more pronounced among the twenty-five largest U.S. 
bank holding companies, whose average tier 1 and total capital ratios had 
decreased by 62 and 69 basis points, respectively.” 
338 Among others, Fisher Black, Merton Miller, Stephen Buser, Andrew Chen, Edward Kane, Eugene Fama, 
Robert Taggart, Stuart Greenbaum, Yair Orgler, Anthony Santomero, William Osterberg, Kenneth Froot and 
Jeremy Stein. 
339 Dowd (1996) suggests that “it is […] useful to compare banks to other (i.e. non-
financial) firms that issue debt and equity.” Osterberg and Taggart (1983) posit that non-
financial firm’s capital structure theory provides “a useful framework for analyzing bank 
capital structure.” 
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 Dietrich and James (1983) argue that the functions of equity capital in both banking 
and nonfinancial firms do not differ qualitatively.340 Some authors suggest that with no 
regulation and deposit insurance the capital structure decision of a bank is similar to that of 
a non-financial firm. In contrast, others assert that corporate finance theoretical models 
also support the banks’ capital structure decisions (e.g., Santomero 1984; and Buser, Chen 
and Kane 1981).341, 342 Chen and Mazumdar (1994), in their turn, argue that the nature of 
banks’ liabilities and the regulatory framework in which they must operate are two 
important factors in discriminating between capital structures of banks and non-financial 
firms. In the end they observe that “the bank capital structure debate […] 
remain unresolved.”  
Chen, Doherty, and Park (1988) develop a contingent claim analysis of optimal 
capital structure of depository financial intermediaries, integrating both their operating and 
financial decisions. They bring together deposit insurance, reserve requirements, liquidity 
services, and the effects of taxes. They show that an array of capital structures, including 
corner solutions and interior optima, are possible even without taxes and other market 
frictions. They also argue that the optimal capital structure will not change even in the 
presence of regulatory deposit insurance priced at its actuarially fair value. Thus, we can 
question whether capital structure is a matter of relevance for a banking firm. Various 
authors have attempted to shed some light on this question. 
Capital structure is widely recognized to be a critical problem for a bank. Various 
considerations are typically offered to illustrate this view. First and foremost are 
                                                          
340 Dietrich and James (1983, 1651) argue that “[b]ank capital serves two purposes; it is a 
source of funding and it is a residual capable of absorbing losses. These two 
functions of capital in banking do not differ qualitatively from the role of 
capital in a nonfinancial corporation.”  
341 Damoradan (1999) argues that the application of a cost of capital approach to financial firms, such as 
banks, might be problematic on several counts. Firstly, in relation to interest coverage ratio spreads. 
Secondly, to bank’s financial leverage measurement problems. Lastly, to bank’s capital regulatory 
jurisdiction. 
342 For a different perspective see Sealey (1983). The author argues that the theory of corporate finance  
under conditions of perfect capital markets  remains largely inapplicable to the decision-making of 
depository financial intermediaries’ for three main reasons. First, because banking firms can only exist in the 
presence of an imperfect and incomplete market framework. Second, because existing models ignore the 
liquidity services provided by banks. Third, because of the randomness of deposit financing, which is unique 
to deposit-taking institutions (also Rajan and Diamond 1999). Sealey proposes a theory of capital structure 
decisions of financial intermediaries based on market equilibrium. His valuation model of a financial 
intermediary differs from that of a non-financial firm in terns of the liquidity premium paid by the public. 
Capital structure decisions are not, in general, a matter of indifference to shareholders of intermediaries. If 
substantial economies of scale exist in the production of deposit services, then high leverage decisions by 
intermediary management can be justified as maximizing shareholder utility. 
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 mandatory regulatory capital adequacy requirements, but also institutional restrictions to 
pure capital structure adjustments,343 income tax regime, asymmetrically informed 
contracting parties, and divergences on claimholders’ objective functions.  
As Rajan and Diamond (1999) point out in their theory of bank capital, this kind of 
financial firm chooses its capital structure by trading-off three effects of more capital “[it] 
increases the rent absorbed by the banker, increases the buffer 
against shocks, and changes the amount that can be extracted from 
borrowers.” Further, they argue that the optimal ex ante bank capital structure 
“depends on the degree of competition in banking, the nature of 
the available pool of borrowers, and the amount of own capital the 
banker can bring to the business.”  
                                                          
Although disparate in their foundations and consequences, it is possible to find a 
common denominator to all these assertions. As the argument goes, the amount of capital 
banks actually carry in their balance sheets results  most certainly in a non-exclusive 
fashion  from the interaction of considerations mentioned above, and may be in excess 
of a bank’s optimal economic capital.344 This difference represents an economic 
inefficiency for the banking sector, translating into an unnecessary opportunity cost. 
Furthermore, this may distort competition in banking markets. 
The role and actual levels of equity capital carried on banking firms’ balance sheets 
has been satisfactorily described in the literature. Saunders (2000, 442-443), for example, 
summarize in a textbook fashion the functions perform by equity capital in banks: (1) “[t]o 
absorb unanticipated losses with enough margin to inspire 
confidence and enable the FI to continue as a going concern”; (2) 
“[t]o protect uninsured depositors in the event of insolvency and 
liquidation”; (3) “[t]o protect FI insurance funds and the taxpayers”; 
(4) “[t]o protect the industry against increases in insurance 
premiums”; (5) “[t]o fund new assets and business expansion”; and (6) “[to assist 
regulation in] restraining the rate of asset growth”. 
343 We define a pure capital structure adjustment as the corporate transaction that changes the relative 
amounts of debt and equity securities keeping invariant the value of its asset base. Leveraged buyouts 
provide an illustration of the concept. In Portugal, as in other European countries, there are legal quantitative 
restrictions on share repurchases. 
344 In terms of Pareto optimality conditions. 
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 The canonical argument underlying the justification for the need of an adequate 
level of equity capital in the banking firm is rooted in its pivotal role as a solvency cushion 
in case of adverse shocks, such as, loan losses or shrinking demand due to economic cycle 
downturns.345 These kinds of events may trigger financial distress and ultimately 
insolvency, which because of deposit insurance mechanism is resolved at taxpayer 
expense. 
As suggested by Osterberg and Thomson (1989) “the primary function of 
bank capital is to serve as a cushion against unanticipated losses 
on assets, thereby ensuring the solvency of the bank.”  Besides this 
function a bank capital base also serves the implementation of its strategy and thus, 
performs a crucial role in financing the bank’s growth.  
Rajan and Diamond (1999) argue that “[t]he role played by capital in 
banks, or more specifically in intermediaries, is different from 
the role it plays in industrial firms.” Their underlying argument relates 
to the inability of a non-financial firm to “use a fragile capital structure to 
promise claimants more” (Diamond and Rajan 1998). They further argue that 
deciding upon increasingly costly capital levels should be determined by considerations 
other than liquidity problems. 
Overall, equity capital appears to serve as a guarantee of financial independence, 
and to some extent, to allow easier and less costly access to debt financing. Equity capital 
has also a role in reassuring creditors of the value of their claims, and as a buffer to losses 
particularly in adverse states of the nature. It is also recognized that too little equity capital 
could be an impediment to investment. 
An implication of this enumeration is that a minimum level of capital is crucial to 
ensure the viability of a banking firm (Lewis 1991). Another is that depository institutions 
tend to have a high degree of leverage because their safekeeping and intermediary 
functions typically benefit from (implicit and explicit) Governmental guarantees that 
reduce depositors’ perception of their likelihood of defaulting (Boyd and Prescott, 1988). 
                                                          
345 The banking problems experienced by Asian economies, which were caught in the recent financial 
markets’ turmoil, brought to the forefront the deficiencies of banks’ capital-base in that particular 
geographical area. 
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 Bank capital is also a source of concern because of banks’ central role in the 
financial system, which should justify their regulation and supervision. This argument, 
however, still remains unresolved.346  
3.3.1. The Role of Income Taxes and Financial Distress Costs in the Banking Firm 
Capital Structure Decision 
In the banking industry and under many tax regimes, the deductibility of borrowing 
costs for income taxes purposes also represent an element of the tax advantage of debt 
financing over equity (e.g., Osterberg and Thompson 1996; and Marcus 1983). In these 
circumstances, when a bank’s costs of debt financing are tax deductible and dividend 
payments are not  in the same fashion as non-banking firms  debt financing should be 
viewed as tax-advantageous over equity. 
Although banking firms, as suggested by Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990), are 
not ‘prototypical taxpayers’, both theoretical models and empirical tests seem to suggest 
that banks design tax policies and manage their tax liability so as to adjust “their 
economic balance sheets as their tax-paying status” changes (ib., 
626).347 Other symptoms appear to reinforce the notion that banks, either in aggregate or at 
the individual level, seem to accommodate to the modifications in the tax regime.348 
Osterberg and Thompson (1996), for example, in their examination of the impact of 
regulatory capital standards on leverage ratios for a sample of 232 U.S. bank holding 
companies (BHCs) during 1986 and 1987, document that financial leverage of BHCs and 
municipal securities portfolio seem to be simultaneously determined, the latter being used 
to minimize tax liability.349 
                                                          
346 For the effectiveness of bank’s capital regulatory framework in the U.S. see, e.g., Hovakimian and Kane 
(2000), and Wagster (1996). See also Kim and Kross (1998) for a examination of the impact of the 1989 
bank’s capital adequacy regulatory requirements on loan loss provisions and loan write-offs of U.S. banks. 
Mota (1994) examines the effects of capital requirements enforced by the Basle 1988 Accord on Portuguese 
banking system. 
347 According to author's estimates, between 1989 and 1998, the average implicit tax rate for a sample of 
Portuguese banks is 18.48 percent in simple average terms, and 20.46 percent in terms of the net total assets 
weighted average. See Chapter 5 for further details. 
348 Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) suggest that for banks “[t]ax management appears to be 
relatively unimportant in the discretion exercised over these transactions 
[accounting, investment, and financing].” 
349 In the U.S., prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, municipal bonds (the so-called MUNIs) provided many 
banks, especially smaller ones, with an important tax shelter from federal income taxes. However, except for 
special circumstances, this tax shelter has been removed, and thus is no longer available. It should be noted 
that Osterberg and Thompson’s (1996) findings may be contaminated by the effects of the unique revisions 
in tax rules occurred during the sampling period. Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990) report strong evidence 
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 This conclusion may be interpreted as consistent with the tax hypothesis of 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) and thus shows the presence of a "significant 
association between tax status and [banks’] financing decisions" 
changes (ib., 649).350 This hypothesis is also consistent with Osterberg and Thompson’s 
(1990) model, which at the individual bank level yields the prediction that income taxes 
are plausibly a relevant consideration in the capital structure decision of the banking firm. 
In the same direction but regarding the case of the financing behavior of commercial 
banks, Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990) hypothesize that there is a relationship 
between their marginal tax rates and financing behavior.351 Further, these authors 
document that their empirical tests provide evidence in support of a tax clientele effect in a 
sample of U.S. banks. 
Besides the potential tax benefits associated with borrowing costs, banks have at 
their disposal other sources of incentives to manage banks’ tax liability that provide the 
same income tax-deductibility as the costs of debt financing: this makes them perfect 
substitutes as tax-shields.352 Among others, banks’ managers have the ability to use other 
sources of tax relief, such as, the depreciation of fixed assets, provisions for loan losses, 
investment tax credits, and the timing of tax-accounting record, all with potential for 
influencing capital structure decisions (Gelfand and Hanweck 1987).353 
As discussed earlier, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) call our attention to the role 
played by the depreciation of fixed assets explaining its substituting effect. However, in 
banking the relative importance of this particular kind of assets is typically small, and thus 
the potential magnitude of this tax shield may be negligible.354 A particular case in point is 
the amortization of goodwill involved in transactions of external growth acquisition. This 
intangible asset, under certain taxation environment  such as in the U.S.  is capitalized 
                                                          
in support of the hypothesis that banks respond to changes in the tax rules relating to deductibility of interest 
expense incurred by investing in MUNIs, by adjusting their portfolios of this type of bonds. 
350 The argument that the deductibility of interest payments to debtholders for income taxes purposes at firm 
level has been demonstrated by Modigliani and Miller (1963). Miller (1977) extended the analysis in order to 
incorporate taxation effects at the investor personal level. See Chapter 2 for further details. 
351 Refraining from issuing very long-term maturity debt securities, as this particular kind of financing 
instrument was reclassified, in the U.S., as equity for income tax purposes, might illustrate this point. 
352 Portuguese Tax Code (article No. 33) attributes to banking supervisory authority  Bank of Portugal  
as the lawful entity to regulate in this matter. 
353 As argued by Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) “tax incentives arise because firms 
can reduce the present value of tax payments by timing transactions.” 
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 and amortized over an extended temporal horizon. Differently, in other countries such as 
Portugal, accounting rules require goodwill arising in acquisitions to be deducted from 
equity capital over a (relatively short) period of time to be defined by the supervisory 
authority. This mandatory accounting procedure determines two different kinds of 
consequences. First, the acquirer might experience a significant decrease in its capital base 
and thus incur the risk of failing to comply with the regulatory capital requirements.355 
Further, to avoid that risk the bank may need to issue new equity capital at an inopportune 
time, hence incurring, among other consequences, in the well-known costs of asymmetric 
information. Second, in this framework the bank cannot benefit from any tax advantage 
from its acquisition, rendering the transaction less attractive in terms of economic value. 
In banking, the importance of provisions for loan losses in terms of income taxes is 
well established.356 Thus, it is conceivably an important source of tax savings, which is 
available to be used in the management of a bank’s tax liability (e.g., Greenawalt and 
Sinkey 1988).357 Henderson (1987) illustrates this behavior by showing that banks’ loan-
loss reserves for tax purposes exceed those for accounting purposes between 1978 and 
1981. The opposite situation occurred in 1982. 
Taxation may also have an impact on banks exhibiting a level of capital below the 
minimum required by regulation. In this instance, the bank may be willing to voluntarily 
disburse tax payments as the result of incurring in accounting transactions aiming at 
fostering the book value of its regulatory capital. The accounting recognition of profits as 
well as the postponement of losses both increases the book value of regulatory capital, 
lessening the regulatory costs either in the form of prompt corrective action or extended 
oversight with interference, among other issues, in the choice of the bank’s financing 
policy. Additionally, this kind of earnings management may well have as a by-product 
effect a more profitable access to deposits given that the insurance provided to depositors 
is likely to reduce their required rate of return. 
                                                          
354 According to the estimates for our sample of Portuguese banks, between 1989 and 1998, net fixed assets 
represent 2.84 percent of net total assets. Annual fixed assets depreciation, during the same time period, 
represents 2.54 percent of total costs.  
355 Depending on the premium paid and the number of years allowed for offsetting goodwill. 
356 For our sample of Portuguese banks we estimate at 11.47 percent the average relative importance of 
provisions for loan losses to total costs during the period 1989-1998. 
357 The authors assert that “managers might have an incentive to maximize loan-loss 
deductions for tax purposes to minimize tax payments. Furthermore, because of 
differences in tax regulations and financial accounting standards, the tax 
deduction related to loan losses may not equal the expense reported on financial 
statements as the loan-loss provision.” 
114 
 A banking firm is not exempted from financial distress and bankruptcy risk. 
Raising financial risk by leveraging-up the bank’s capital structure (assuming no 
regulatory intervention) entails a costly increase in bankruptcy risk.358 Arguably, the 
bankruptcy costs associated with banking firms are of a different nature from those of non-
financial firms, because of bank specific factors. Three major factors tend to explain why 
banking firms, like depository institutions, tend to face lower expected bankruptcy costs 
than non-financial firms  for the same level of financial leverage. The first factor is 
related to the effectiveness of bankruptcy administrative proceedings, the second factor is 
related to the governmental safety net regime, and the third effect is related to the so-called 
too-big-to-fail doctrine.359  
Under most bankruptcy law regimes banks’ insolvency and liquidation processes 
are handled outside the legal context of the bankruptcy law (e.g., Hetzel 1991).360 The 
insolvency of a bank is, presumably, managed in a more expeditious and prompt fashion 
by regulatory and supervision authorities, than the insolvency of a non-banking firm, 
which is administered by ordinary bankruptcy courts (e.g., Berger, Herring and Szegö 
1995; Kaufman 1994).361 Interestingly, losses to creditors (including the public deposit 
insurer) from banks’ insolvency are often smaller than losses from insolvency of non-
banking firms, presumably because banks’ resolution process is more efficient (Kaufman 
1994; Masulis 1988).362  
                                                          
358 Because the probability of bankruptcy is a monotonically increasing function on financial leverage firms 
exhibiting higher levels of financial leverage should have higher probabilities of bankruptcy. Further, since 
bankruptcy costs are firm specific they are a primary determinant of differences in the capital structure across 
firms. 
359 The governmental safety net was designed and implemented to promote the safety and the soundness to 
the banking system. Its typical configuration includes mechanisms, such as, capital adequacy requirements, 
deposit insurance, lender of last resort, discount window facility, regulatory forbearance, and disclosure 
requirements. 
For a review of bank runs literature see, e.g., Calomiris and Gorton (1991). Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
e.g.,, discuss the role of deposit insurance a protective device for banks’ deposits. See Barth et al. (1997) for 
a characterization of deposit insurance mechanisms across countries. According to Arshadi (1989) and Pyle 
(1986), among others, there is a clear link between capital and deposit insurance regulation. 
360 In Portugal, according to the nº2 of article 139º Decree of Law nº 298/92 from 31 of December 1992: 
credit institutions are not submitted to the provisions of bankruptcy, reorganization and creditor protective 
legal regimes. Article 2º of Decree of Law 132/92 from 23 of April 1992 endorsing the ‘Código dos 
Processos Especiais de Recuperação da Empresa e de Falência’ (Bankruptcy Code) states that its provisions 
are not enforceable to (besides other notable cases) to credit or financial institutions as well as insurance 
firms. 
361 Firms in insolvency face nontrivial  direct and indirect  bankruptcy costs associated with their 
financial condition. Such costs are recognized in the bankruptcy literature as positively correlated with the 
time spent in bankruptcy (e.g., Campbell 1997). On this ground, we may also argue that banks should have 
lower expected bankruptcy costs. 
362 It is debatable if the same claim may be made on a general welfare perspective. 
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 The effect of safety net mechanisms on a bank bankruptcy are, to a large extent, 
determined by their insensitivity to risk, and by a bank’s lower probability of bankruptcy. 
In this context, the distribution of safety net subsidies among insolvent banks may become 
asymmetrical, with the more financially debilitated banks likely to pocket more financial 
subsidies, hence reducing their bankruptcy costs.363 
According to Saunders (1997), O’Hara and Shaw (1990) and others, the argument 
that banks may be too big to fail is grounded on the negative externalities entangled in the 
failure of a bank.364 Thus, the probability that a large banking firm is liquidated because of 
failure is, ceteris paribus, lower than the similar probability for a non-banking firm of the 
same size.365 The presence of the too-big-to-fail doctrine366 in banking enhances the 
potential for moral hazard behavior. Once depositors and debtholders of large financial 
institutions perceive that they are likely to be protected if the institution fails, they have 
less incentive to monitor the institution and withdraw their deposits when the bank takes on 
too much risk.367 Because of this lack of monitoring, large institutions might take on even 
greater risks than they might otherwise would, thereby making economic distress more 
likely.368 
Summarizing, we argue that a banking firm, as a depositary institution, tends to 
experience lower expected bankruptcy costs for identical levels of financial leverage and 
size, than a non-financial firm.369 The actual magnitude of a banking firm’s bankruptcy 
                                                          
363 The lower probability of bankruptcy of banks might be due to the presence of subsidized deposit 
insurance ‘insensitive’ to risk. 
364 See, e.g., Black et al. (1997), Angbazo and Saunders (1997) and Hetzel (1991) for further details. 
365 Saunders (1997, 378) suggests that the too big to fail banks may be viewed by regulators “as being 
too big to be closed and liquidated without imposing a systemic risk to the 
banking and financial system.” 
366 The presence of a too-big-to-fail policy in the US, which was announced in the aftermath of the 
Continental Illinois insolvency in 1984, seems to have encouraged increased risk taking on the part of large 
banks. 
367 As indicated by Boyd and Gertler (1993), large US banks did take on riskier loans than smaller banks and 
this led to higher loan losses for the large banks. In addition, large banks had smaller amounts of capital 
relative to assets than smaller banks, further increasing the risk that they faced. 
368 The expansion of the number of large financial institutions resulting from financial consolidation 
increases the pressure over the safety net and may eventually lead to more severe moral hazard problems that 
seem associated to the too-big-to-fail doctrine (e.g., Mishkin 1999). 
369 One dimension that strikingly differentiates banks and non-financial firms is related to the amount of off-
balance items carried by both types of entities. Banking firms, typically, resort more heavily to off-balance 
activity than their counterparts. However, according to Lucas and McDonald (1987) “off-balance sheet 
commitments have little effect on the risk of bankruptcy.” 
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 costs, as well as the emergence of eventual returns to scale effects, remain open empirical 
questions ready for testing in the same fashion as they are for non-financial firms.370 
 Taking into consideration the above factors, capital structure choices may be 
determined by trading-off the incremental benefits of the deductibility of debt financing 
costs, depreciation, loan loss provisions and alike, against the incremental (direct and 
indirect) costs of financial distress and bankruptcy triggered by higher financial risk.371 
From this perspective, identifying and measuring the costs of financial distress is a critical 
step towards the definition of the optimal capital structure. 
Orgler and Taggart (1983), building on a number of studies on non-financial firms’ 
optimal capital structures developed a model of optimal capital structure for a banking 
firm. In their model, more aggressive use of leverage provides banks with more favorable 
tax treatment and an increase in the value of their deposit insurance. Offsetting these 
benefits are the (eventual) diseconomies of scale in producing deposit services and the 
deadweight costs of bankruptcy that are partially borne by a bank’s residual claimants.372 
Costs of financial distress include (1) the costs of transferring ownership from 
shareholders to creditors; (2) the losses that may occur as a result of the perception that 
bankruptcy may be imminent, even if it is ultimately avoided; and (3) the costs of conflicts 
of interest between shareholders and creditors that may lead to suboptimal operating, 
investment, and financing decisions.  
Conceptually, the costs of financial distress may be thought as the present value of 
the economic distress costs of an all-equity bank plus the present value of the additional 
costs associated with leveraging up such bank. The economic performance of both the 
levered and the unlevered banks is equally undermined by the deterioration of assets’ risk 
in adverse states determining, consequently, similar levels of economic distress. However, 
the leveraged bank will experience a greater loss of value because of the increased risk of 
bankruptcy associated with its leveraged condition.373  
                                                          
370 See discussion in precedent Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 for more details. 
371 An implicit assumption of the static tradeoff models of capital structure is that adjusting a bank’s capital 
structure is costless. 
372 Diseconomies of scale exist if an increase in volume results in an increase in average unit cost. 
Deadweight costs of bankruptcy arise solely because of the insolvency and provide no social value. An 
example of a deadweight cost would be the legal costs arising from a bank’s failure. 
373 Inherent to the increased uncertainty about the ability to honor all claims on the bank’s cash flow stream, 
in addition to larger agency costs incurred in controlling the conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
creditors. 
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 Part of financial distress costs is borne by the bank’s creditors and part by 
shareholders. To the extent that creditors can foresee, at the time the debt is issued, the 
likelihood of these costs, they will raise their required rates of return and shift the entire 
expected costs of financial distress to shareholders under risk neutrality. In response, 
shareholders may choose to reduce these expected costs by increasing the capital ratio of 
the bank to the point at which the reduction in the expected costs of financial distress just 
offsets the reduction in the tax benefits of debt. In effect, market capital ‘requirements’ 
increase in response to a rise in the expected costs of financial distress. 
Depository institutions are vulnerable to an idiosyncratic financial distress cost 
stemming from their deposit-taking activity. The emergence of financial distress in a 
depository institution is likely to cause a loss of confidence in the solvency of the bank. In 
such an environment, depositors might well exercise the put option embedded in their 
deposit contract, which gives them the right to withdraw funds instantly or at short notice. 
This action will increase the bank’s exposure to liquidity risk enhancing the probability of 
bankruptcy, particularly, in less favorable states of nature.374 From this perspective a 
bank’s capital structure may reveal potentially adverse financial liquidity problems. 
It has been suggested by a number of authors that the presence of publicly insured 
deposits grants a bank’s equityholders an incentive to take on excessive risk leading to an 
increase in the bank’s probability of bankruptcy. Such managerial risk-taking behavior 
would imply significant erosion in the bank’s value as a going concern375 because, at least 
partly, of the potential for moral hazard behavior (e.g., Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan 
1997).  
Saunders (1998, 379) provides evidence on a sample of 1049 U.S. banks that failed 
during the 1987 to 1992 period. The total estimated losses supported by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) average 14 percent losses-to-assets rate. We 
interpret this result as an estimate of direct costs of bankruptcy. James (1991) provides 
evidence on the economic losses occurred in bank failures in the U.S. from 1985 to mid 
1988. He estimates that, on average, the loss of the (book) value of failed banks’ total 
                                                          
374 This characteristic is, under certain banking regimes, potentially restricted by the presence of (often-
subsidized) financial assistance mechanisms  the so-called safety net.  
375 For Hawkins (1986) argues that the concept of going concern “places emphasis on the 
continuity and whole process of business activity.” 
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 assets is 30 percent.376 Indirect bankruptcy costs, in turn, encompass a “wide range of 
unobservable opportunity costs” (Weiss 1990) and tend to be higher than the 
bankruptcy costs reported for non-financial firms by Weiss (ibid.).377  
Hannan and Hancock (1988) estimated a 0.35 percent average probability of 
insolvency for a 12-month period using survey data for a sample of approximately 300 
U.S. banks, collected during the first quarter of 1985. The authors found a positive 
relationship between banks’ uninsured deposit interest rates (or the spread over the risk-
free rate) and the level risk of banks’ riskiness. Further they find that “the risk of 
insolvency (and hence default) determines the premium over the 
risk-free rate that banks must offer CD purchasers.”378 
A significant source of bankruptcy costs is the loss of both franchise379 and 
charter380 value (e.g., Milne and Whalley 1998; Saunders and Wilson 1997b). In a world 
with market frictions and imperfections, such as transaction costs, informational 
asymmetry and agency conflicts, there are incentives for banking firms to develop 
reputational capital, also called goodwill (Greenbaum and Thakor 1995, 85). Charter 
value, franchise value and reputational capital will be, partly or totally, lost “in the 
event of insolvency or substantial increase in financial distress” 
                                                          
376 The author measure the losses incurred in bank’s failure “as the difference between the book 
value of the assets and the recovery value net of the direct expenses associated 
with the failure” (James 1991, 1223). 
377 The empirical evidence provided by Weiss (1990) on direct bankruptcy costs is estimated under the 1979 
Bankruptcy Code framework. The author measures financial leverage as the quotient between book value of 
debt and the market value of equity. In the evidence reported by Saunders (1998) direct bankruptcy costs are 
measured against the book value of total assets. Using Barth and Brumbaugh (1994, table 1) data we estimate 
average failure costs (a proxy for direct costs of bankruptcy) of U.S. failed banks during the 1980 to 1992 
period as 19.93 percent, and 14.43 percent in terms of weighted average by failure assets. 
378 The authors estimated a perceived likelihood of bankruptcy, p, for each bank in their sample. Assuming 
the trivial presumption that insolvency occurs when actual losses depletes equity capital, p is estimated as 
being equivalent to the probability that NI / A < - K / A, where NI stands for net income, A for total assets, 
and K for equity capital. Further assuming that [E (NI / A) + K / A] / σ, “represents the number of 
standard deviations between the expected value of return of assets, E (NI / A), 
and that negative values of NI / A, NI / A < - K / A, which would result in 
insolvency, where σ represents the standard deviation of the return to assets.” 
“It follows from Chebyshev’s inequality that for any symmetrical distribution, 
the probability of insolvency, p, will be such that p ≤ (1/2) σ2 / [E(NI / A) + K 
/ A]2, where the “1/2” in this expression reflects the fact that insolvency occurs 
only in one tail of the distribution.” 
379 Franchise value may be interpreted as the long-run value of the banking firm as an ongoing concern. 
According to Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) the sources of franchise value in banking include “[…] 
efficiency, access to markets protected from competition, and valuable lending 
relationships.” 
380 Because in banking there are barriers to entry in the form of limitations to the establishment of new 
ventures “a banks’ charter, which gives the right to do business as a bank, is by 
far its most important intangible asset” (Sinkey 1998, 862). 
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 (Harker and Zenios 1998, 7). Therefore, as suggested Saunders and Wilson (1997b), 
among others, higher charter value banks should have the incentive to over capitalize their 
balance sheet as a protective strategy against costly insolvency.381 
Banks like other firms typically retain a fraction of their earnings. Thus, ceteris 
paribus, more profitable banks will therefore show higher levels of retained earnings, and 
consequently higher equity capital, which provides a cushion against losses, lowering 
bankruptcy costs. In the presence of imperfect capital markets, a bank with more capital 
and lower bankruptcy costs is also likely to have a lower cost of capital and therefore a 
higher market valuation. 
3.3.2. Agency Problems in the Banking Firm’s Capital Structure Decision  
Conflicts of interest among claimholders emerge indifferently in contractual 
arrangements of both banks and non-banking firms. However, the nature of these agency 
problems is arguably distinct in the two types of firms. Traditional agency conflicts 
include the incentive and behavioral problems of shareholders, managers, and debtholders. 
In banking, however, other groups of claimholders  such as insured depositors, 
regulators and taxpayers  also matter in assessing agency problems.382 Plausibly, certain 
characteristics of banking environments yield peculiar kinds of agency relationships. These 
bank-specific agency relationships are likely to exhibit a complex and intricate structure 
due to the extended array of variants of principal-agent arrangements that are possible 
within the nexus of banking contracts. These banking idiosyncratic agency problems may 
also be much more subtle and difficult to fully understand because of the presence of 
overlapping and crossover effects of factors, such as the discipline of capital regulation and 
the incentives provided by deposit insurance mechanisms. 
As noted earlier (chapter 2) the typical ownership structure of contemporary (large) 
corporations  as it is arguably the case of banks  implies that residual claims and 
control rights are separated. This creates the conditions for conflicts of interest between 
owners and managers, resulting in the misalignment of their objective functions.383 In this 
                                                          
381 Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) explored the relationship between franchise value and risk 
taking over the 1986-94 period. Their findings suggest that “banks with more franchise value hold 
more capital and have less asset risk than banks with less franchise value.” 
382 See, among others, Filbeck and Mullineaux (1999), Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1997), Davis 
(1995), Scroggins, Fielding and Clark (1995), Barth and Brumbaugh (1994), and Arshadi (1989). 
383 As argued by Rappaport (1986, 6) this problem ”is exacerbated in large corporations where 
is difficult to identify the interests of a diverse set of stockholders ranging 
from institutional investors to individuals with small holdings. Since the 
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 setting it is widely acknowledged that agency problems are likely to arise, partly, because 
managers tend to, self-interestedly, pursue their own interest, which are not necessarily 
identical to those of shareholders.384 Two possible (and related) explanations for this 
managerial behavior are (1) the undiversified nature of managers’ human capital (specific) 
investment,385 and (2) their informational advantage regarding bank’s future performance 
and growth prospects, and therefore the bank’s true market valuation.386 
In summary, we find that the presence of costly agency problems in banking 
habitats is a well-established fact in this literature (e.g., Wall and Peterson 1998; Flannery 
1994). In this framework, we may hypothesize that these problems are a potentially 
relevant factor in the determination of a bank’s capital structure. More specifically, we 
may conjecture that managerial discretion behavior, such as the preference for risk 
aversion, might be also influential in the capital structure decision-making of banks (e.g., 
Wall and Peterson 1998, 8; Hughes and Mester 1994; and Shrieves and Dahl 1992). 
3.3.2.1. The Nature of the Agency Problem in Banking 
As seen earlier, banking firms are not immune to the agency costs entangled in 
conflicts of interest resulting from divergences in claimholders’ objective functions and the 
propensity for opportunistic behavior.  
Besides the traditional forms of moral hazard, in banking this kind of opportunistic 
behavior may also emerge from contracting relationships between banks and borrowers, 
banks and depositors, and banks and providers of public deposit insurance (e.g., Boyd, 
Chang and Smith 1998, Kareken and Wallace 1978, and Merton 1978).387 In a banking 
system where banks are not allowed to owning equity stakes in non-financial firms,388 it is 
shown that the bank will act to control the moral hazard problem between itself and 
                                                          
ownership of shares in large corporations tends to be diffused, individual 
shareholders are said to have neither influence on nor interest in corporate 
governance issues […].“ 
384 Thomson (1994) argues that “[…] to understand the objectives of bank management one 
must first understand the incentives they [managers] face.” 
385 See, e.g., Friend and Hasbrouk (1988, 2) who characterize managerial risky investment in the firm as “[…] 
reflecting both holdings of marketable securities and firm-specific human 
capital, is both large and largely nondiversifiable.” 
386 Seitz (1982) observes that “[t]here are two bodies of theory that are based on the 
assumption that the interests of managers and shareholders do not automatically 
coincide, that information is not free, and that both parties will attempt to 
maximize their own self interest when contracting with each other. These are 
agency theory and signaling theory.” 
387 It has been argued that in a universal banking framework governmental safety net far might extend the too 
broadly, exacerbating moral hazard problems and therefore they could, potentially, spillover beyond the 
financial sector (e.g., Corrigan 1983, 1987, and Saunders 1994). 
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 debtors.389 Since the active control of this problem lowers the bank’s probability of 
bankruptcy, on average, its assets would be more valuable in future bankruptcy states. This 
behavior would also be beneficial for the public deposit insurer by limiting the present 
value of its future liability implicit in the deposit insurance contract. However, when a 
bank is allowed to be simultaneously a creditor and a residual claimant on the same firm, 
its incentives to control moral hazard problems are likely to be substantially reduced.390 
Banking institutions are, by their very nature, ‘opaque’ institutions essentially 
because of imperfections on the information that flows among managers, investors, 
regulators, depositors, and borrowers (e.g., Ross 1989).391 Although banks generate 
considerable amounts of information as part of their production technology process, that 
information is not readily available to outside investors and public deposit insurer. Further, 
information produced in decision-making and in other activities is not disclosed to 
claimholders because, among other things, concerns with confidentiality (e.g., Campbell 
1979). In these instances, incentive conflicts arising in agency relationships can be 
expected to play an important role in determining contractual relationships among 
claimholders.392, 393 
Under efficient capital markets assumption, a value-maximizing bank wishing to 
increase its own riskiness   either by undertaking unprofitable investment projects and/or 
leveraging-up its capital structure  would be required to offer a higher expected return to 
its claimholders. Consequently, as argued by, e.g., Karels and McClatchey (1999) and 
Flannery (1994a), depositors and other creditors of such a bank would attempt to control 
                                                          
388 Therefore preclude from being simultaneously a creditor and a residual claimant on the same firm. 
389 For a contrasting view see Santos (1999a), Kim (1992) and Pozdena (1991). 
390 This may vary according to the specificity of national models of governance. 
391 This immanent characteristic of the banking firm represents one of its raison d'être and helps to explain, 
at least partly, why financial intermediation is a profitable activity. 
392 As previously explained, agency problems arise in circumstances where decision-making responsibility 
(and therefore, control over resources) is, either explicitly or implicitly, delegated by a principal to an agent, 
in settings where (1) objectives among claimholders may diverge, and (2) full information enabling control to 
be exerted is not readily available. In this setting incentives of the principal and agent are likely to be 
misaligned, and the principal is unable to assess, accurately, the agent’s actions and exert control. Therefore, 
the potential for wealth transfers between principal and agent is material. Because of this potential wealth 
transfers, significant costs may be incurred in designing, monitoring and enforcing contracts between agent 
and principal to prevent such transfers. 
393 Diamond (1996, 1984), for example, characterizes a banks as a delegated monitor arguing that its role as 
financial intermediaries involves assuming responsibility as a delegated principal in monitoring borrowers. 
This analysis only looks to a particular subset of the agency problem set in financial institutions. 
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 the risk-taking behavior of its owners by demanding a higher return on their claims.394 
Thus, ceteris paribus, the higher the incentives for equityholders to transfer wealth for its 
own benefit at debtholders expense, the lower should be the bank’s level of financial 
leverage (and higher its capital ratio). Thus if, as suggested in the literature, banks are 
known for exhibiting some of the lowest capital-to-assets ratios than, arguably, these two 
agency problems might be acute in the banking industry.  
3.3.2.2. The Shareholders – Managers’ Agency Problem in Banking 
In banking, agency conflicts stemming from shareholders – managers’ relationships 
are of the same nature as the ones emerging in a non-banking firm. In essence, the lack of 
appropriate monitoring and discipline by shareholders may exert managers to pursue their 
own objectives to the detriment of those of shareholders.  
The shareholder-manager agency problem is a consequence of the managerial 
preference for (1) low effort levels and propensity for high personal consumption of bank’s 
resources; (2) low risk investment policies and low levels of financial leverage (to reduce 
the probability of bankruptcy);395 (3) short-term maturity investments, and (4) reduced 
probability of losing a job either by opposing increased leverage and / or fighting against 
hostile propositions of change in control. 
When a bank’s ownership structure is diffuse and managers have only symbolic 
equity holdings,396 bank’s owners  because of the separation between ownership and 
control  need to provide the appropriate incentives to induce managers to maximize 
owners’ wealth. But because bank owners only possess an imperfect control of managerial 
decision-making, it might be advantageous for them to incur in expensive contracting and 
                                                          
394 As noted by Karels and McClatchey (1999) “[e]xcessive asset or leverage risk results in 
a higher cost of borrowing which, in turn, discourages further risk-taking by 
reducing the profitability of such actions.” This raise in borrowing costs might well arise, 
for example, due to an increase in the bank’s liquidity risk caused by depositors withdrawing their funds. In 
this instance, the bank will have to attract new depositors  in order to offset lost deposits and avoid 
liquidation or receivership  and offer commensurately higher interest rates. 
395 Thomson (1994) suggests that “[…] bank capital structure decisions are not 
independent of risk-preference of managers.” 
396 Both, Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signaling theory, made 
the prediction that managers stock’s ownership is positively related to firm market value. However, it is not 
warranted that by increasing the bank’s managers fractional equity stakes the potential misalignment in risk-
return preferences of the bank’s managers and equityholders is eliminated, because managers are not, 
typically, so well-diversified as outside equityholders. In this setting, leverage-upward pure capital structure 
decisions (taking the asset-base as invariant) increases managers ownership holdings and therefore lower 
outside equityholders agency costs. 
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 monitoring arrangements and thereby obtain a better alignment between theirs’ and 
managers’ interests.397 
As suggested by Gorton and Rosen (1995) the shareholder - manager problem 
provides a basis for explaining the increased risk-taking by banks in the U.S. during the 
1980s. In their model, bank managers faced with declining prospects for future profits, 
increased portfolio risk as a way of concealing poor prospects from shareholders. More 
typically, this agency conflict is characterized by excessively risk averse behavior on the 
part of the manager, who may pursue his own objective function at the expense of better-
diversified shareholders. This manifestation of the shareholders - managers agency 
problem may nonetheless be helpful in mitigating moral hazard behavior and in promoting 
the alignment between the interests of (risk-averse) bank managers and those of bank 
regulators.398 
As previously discussed (see Chapter 2), an array of control mechanisms to remedy 
agency problems is available in the banking environment. These included (1) the corporate 
law as a means of efficient contracting; (2) the governance structure as a means of 
mitigating management-incentive anomalies; (3) capital market discipline; (4) the 
discipline of managerial labor market; and (5) signaling and financial intermediation 
activities as a means of mitigating asymmetries of information. 
The disciplinary role of financial leverage is a well-known implication of Michael 
Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis.399 When free cash flow is large and corporate control 
transactions are absent, managerial discretion might lead to overinvestment, creating a 
conflict between managers and equityholders whose wealth maximization, in these 
instances would be neglected. The crux of the free cash flow argument is committing the 
management team to cash flow payments to owners rather than allowing them to take on 
unnecessary and inefficient risk. One effective way to achieve this goal is by directing 
managers to stock buyback transactions. Share repurchases are, in contrast to dividend 
payouts,400 a very credible means of returning excess cash to investors because funds are 
                                                          
397 Recently Besanko and Kanatas (1996) have shown that a bank’s managerial stockholdings is related to its 
voluntary and involuntary security offerings. Their numerical solutions are consistent with the empirical 
findings of Cornett and Tehranian (1994) concerning the impact in banks’ stock price of new external equity 
offerings’ announcements. Results also suggest that insiders’ ownership holdings are inversely related to the 
magnitude of the share price decline. 
398 See Demsetz, Seidenberg, and Strahan (1997). 
399 See Jensen (1986). 
400 With the obvious exception of the so-called specially designated dividends. 
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 distributed immediately (and transparently), often enjoying a more favorable tax 
treatment.401  
Another mechanism to mitigate shareholder - manager agency conflicts is by 
increasing financial leverage.402 When principals can only imperfectly monitor agents’ 
decision-making, it has been shown that taking on more debt provides appropriate 
incentives for managers, to avoid excessive perquisite consumption, to exert adequate 
effort, and to make optimal investment decisions. The reason is that higher leverage puts 
pressure on managers to generate cash flows to adequately servicing the debt thus avoiding 
bankruptcy which adversely affects the value of their human capital (Jensen 1986; 
Grossman and Hart 1982; and Jensen and Meckling 1976). Additionally, shareholders may 
include residual claims holdings in managers’ compensation schemes, the relative value of 
that equity ownership may be enhanced by increased leverage, further heightening their 
incentives. Moreover, leveraging-up reduces the scope for managers to avoid liquidation 
when this is optimal for shareholders (Harris and Raviv 1990). 
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) examine the relationship between 
management ownership and risk taking in large U.S. banks during the 1978-1985 period, 
and observe that stockholder-controlled banks (with high managerial equity positions) 
exhibit greater risk-taking behavior than manager-controlled banks (with low managerial 
equity positions). This result suggests that the former banks have incentive to take on more 
risk than the latter. 
Gorton and Rosen (1995) note that managerial entrenchment may arise even when 
managers hold a small fraction of the bank’s equity. This might occur if they succeed in 
amassing sufficient voting power to defeat attempts to remove them from office. Under 
this corporate control hypothesis, banks with entrenched managers are expected to engage 
in inefficient risk-taking. Conversely, if managers have large stock holdings and, hence, 
considerable personal wealth at stake, they will prefer an efficient risk-taking behavior, as 
predicted by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
                                                          
401 Although the presence of unique regulatory capital adequacy requirements might affect banks’ share 
buybacks differently from firms not experiencing regulatory capital constraints, it seems that stock 
repurchases by banks “result in a positive and significant valuation effect for the 
repurchasing banks” (Akhigbe and Madura 1999). Because large stock repurchases affect significantly 
regulatory capital  eventually threatening banks ability to meet capital adequacy standards  banks are not 
allowed to engage in such transactions without receiving an ex ante approval. 
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 Managerial discretion give management the opportunity to manipulate the bank’s 
accounts in order to mask the deterioration in its financial condition. Delay in recognizing 
loan losses or anticipating gains from trading are examples of such practices (Carey 1993). 
Given that these cosmetic operation smooth earnings, they are likely to influence the level 
of a bank’s capital ratio through retained earnings. This problem becomes more 
troublesome when there are barriers to assess the true economic condition of a bank, such 
as when its accounting is not marked-to-market.403 Carrying bank’s transaction at their 
historical value may result in unrecognized losses that may turn bank’s economic net worth 
negative even when accounting records portray a more favorable situation. 
3.3.2.2.1. Corporate Control in Banking 
Among the various devices outside investors have at their disposal to exert 
discipline over a bank’s insiders, the market for corporate control is of particular 
importance. Corporate control transactions facilitate the concentration of ownership 
(gathering into one or more bundles fragmented share ownership) and thus are helpful in 
improving owners’ effective control over a bank’s resources and also in reducing 
managerial discretionary over decision-making. The threats of a corporate control 
transaction, such as a hostile takeover bid, in the banking industry are presumably less 
effective in disciplining managerial behavior than in non-banking firms. The presence of 
institutional constraints to bank’s corporate control transactions make these operations less 
frequent in banking, thus explaining the differences between the two sector of economic 
activity in that respect (see, e.g., Prowse 1997).404, 405 This suggests that the structure of the 
banking corporate control market may incorporate special features. 
In contrast to the market for corporate control of non-banking firms, the regulatory 
interference in the banking market is likely to undermine its importance and efficacy as a 
mechanism to discipline managers. In this framework, capital structure decisions are likely 
                                                          
402 Regulators may also be concerned about the incentives shareholders provide managers.  John et al (1995) 
argue below that a deposit insurance premium that reflects both leverage and the structure of management 
compensation can lead banks to choose risk in accordance with regulators preferences. 
403 See, e.g., Mondschean (1996) for a review of the problems associated with the adoption of marked-to-
market accounting in commercial banking.  
404 For example Hadlock, Houston and Ryngaert (1999) emphasize that “in non-bank acquisitions a 
hostile takeover is a more likely possibility than it is in banking.” 
405 Common restrictions are on prospective acquirers damaging the credibility of takeover threats. Corporate 
control transactions between banks and non-banks are also restricted, as ownership of banks by non-financial 
corporations. Whenever permitted hostile takeovers in banking industry are required prior approval by 
supervisory and regulatory authorities besides being, normally, more time consuming and more expensive. 
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 to play a diminished role in comparison to the role they play in the market for corporate 
control of non-financial firms.406 However, it must be acknowledged that actual corporate 
control transactions in banking may influence capital structure decision-making when 
capital adequacy requirements are binding.407 
An interesting empirical result reported by Hadlock, Houston and Ryngaert (1999) 
suggests that “banks with higher levels of management ownership are 
less likely to be acquired.” This evidence seems consistent with the view that 
in banking systems characterized by concentrated ownership structures the market for 
corporate control may be less active. Schranz (1993) indicates that banks operating in 
active takeover markets are more profitable than those operating in markets where 
takeovers are restricted. Further, banks operating in these restricted banking markets make 
greater use of alternative methods for providing managers with the incentive to maximize 
firm value, such as increased managerial equity holdings.408 Lastly, Brickley and James 
(1987) provide evidence supporting the substitute hypothesis, that is, the market for takeovers 
and the board of directors are substitute mechanisms for controlling managerial behavior. 
3.3.2.3. The Shareholders – Debtholders’ Agency Problem in Banking 
Conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders lead to suboptimal 
investment, financing and dividend policies. These conflicts emerge when equityholders in 
control of a bank’s decision-making have the incentive to transfer wealth to themselves at 
the expense of less well-informed debtholders.409  The most emblematic manifestations of 
this kind of opportunistic behavior include: risk shifting410 either via claim dilution 
(excessive dividend payouts or increased leverage), or asset substitution (opportunistic 
substitution of less risky assets for riskier ones, eventually, undertaking negative net 
present value investment); and underinvestment (rejection of positive net present value 
                                                          
Gorton (1992) suggests that the difficulty potential acquirers might have in valuing portfolios of opaque and 
illiquid assets is an additional obstacle to hostile acquisitions in banking.  
406 See chapter 2 for further details. 
407 See in this Chapter the discussion about the effect of accounting rules of goodwill involved in acquisitions 
on bank’s compliance with regulatory capital norms. 
408 Higher levels of concentration in ownership are also helpful in aligning managers with the objective of 
maximizing owners’ welfare via the disciplinary role of block shareholders. 
409 As posited by Osterberg and Thomson (1989, 11) “[…] as Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue, 
conflicts arise between stockholders and bondholders that cause total bank value 
maximization and equity value maximization to differ.” 
410 Empirical evidence provided by Esty (1997) illustrates a case of risk shifting behavior in the U.S. ‘Savings 
and Loans’ industry during the 1983 to 1988 period. See also John, John and Senbet (1991). 
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 investment opportunities) (see, e.g., Galai and Masulis 1976).411 Additionally, 
equityholders may avoid taking socially desirable actions which could benefit current 
debtholders because they might adversely affect their own wealth. 
Since the landmark contribution of Black and Scholes (1973), it is well established 
that the value of residual claims can be conceptualized as a call option on the value of the 
bank with an exercise price similar to the face value of the bank’s debt. In this framework, 
equityholders’ wealth is positively affected by the adoption of riskier policies just as the 
value of a call option is raised when the volatility of the underlying asset increases.412 
Since debtholders (and depositors) can only monitor equityholders’ actions imperfectly, 
equityholders can increase the value of their option by increasing the risk of the bank’s 
underlying assets (e.g., Saunders, Strock and Travlos 1990).413 Value-maximizing 
shareholders will, therefore, design insiders’ incentive contracting in order to induce them 
to behave according to the shareholders’ risk preferences414 by adopting higher risk-return 
projects and increasing leverage to fund them.415 If projects turn out highly profitable, 
debtholders (and depositors) with a fixed contractual payoff, will not share the project 
upside with shareholders. However, if the project ends up being unprofitable, debtholders 
(and depositors) might not be paid in full, ending up (implicitly) sharing the project’s 
downside risk. This behavior leads to a reduction in the risk-adjusted value of debtholders’ 
(and depositors’) claims on the bank to decrease, creating a wealth transfer to shareholders 
at creditors’ expense.416   
                                                          
411 Galai and Masulis (1976) argue that “[w]hen firms have outstanding debt, however, 
managerial efforts to maximize shareholders’ value will not necessarily maximize 
the firm’s total value. Debt financing creates an opportunity for equityholders 
to extract wealth from debtholders, either by increasing leverage or by 
substituting riskier assets for those which had existed when debt was first 
issued.” 
412 The incentive for this behavior is, in general, associated to financial leverage and to the size of the firm’s 
growth opportunity set. 
413 This effect is cited in the literature as the wealth transfer effect. 
414 As pointed out by Flannery (1994a) a “levered firm’s managers and equityholders have 
private incentives to pursue suboptimal investment and risk strategies.” 
415 Osterberg and Thomson (1989) indicate that “[w]hile banks in some ways may be different 
from other firms, banks’ incentives to engage in risky behavior are in some ways 
similar to the incentives of nonfinancial corporations.” A similar view is suggested by 
Simpson and Gleason (1999) who argue that the"[…] incentives for risk-shifting from equity 
owners to depositors exist in banking similar to the agency problem caused by the 
conflict between owners and debt-holders in other corporations." 
416 The transfer occurs whenever the reduction in the value of the bank is inferior to the reduction in the value 
of depositors’ claims. 
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 It has been noted that escalating the use of debt financing in the bank’s capital 
structure is likely to affect the behavior of claimholders.417 Therefore, such decisions 
become relevant for the bank’s market valuation because of the allocation of control rights 
among its claimants and the incentives for outsiders to exert control over the bank’s assets. 
This external intervention is more likely in adverse macro conditions and in cases of poor 
performance. However, its credibility is contingent on the likelihood of the control rights 
over the bank’s assets being transferred from insiders to creditors in an insolvency state.  
As suggested by Myers (1977), in financial distress shareholders lack the incentive 
to allocate new equity capital even to finance investment projects with an expected positive 
net present value, since most of the benefits would accrue to debtholders. Moreover, 
shareholders may have the incentive to continue the bank’s operations beyond the point at 
which it should be liquidated in order to at least maintain an option value for their claims. 
A rational and risk neutral debtholder will require a commensurate return (in the 
form of a higher credit risk premium) for the present value of such expected expropriations 
of its claims. To signal debtholders the bank financial condition, and the alignment in the 
objective functions of both shareholders and debtholders (and the unlikelihood of engaging 
in future wealth expropriation behavior), owners may optimally increase the bank capital 
ratio. In this framework agency problems between shareholders and debtholders do raise 
market capital ‘requirements’. 
Problems of expropriation of debtholders’ wealth may be magnified if the debt has 
a long maturity and is difficult to be redeemed in the short term. This is because 
shareholders are more likely to expropriate value if there is more time before creditors can 
react by raising rates or withdrawing credit (Flannery 1994). 
3.3.2.4. The Shareholders – Depositors’ Agency Problem in Banking 
Agency conflicts arising between shareholders and depositors and between 
shareholders and regulators are probably the most peculiar in banking. Among the variety 
of agency problems that have been emphasized in this literature, is the incentive to increase 
risk and therefore expropriate debtholders’ wealth, provided to residual claimants by the 
limited liability mechanism. Since some of the governmental safety net mechanisms shield 
debtholders’ wealth (in particular, depositors) against the consequences of bank insiders’ 
                                                          
417 If ownership rights of claimants on bank’s future cash flow stream are instrumental for their behavior, 
then they configure incentive system for their holders. 
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 risk-taking, depositors’ incentive to monitor and control risk-taking is severely limited.418 
In the absence of such monitoring it is known that moral hazard behavior might emerge.419 
When regulatory deposit insurance is absent then the agency problem between depositors 
and shareholders reverts to the classical conflict between residual claimants and creditors, 
which was discussed in the previous subsection. 
Yet we should recognize that the deposit contract might be seen as depositors 
granting shareholders a put option over the assets of the bank. Shareholders have an 
incentive to increase the value of that option by increasing the risk of the institution, either 
by increasing the leverage, or by investing in riskier asset portfolios (e.g., Gilbert 1990).420  
A fixed-premium deposit insurance regime (invariant to financial and asset risks)421 
creates a put option to bank owners and also encourages the assumption of higher  and 
potentially inefficient  risk to maximize the value of their put-option subsidy on deposit 
insurance (e.g., Barth and Brumbaugh 1994; Marcus and Shaked 1984; Merton 1977).422 If 
the incentives for imprudent risk-taking activities result in economic losses that are 
ultimately passed on to the deposit insurer, a moral hazard problem arises. 
Furthermore, in a framework characterized by the simultaneous presence of 
outstanding debt financing and limited liability,423 equityholders have further incentives for 
taking on inefficient risk.424 The individual (insured) depositor, however, because of the 
                                                          
418 Lucas and McDonald (1992) posit that “risk taking by banks is often attributed to 
moral hazard induced by non-risk-based deposit insurance, coupled with regulator 
inability to monitor bank risk” 
419 The crisis of the ‘Savings and Loans’ institutions in the 1980s in the U.S. has been frequently attributed to 
moral hazard problem associated with public deposit insurance (e.g., Barth 1991; White 1991; and Kane 
1988). For a review of the deposit insurance literature see, among others, Kane (1995). 
420 Agency problems between managers and shareholders can be lowered as the owners’ incentive to increase 
the value of their put option, aligns with the managers’ interest to avoid eroding the value of their human 
capital and to maintain the private rents inherent to control. As suggested by Barth and Brumbaugh (1994), 
the threat of a severe regulatory intervention might well determine an alignment in managers and owners’ 
preference for excessive risk-taking. This problem is examined theoretically in Fluck (1999a). 
421 As it was the case in the U.S. before the implementation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. 
422 According to Barth and Brumbaugh (1994, 76) “[…] insured depositors are indifferent to 
the risk of the assets that are acquired with their funds. Protected against 
losses by deposit insurance, they have no incentive to impose discipline upon the 
owners and managers of their depositaries.” 
423 The feature of the limited liability, present in the prevalent firm organizational form in the banking 
industry, prevents equity to be negative, although it does not cap its potential to grow infinitely. However, as 
it is well documented in the literature, shareholders of limited-liability banks financed by (either insured or 
uninsured) deposits have incentives to take risk beyond that which is optimal for an 'all equity' bank (e.g., 
Kose, Saunders and Senbet 1998, and John, John and Senbet 1991). 
424 John, John and Senbet (1991) argue that incentives risk-shifting in depository financial institutions are 
provided by the presence of limited liability for owners, and the convexity associated to the payoff of limited 
liability levered equity. 
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 smallness of his fractional claim on the bank and because of the public insurer’s 
guarantees, is unable (and/or unwilling) to exert an effective influence on bank’s insiders 
decision-making or in monitoring their decisional behavior.425 Hence, modifications in the 
riskiness of the bank’s asset portfolio  such as increasing the variance of its return  
and in the bank’s financial risk affects positively the likelihood of financial distress and 
insolvency becoming a source of potential wealth transfers between equityholders and 
debtholders and depositors.426 Therefore shareholders have an additional incentive to 
encourage managerial discretionary action to promote their welfare at debtholders’ 
expense.427 
Plausibly, because of their specialness, banks benefit from the protection of a 
governmental safety net, from which they enjoy preventative financial assistance. Among 
the different mechanisms included in the safety net, deposit insurance is one of the most 
prominent. As is widely accepted, the presence of this government guarantee creates a 
well-known moral hazard problem in the form of an incentive for excessive risk-taking, 
whereas depositors have little or no incentive to monitor the bank (e.g., Mishkin 1999). 
An element that plays a particularly important role in lessening the moral hazard 
problem associated with the governmental safety net is the bank franchise value.428 The 
safety net provides a cushion to a bank’s creditors which protect them from economic 
losses. However, this protection creates a moral hazard problem by limiting their incentive 
to control risk-taking. Insured depositors have little (or no) motivation to restrain riskiness 
by requiring a return commensurate with the bank’s risk level or by withdrawing their 
deposits when the bank becomes riskier. To avoid losses in franchise value, the bank 
owners might be motivated to adopt less risky business strategies. This leads to a better 
                                                          
425 The propensity for banks’ insiders to behave in a moral hazard fashion it is widely accepted view, 
however, other authors claim that such behavior was already present prior to the inception of deposit 
insurance system (Greenbaum and Thakor 1995, 454; Calomiris and Khan 1991, 499). 
426 Because part of (insured and uninsured] depositors’ payoff includes liability services (see, e.g., Diamond 
1996) provided by the depository institution, any increment in its probability of insolvency reflects in a 
diminished expected return if the bank enters in financial distress and ultimately in undesirable liquidation. 
427 As noted by Esty (1997) for U.S. subordinated (uninsured) debtholders, typically, contribute with hold 
only a fractional amount of banks’ liabilities. Hence, it is not unlikely that these claimants provided credible 
discipline against bank management risk-taking. 
428 Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) conceptualize franchise value as “the present value of 
the stream of profits that a firm is expected to earn as a going concern.” Further 
they suggest that the sources of franchise value include “[…] efficiency, access to markets 
protected from competition, and valuable lending relationships.” Acharya (1996), 
Keeley (1990), and Marcus (1984) show formally how franchise value can mitigate moral hazard problems in 
banking. 
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 alignment between bank’s equityholders interests and those of the deposit insurer and 
supervisory authority. In this sense the reluctance to incur in losses of franchise value 
becomes, therefore, a useful instrument to ameliorate the moral hazard problem in 
banking.429  
A particular feature of banking firms is the fact that their liabilities are, to a large 
extent, held by (small) depositors and other financial institutions. Small  insured or 
uninsured  depositors do not have either the incentive or the skills to secure and process 
the information needed to assess a bank’s riskiness, creating a potentially severe free-
riding problem.430 Because small depositors are unable to appropriate control rights that 
would enable an external intervention, their reaction to poor performance and increased 
risk is limited to withdrawing their deposits if the bank is taking on too much risk. For 
these reasons small depositors need a public or private agent to try to mitigate the costs 
associated with the conflict of interests between bank owners and depositors. Regulatory 
and supervisory authorities are though engaged in just such an agency relationship as 
depositors’ agents.  
A similar, although more acute, problem occurs in banking environments where 
public deposit insurance is priced insensitively to asset risk. Banks’ equityholders are 
provided with a distortionary incentive to increase banks’ asset riskiness. In this case, the 
banking firm is tempted to leverage-up because of the advantageous cost of deposit 
funding due to the subsidy granted by public deposit insurers at taxpayers’ expense.431 
Shareholders, instead of using their own financing or resorting to risk sensitive debt-
financing to fund incremental asset growth, are thus very likely to resort to such deposit 
financing, hence reducing the capital ratio and further increasing the probability of 
potentially disruptive and costly insolvency. 
The shareholder - depositor agency problem might be exacerbated because the 
intrinsic nature of the deposit contract which precludes the application of priority rules to 
deposit claims, such as, existing deposits over future deposits. Diluting deposit claims 
through increased leverage creates a problem (because new deposits are equally ranked 
                                                          
429 Brewer and Saidenberg (1996) provide an examination of the impact of franchise value and agency 
conflicts in mitigating risk-taking by U.S. ‘Savings and Loans’ institutions. 
430 As argued by Freixas and Rochet (1997, 17) “monitoring typically involves increased 
returns to scale.” 
431 Prowse (1997) suggest that banks (insured) debt issuance provide “strong oligopolistic 
advantages on the liabilities side of their business.”  
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 with old ones) which resembles, for example, the problems of increased leverage, 
excessive dividend payouts or asset substitution.432 This potential problem is also of 
significant importance for uninsured depositors who do not benefit from the protection of 
the governmental safety net. To mitigate this (shareholders – depositors) agency problem, 
one might think of individual depositors disciplining shareholders by liquidating their 
investments (withdrawing their deposits) if managerial actions were perceived as damaging 
to their wealth.433 
It has already been noted that governmental intervention in deposit markets to 
ensure protection to depositors against banks’ opportunistic risk-taking434 can be 
accomplished by guaranteeing or insuring (with either flat or risk-based pricing) 
depositors’ claims.435 However, this action, grants banks’ owners a ‘free’ put option on the 
assets of the bank, enabling them to honour deposit obligations under all circumstances and 
‘transforming’ deposits into risk free assets.436 To overcome the agency problem between 
bank owners and regulators, the latter attempts to constrain and control owners’ incentive 
to increase the value of the put option  and hence to exercise moral hazard  granted to 
them by deposit insurance437 (or other form of implicit guaranty to depositors’ claims). The 
regulatory burden over bank owners includes the imposition of restrictive limits on 
operations and by on-site and remote scrutiny. 
                                                          
432 Problems may well be exacerbated since deposit claims are not traded in (organized and competitive) 
secondary markets where prices reflect the informational effects of such actions. As observed by Greenbaum 
and Thakor (1995, 453) “the fact that […] deposits are not traded in a secondary market 
implies that the depositor’s payoff does not depend directly on how information 
about the bank is processed by other market participants[…].”This lack of market pricing 
discipline exacerbates the intrinsic moral hazard problem of the deposit contract, irrespective of its insured or 
uninsured nature. 
433 The so-called ‘first come, first served’ rule reflects the callable nature intrinsic to a bank deposit contract. 
Two major difficulties may appear. First, the possibility of ‘bank runs’ emerging (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig 
1983). Second the presumption that all depositors are well informed about the bank’s riskiness. Although the 
‘first come, first served’ rule might well increase the incentives for monitoring, differential distribution of 
information among depositors is possible, and in this setting agency costs may be borne, disproportionately, 
by the more poorly informed depositors. 
434 Prudential supervision aims at limiting the liability incurred by both the insurer and the guarantor. 
435 Even with risk-adjusted deposit insurance pricing, incentives for risk-shifting will still be present. Hence, 
the propensity for excessive risk-taking can not be exclusively attributed to risk-insensitive deposit insurance 
pricing (John, John and Senbet (1991). 
436 Alternatively, government protection can be interpreted as the government granting a put option to 
depositors, which offsets the put option granted by depositors to the bank owners, and thus removes their 
incentive to monitor bank actions. 
437 Merton (1977) shows that the government deposits guarantee can be viewed as a put option for banks on 
the government. 
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 3.3.2.5. The Taxpayers – Regulators’ Agency Problem in Banking 
Arguably, there is also a moral hazard problem emerging out of the agency 
relationship between taxpayers and governmental entities, such as public deposit insurer 
officials and other regulators (e.g., Barth and Brumbaugh 1994). It is acknowledged in the 
banking literature taxpayers are clearly dispersed, and consequently have neither the 
incentive, nor the ability, to monitor government officials  specially regulators  and 
ensuring they are acting in taxpayers’ interest. Timely regulatory intervention to either 
curbe excessive risk-taking strategies or impose recapitalizations are example of effective 
ways of minimizing deposit insurance payments and therefore protecting taxpayer 
interests. U.S. empirical evidence provided by Barth and Brumbaugh (1994) related to the 
length of time that insolvent banks were left operating before liquidated or sold suggests 
that the agency problem still exist. 
3.3.2.6. Other Agency Problems in Banking 
Preservation of charter value438 (e.g., Sinkey 1998) and franchise value439 are 
identified in the banking literature as relevant considerations for bank’s capital structure 
decision-making (e.g., Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan 1996). The rationale here is that 
both reduce the incentive for the assumption of increasingly riskier managerial financing 
choices.440 However, bank’s equityholders may have less incentive to act cautiously with 
regard to risk-taking if bank charter values fall. This happened in the U.S. during the 1980s 
due to poor profitability resulting from heightened competitive pressure on banking 
markets (e.g., Keeley 1990). Empirical evidence supports the notion that banks with higher 
charter and franchise value tend to exhibit higher capitalization and lower asset risk, 
yielding a lower total risk. 
Banks with large franchise values may be predisposed to operate more safely than 
those banks with little (or none) franchise value as precautionary strategy to preserve. For 
instance, high-franchise-value banks may be more likely to hold capital in excess of that 
                                                          
438 According to Sinkey (1992, 739) charter value may be seen, in general terms, as the total value of all 
intangible assets. The loss of charter value can be viewed as the costs of bankruptcy. Once a bank’s charter 
value is exhausted it has nothing more to lose. According to Greenbaum and Thakor (1995, 541) a bank’s 
charter value is the “economic value of a bank to its owners (the shareholders). It can 
be viewed as the net present value of the profits expected to accrue to the 
shareholders over the life of the bank.” Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981, 51) define a bank’s 
charter value, simply, as the “value of the right to continue in business.” 
439 Authors conceptualize franchise value as the present value of bank’s future expected profits on a going 
concern basis. 
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 required by regulations, may limit their exposure to high-risk borrowers, and may hold 
well-diversified loan portfolios. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that, in general, high 
franchise value banks design their risk-taking strategies to preserve their franchise values 
from the risk of insolvency. 
3.3.2.7. Some Summary Remarks 
The risk-taking profile of a bank is contingent on its claims structure, on the level 
of alignment between managers and equityholders, and on the presence and structure of 
regulatory intervention. As insiders’ bank ownership increases, some scholars maintain 
that their interests will tend to become more closely aligned with outside investors’ 
interests, creating a strong incentive to maximize the value of their call and put options by 
appropriately increasing the risk level. 
Other scholars (e.g., Smith and Stulz 1985) argue that as managerial ownership 
holdings increase, managers will become more risk averse and are increasingly likely to 
pursue hedging and other risk-reduction strategies. This is because managers may not hold 
well-diversified portfolios and will, therefore, have incentives to reduce the riskiness of the 
bank’s returns.  Arguably, the presence of managerial risk aversion may offset the 
excessive risk-taking propensity stemming from incentives to moral hazard behavior.441 
The relationship between ownership structure and risk-taking is, arguably, significant only 
at low-franchise value banks  those with potentially more severe moral hazard problems 
and owner–manager conflicts over risk-taking preferences. In this framework, bank 
insider’s equity holdings do affect risk-taking through asset risk while ownership 
concentration affects risk taking through leverage.442 This is consistent with the idea that 
outside blockholders more readily control managerial risk-taking by influencing leverage 
than by influencing asset risk. 
Taken together, agency problems between shareholders and creditors and between 
shareholders and managers confront shareholders with a tradeoff. Higher capital reduces 
the wealth transfer problem between shareholders and creditors but aggravates conflicts of 
                                                          
440 Regulators restrain such incentives by threatening to interfere in a bank’s operations and to revoke a 
bank’s valuable charter (e.g., Buser, Chen, and Kane, 1981; Marcus 1984).  
441 Underlying there is the presumption that bank owners and managers engage in efficient contracting in the 
sense that the arguments in the managers’ compensation function are positively related to the owners’ wealth 
(e.g., Clinch and Magliolo 1993). 
442 As pointed out, e.g., by Ross (1977, note 13) the increase of managerial ownership is likely to make arise 
risk aversion behavior. In these instances managers will have an incentive to attempt to reduce the risk of 
asset portfolios once they are likely to be undiversified investors.  
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 interest between shareholders and managers, and vice versa for lower capital. 
Unfortunately, the corporate finance literature has made little progress in quantifying this 
tradeoff, and so the net impact on capital market ‘requirements’ is ambiguous. 
3.3.3. BANKS CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE WITH ASYMMETRIC DISTRIBUTION OF 
INFORMATION  
It is a well-established notion that differentiated allocation of (costly) information 
between a firm’s insiders and outsiders is a major departure from the assumptions 
underlying the Modigliani and Miller irrelevance theory. Furthermore, it is also recognized 
that the presence of this friction will make firms incur in relatively higher costs of raising 
external capital, and therefore becoming an additional reason for why capital structure 
choice does matter.443 In this vein, more recent work has suggested that in a framework 
characterized by non-uniformly distributed information between insiders (managers / 
owners) and outsiders (capital market participants) the decision of adjusting the capital 
structure may convey important information (e.g., DeYoung et al. 1998). Therefore, a 
significant part of the research in this area has focused on new securities offerings by 
firms. 
As has been discussed in earlier sections there is abundantly documentation in the 
literature suggesting that a bank is not exempted from the problems of asymmetric 
information. This acknowledgement is supported, not only on the imbalanced distribution 
of information between banks’ insiders and outsiders, but also predicated in informational 
considerations linked to its role as financial intermediary. More specifically, in the (1) 
prominent role as information processors and providers,444 and (2) the opacity associated to 
some of its actions.445 
                                                          
443 Outside claimants also would need to monitor and discipline inside investors as they might face incentives 
to behave self- interestedly. 
444 Diamond’s (1984) theory stresses the functional role of the banking firm as an information processor. 
According to this theory, banks exist because they are able to capture economies of scale (and comparative 
advantages) in the production of private information inherent to their financial intermediation technology. In 
this sense, banks may be seen as experts in lending to information-problematic borrowers, such as, a firm 
needing some specific financing arrangement found, otherwise, costly to communicate. The acquisition of 
information is made in the loan screening and contracting processes, and augmented over time by the 
oversight of the bank-customer relationship (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1994). The role performed by banks as 
monitors of borrowers is recognized as helpful in reducing asymmetric of information among market 
participants. 
445 Ross (1989) argues that “loan organizations are opaque” because they only allow market 
participants a blurred view of their true characteristics.  
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 By the same token, when we recognize that (1) a bank may be run by professional 
managers lacking the incentives provided by ownership rights; and (2) that a bank’s 
insiders might have an informational superiority in relation to outsiders, than the capital 
structure decision should not neglect the costs associated with these considerations. In this 
framework, when insiders know more about the risk (quality) of a bank’s asset portfolio 
than outsiders do, their informational superiority may have a distortionary effect on 
decision-making, if a bank must raise funds from uninformed external investors. In this 
situation, high-quality banks would be willing to signal their (true) quality by holding 
riskless asset portfolios in order to enable them to signal their higher than average ‘quality’ 
and therefore reduce the deadweight costs of asymmetric information,446 and therefore 
issue risky debt at a lower interest rate (e.g., Lucas and McDonald 1992, 1987).447  
Asymmetric information problems in a banking firm may erupt from both sides of 
its balance sheet. Whatever the circumstances, the problem always arises as a 
manifestation of one of three different kinds of contractual opportunistic behavior: ex ante, 
interim, and ex post , the so-called adverse selection problem,448 moral hazard 
problem,449 and costly state verification problem,450 respectively (see, e.g., Freixas and 
Rochet 1997, 16). 
It is intuitive that borrowers know more about their default risks than lenders do. 
Such informational asymmetry may create an adverse selection problem (underinvestment) 
which, in line with Akerlof’s (1970) and Myers’ (1977) arguments, may lead to credit 
rationing (e.g. Stanton 1998).451  
                                                          
446 As measured by the differential between the cost of capital reflecting the true quality (risk) of an issuing 
firm and the return required by poorly informed investors that, as shown by Akerlof (1970), corresponds to 
the average quality (risk) as it is perceived by market participants. 
447 Empirical evidence documents that banks with higher asset quality do in fact hold more cash and 
securities what may be interpreted as evidence supporting this proposition. 
448 Adverse selection in financial markets occurs when the potential borrowers who are the most likely to 
produce an undesirable outcome—the bad credit risks—are the ones who most actively seek out a loan and 
are thus most likely to be selected. Since adverse selection makes it more likely that loans might be made to 
bad credit risks, lenders may decide not to make any loans even though there are good credit risks in the 
marketplace. 
449 Moral hazard in financial markets occurs when the lender is subjected to the hazard that the borrower has 
incentives to engage in activities that are undesirable from the lender’s point of view, because these activities 
make it less likely that the loan will be paid back. Since moral hazard lowers the probability that the loan will 
be repaid, lenders may decide to restrain themselves from transacting. 
450 See, among others, Dowd (1996) and Townsend (1979). 
451 See Wagster (1999) for an examination of the credit crunch problem in banks from Canada, Germany, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States during the 1989-1992 period. Results are consistent with 
the asset reallocation hypothesis in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States during that period. 
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 The notion that a bank is an opaque entity is well-established and enjoys 
widespread support. Understandably, asset allocation decisions of a bank, as well as the 
risk / return attributes of a significant part of its assets are unobservable by outsiders.452 It 
is also recognized that financial intermediation activity helps in resolving (or mitigating) 
asymmetric information problems arising in both firms and individuals’ financial 
contracting. Banks acquire an informational advantage by producing private information 
through the screening and monitoring activities of their loan customers. However, this 
informational superiority may become itself a source of further asymmetric information 
problems, this time, between banks and financial markets. It is trivial that insiders should 
typically have more information about a bank’s earnings prospects and future financial 
condition than capital markets participants. Because of this opacity453 investors will have 
to draw inferences from the actions of the bank’s managers, who may, therefore, attempt to 
convey their private information to market participants by emitting credible signals, such 
as capital structure decisions.454 When the management team is in possession of inside 
information about the value of the firm’s assets, future cash flow streams and investment 
opportunity set, capital structure adjustments are valid “information-revealing 
decisions” (Grinblatt and Titman 1998, 633) to convey that information to investors.  
As explained by, among others, Ross (1977), Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers 
and Majluf’s (1984), a firm’s security issues decisions arguably have an informational 
content. Therefore, the announcement of debt and equity security issuance conveys 
information to capital market participants about the firm’s true characteristics. 
As shown in Ross’ (1977) model, firms whose managers believe have poor 
prospects are more likely to issue equity, while firms whose managers believe have good 
prospects are more likely to issue debt.455 If it is less costly for a ‘good quality’ bank to 
                                                          
Mixed results are reported for the four supply-side research hypotheses  voluntary risk-reduction, higher 
regulatory scrutiny, risk-based capital and unweighted capital ratio.  
452 Berger and Davies (1994), e.g., suggests that “banks hold a substantial amount of private 
information about their own conditions” 
453 One of the reasons banking firms’ assets are characterized by a significant amount of opacity is that 
“banks know more about the quality of their assets than do outside investors” 
(Lucas and McDonald 1992, 86). See also Ross (1989). 
454 Market participants may draw inferences about a bank’s condition and prospects from both debt and 
equity securities issues (e.g., Wall and Peterson 1998). However, differences in the claims of debt and equity 
securities on a bank’s cash flow tend to make the former less sensitive to market misestimation than the 
latter. 
455 Wall and Peterson (1996) provide support to this view arguing that the “attempts to raise new 
capital via stock issues could be costly to shareholders because such efforts 
signal that management has adverse news about the bank.” 
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 signal its higher quality by incurring more financial leverage than for a ‘bad quality’ bank, 
then a signaling equilibrium may exist in which banks that expect to have better future 
performance will have lower capital ratios (Ross 1977). 
Leland and Pyle (1977) demonstrate that when the verification of true 
characteristics of a project (firm) by outsiders may be too costly or even infeasible, funding 
new ‘good quality’ projects (firms) require a credible and observable signal in order the 
transfer information to less informed outsiders investors. This signal, according to Leland 
and Pyle, be may be insiders’ investment in the project’s (firm’s) ownership. 
Myers and Majluf’s overvaluation and undervaluation hypotheses support the 
prediction that firms issue equity securities when managers perceive the stock to be 
overvalued,456 and debt securities otherwise. Stated in general terms, their model suggests 
that a firm is most likely to prefer to issue debt securities rather than shares of stock. 
Embedded in this hypothesis is the notion that actions implying that future earnings will be 
sufficient to generate adequate capital are a positive signal to shareholders while actions 
that imply future earnings will be insufficient are a negative sign. Their model approach 
has been extended to develop hypotheses about other methods of maintaining or raising 
capital ratios such as recognizing gains on appreciated assets — actions that do not include 
equity issuance. 
Thus, theory suggests a variety of benefits and costs to shareholders with the use of 
higher capital ratios. These benefits include a reduction in taxes, an increase in the value of 
deposit insurance, and an increase in bank management teams’ incentives to operate 
efficiently. The costs include the increased deadweight costs of bankruptcy, diseconomies 
of scale in producing deposit services, and incentives to take on excessive risk. Theory also 
suggests that the optimal level of capital from the managers’ perspective may be higher 
than that desired by shareholders if managers are risk averse. In addition, banks may not 
always be at their optimum level of capital if adjusting capital ratios is costly. 
Announcements of new capital issues may be viewed by the market as an adverse signal 
about the issuing bank’s value and hence lead to a decline in the price of the bank’s 
stock.”457 
This information hypothesis has been submitted to empirical testing in the context 
of the examination of the stock price reactions to announcements of common stock 
                                                          
456 When managers believe that the firm’s stock price is higher than the security’s intrinsic value. 
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 offerings of U.S. commercial bank holding companies (e.g., Cornett and Tehranian 1994; 
Keeley 1989; Polonchek, Slovin and Sushka 1989; and Wansley and Dhillon 1989).458 
Results reported are fairly consistent with the prediction of Stephen Ross’ signaling theory 
that the announcements of common stock issuances are associated with significant 
negative stock price reactions.459 However, reactions are smaller than those found for non-
financial firms.460 Keeley’s (1989) findings imply that involuntary stock issues may 
produce a significantly more negative return than voluntary issues, this might be 
interpreted as inconsistent with the predictions of Ross’ (1977) model. Keeley, however, 
offers an explanation based on asymmetric information considerations for this potentially 
contradictory result. As the argument goes, once the market recognizes a bank as being 
under regulatory pressure to increase its capital-base, this situation may convey (negative) 
regulatory inside information about the bank’s future prospects.461 
Banks’ informational competitive advantage, according to modern banking theory 
(e.g., Das and Nanda 1999; and Freixas and Rochet 1997), mitigates asymmetric 
information problems between banks and borrowers is based on the development of long-
term relationships.462 This conduct helps banks to evaluate their borrowers’ 
creditworthiness and to monitor their performance over time. In the United States, there is 
substantial evidence supporting the hypothesis that private information and associated 
relationship-specific activities are intrinsic to bank lending. For example, event studies 
conducted by James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) found that the 
announcement about bank credit agreements led to large positive stock returns of 
borrowing firms. They concluded that banks used private information unavailable to the 
                                                          
457 See Wall and Peterson (1996). 
458 In these empirical studies no distinction is made in respect to voluntary and involuntary security issues. 
459 As discussed in chapter 2, Myers’ undervaluation theory yields a similar prediction. 
460 For evidence of stock price reaction to new common stock issues of non-financial firms see the summary 
of empirical literature appended to chapter 2. Cornett and Tehranian report that the two-day announcement 
abnormal returns of voluntary common stock and straight debt issues were -1.56 percent and 0.17 percent 
respectively. The two-day announcement abnormal returns of involuntary common stock and straight debt 
issues were –0.64 percent and 0.32 percent respectively. The abnormal returns of voluntary common stock 
and its difference to abnormal returns of involuntary common stock are statistically significant at the 1 
percent an at the 5 percent level respectively. 
461 Other explanations offered by the author relates (1) to the capital issue negative effect on the value of the 
deposit insurance guarantee, and (2) to the possible influence of market frictions, such as taxes and agency 
costs, on the bank’s deviation from its optimal capital structure. 
462 As previously explained banks produce private information on informationally opaque borrowers through 
the process of loan contracting. Arguably, the bank-borrower relationship is valuable because its disruption 
(as shown in Slovin, Sushka and Poloncheck 1993) may engender significant costs for borrowing firms. The 
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 market when they made loans. Slovin et al. (1993) investigated share price effects on the 
client firms of the Continental Illinois Bank failure in 1984 and reported similar 
findings.463  
When both asymmetric information and transaction costs are present in new 
security offerings, then these market frictions may exert some influence on the relative 
costs of internal versus external finance and the relative costs of debt versus equity. When 
insiders have a significant private information advantage over outsiders, shareholders may 
be reluctant to issue new equity, arguably because they might fear underpricing.464 
Moreover, transaction costs in raising funds externally may be quite substantial, 
particularly in equity issues.465 In contrast with non-banking firms, banks typically have a 
transaction cost advantage in issuing additional liability securities either in the form of 
deposits and/or by borrowing against their financial slack. Such cushion of funding 
capacity offers a valuable ‘protection’ against costly unexpected adverse shocks, besides 
securing the financial viability of unexpected profitable investment opportunities.466 
As suggested by Wall and Peterson (1998) the regulatory discipline of banks’ 
capital adequacy may be biased towards requiring new equity issues instead of new debt 
issues, or restricting or disallowing equity for debt swaps. In such instances, unnecessary 
costs will be imposed to ‘good quality’ banks by making them stay away from their 
optimal capital structure, and by making them issuing recognizably more expensive new 
equity securities rather than issuing new debt.  
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (l984) argued that firms do follow a pecking 
order in using their financing sources. At the top of the pecking order are internally 
generated cash flows, which have transaction and information costs advantage over equity 
                                                          
conceptual foundation of their argument is rooted in the recognition that there is relationship-specific private 
information in bank credit activities. 
463 Yamori and Murakami’s (1999) paper reports that in Japan “firms with a closer relationship 
to the Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank […] were more likely to record larger negative 
abnormal returns.” This evidence supports the hypothesis that in Japanese banking market a bank 
(main) relationship is valuable. 
464 Equityholders, as residual claimants on a bank’s value, may be reluctant to additional equity offerings for 
several reasons. Among them, and because of common equity value sensitivity to market misestimation and 
because of wealth transfers from old shareholders to old creditors if interest rates on outstanding debt are not 
easily lowered to reflect its increased safety (Miller 1995). 
465 These transaction costs typically include preparation of the registration statement and prospectus 
registration fees, printing and mailing costs, underwriting fees, and possible costs of underpricing. 
466 In these instances, costs of financial distress associated with an undercapitalized state tend to be 
substantial. Similarly, transaction costs involved in raising new equity capital in a ‘fire offering’ of stock 
might well prove too costly in the Myers-Majluf sense. 
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 capital. If external funds are needed, (tax-deductible) debt is usually preferred to equity 
because its issuing costs are usually lower, and because debt reduces verification costs 
(e.g., Townsend 1979). All of these incentives may be accentuated for small banks, which 
typically face very high transaction costs in issuing new equity. 
As discussed in the previous subsection, asymmetric information problems may 
also lead to agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors (debtholders, and insured 
and uninsured depositors) that are exacerbated in financial distress situations.  
Shareholders may find that actions which maximize the value of all claims on the bank do 
not necessarily maximize the value of their own claims. This may lead to attempts on their 
part to shift wealth from creditors to shareholders.  
As hypothesized by a number of authors, (e.g. Beaver, Ryan and Wahlen 1997; 
Wahlen 1994; and Elliot, Hanna and Shaw 1991), in the banking industry, managerial 
discretion over loan loss provisions can provide a signaling device to capital markets. 
Thus, announcements of adjustments in reserves for loan losses have an information 
content. This part of the empirical literature documents that discretionary loan loss 
provisions are positively associated with bank stock returns.467 As conjectured by Scholes, 
Wilson and Wolfson (1990), there is likely to be an incentive to manage reported earnings 
what may be seen by capital market participants as conveying private information and 
thereby contribute to lower the bank’s cost of capital.. These authors also find evidence of 
earnings, capital and tax management.468 Collins, Shachelford and Wahlen (1995) provide 
evidence consistent with management of tax liability and capital position using loan 
charge-offs, loan loss provisions, security issuances, and dividends. Wahlen (1994) 
provides empirical evidence documenting that after controlling for current changes in cash 
flows, unexpected changes in non-performing loans, and unexpected loan charge-offs, 
unexpected provisions are positively related to future changes in cash flows.469 The 
                                                          
467 However, in a recent study, Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999) report that “loan loss provisions 
are negatively related to both future earnings changes and contemporaneous stock 
returns contrary to the signaling results documented in prior work.” 
468 Earnings management, according to Healy and Wahlen (1999), “[…] occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
469 Loan provisions, loan charge-offs, and non-performing loans have distinct natures. Under generally 
accepted accounting principles (e.g., U.S. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5), loan loss 
provisions should reflect managerial expectations on the period changes of probable future loan losses. Loan 
loss provisions are, though, inherently judgmental estimates and thus discretionary. Differently, loan charge-
offs and changes in non-performing loans are relatively less discretionary and so can be used as indicators of 
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 evidence, therefore, suggests that bank managers are likely to increase the discretionary 
component of unexpected loan loss provisions when future cash flow prospects are 
favorable.470 The results of Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas’ (1999) empirical testing of the 
capital management hypothesis indicate “strong support for the hypothesis 
that loan loss provisions are used for capital management.”471 Moyer 
(1990) also reports evidence consistent with the capital management hypothesis. 
Empirical findings by Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) suggest that 
“firm financing decisions can depend on the level of accounting 
discretion managers are able to exercise and vice versa.”472 In 
addition they “document that decisions about accounting affect the 
timing of securities issuances.” They also report that their evidence 
“supports the notion that […] investment, and financing decisions 
are not independent” contradicting the irrelevance theory of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). 
Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) find no evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that taxes play a role in either delaying or accelerating loan charge-offs such 
result is interpreted as inconsistent with the tax management hypothesis.473 Greenawalt and 
Sinkey’s (1988) empirical findings are consistent with the income-smoothing hypothesis.474 
The authors also looked for alternative explanations rooted in managerial behavior theories 
addressing problems such as agency conflicts, compensation incentives and risk-taking 
propensity. Dividend policy was also taken into consideration. Moreover, Greenwalt and 
Sinkey argue that loan loss provisions sometimes signal asset quality, which “may 
                                                          
the non-discretionary portion of the loan loss provision. Loan charge-offs reflect total principal in loans 
deemed uncollectible by management during the period (net of recoveries). At the time of loan charge-offs, 
specific loans are removed from the accounting books. Non-performing loans include the principal of all 
loans that are overdue for more than a certain period (e.g., 90 days).  
470 As argued, among others, by Beaver, Ryan and Wahlen (1997) discretionary loan loss provisions are 
positively associated with bank stock returns and future earnings. 
471 However, they fail to “find evidence of earnings management via loan loss 
provisions.” 
472 The authors further claim that “the decision to issue equity, capital notes, and 
preferred stock depends on miscellaneous gains and loan loss accruals.” 
473 They report that “loan charge-offs, loan loss provisions, and the decision to issue 
securities are jointly determined” and “[a]pparently, this interaction results from 
the use of all three transactions to manage primary capital ratios.” However, the 
authors claim that “[t]he provision for loan losses, loan charge-offs and issuances of 
securities are all used to manage primary capital ratios.” 
474 The authors examined a sample of 106 U.S. bank holding companies, during the period 1976-1984. 
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 influence the ability of banks to increase leverage” (Osterberg and 
Thompson 1996, 319). 
Dividend policy is also an important consideration for a bank’s capital structure 
choice, particularly in a differentially informed setting. If because of costs of asymmetric 
information insiders adopt a pecking order of financing, with everything else held constant, 
then security issuance will be contingent on dividend payments to shareholders. Moreover, 
the degree of asymmetric information in a bank’s environment should imply “that 
dividend reductions should be a negative signal for banks share 
prices.” Recently, observed by Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1999, 200) observed that 
we are still lacking a "comprehensive study of bank dividend payout, even 
though several aspects of banking make it a unique setting for 
analyzing dividend reductions.”  Thus, further investigation in this area is 
required to substantiate our conjectures and therefore extend our understanding of the 
dividend puzzle. 
3.3.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The discussion we have been conducting on the capital structure problem at the 
banking firm level shows that, once we conceptualize the propositions of the general 
theory of capital structure in a banking framework, there is a potential for developing 
testable hypotheses for empirical testing. However, relatively little attention has been 
devoted in the literature to such examination of the determinants of capital structure choice 
in banking habitats. Thus, it is not surprising that the empirical validation of theories and 
concepts on this area is truly scarce as the following papers review illustrates. 
 Marcus (1983) examined data from a sample of 44 banks taken from bank 
Compustat tapes for the period 1958-1977. His empirical findings suggest that banks 
capital ratios are inversely related to changes in interest rates and to the tax disadvantage of 
equity financing. Furthermore, the author argues that costly deviation from target capital 
levels and economies of scale in rising equity capital (Smith 1977) might explain the large 
swings experienced by U.S. banks in their capital bases during the 1970s. Finally, evidence 
suggests banking regulators tend to view a bank’s capital relatively to other banks.  
 Sharpe (1995) examined a sample of 13 Australian trading banks (231 annual 
observations) during the period 1967 through 1988. Underlying this study is the 
presumption that regulatory jurisdiction under capital and deposit insurance (or similar 
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guarantees) is absent in Australian banking habitat. He documents an inverse relationship 
between banks’ capital ratios and growth opportunities and a positive relationship with 
(expected) retained earnings. These empirical findings are consistent with the asymmetric 
information explanation of capital structure. Hypotheses related to income tax (at the bank 
level) and bankruptcy considerations received weak empirical support. 
 Osterberg and Thomson (1996) used semi-annual data on a sample of 232 U.S. 
bank holding companies, from December 1986 to December 1987, to investigate the 
impact of banks’ regulatory capital standards on their leverage ratios. Findings suggest that 
capital regulation influence bank financial leverage. Moreover, it is shown that financial 
leverage of banks leveled with capital regulatory standards is affected by market discipline 
and financial leverage of over-capitalized banks (in relation to capital regulatory standards) 
are affected by capital regulatory discipline. Therefore, a bank meeting or exceeding the 
regulatory capital standards should expect such standards to affect banks’ financial 
leverage. 
 Hasan (1997) investigated data from Call and Income Reports (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation tapes) of 1307 U.S. banks during the 1985 through 1994.475 His 
testable hypotheses included a U-shaped relation between optimal leverage and business 
risk; an inverse relation between financial leverage and. the ratio of risk-weighted assets to 
total assets; and a positive relation between leverage and the bank size. Although 
regressions yielded the expected signs of the relevant coefficients, he failed to detect 
statistical significance. 
 Overall, these three empirical investigations do not provide persuasive and 
affirmative evidence to substantiate the validity of hypotheses formulated to foster our 
understanding about the determinants of banks capital structure choice. Nevertheless, these 
studies were instrumental in revealing some problematic sources of empirical 
inconclusiveness, and therefore were helpful in the design and specification of some of the 
hypotheses included in the theoretical model framed in our questionnaire. In contrast with 
this panorama we submitted to empirical testing (see chapter 5) a non-negligible number 
of propositions in the form of a survey questions.■ 
 
475 The sample includes 328 large (with total assets of more than 1 billion U.S. dollars) banks and 979 small 
banks. 
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The Portuguese Banking Industry: A Characterization 
CHAPTER 4: The Portuguese Banking Industry: A Brief Characterization 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 The empirical investigation of this dissertation (included in Chapter 5) is dedicated 
to test various capital structure propositions. To this end we used data collected through a 
survey conducted to a sample of CEOs of Portuguese banks, and their accounting data 
assembled in a database. To contextualize that part of our study, in this chapter we aim at 
providing a broad characterization of the Portuguese banking industry, as well as 
describing some aspects of their recent financial performance, such as capitalization and 
profitability.  
First, we describe the design of the banks financial statement database developed 
for this study. Secondly, we put the evolution of the Portuguese financial system in the last 
quarter century into perspective, focusing on the milestones of the banking industry 
modernization and liberalization after 1984. Third, we examine the recent performance of a 
sample of Portuguese banks. 
We append to this chapter: (1) a summary of the milestones of the modernization 
and liberalization of the Portuguese financial system (Appendix 4.1); (2) a synthesis of the 
privatization of nationalized banks (Appendix 4.2); (3) a comprehensive map of the 
Portuguese banking industry during the 1989-1998 period (Appendix 4.3); (4) a list of 
acronyms (Appendix 4.4); and (5) an illustrative comparison between Portuguese and U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) in banking (Appendix 4.5). 
4.2. SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA  
To frame our empirical examination, define the survey population and design the 
sample, we needed to collect the relevant data. Unfortunately, in contrast with the U.S. 
(and other countries), there are no currently available public databases of accounting and 
market data in Portugal, like Compustat or CRSP tapes. In order to overcome this 
shortcoming, we had to build from scratch a database using the publicly available 
information.476 
                                                 
476 At bank level, biannual and year-end accounting data is available from banks annual reports, and from the 
Bulletin published by the Portuguese Banking Association (APB). The Lisbon Stock Exchange publishes the 
financial statements of listed banks. Quarterly balance sheet data is published by the “Diário da República”, 
the official journal. APB does not disclose the financial statements of individual banks when these are 
compelled to consolidation. We could not find a satisfactory explanation for this behavior. 
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Firstly, we collected copies of banks’ annual reports starting in 1985, which we 
requested through a mailing addressed to all banks. Using financial statement and 
operating data published by the Portuguese Banks’ Association477 (APB) in its "Boletim 
Informativo," we built, in a spreadsheet format, one time series and one cross-section 
database covering the 1982-1998 period. The databases include both balance sheet and 
income statement data, which was manually keyed in. We also used formulas to ensure and 
control data consistency.478 Market data  share prices and stock market indexes  was 
also collected from the Lisbon Stock Exchange files and from Banco Totta & Açores 
(BTA) for its stock market index. Table 4.1 reports the number of banks annually included 
in the database. 
 
Table 4.1 
Number of Banks Included in Database 
Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Banks 17 17 18 25 27 27 27 27 35 36 35 43 45 45 46 49 54
 
Specific mandatory accounting standards and rules for banks were enforced in 
1989.479 This introduction, as acknowledged by practitioners, induced substantial 
adjustments and modifications in accounting practices and financial reporting of banks 
[e.g., APB Boletim Informativo 3(6): December 1990]. The implications, in terms of data 
for our study, resulting from the modification of banking GAAPs were minor. Essentially, 
we had to readjust in 1989, 1990 and 1991 balance sheet data, the concept of equity capital 
by excluding from it income bonds, subordinated debt and provisions. Starting in 1992,480 
mandatory accounting consolidation rules were enforced for banks, following the 1991 
transposition to the Portuguese juridical order of the European Union (E.U.) 7th 
                                                 
477 Translation of the Portuguese expression “Associação Portuguesa de Bancos”. 
478 We created a control variable to compute eventual differences between total assets and total liabilities and 
equity capital. In addition, we built a link between net earnings calculated in the income statement and equity 
capital in the balance sheet through retained earnings.   
479 The first attempt to impose accounting standards to banking firms dates back to 1959 (Decree of Law No. 
42641). In 1978 banking accounting standards were introduced (Decree of Law No. 455/78, from December 
30) which were applied until 1989. Since then, responsibility was committed to BP to define, enforce and 
oversee banking accounting standards (Decree of Law No. 91/90, from March 17). 
480 See Decree of Law No. 36/92, from March 28. 
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Directive.481 This new accounting framework did not require any adjustments to the data 
for the purpose of our study.482 
4.3. THE PORTUGUESE BANKING INDUSTRY AFTER 1974: AN OVERVIEW 
Banking markets across the world have undergone significant changes in the last 25 
years. As national economies and financial markets became increasingly integrated and 
liberalized, volatility surged and competition steadily evolved to higher thresholds. 
In the last 25 years the Portuguese banking system has been submitted to 
significant pressure for structural readjustment undergoing a process of substantial 
reorganization.483 This process was a consequence of the confluence of global forces of 
change and internal factors that propelled compounded and self-reinforcing effects.484 
Various political and economic events, unfolding since the early 1970s, were 
important determinants of the actual shape of the Portuguese banking industry. The most 
influential factor at the internal level, however, was the revolutionary process initiated in 
April 1974, and the political and economic events it consequently propelled. Among those 
was the massive program of nationalization of the economy undertaken in 1975. Starting in 
the 1980s, the confluence of several factors induced the emergence of a substantial process 
of economic liberalization. Among those factors were (1) the entry into the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1986; (2) the adhesion to the European single market in 
1992; and (3) the entry in the third phase of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 
the end of 1998.485  
As noted earlier, in the aftermath of the political unrest of April 25, 1974, the 
Portuguese banking system experienced a dramatic change that culminated, in 1975, with 
the nationalization of all Portuguese privately owned banks. Subsequently, new entries in 
                                                 
481 See Decree of Law No. 238/91, from July 2. 
482 See Appendix 4.5 for an illustrative comparison between Portuguese and U.S. general accepted 
accounting practices (GAAP). 
483 See Appendix 4.1 for a summary of the milestones in the process of modernization and liberalization of 
the Portuguese financial and banking system. 
484 According to Brennan (1997), the main consequences of the global forces of change were: the pervasive 
integration of world’s economies and their markets, the changing role of the state and the citizen, 
technological development, and markets deregulation. Overall, the effects of this process of change include 
(1) the fragmentation of financial services’ supply; (2) changes in patterns of demand for liquidity; (3) shifts 
in asset holdings; and (4) the declining role of traditional banking. See De Bandt and Davis (1999) for an 
examination of the European banking market structure during the period 1992-1996. Boyd and Gertler (1993) 
examine the U.S. commercial banking industry in the 1980s. 
485 Barata (1995) provides an analysis of the evolution of the Portuguese banking system during the 1986 to 
1992 period. 
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the industry were prohibited and the management of banks and banking markets became 
extensively and heavily regulated. 
By the mid 1980s, coinciding with the process of the integration in the EEC, a 
period of deep economic liberalization started to unfold leading to a significant 
modernization of the Portuguese financial and banking systems. The most prominent steps 
in the process include (1) the reopening of the banking industry to private investors (1985); 
(2) the setup of new banking ventures lead by Portuguese private investors; (3) the 
inception of new branches of foreign banks (1985/1986); (4) the progressive abolition of 
the administrative ruling of interest rates (1985/1989), as well as the restrictions to bank 
lending (1990/1991);486 (5) the progressive elimination of capital movements control 
(1992); and (6) the initiation of the reprivatization of formerly nationalized banks 
(1989).487  
During this time span financial markets, with virtually no activity after the 1974 
revolution, were revamped and restarted their operations in a new regulatory and operating 
framework. The privatization of former nationalized banks, deregulation trends and the 
challenges of the 1993 European single market for financial services, were some of the 
determinants of the financial liberalization process (e.g., Decressin and Mauro 1998). 
These factors should not be overlooked when we examine the restructuring and 
development process of the Portuguese banking industry. 
In the last decade, probably no other sector of the Portuguese economy experienced 
such a dramatic change, as the banking industry. From ownership, to product development, 
distribution, strategy, operations, and balance sheet structures. Everything changed, 
sometimes radically, in the context of fast changing political and economic framework, and 
regulatory and supervisory regimes. Eventually, the dynamics of these (interactive) events 
set the stage for a reasonably competitive banking system prepared to face the challenges 
of fierce competition both domestically and internationally. Thus, Portuguese banks had to 
readjust rapidly in order to cope with more open and competitive financial markets where 
challenges and threats are similar to all competitors. 
                                                 
486 Popularized as credit ceilings. 
487 See Appendix 4.2 for a schedule and a chronology of the bank privatization program. 
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The surge of private investment in banking determined the inception of a number of 
de novo banks,488 which implemented aggressive growth strategies, generally, through 
acquisitions of existing banks made available by the privatization process. 
4.4. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE PORTUGUESE BANKING INDUSTRY (1989-1998)  
A better understanding of the object of our empirical examination requires the 
description and characterization of the architecture of the Portuguese banking industry 
from 1989 to 1998. 
To characterize the Portuguese banking industry in terms of its size (number of 
banks) and composition we can, basically, resort to two sources of data. These two main 
providers of information are the Portuguese Central Bank, “Banco de Portugal”, and the 
Portuguese Banking Association, “Associação Portuguesa de Bancos”. Unfortunately, it is 
almost impossible to reconcile data from those two sources. BP data refers to banking 
institutions (either credit institutions or financial companies) registered and authorized to 
operate in the Portuguese territory,489 while APB data covers the affiliated banks only. 
As a consequence of the process of change discussed earlier, the Portuguese 
banking industry has recorded a significant number of newcomers, as well as exits and 
consolidations. To account for these movements is important step in order to assess the 
actual shape of the industry. 
According to APB’s “Boletim Informativo” there were, by the end of 1998, 43 
banks. However, BP’s 1997 Annual Report and Decressin and Mauro (1998, table 2) report 
the existence of 62 registered and accredited banks.490 Furthermore, the financial 
institution list annually provided by BP reports the existence of 42 banks (for reasons we 
                                                 
488 Such as, Banco Comercial Português (BCP), and Banco Português de Investimento (BPI). 
489 Banco de Portugal lists include banks, branches of credit institutions with head offices in the E.U., or 
credit institutions with head offices in third countries (branches and representation offices). These entities are 
mostly representation offices acting as operating extensions of banking entities incorporated in any other 
country. In general they have a narrow scope and are mainly active in interbank and wholesale banking 
markets. 
490 The table included in Appendix 4.3 describes the composition of the Portuguese banking industry based 
on APB data. 
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cannot explain) not including two existing mutual banks and CGD.491 Thus, we could 
arrive at an estimate for the total number of banks of 45.492  
Whatever perspective we adopt to report the number of banking institutions in the 
marketplace, both BP and APB data suggest that the number of banks rose significantly 
during the 1989-1998 decade (see Table 4.1). This is interpreted as a strong indicator of the 
magnitude of the transformation experienced by the banking industry in Portugal. 
 
Table 4.1 
Number of Institutions in the Portuguese Banking System (1989-1998) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number of banks according to APB 27 36 37 36 45 46 46 46 45 46 
Number of banks according to BP  27 31 35 36 42 45 48 51 62 62a 
Sources: Author’s estimates; Decressin and Mauro (1998) and Banco de Portugal annual reports. 
a Estimate. 
This evolution is even more impressive if we take into account that bank 
privatization started in 1989 and ended in December 1996. 
4.5. INDICATORS OF PORTUGUESE BANKS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE   
According to Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen (1995) there are some empirical 
regularities in bank capital, earnings and tax management. This suggests that our search for 
stylized facts related with the financial performance of Portuguese banks, should not 
overlook these aspects.  
Data for this analysis was drawn from our financial statement database. As we are 
interested in analyzing banks operating under the Portuguese law and whose financial 
decisions are made by local management teams, we deliberately excluded from the sample 
foreign (either from E.U. or from third countries) subsidiaries, branches, and representation 
offices. We also dropped banks that were operating for less than two full years at 1998 
year-end. After this screening process we retained the sample presented in table 4.2. 
 
                                                 
491 The BP list also reports the existence of 26 bank representation offices, 36 subsidiaries of U.E. financial 
institutions and 3 subsidiaries of third country financial institutions. 
492 Montepio Geral and Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo are the two mutual banks excluded from 
the BP listing. See the banks listing in Appendix 4.4 for a configuration of the Portuguese banking industry 
according to the APB data.  
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Table 4.2 
Number of Banks in the Sample 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number of banks in the sample 20 20 21 21 28 31 31 32 34 32 
 
A central aspect of the financing structure of banks can be evaluated through the 
evolution of their capital ratio (equity capital-to-total net assets). To make this analysis, we 
started computing the individual banks’ annual capital ratio. Then, we estimated the 
aggregate indicator as an average weighted by net total assets. Table 4.3 presents the 
results and also includes capital ratio estimates provided by Banco de Portugal. 
 
Table 4.3 
Capital Ratio (1989-1998) 
 [unit: percent] 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Average Standard 
Deviation
Sample 6.9 8.5 8.8 6.6 5.9 5.5 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.7 6.0 1.6 
BP 10.3 7.3 7.6 8.0 7.4 7.2 6.5 6.4 6.0 6.6 7.3 1.2 
Sources: Author’s estimates; BP Annual Report [[1996, 180); (198, 195)] 
 
According to our estimates, the average capital ratio during the 1989-1998 is 6.0 
percent. The average calculated using BP data is 7.3 percent. Since we are not aware of the 
composition of BP sample, possible explanations for the difference between the two 
averages might relate to sampling or calculation method.  
 
Figure 4.1 
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 The graph depicted in Figure 4.1 reflects an inverse evolution of the capital ratio 
between 1989 and 1992. From then onwards, the two series are almost parallel. 
Interestingly, the period of time when the two series seem inversely related corresponds to 
the enforcement of capital adequacy requirements. Therefore, one might expect a build up 
in banks’ capital-base to comply with the new capital standards (fully enforced by 1992), 
and consequently a rise in the capital ratio. Additionally, we may also conjecture that we 
should expect bank capital to pile up in preparation for the governmental privatization 
program, by that time well underway.493 
According to our estimate, the average capital ratio peaked in 1991, i.e., around the 
period when capital adequacy standards were imposed following the 1988 Basle Accord. 
One potential explanation for this phenomenon may be related to Wall and Peterson’s 
(1987) hypothesis that the mandatory primary capital requirements enforced by U.S. bank 
regulators in 1981 influenced changes in large bank holding companies in the three 
subsequent years. 
  To provide a means of comparison with banking institutions operating in the U.S. 
and thus submitted to dissimilar market and regulatory discipline, we include in Table 4.3 a 
summary of the evolution of capital ratio of commercial banks during the 1950-1992 time 
period. 
Table 4.4 
Capital Ratio of U.S. Commercial Banks (1950-1992) 
[unit: percent] 
 Mean 
 
Standard  
deviation 
1950 7.3 0.40 
1960s 7.7 0.52 
1970s 6.5 0.46 
1980-1992 6.3 0.46 
Source: Author’s estimates; Data from Barth and Brumbaugh (1994, table 4). 
The 6.3 percent average capital ratio of U.S. commercial banks during the 1980-
1992 period compares with 6.0 percent for the banks in our sample and 7.3 for BP sample, 
both from 1989-1998. Volatility is higher for Portuguese banks (in both samples) than for 
U.S. banks. This result is not unexpected since in the Portuguese banking industry during 
that time frame there were a number of de novo banks which financial performance is 
                                                 
493 See Appendix 4.2. 
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likely to be more volatile than their established peers (see, e.g., DeYoung and Hasan 
1998). 
Return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) are popular measures of bank 
performance. It is well known that ROE can be decomposed in terms of the product of 
ROA and the so-called ‘equity multiplier’ (EM), which is the inverse of the capital ratio.494 
Once we compute these indicators we are able to calculate Hannan and Hanweck’s (1988) 
risk index: RI = [E(ROA) + (1/EM)] / σROA, where E(ROA) stands for expected return on 
assets, and σROA for the standard deviation of ROA. 
 
Table 4.4 
ROA and ROE for Portuguese Banks (1989-1998) 
[unit: percent] 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Average Standard 
Deviation
ROE 12.8 18.4 22.7 15.7 18.6 4.8 9.3 18.4 24.3 25.2 17.0 6.5 
ROA 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.2 
(Implicit) EM 17.4 16.6 20.1 17.7 28.4 8.3 17.2 37.8 27.8 36.7 22.8 9.5 
Source: Author’s estimates 
 
 The average ROE, ROA and EM during the 1989-1998 period were 17.0 percent, 
0.8 percent and 22.8 respectively. The volatility of these indicators can be considered as 
high as measured by variation coefficients of 38 percent, 25 percent and 42 percent 
respectively for ROE, ROA and EM. We understand these results as a consequence of the 
growth dynamics introduced by the presence of a number of de novo banks in our sample. 
 The calculation of the RI measure for our sample yielded a result of 3.6. According 
to Hannan and Hanweck (Ibid.) the RI measures, in terms of units of ROA standard 
deviation, how much the accounting earnings can fall before becoming negative. Therefore 
the lower the RI the riskier the bank. 
 Figure 5.2 portrays the evolution of ROE and ROA during the period under 
scrutiny. 
 
                                                 
494 ROE and ROA were computed on a total asset weighted basis. 
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Figure 4.2 
ROE and ROA (1989-1998) 
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Table 4.5 provides ROA and ROE estimates of means and standard deviations of a 
sample of U.S. commercial banks during varying periods of time.  
 
Table 4.5 
ROA and ROE for U.S. Commercial Banks (1950-1992) 
[unit: percent] 
 ROA ROE 
 Mean Standard  
deviation 
Mean Standard  
deviation 
1950 0.61 0.067 8.34 0.675 
1960s 0.74 0.051 9.65 1.004 
1970s 0.80 0.063 12.40 0.707 
1980-1992 0.64 0.206 10.30 3.270 
Source: Author’s estimates; Data: Barth and Brumbaugh (1994, table 4) 
The 10.3 percent ROE for the U.S. commercial banks included in the sample, 
during the 1980-1992 period, is significantly lower than the one we found for our sample 
of Portuguese banks. However, the difference is smaller in relation to ROA. The implicit 
EM, 16.1, is lower than the one observed in our sample. The risk index for these U.S. 
commercial banks was calculated as 6.1, which is substantially higher than the one 
observed in our sample. Overall, these results are consistent with the conjecture that U.S. 
banks might be closer to the mature phase of their life cycles than their Portuguese 
counterparts.  
Another important dimension of bank performance relates to the management of 
their income tax liability. To illustrate this point we computed the implicit tax rate (as 
- 156 - 
measured by the relation between the annual provision for income tax and earnings before 
taxes).495 Net total assets were used to estimate the weighted average of the implicit tax 
rate. 
 
Table 4.3 
Implicit Tax Rate of a Sample of Portuguese Banks (1989-1998) 
[unit: percent] 
  simple  
average 
weighted  
average 
1989 14,44 17,38 
1990 19,13 17,83 
1991 17,18 20,59 
1992 17,00 15,94 
1993 22,13 23,17 
1994 18,53 19,52 
1995 18,05 21,02 
1996 17,69 23,23 
1997 22,93 22,94 
1998 17,74 22,94 
1989 - 1998 18,48 20,46 
Source: Author’s estimates 
On average, from 1989 through 1998 the implicit tax rate is estimated at 18.48 
percent and 20.46 percent as a simple and weighted average respectively. This result shows 
that the banks with higher net asset values (and therefore the higher weights in the average 
computation) are likely to have a higher tax liability. 
4.6. A PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS EXAMINATION OF PORTUGUESE BANKS’ PERFORMANCE 
(1998) 
The assessment of bank performance is a widespread practice among, namely, 
investment bankers, rating agencies, supervisors, regulators, and deposit insurers.496 Given 
the characteristic informational opacity of banks performance analysis may prove difficult 
for a number or reasons.497 Among them is the methodological design of such an 
examination.498 Regulators and deposit insurers are among the entities that appraise bank 
                                                 
495 Because financial statements for “Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo” are only available after 1994 
we excluded it from the sample. 
496 Traditionally on-site and off-site examinations have been, at least in the U.S., a primary mechanism used 
by regulatory and supervisory authorities to appraise bank performance. 
497 As suggested by Flannery and Houston (1996) "the commercial banking industry arguably 
has specially severe informational asymmetries, given its specialization in 
funding assets which cannot readily be sold in public markets." 
498 This might be explained by the large number of variable interdependencies, which should be looked upon 
when attempting to establish the statistical significance of some hypothesized relationships among them. As 
pointed out by Dhillon (1990, 23) “with large numbers of variables the number of 
relationships is so large as to be beyond comprehension, and some data reduction 
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performance more regularly and closely because of the incidences of capital standards and 
deposit insurance premia.499 One of the instruments used by them in off-site examination 
of bank performance is the so-called CAMEL model.500 This analytical tool enables 
examiners to produce a ‘rating’, which ranks the bank in terms of its financial 
performance. Underlying the model is the assumption that bank performance is determined 
by five orthogonal variables (the five letters of its name). 
To assess the performance of banks in our sample in 1998, we conducted a 
principal component analysis to 21 performance variables in an attempt to identify new 
uncorrelated variables that maximize the explained variance in the data.501 Table 4.6 
describes the 21 variables used in the analysis. Data was drawn from our database. 
 
Table 4.4 
Variable Definition 
Code Variable  Definition 
v1 Size 1997-1998 Average Total Assets 
v2 Asset Structure1 Average Credit (gross) / Average Total Assets 
v3 Asset Structure2 (Average Trading Portfolio + Average Financial Investments) / Average Total 
Assets 
v4 Off-Balance-Sheet Commissions / Total Income 
v5 Liquidity Average Cash & Equivalents / Average Short-Term Liabilities 
v6 Resources-to-Credit Conversion Rate Average Credit (gross) / Average Operating Funding 
v7 Capital Intensity Depreciation / Total Costs 
v8 Financial Margin (Interest Income – Interest Expense) / Average Earning Assets 
v9 Operating Costs-to-Banking Product Operating Costs / Banking Product 
v10 Average Assets per Employee Average Total Assets / Number of Employees 
v11 Banking Product per Employee Banking Product / Number of Employees 
v12 Credit Risk Provisions / Credit Portfolio 
v13 Interest Rate Risk Net Interest Income / Average Earning Assets 
v14 ROA Operating Income / Average Total Assets 
v15 ROE Net Income / Average Equity Capital 
v16 Non-Debt Tax-Shields (Depreciation + Provisions) / Total Costs 
v17 Implicit Tax Rate Income Tax / Earnings before Taxes 
v18 Tier 1-to-Total Capital Average Equity Capital / Total Capital 
v19 Capital Ratio Average Equity Capital / Average Total Assets 
v20 Tier 1 + Tier 2 –to-Total assets Average Equity Capital + (Subordinated Debt + provisions) / Average Total Assets 
v21 Debt-to-Equity Average Debt Financing / Average Equity Capital 
 
                                                 
technique that can systematically summarize large correlation matrices is clearly 
needed.” 
499 Flannery and Houston (1996) find that the likelihood of a bank being examined is significantly and 
negatively related to its capital ratio. They document that larger banks are more likely to be examined. 
500 CAMEL stands for Capital. Assets, Management, Earnings and Liquidity. 
501 Sharma (1996, 58) proclaims the appropriateness of using the principal components analysis “in 
determining the financial health of firms in a given industry” as an illustration of the 
paradigmatic application of the technique. See Appendix 4.6 for a methodological note. 
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Our principal components analysis explained 80.1 percent of the variance (see 
Appendix 4.7 ‘total variance explained’ and ‘component matrix’ tables). Adopting the 
usual criteria (see Appendix 4.6) we retained five components. Figure 4.3 shows the scree 
plot which graphically explains that component number five is the last with an eigenvalue 
larger than one. 
The first component explained 24.9 percent of the variance. Communalities larger 
than 0.70 in the first component include the following variables: v10, v16, v7, v3. We 
associate this component with bank asset structure. Our second component accounted for 
22.3 percent of the variance. Communalities larger than 0.70 in the second component 
include the following variables: v19, v20, and v18. We interpret this component as being 
related with bank capital. The third component explained 12.5 percent of the variance. 
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Communalities larger than 0.70 in the third component include the following 
variable: v17. This component appears to be linked to tax management. The fourth 
component explained 11.6 percent of the variance. Communalities larger than 0.70 in the 
fourth component include the following variables: v13. We interpret this component as 
being associated with profitability. Finally, the fifth component of our analysis explained 
8.7 percent of the variance. Communalities larger than 0.70 in the fifth component include 
the following variable: v12. In our view this component is associated to credit risk 
management. None of the remaining components explained more than 5 percent.  
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In summary, the results of our principal components analysis suggests that bank 
performance in 1998 might have been affected by asset structure, capital, tax management, 
profitability and credit risk. ■ 
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Appendix 4.1 
Milestones of the Portuguese Financial System Modernization Processa 
Year Month Summary 
1984 February • Banking is reopened to private ownership. 
1985 May/July • Mutual funds and fund management rules are approved. 
 August • Treasury Bills are created. 
• Participating Bonds are regulated. 
• Interest rates are liberalized: minimum rates are set for over 180 days term deposits, and maximum rates are set to 
90 to 180 days and over two years banking credit. 
• Regulation of Pension Funds and Pension Funds management. 
 October • The foreign exchange spot market is introduced. 
1986 January • The charter of Banco de Portugal is revised and a new instrument is created to conduct open market policy – 
Monetary Regularization Securities (TRM). 
 February • Venture capital is regulated. 
 June • Money market brokers are allowed to establish and operate in the interbank market. 
 October • The privatization of state owned banks is made possible. Amendment to the charter of UBP, paving the way for its 
privatization. 
 December • Banks are allowed to invest in the international money market and forward exchange transactions are liberalized. 
Banks are allowed to engage in forward exchange transactions with their clients, the Banco de Portugal and their 
peers. 
1987 February • Operations in the forward exchange market start. Only Portugal resident banks are allowed to participate in this 
market. 
• Certificates of Deposit are created. 
 August • Rules and regulations for the Interbank securities market (MIT) are changed as to allow the BP to absorb excess 
liquidity and formally introduce an open market policy. 
 October • The Foreign Exchange market is liberalized. The exchange rate stops being established by BP and financial 
institutions are allowed to trade freely although under strict supervision from the Central Bank. 
• Security markets regulations are changed in order to foster the development of Stock Exchanges. The National 
Council of Stock Exchanges is re-established and a Securities Exchange Auditor is established to deal with all 
maters related to the securities markets. Later, the Securities Exchange Auditor would give way to the Securities 
Exchange Commission. 
 November • Issues of fixed rate treasury bonds are launched for the first time. Maturity varies between 18 and 36 months. 
These securities are freely traded in secondary markets. 
1988 February • CLIPs (revolving credit facilities to the public sector) are introduced. 
 July • Major changes related to the modernization of the Security Markets, mainly: 
— Bonds with warrants are introduced; 
— Dematerialized equity securities are introduced; 
— Initial Public Offerings and Public Offers of Acquisition are regulated; 
— Closed-end funds are introduced. 
• Interbank money market brokers are allowed to operate in the Foreign Exchange Market; 
• Banks are allowed to own brokerage and dealing houses. 
• The charter of BNU is changed, paving the way for its privatization. 
 September • Limits on banking credit rates are fully removed. 
 October • The charter of BTA is changed, paving the way for its privatization. 
1989 January • A minimum limit of 3,5 billion PTE for banks’ equity capital is established. 
 March • The ceiling on check deposits is raised up to one third of the minimum rate on term deposits under 180 days. 
 April • The charter of UBP is changed, allowing its privatization. 
 June • The charter of BTA is changed, allowing its privatization. 
 December • The charter of Banco de Fomento Nacional was altered.  Denomination changed for Banco de Fomento Exterior. 
1990 March • Limits on banking credit are fully eliminated.  
 April • A Privatization law is passed  (Law No. 11/90), allowing the privatization of at most 49% of the equity capital of 
companies nationalized after 1974. 
 June • Investment in foreign securities markets is allowed. 
 September • The charters of CPP, BFB, BPSM e BESCL are changed allowing its privatization. 
• The Portuguese Escudo starts being monitored against the currencies of the ERM. 
 October • Non-residents are allowed to buy foreign currency in the forward exchange market. Nevertheless, restrictions on 
the selling of foreign exchange against escudos to residents are kept in place. 
• The charter of BPA is changed, allowing its privatization. 
 December • Capital adequacy requirements were introduced. 
1991 January • Leasing is authorized to expand into real estate financing. 
 February • Foreign Exchange market is regulated. 
 March • Brokers and dealers were allowed to offer securities custody services. 
 April • The Securities Exchange Code is approved. 
• Transitory fiscal benefits are established to foster the development of the Securities Exchanges. 
 July • The Securities Exchange Commission and its internal regulations are formally approved 
1992 March • The EEC Directive No. 86/635/CEE transposed to the Portuguese legal system accounting consolidation principles 
and rules for financial institutions. 
 April • Portuguese escudo enters the ERM of EMU. 
 May • Deposit rates are liberalized. 
 August • Control of capital movements are eliminated and capital flows completely liberalized. 
• The issuance of Commercial Paper is regulated. 
1993 July • New rules are introduced into the functioning of the interbanking money market 
a See list of acronyms in Appendix 4.4. 
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Appendix 4.2 
Table A - Schedule of Portuguese Banks Privatization 
Banks Percentage 
Sold 
Method Date 
• Banco Totta & Açores (BTA)    
1st tranche 49.0 Public offer March and July 1989 
2nd tranche 31.0 Public offer July 1990 
3rd tranche 3.1 
10.2 
Public offer 
Private Placement 
November 1996 
• Banco Português do Atlântico (BPA)    
1st tranche 33.0 Public offer December 1990 
2nd tranche 17.6 Public offer May 1992 
3rd tranche 17.5 Public offer July 1993 
4th tranche 7.5 Direct sale March 1994 
5th tranche 24.4 Direct sale March 1995 
• Sociedade Financeira Portuguesa (SFP)a 100.0 Public offer May 1991 
• Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa (BESCL)    
1st tranche 40.0 Public offer July 1991 
2nd tranche 60.0 Public offer February 1992 
• Banco Fonsecas & Burnay (BFB)    
1st tranche 80 Public tender August 1991 
2nd tranche 20 Public offer July 1992 
• Banco Internacional do Funchal (BANIF) 16.0 Public offer November 1992 
• Crédito Predial Português (CPP) 100.0 Public offer December 1992 
• União de Bancos Portugueses (UBP)b    
1st tranche 61.1 Public offer February 1993 
2nd tranche 20.0 Direct sale July 1995 
• Banco de Fomento e Exterior (BFE)    
1st tranche 19.5 Public offer December 1994 
2nd tranche 65.0 Public tender August 1996 
• Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor (BPSM)    
1st tranche 80.0 Public tender November 1994 
2nd tranche 20.0 Public offer March 1995 
• Banco Comercial dos Açores (BCA)    
1st tranche 56.0 Public tender August 1996 
2nd tranche 10.0 Public offer December 1996 
Sources: Decressin and Mauro (1998), Associação da Bolsa de Derivados do Porto (1996), Sousa and Cruz (1995) and various issues of  
“Diário da República.” 
a Changed its denomination to Banco Mello S.A. In June 28, 1996 was altered to 28 Banco Mello Investimentos, S.A. 
b In June 28, 1996 changed its denomination to Banco Mello Comercial, S.A. 
 
Table B - Chronology of Portuguese Banks Privatization 
1989 March, July • Banco Totta & Açores, 1st tranche. 
1990 July • Banco Totta & Açores, 2nd tranche. 
 December • Banco Português do Atlântico, 1st tranche. 
1991 July • Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa, 1st tranche. 
 May • Sociedade Financeira Portuguesa. 
 August • Banco Fonsecas & Burnay, 1st tranche. 
1992 February • Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa, 2nd tranche. 
 May • Banco Português do Atlântico, 2nd tranche. 
 July • Banco Fonsecas & Burnay, 2nd tranche. 
 November • Banco Internacional do Funchal. 
 December • Crédito Predial Português. 
1993 February • União de Bancos Portugueses, 1st tranche. 
 July • Banco Português do Atlântico, 3rd tranche. 
1994 March • Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor, 1st tranche. 
  • Banco Português do Atlântico, 4th tranche. 
 December • Banco de Fomento e Exterior, 1st tranche. 
1995 March • Banco Português do Atlântico, 5th tranche. 
  • Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor, 2nd tranche. 
 July • União de Bancos Portugueses, 2nd tranche. 
1996 August • Banco Comercial dos Açores, 1st tranche. 
  • Banco de Fomento e Exterior, 2nd tranche. 
 November • Banco Totta & Açores, 3rd tranche. 
 December • Banco Comercial dos Açores, 2nd tranche. 
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Appendix 4.3 
Banks Affiliated with the Portuguese Banking Association (1989-1998)a 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
_ ABN ABN ABN ABN ABN ABN ABN ABN ABN 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARB ARB 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ AGT 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BAI 
BANIF BANIF BANIF BANIF BANIF BANIF BANIF BANIF BANIF BANIF 
BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS 
BBR BBR BBR BBR BBR BBR BBR BBR BBR BBR 
BBI BBI BBI BBI BBI BBI BBI BBI BBI BBI 
_ BBV BBV BBV BBV BBV BBV BBV BBV BBV 
BCA BCA BCA BCA BCA BCA BCA BCA BCA BCA 
BCI BCI BCI BCI BCI BCI BCI BCI BCI BCI 
_ BCM BCM BCM BCM BCM BCM BCM _ _ 
BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP 
BES BES BES BES BES BES BES BES BES BES 
_ _ _ _ BESSI BESSI BESSI BESSI BESSI BESSI 
_ BEX BEX BEX BEX BEX BEX BEX BEX BEX 
BFB BFB BFB BFB BFB BFB BFB BFB BFB BFB 
BFN BFE BFE BFE BFE BFE BFE BFE BFE BFE 
BIC BIC BIC BIC BIC BIC BIC BIC BIC BIC 
_ _ _ _ BII BII BII BII BII BII 
_ _ BNC BNC BNC BNC BNC BNC BNC BNC 
_ _ _ _ BNI BNI BNI _ _ _ 
BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP 
BNU BNU BNU BNU BNU BNU BNU BNU BNU BNU 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BOSTON 
_ _ _ BOT BOT BOT BOT BOT BOT BOT 
BPA BPA BPA BPA BPA BPA BPA BPA BPA BPA 
BPI BPI BPI BPI BPI BPI BPI BPI BPI BPI 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BPI,SGPS BPI,SGPS 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BANCO BPI 
_ _ _ _ BPN BPN BPN BPN BPN BPN 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BPP BPP 
BPSM BPSM BPSM BPSM BPSM BPSM BPSM BPSM BPSM BPSM 
_ _ _ _ BSN BSN BSN BSN BSN BSN 
BTA BTA BTA BTA BTA BTA BTA BTA BTA BTA 
_ _ _ _ _ CCCAM CCCAM CCCAM CCCAM CCCAM 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ CENTRAL CENTRAL 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ CETELEM 
_ BTQ BTQ BTQ BTQ _ _ _ _ _ 
CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD 
_ CMCAL CMCAL CMCAL CMCAL CMCAL CMCAL CMCAL CMCAL CMCAL 
_ _ _ _ CISF CISF CISF CISF CISF CISF 
CITI CITI CITI CITI CITI CITI CITI CITI CITI CITI 
CL C L C L C L C L C L C L C L C L C L 
CPP CPP CPP CPP CPP CPP CPP CPP CPP CPP 
_ _ _ _ _ CDB CDB CDB CDB CDB 
_ DBI DBI DBI DBI DBI DBI DBI DBI DBI 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ EFISA EFISA EFISA 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BEA 
_ _ _ _ FINANTIA FINANTIA FINANTIA FINANTIA FINANTIA FINANTIA 
_ _ _ _ FNB FNB FNB FNB FNB FNB 
GNL GNL GNL GNL GNL GNL GNL GNL GNL GNL 
_ HPN HPN HPN HPN _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ IMIBANK 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ INTERBANCO INTERBANCO
_ _ _ _ _ ITAÚ ITAÚ ITAÚ ITAÚ ITAÚ 
UBP UBP UBP UBP UBP UBP UBP MELLO MELLO MELLO 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ MELLO imob. MELLO imob. MELLO imob. 
_ MELLO MELLO MELLO MELLO MELLO MELLO MELLO Inv. MELLO Inv. MELLO INV. 
M G M G M G M G M G M G M G M G M G M G 
_ _ _ _ _ SBL SBL SBL SBL SBL 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ SANTANDER
CHASE CHASE CHASE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
MNF MNF MNF _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
LLOYDS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
a See list of acronyms in Appendix 4.4. 
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Appendix 4.4 
List of Bank Acronyms 
ABN ABN AMRO Bank, N.V. 
ARB Banco Alves Ribeiro 
AGT Banco de Negócios Argentaria 
APB Associação Portuguesa de Bancos 
BAI Banco Africano de Investimentos 
BANIF Banco Internacional do Funchal 
BARCLAYS Barclays Bank 
BBR Banco do Brasil 
BBI Banco Borges & Irmão 
BBV Banco Bilbao Viscaia 
BCA Banco Comercial dos Açores 
BCI Banco Comércio e Indústria 
BCM Banco Comercial de Macau 
BCP Banco Comercial Português 
BEA Banco Expresso Atlântico 
BES Banco Espírito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa 
BESSI Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento 
BEX Banco Exterior de Espanha 
BFB Banco Fonsecas & Burnay 
BFE Banco de Fomento e Exterior a 
BIC Banco Internacional de Crédito 
BII Banco Investimento Imobiliário 
BNC Banco Nacional de Crédito Imobiliário, SA 
BNI Banco Nacional de Investimento 
BNP Banque Nationale de Paris 
BNU Banco Nacional Ultramarino 
BOSTON Bank Boston Latino Americano 
BOT Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
BP Banco de Portugal 
BPA Banco Português do Atlântico 
BPI Banco Português de Investimento 
BANCO BPI Banco BPI 
BPN Banco Português de Negócios 
BPP Banco Privado Português 
BPSM Banco Pinto  Sotto Mayor 
BSN Banco Santander de Negócios 
BTA Banco Totta & Açores 
CCCAM Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo 
CENTRAL Central - Banco de Investimento 
CETELEM Banco Cetelem 
CGD Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
CMCAL Chemical 
CISF Banco CISF 
CITI Citibank International 
C L Credit Lyonnais 
CPP Crédito Predial Português 
CDB Credibanco 
DBI Deutsche Bank de Investimento, SA 
EFISA Banco Efisa 
FINANTIA Banco Finantia 
FNB Finibanco 
GNL  GENERALE 
HPN Hispano 
IMIBANK SANPAOLO IMI BANK 
INTERBANCO Interbanco 
ITAÚ Banco Itaú Europa, SA 
MELLO Banco Mello Universal b 
MELLO imob. Banco Mello Imobiliário 
MELLO Inv. Banco Mello Investimento 
MG Montepio Geral 
SBL Sabadell 
SANTANDER Banco Santander Portugal, Sa 
CHASE Chase Manhattan Bank 
MNF Manufactors Hanover 
LLOYDS Lloyds Bank 
a ignated as “Banco de Fomento Nacional” until 1989. Des
b Designated as “União de Bancos Portugueses” until 1996. 
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Appendix 4.5 
 
We must recognize that the major stream of theoretical and empirical research in banking is produced in the U.S. Nonetheless, as noted 
by Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997), North American and Japanese banks significantly different from their counterparts in continental 
Europe. The most striking differences include market structure, regulatory and supervisory environment, deposit insurance regime, and 
accounting rules and practices. In order to shed some light on this last aspect we appended this table. 
 
Illustrative Comparison between Portuguese and U.S. General Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) 
Topic Portuguese GAAP U.S. GAAP 
Revaluation of fixed tangible 
assets  
Under the discretion of the legislator, 
Portuguese GAAP allow firms to revalue 
their tangible fixed assets to reflect the 
impact of inflation. 
Depreciation of tangible assets is computed 
on the revalued amounts, with the original 
acquisition cost and 60% of the revaluation 
increment being deductible for corporate 
income tax purposes.  
Under U.S. GAAP, tangible fixed assets may not 
be stated at more than their historical acquisition 
cost. 
 
Research and development 
(R&D) costs, notably 
product development  
 
 
 
As a general principle, R&D costs may be 
included as expenses in the period incurred. 
However, capitalization and amortization of 
such costs is a common practice which is 
allowed if specific requirements are met. 
Such requirements appear to be less 
stringent than the U.S. GAAP regime. 
U.S. GAAPs require R&D costs that they be 
expensed in the period incurred. 
Some costs related to R& D activities, however, 
are properly capitalized and carried forward as 
assets if they have alternative future use. In these 
instances the appropriate amortization schedule 
applies. 
Goodwill 
(Related to acquisitions 
accounted by ‘purchase 
method’) 
 
Under Portuguese accounting principles, 
positive goodwill may be either amortized 
over its estimated life, which cannot exceed 
40 years, or credited to reserves. 
Whatever the procedure, income tax 
deductibility is not allowed. Goodwill is 
always deducted in terms of the regulatory 
solvency ratio, no matter the criteria adopted 
for its accounting. 
Under US GAAP, positive goodwill is capitalized 
and amortized over its estimated life, which may 
not exceed 40 years. 
Income tax treatment is similar to Portuguese 
regime. 
 
Compensation Plans 
(As part of its profit-sharing 
plan, banks customarily 
distribute a portion of its net 
income to management and 
employees)  
 
Profit-sharing plan distribution: 1) is 
reflected in the period in which formal 
shareholder approval is obtained and is 
recorded as a reduction of retained earnings 
or other reserves or 2) is recorded as 
compensation expense in the period to 
which they relate. 
Is always deductible in terms of income tax. 
U.S. GAAP requires that such distributions be 
recorded as compensation expense in the period to 
which they relate. 
Income taxes  It is acceptable to recognize income tax 
expense based upon the estimated current 
income tax liability on the current year’s 
earnings. When income and expense 
recognition for income tax purposes does 
not occur in the same period as income and 
expense recognition for financial reporting 
purposes, the resulting temporary difference 
is not considered in the computation of the 
income tax expense for the period. 
Income taxes are provided using the liability 
method, which requires the recognition of 
deferred tax assets and liabilities for the expected 
future tax consequences attributable to differences 
between the financial statement carrying amount 
of assets and liabilities and their tax bases. A 
valuation allowance is provided based on the 
expected realization of these deferred tax assets. 
Consolidation Rules 
 
 
 
When equity stakes are more than 50 percent 
or between 20-50 percent there are no 
meaningful differences between Portuguese 
and U.S. consolidation rules. 
Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries 
are reported using the equity method of 
accounting. 
Equity stakes less than 20 percent are 
accounted at cost. Unrealized losses are 
provisioned. 
Whenever a parent-company (or any 
subsidiary) has joint control (with other 
firm(s) not included in its consolidation 
perimeter) of a firm, consolidation is made 
under the proportional consolidation 
method. 
When equity stakes are more than 50 percent or 
between 20-50 percent there are no meaningful 
differences between Portuguese and U.S. 
consolidation rules. 
Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries are 
reported using the equity method of accounting. 
Equity stakes less than 20 percent are reported at 
fair value. 
 
- 165 - 
Appendix 4.6 
Principal Components Analysis: A Methodological Note 
 
Principal components analysis (PCA) is an exploratory multivariate statistical 
technique that linearly transforms correlated variables of an original large data set, 
reducing its dimensionality to a smaller number of mutually orthogonal (uncorrelated) 
components (e. g., Joliffe 1986).502 These linear functions of the original variables aim at 
accounting as much of the variation in the original set as possible.503  Hence, PCA is a 
descriptive multivariate statistical technique for analyzing relationships that may exist 
among a set of quantitative variables and, therefore, useful in understanding existing 
dependencies among those variables and also in determining whether subsets of variables 
cluster, or go with one another.504 
Employing the PCA as an exploratory method to describe a set of variables does 
not require defining any distributional assumptions (see, e.g., Timm 1975, 542). 
Nevertheless, it is presumed that (1) all variables to be measured at the numerical level; 
and (2) relationships between pairs of variables are linear. 
Since PCA purpose is the reduction original data set while maximizing the 
explanation as much of the variation as possible in the original data set, then a crucial step 
in a principal components analysis relates to the choice about the number of components to 
retain. In deciding on how many components to retain, two main methods are suggested in 
the literature: (1) Kaiser’s (1960) criterion; and (2) Cattell’s (1966) graphical scree test. 
The first one suggests the selection of those components that account an eigenvalue greater 
than one. Stevens (1996) suggest the use of Kaiser’s (1960) criterion under the following 
conditions: Less than 30 variables and communalities below 0.70, or when N > 250 and the 
mean communality is ≥ 0.60. “The choice of criterion may depend on the 
size of the communalities and the number of variables and 
                                                 
502 It should be noted that, by its descriptive statistical nature, hypothesis testing is unavailable under 
principal component analysis. Thus, the examination or interpretation of components cannot lead to rigorous 
conclusions regarding support for or against a given theoretical proposition. 
503 As argued by Stevens (1996, 383) “[i]n principal components analysis we simply 
transform the original variables into linear combinations of these variables.” 
The new variables  principal components  are formed, in decreasing order of importance, so that: (1) 
they are uncorrelated; (2) the first principal component accounts for as much of the variability in the data as 
possible; and (3) each succeeding component accounts for as much of the remaining variability as possible. 
504 See, e.g.,, Joliffe (1986) for a detailed and rigorous analytical discussion of the principal components 
analysis method. 
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participants. The Kaiser criterion has been recommended for 
situations where the number of variables is less than 30 and the 
average communality is grater than 0.70 or when the number of 
participants is greater than 250 and the mean communality is 
greater than or equal to 0.60 (Stevens 1996)” (Bryman and Cramer 1999, 
277). The second method, graphically, depicts the descending variance accounted for by 
the components initially extracted. The components “to be retained are those 
which lie before the point at which eigenvalues seem to level off” 
(Bryman and Cramer 1999, 277).  
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Appendix 4.7. 
Principal Components Analysis Results 
 
Table A - Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial 
Eigenvalues 
  Extraction Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings 
  
 Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5,239 24,948 24,948 5,239 24,948 24,948 
2 4,677 22,273 47,221 4,677 22,273 47,221 
3 2,634 12,544 59,765 2,634 12,544 59,765 
4 2,444 11,637 71,401 2,444 11,637 71,401 
5 1,819 8,662 80,063 1,819 8,662 80,063 
6 ,926 4,411 84,474    
7 ,772 3,677 88,151    
8 ,564 2,687 90,838    
9 ,439 2,093 92,931    
10 ,370 1,760 94,691    
11 ,298 1,419 96,110    
12 ,248 1,182 97,293    
13 ,220 1,049 98,341    
14 ,117 ,556 98,898    
15 8,861E-02 ,422 99,320    
16 6,142E-02 ,292 99,612    
17 4,613E-02 ,220 99,832    
18 1,828E-02 8,704E-02 99,919    
19 1,153E-02 5,491E-02 99,974    
20 3,148E-03 1,499E-02 99,989    
21 2,346E-03 1,117E-02 100,000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Table B - Component Matrix 
Variable   Component   
 1 2 3 4 5 
V1 5,266E-02 -,400 ,308 -,133 ,469 
V2 ,646 -,570 9,098E-03 -3.493E-02 -,449 
V3 -,708 ,384 -,145 ,115 ,482 
V4 -,186 ,675 ,505 -,127 1,852E-02 
V5 ,295 ,490 ,389 -,623 -5.339E-02 
V6 ,375 -,618 ,216 ,464 -1.143E-02 
V7 ,712 8,084E-02 ,352 -,445 -,155 
V8 ,851 7,017E-02 8,911E-02 ,447 -,113 
V9 ,392 ,130 -,607 -,219 ,361 
V10 -,822 -6.968E-02 ,102 ,370 -,163 
V11 -,646 ,322 ,495 ,284 -5.180E-02 
V12 ,513 8,225E-03 -,227 ,187 ,638 
V13 ,399 -2.332E-02 -,286 ,753 9,916E-02 
V14 ,487 ,391 ,491 ,526 6,043E-02 
V15 1,433E-02 -,450 ,489 -4.792E-02 ,500 
V16 ,760 ,132 ,372 9,623E-02 1,422E-02 
V17 -,265 -,250 ,720 ,105 ,131 
V18 6,879E-02 ,725 -,200 7,044E-02 -,365 
V19 ,117 ,911 -2.144E-03 ,234 -8.497E-02 
V20 9,831E-02 ,857 -2.140E-02 ,273 ,128 
V21 -,492 -,553 4,651E-03 ,303 -,349 
Extraction Method: Prin pal Component Analysis. ci
5 components extracted. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
Portuguese Banks’ CEOs Capital Structure Decisions: 
Empirical Evidence (1989/1998) 
 
CHAPTER 5 - Portuguese Banks’ CEOs Capital Structure Decisions: Empirical 
Evidence (1989/1998) 
 
The scientific method for deciding among competing theories is, of course, to 
subject them to a controlled experiment  or, in the case of research in 
finance, empirical testing. In the matter of leverage and dividend policy, 
however, designing broad-based tests of actual corporate decision-making that 
would allow us to distinguish among these theories has proven to be quite 
difficult. The dearth of reliable empirical evidence on this topic has forced 
proponents of each theory to rely largely on anecdotes to buttress their 
arguments. 
 
Michael Barclay, Clifford Smith and Ross Watts, “The Determinants of Corporate Leverage and 
Dividend Policies,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 1995 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This investigation is primarily concerned with gathering evidence to allow the 
establishment of an empirical link between testable propositions in the form of survey 
questions, and capital structure theory of the banking firm. More specifically we aim at, 
using survey responses of a sample of banks’ Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), to 
document preferences for capital structure policy models, and to uncover the empirical 
relevance of determinants of Portuguese banks’ voluntary capital structure choice. Thus, 
we are interested in establishing a link between the general theory of corporate capital 
structure (discussed in Chapter 2) adopted to the idiosyncrasies of banks (as discussed in 
chapter 3) and the structure of motives involved in debt / equity choices made by 
Portuguese banks’ CEOs during the 1989-1998 time period.  
This survey-based empirical examination was conducted on the format of a face-to-
face interview survey  supported by a structured questionnaire (see Annex 1 and 2)  
and was administered to a sample of 51 bank CEOs who were in office during some or all 
of the 1989-1998 period. The questionnaire’s structure and design was based on the 
theoretical discussion of the problem of capital structure of the banking firm developed in 
chapter 3.505 
                                                 
505 As we point out on page 102 of the dissertation “The examination performed in this chapter 
focus on the capital structure problem in a banking habitat, and aims at being 
the theoretical foundation of our empirical investigation. More specifically, of 
the set of testable propositions embedded in the survey instrument.” 
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Testable propositions concerning the determinants and the policy models of 
Portuguese banks’ CEOs capital structure decision-making were framed in the questions 
composing the survey questionnaire. 
In order to try making this chapter more reader-friendly we opted for formulating 
the hypotheses on a question-by-question basis rather than presenting them as an 
autonomous theoretical model. We discuss the theoretical motivation of the survey 
instrument, i.e. its content validity,507 in section 5.6. The establishment of that theoretical 
validity, i.e., showing survey questions theoretical grounding to capital structure theory, 
was attempted through an examination of the theoretical foundations of testable 
hypotheses, which is presented on a question-by-question basis.508 That discussion provides 
the conceptual foundation of the theoretical model underlying our survey investigation. 
Although the potential benefits this presentation layout may ease the reading of the 
part of the dissertation, we admit that it might not favor an overall perception of theoretical 
scope of the investigation. In order to try to overcome this potential shortcoming we 
present a summary of the theoretical framework underlying the questionnaire by 
identifying testable propositions, and their correspondence to questions included in the 
survey instrument (see table in Appendix 5.1). 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section discusses a 
few general methodological problems associated with financial economics research at 
large. Some of the more troublesome problems typically surfacing in empirical tests of 
corporate capital structure are also addressed.509 The rationale and the motivation of the 
research design are discussed next. The following section specifically addresses the 
description of research design followed by a discussion of some of the problems typically 
associated with survey-based research. The survey design is then described. The final 
section deals with issues related to statistical testing of survey data, elaborate on 
                                                 
507 See section 5.5 for a discussion of content validity issues. 
508 Whenever appropriate we also declared our expectations about the results in order to decide when to 
conduct one-tailed or two-tailed statistical tests.  
509 In this section we also lay down thoughts and concerns about the issue of scientific inquiry in general, and 
in this particular research. In addition, we discuss arguments that support it in both ontological and 
epistemological grounds. These assertions are the philosophical foundations of the research design of the 
investigation. 
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propositions included in survey questions, presents and discuss results on a question-by-
question basis. 
5.2. METHODOLOGY AND METHOD ISSUES 
Philosophical inquiry in science has taken the form of a long and ongoing debate. 
In financial economics, as suggested by Frankfurter and McGoun (1996, 4), “[w]hat 
there is to know (ontology) and how it is known (epistemology)” 
remain intriguing but unanswered questions.510 
Efforts to improve knowledge about finance phenomena have occupied scholars 
and the ‘best’ ways to conduct scientific research (methodology) remains a continuing 
source of controversy.511 Two dominant paradigms have emerged in economic research 
from this controversy  the normative512 and the positive513 approaches.514  
The literature of financial economics in general and capital structure in particular, 
is not insulated from the debate surrounding these research methodological matters. 
Whether or not research in financial economics can follow the traditional scientific method 
is a recurring question. The question seems appropriate since research hypotheses in 
                                                 
510 See also, e.g., Ryan, Scarpes and Theobald (1992), Morgan (1988) and Weston (1964) and Peter Tufano’s 
introductory remarks to the Harvard Business School / Journal of Financial Economics conference on 
‘Complementary Research Methodologies: The Interplay of Theoretical, Empirical and Field-Based Research 
in Finance’.  
511 We share Blaug’s (1992) view that “methodology is not just a fancy name for ‘methods 
of investigation’”(emphasis in the original). Frankfurter and McGoun (1996, 3) argue that 
methodology is used “most often as a synonym for method, to refer to the technique of 
data acquisition and analysis in research, when it should instead refer to the 
underlying philosophy and logical structure of the process.” 
512 A normative theory uses deductive reasoning to develop a logical set of rules as corporate capital structure 
decisions might be appraised. As Jensen (1983, 2) points out “answers to normative questions 
always depend on the choice of the criterion or objective function which is a 
matter of values. Therefore, normative propositions are never refutable by 
evidence.” A normative theory examines characteristics, relationships, and actions that should exist. The 
important point is that normative theories are not necessarily empirically based. Rather, such theories rely on 
deductively plausible analysis of human behavior and/or expected consequences of actions. 
513 The positive approach to the study of economic phenomena attempts to describe what actually happens in 
reality, its findings derive from actual observation of real-world behavior, i.e., it is inductively established. 
Jensen (1983, 2) suggests that “answers to positive questions […] involve discovery of 
some aspect of how the world behaves and are always potentially refutable by 
contradictory evidence.” 
514 According to Patton (1990) the essence of the discussion has been centered “on the relative value 
of two fundamentally different and competing inquiry paradigms: (1) logical-
positivism, (2) phenomenological inquiry.” The former “uses quantitative and 
experimental methods to test hypothetical-deductive generalizations” (Ibid.). The 
latter “Uses qualitative and naturalistic approaches to inductively and holistically 
understand human experience in context-specific settings” (Ibid.). 
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financial economics cannot be subjected to repeat testing under stringent control 
conditions. 
Financial economics research is also subject to other epistemological problems. 
Among them, one is related to the possibility of generalizing the empirical results;515 
another is linked to the ability of existing theoretical models to yield testable predictions 
consistent with research methods currently available.516 
There is a broad agreement that empirical investigation must subject actual data to 
rigorous testing in order to confirm or refute research hypotheses.517 Because results of a 
single test are hardly conclusive, replication is usually needed to confirm the findings of 
previous work. Thus, hypotheses are never fully confirmed, although they may be denied. 
To deny a hypothesis, one has to find a single instance in which it fails to apply.518 To 
confirm a hypothesis, however, it must perform as predicted in all conceivable 
environments. In practice, once a hypothesis has been upheld in many tests, one can then 
say that the hypothesis has been affirmed.519 
                                                 
515 “The relevance of the falsifiability requirement is critically central to the 
historical evolution of the financial theories of the capital structure and the 
cost of capital. In this subset of financial economics, there has been a tendency 
to replace one theory by another because the latter could rationalize better data 
from a more recent sample period. This replacement has been achieved by leaving 
earlier facts unexplained or same issues unresolved” (Frankfurter and McGoun 1996). 
516  Allen and Morris (1998, 9) suggest that “[t]he inability of standard finance theories to 
provide satisfactory explanations for observed phenomena lead to a search for 
theories using new methodologies. This was particularly true in corporate finance 
where the existing models were so clearly unsatisfactory”. As Titman and Wessels (1988, 
1) point out, capital structure empirical studies “has lagged behind theoretical research, 
perhaps because the relevant firm attributes are expressed in terms of fairly 
abstract concepts that are not directly observable.” 
517 In this approach, the issue to be investigated is developed into a testable hypothesis. When testable 
hypotheses are formulated, relevant data is collected and processed in some experimental framework. Finally 
the results are evaluated. If results of the experiment are consistent with predictions, the hypothesis is said to 
be accepted; if the results are in opposition to predictions, it is rejected. 
518 Under the “[…]logical positivist doctrine […] the acceptability of a theory 
depends on its verifiability or falsifiability” (Stiglitz 1989, note 5). There is an intense 
debate about the role empirical testing plays on theory confirmation (refutation). Competing concepts include 
Popper-Samuelson’s falsificationism (embraced by Mark Blaug), Caldwell’s (1982) confirmationism, and 
Hausman’s (1989) deductivism (called verificationism by Blaug (1992, xvi). See Blaug (1992) and Caldwell 
(1982) for interesting discussions on the topic.  
519 According to Stiglitz (1989, 345) “[t]here is a peculiar perversion of the positivist 
doctrine that was popularized by Milton Friedman, which held that the validity of 
a theory depended not on the reasonableness of the assumptions but on the 
verification of the implications of the theory. This view has been extended by 
some to suggest that a theory is a good theory if any of its implications are 
verified. This is sheer nonsense. For a theory to be verified requires that none 
of its implications be falsified.” 
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However, if environmental conditions underlying the object of research cannot be 
experimentally replicated then we must be prepared to accept and interpret the findings 
without generalizing the results. In these circumstances, we should attempt interpreting the 
empirical reality rather than explaining it.520 
Extant capital structure theoretical models have, so far, successfully incorporated a 
“large number of potential determinants of capital structure” choice 
(Harris and Raviv 1991, 299). However, we must recognize that empirical literature have 
not yet produced irrefutable evidence to validate the contextual relevance of such models 
which, depending on the observed reality and the research methods applied, are often a 
source of unconvincing and contradictory results.521 This état d’affaires is a natural cause 
of disagreement among academics, as illustrated by Frankfurter and Philippatos’ (1992, 3) 
claim that one of the central problems confronting corporate finance theories “is their 
weak correspondence to facts.”522  
One plausible explanation for this phenomenon may be the misalignment between 
the behavioral characteristics of financial choices available to firms and the theoretical 
microeconomic underpinnings of the standard neoclassical model of the firm, which 
represents a popular theoretical foundation for a number of corporate finance models.523 
                                                 
520 Barclay and Smith (1999) suggest that "the greatest barrier to (scientific) progress in 
solving the [capital structure] puzzle has been the difficulty of devising conclusive 
tests of the competing theories." 
521 Opler and Titman (1996) provide a suggestive illustration: “in dynamic models like Fischer, 
Heinkel and Zechner (1989), a firm issues equity after its share price declines 
and repurchases equity after its share prices increase to adjust towards an 
optimal capital structure. […] existing research indicates that firms actually do 
the opposite.”  
522 Also Kochhar and Hitt (1998), and Barton and Gordon (1987, 1988), among others, recognize that 
financial economic theories could not yet provide a satisfactory comprehensive explanation for the firm’s 
capital structure observed behavior. 
523 Resource allocation in the neoclassical theory, is a price-oriented objective, and the firm, like its 
management, does not play a central role in it. The theory is well known as a "black-box", because resources 
go into it and goods come out of it, with little attention paid to its transformation process. Behavioral features 
of firm’s management plays no real role in this model, and consequently incentive problems and transaction 
costs are ignored. According to Hart (1995, 155) this “is a caricature of the modern firm” or, in 
a rhetorical metaphoric fashion, “[f]or a long time, the firm’s appearance in economic 
models was anorexic: more bones than flesh” Hart (1988). Jensen (1983) argues in the same 
direction: “Unfortunately, the vast literature of economics that falls under the 
label of ‘Theory of the Firm’ is not a positive theory of the firm, but rather a 
theory of markets.” As argued in Weston (1966): “important questions about the internal 
operations of the firm and the processes by which decisions are reached were 
never intended to be handled by the economic theory of the firm.” 
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Moreover, an excessive emphasis on the positivistic methodological524 approach to 
scientific inquiry into financial economics may have exacerbated the situation.525  
The behavioral decision-making patterns of economic agents are a crucial element 
of economic analysis and a dividing line, particularly, between followers of the 
neoclassical economics doctrine and the supporters of behavioral economics. The former 
sees economic agents behaving as fully rational utility maximizers (i.e., maximizing their 
subjective expect utility in an uncertain economic environment). The latter argue that 
agents behavior is “intendly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon 
1957).526 The neoclassical expected utility hypothesis  theory that characterizes the 
individual’s utility-maximization behavior in consumption and investment activities  has 
been a cornerstone for economic empirical research (e.g., Simon 1997). However, within 
this setting, individual decision-making is driven by the presumption of (full) rationality, 
which requires them “to maximize utility in a world they either 
understand exactly or in terms of a known probability distribution 
(i.e., they are maximizing subjective expected utility)" (Simon 
1997).527 Supporters of the opposite view, like Herbert Simon, argue that economic agents 
have a bounded rationality.528 
                                                 
 
524 Among other presumptions the positivistic view assume that individuals will always act rationally. There 
is substantial evidence indicating that this may be not always the case. Therefore, this assumption ignores the 
power of other factors  such as, tradition, loyalty, and reputation  in human behavior. 
525 In this vein Scholes and Wolfson (1989) suggest that “to build a rich model of capital 
structure planning requires that we abandon a neoclassical perspective where 
transactions can be effected costlessly and information is freely and equally 
available to all participants in the market.” Findlay and Williams (1985) argue that the 
source of the problem “lies in the philosophical framework of subverted positivism 
(which is, itself, a rather crude form of instrumentalism).” These authors add “it 
appears that available data and methodologies will allow researchers of one camp 
to not reject A, and those of another camp to not reject not A, indefinitely.”  
526 A significant number of authors expressed their dissatisfaction concerning the focus on the neo-classical 
paradigm as a theoretical framework for research of firm economic phenomena. Among others, see Foster 
(1979), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Summers (1982), Williams and Findlay (1983, 1984, and 1986), and 
Findlay and Williams (1985, and 1987). 
527 Full rationality model of economic behavior implies that decision-makers have the ability to ascertain the 
probabilities of all possible payoffs, rank each possible decision outcome, and choose the course of action 
which maximizes the expected value. As Simon (1997) points out ” neoclassical economics is 
right in finding the core of its subject in the act of rational decision; its 
deficiencies arise from failure to ascertain how decisions are actually taken. 
And to ascertain that, we need to know about processes that occur within heads.” 
528 In Herbert Simon own words “within the framework of bounded rationality, we assume 
that people have some goals and constraints and search for an alternative that 
reaches the goals, subject to the constraints and within specified limits on the 
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Capital structure empirical research has experienced significant problems and 
difficulties in modeling theoretical concepts and hypotheses (e.g, Hackethal and Schmidt 
1999;529 Williamson 1990; Titman and Wessels 1988; and Simon 1984). Different factors 
have been identified as potentially contributing to this situation. Among these we include 
identification problems530 (e.g., Fama and French 1997), measurement problems531 (e.g., 
Harris and Raviv 1990, Taggart 1985), and model mispecification problems532, 533 (e.g., 
Thies and Klock 1992). All of them are extensively discussed in the literature. 
Perhaps the most embarrassing shortcoming of the actual dominant methodological 
paradigm in corporate finance research is the inclusion of behavioral features in empirical 
models. This problem limits the possible reconciliation of theoretic modeling (and 
empirical testing) with the observed behavior of firms and other economic actors.534 
According to Robert Merton’s view, the core of finance theory is “the study of 
the behavior of agents in allocating and deploying their 
resources, both spatially and across time, in an uncertain 
                                                 
knowledge and computational capacities and skills of the decision maker” (Simon 
1997, 18). 
529 The authors claim that “there are substantial differences between the results 
obtained by the various studies which use balance sheet data, and indeed the 
results as a whole seem to be quite unreliable. This is due to problems of 
methodology.” 
530 Identification problems result from “stating [hypothesized] relations in a form that 
casts light on the underlying mechanisms” (Simon 1997, 73).  Econometrically, this problem 
arises in the form of either over or under specifying the model. Either by omitting relevant independent 
variables from model, or by including irrelevant independent variables. 
531 In the particular case of banks, as pointed out in Damodaran (1999, 280), there is an additional 
measurement problem, which is determined by the blurring boundaries of bank’s liabilities in terms of both 
the operating and financing functions they perform. Furthermore, measurement problems are exacerbated by 
difficulties in the classification of hybrid securities as debt or equity and by the use of accounting data. 
Selection of proxies for financial and economic variables is another source of measurement problems. 
532 Simon (1997) claims that modeling specification is contingent of prior evidence supporting both the 
structure and the variables to include in the model. The issues of relationship linearity and dynamics illustrate 
this type of problems. 
533 It should be noted that including convertible and preferred stock in other financing categories results in 
models with less explanatory power (for the other classifications) and higher standard errors for parameter 
estimates. 
534 Jensen (1983) emphatically observes that “[i]n most economic analysis, the firm is modeled 
as an entrepreneur who maximizes profits in an environment in which all contracts 
are perfectly and costlessly enforced. In this firm there are no ‘people’ 
problems, and as a result the research based on this model has no implications 
for how organizations are structured or how they function internally.” 
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environment” (Merton 1995).535 Hence, from this inspired definition, it seems 
reasonable to derive the implication that the object of finance theory is the financial 
behavior of agents.536 
Therefore, as we attempt to explain managerial decision-making in complex (and 
full of subtleties) real-world settings, we ought to admit, like Simon (1997) did, that “[…] 
we must seek to discover what went on in the heads of those who 
made the relevant decisions […].” 
Survey questions can provide insights into the practice of the financing behavior of 
firms and the factors that affect their decision-making (Norton 1989, 327). 
Field-based research designs, such as surveys administered through face-to-face 
interviews, are helpful in the investigation of managerial motivations and constraints that 
determine financial decision making. They are effective tools through which “we can 
test some of the results of theoretical research” (Norton 1989, 326). 
Thus, empirical research on corporate finance should not disregard these research designs 
that aim at illuminating financial behavior of firms. Studies that seek empirical validation 
of theoretical propositions should, advantageously, include “surveys aimed at 
ascertaining the views and practices of financial managers and 
thereby create a linkage between theory, empirical evidence, and 
practice” (Kamath (1997). Pruitt and Gitman,537 among others,538 provide a similar 
argument.539 
                                                 
 
535 See Fama and Miller (1972) for a similar proposition. Farrelly (1980) argues that “[s]ince 
perceptions are important determinants of how individuals and firms allocate 
resources, perceptions are worthy of study.” 
536 As pointed out by Mark Blaug (1992, xxv) “[E]conomics is […] a peculiar science, set 
apart from, say, physics because it studies human actions and therefore invokes 
the reasons and motives of human agents as the ‘causes of things’.”  
537 Pruitt and Gitman (1991) argue “although there is no substitute for theoretical and 
econometric-based research investigations […] one key source of information 
concerning investment, financing, and dividend decisions has been virtually 
overlooked  corporate financial managers.” 
538 Dowd (1996, 38) observes “if we do not understand why agents use the contracts forms 
they do, then we can only have, at most, a limited understanding of firm capital 
structure and financing decisions.” Barton and Gordon (1987, 1988) suggest an interweaving 
between financial economics and theoretic behavioral considerations to generate testable explanations toward 
a better understanding of corporate financial behavior. And Frankfurter (1994) asserts “more important, 
and highly questionable, is the notion that from the analysis of massive 
electronic data one can infer the motivations of individuals and firms.” 
539 Herbert Simon  (1997) claims that “[t]here is widespread recognition that economics 
needs closer and more direct contact with the phenomena it seeks to explain: that 
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Summarizing, “[because of] the complexities of the real-world 
setting, actual [capital structure] decision procedures are inevitably 
heuristic, judgmental, imitative […]” (Miller 1977, 272). Thus, exclusive 
reliance on econometric-based research of data sets, which is mostly useful in establishing 
functional relationships, estimating magnitudes and evaluating statistical goodness of fit, 
may be awkward in seeking to quantify motivations, expectations, and other behavioral 
attitudes of individuals or groups. Therefore, many debt /equity choice research questions 
can be beneficially analyzed by inquiring actual decision-makers using field-based 
research methods in order to try to enhance our knowledge about capital structure decision-
making.540   
5.3. SURVEY-BASED RESEARCH IN CORPORATE FINANCE 
The use of qualitative empirical research in attempting to explain actual firm 
behavior with respect to capital structure and dividend decisions, as well as current events 
in financial markets, is a long-established practice.  
Field-based empirical investigations of corporate finance were already conducted in 
the 1950s and the early 1960s. Lintner (1956), and Donaldson (1961)541 examine financial 
managerial decision making to understand the behavioral and motivational factors involved 
in dividend policy and firm financing. 
Survey-based empirical research has never been the standard approach in the study 
of corporate finance. Nevertheless, recently, interest in it seems to be growing. At the 
academic level, a distinguished panel of renowned financial economists542 convened in 
July 1999 for a conference focusing on “Complementary Research 
Methodologies: The Interplay of Theoretical, Empirical and Field-
                                                 
it must develop its methods for observing economic decision process closely, 
inside business firms as well as in markets.” 
540 Frankfurter and McGoun (1996) argue, in relation to epistemological basis of modern finance theory, that 
conclusions on behavioral motivations of individuals (or groups) should not be drawn without verifying their 
validity through direct inquiry.  
541 Interestingly enough, both Lintner and Donaldson, based on the observation of corporate behavior, 
developed hypotheses, respectively, for dividend and financing corporate policies, that had a clear influential 
role in corporate finance theory. About Lintner’s results on dividend policy Myers (1994) points out that 
”John Lintner’s model of how firms set dividends […] dates back to 1956, and it 
still seems to work.” 
542 Among others (in alphabetical order), Franklin Allen, Robert Bruner, Gordon Donaldson, Stuart Gilson, 
Paul Gompers, Steven Kaplan, Robert Merton, Rick Ruback, Eduardo Schwartz, Bill Schwert, René Stulz, 
Peter Tufano, and Karen Wruck. 
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Based Research in Finance.”543 Promoters of the event declared to be interested in 
bringing together both "traditional" and field-based types of research in finance, as they 
acknowledged that “carefully studying the activities of a few firms 
may be one of the only ways to study phenomena which are not 
easily quantifiable.”544 
Likewise, a growing number of academics have employed field-based methods in 
their investigations of firm financial behavior.545 Lintner (1956)546, Baker et al. (1985), and 
Baker and Powell (1999) produced survey-based empirical examinations of the 
determinants of dividend policy of samples of U.S. firms. Partington (1985, 1989) used the 
same method when he examined the largest firms listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange 
Industrial List. 
Survey-based research in banking has been also somewhat overlooked. One of the 
few examples is Scroggins, Fielding and Clark 1995, who surveyed 1000 U.S. commercial 
banks’ directors/officers to study their perceptions and reaction to liability exposure. At the 
practitioners’ level, in the U.S., surveys have been conducted to overcome the paucity of 
data, for example, in small business finance, and banking.547 
                                                 
543 Underlying the conference was the explicit recognition “that there are many complementary 
means of conducting research [in finance].” 
544 Paralleling this view, Foddy (1993) suggests that “asking questions is widely accepted as a 
cost-efficient (and sometimes the only) way, of gathering information about past 
behaviour and experiences, private actions and motives and attitudes (i.e. 
subjective variables that cannot be measured directly).” 
545 See, e.g., Graham and Harvey (2001), Babu and Jain (1998), Jong and Dijk (1998), Kamath (1997) and 
Kester et al. (1997), Trahan and Gitman (1995), Kester, Chang and Tsui (1994), Jog and Srivastava (1994), 
Hittle, Haddad and Gitman (1992), Pruitt and Gitman (1991), Norton (1991a, 1991b, 1989), Pinegar and 
Wilbricht (1989). Table appended to chapter 2 as Appendix 2.1 summarizes this literature. 
546 The model derived from Lintner’s research  based upon interviews with executives of North American 
corporations in the mid 1950s  has been empirically tested, and confirmed by, among others, by Fama and 
Babiak (1968) in US. In Germany, Harhoff and Körting (1998) used an interview-designed survey to collect 
financing pattern information, perceived as “very scarce,” from a sample of German small and medium-
sized enterprises. 
547 The National Survey of Small Business Finances, the National Federation of Independent Business 
Survey, the Survey of Consumer Finances, and the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending are some examples 
surveys conducted in the U.S. at the practitioners’ level. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System conducted in May 1998 the ‘Senior Financial Officer Survey’ to assess the “impact of low 
required reserve balances on bank reserve management practices, recent changes in 
banks’ behavior in the federal funds market, and changes in banks’ attitudes 
toward the discount window.” Although the decision and the responsibility to conduct such surveys 
belong to professional organizations, scholars have used data sets in academic studies (see, e.g., Ang, Cole 
and Lin 2000, Berger and Udell 1998 and Rajan and Petersen 1994). 
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Although the appropriate use of survey-based research may yield potentially 
interesting contributions to our better understanding of financing decision-making at the 
firm level, we must be also aware that, like any other research method, survey-based 
research is not problem-free. Thus, specific research must be designed and implemented 
aiming at circumventing some of the well-known problems that might bias responses and 
thereby potentially damage the scientific validity of the findings. 
As we can conclude from the review of survey-based capital structure literature 
(see Appendix 2.1 to chapter 2 and Appendix 5.4 to this chapter), mail-administered 
surveys is the prevalent design in survey-based research.548  Mail surveys, nonetheless their 
time and cost advantages, are exposed to non-response bias and response bias.549 The first, 
related to the likelihood of having a low rate of response.550 The second, related to the 
possibility of having someone answering the questionnaire that is not aware of the problem 
under inquiry, or is not an active part in its decision-making process.551 A particular form 
of response bias may assume the form of making the surveyed organization look good for 
the researcher (e.g., Klammer and Walker 1987).552 Another additional problem relates to 
the bias that may arise from survey participants interpreting the survey instrument 
questions differently in both mail-administered and interview-based surveys.  
5.4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Two central problems in survey-based research are the design of the experiment, 
including its mode of administration, and the implementation process. The most common 
modes of administering a survey are the self-administration by the respondent and the 
personal interview (e.g., Sheatsley 1983).553 The selection of the mode of administration is 
                                                 
548 Alternative methods of conducting survey include interviews, supported or not in a questionnaire, which 
can be either structure or unstructured. 
549 Tests suggested by Hsiao and Sun (1999), Wallace and Mellor (1988) and Moore and Reichert (1983) are 
helpful in detecting and adjusting for survey response and non-response bias.  
550 We estimated a weighted average response rate of 20.3 percent for mail-administered survey studies 
included in Appendix 5.4. 
551 In mail-administered surveys, questionnaires can be completed by lower (than desired) level employees 
within responding organizations who often have limited knowledge about the subject under inquiry 
[Aggarwal (1980) Interfaces 31-34]. 
552 One illustration of this problem is the so-called social desirability bias (Foddy 1993). Often, this anomaly 
stems from inappropriate question writing. 
553 The interview may be conducted by the researcher or by professional interviewers. Additionally, the 
interview may be face-to-face or over the phone. Surveys administered by the respondent may be conducted 
either via mail or Internet. 
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also strongly influenced by (1) the specificity and technicality of the research topic; (2) the 
size, geographical dispersion and demographic characteristics of the population to be 
surveyed; (3) respondents’ personality and sociability and level of awareness of the 
subject; (4) budgetary and time constraints; and (5) degree of access to the population. 554 
The most important considerations that influenced the design of our survey were 
the inferential nature of the study, minimization of both non-response and response biases, 
the intrinsic technicality of the topic, and respondents’ required level of understanding of 
the questions (e.g., Sheatsley 1983). This last aspect proved to be decisive in our choice 
once recent research methodology literature suggests that the validity of the results is 
substantially increased in a face-to-face interview because the interviewer as the ability to 
“clarify the meanings of questions and response choices” (see, e.g., 
Schober and Conrad 1997). Personal interaction with respondents contributes to provide a 
consistent and accurate elucidation of the purpose of the questions and the meaning of 
response categories. 
The survey was designed as a face-to-face interview conducted by ourselves and 
supported by a structured questionnaire including questionnaire with one open-end 
question and 55 closed questions555 (See Appendices 6.2 and 6.3).556  
The questionnaire structure was developed aiming at gathering data on: (1) 
descriptive questions: relevant contextual aspects of banks capital structure choice (e.g., 
questions 1, and 1.2);557 (2) conceptual / theoretical questions: hypotheses formulated 
upon the theoretical discussion conducted on chapters 2 and 3 (e.g., questions 3, 9.1, 9.2, 
9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 16, 19, 21, 27, and 31); and (3) control questions: variables aiming at 
                                                 
554 This applies either if we are testing research hypotheses, or just seeking descriptive data about some 
particular event. 
555 According to Krosnick (1999), including in questionnaires closed-ended questions with a wide scope of 
answer choices is helpful in reducing or avoiding some of the negative influence of the so-called social 
desirability bias.  
556 Interviews were conducted using the Portuguese version of the questionnaire. Since results are reported in 
English this version of the questionnaire, translated before the beginning of the fieldwork, is also included. 
557 These questions were designed mainly to contextualize certain aspects of banks’ capital structure behavior 
in terms of (1) the metrics predominantly used to gauge financial leverage and (2) the perceived concept of 
debt financing instrument. This last aspect is a recurrent source of problems in capital structure empirical 
research, mostly because of the difficulty in unambiguously defining the perimeter of debt financing. 
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providing opportunities to test congruency between responses to some survey questions 
(e.g., questions 2, 4 and 5).558 
In the field implementation of our survey we followed the set of administration 
procedures suggested by Dillman (1983) under the designation of Total Design Method 
(TDM).559 The choices of both the research design and the procedures for its 
implementation were made aiming at avoiding (or reducing) the methodological problems 
that could damage the significance of the results of the experiment. 
In developing the survey instrument a primary attention was directed to 
establishing the validity of the construct, which, typically, is evaluated in respect to four 
different aspects.560 The content validity, involving the verification, at the theoretical level, 
whether or not the questionnaire’s design and structure comprehensively and specifically 
covers the construct. I.e., if questionnaire’s conceptual foundations are adequately rooted 
in the theoretical discussion of the relevant literature. The criteria-related validity 
questions the degree the questionnaire fulfills the conditions determined by the structure of 
hypotheses (construct). The converging validity, in what degree the questionnaire captures 
measures congruent with other survey efforts focusing on similar objects of inquiry. The 
discriminant validity looks the degree to which the questionnaire measures only what it 
attempts to, if it has the ability to discriminate the reality from their observed effects.561 
A number of different issues concerning the questions of the survey instrument 
deserve particular attention. Among them are, the type of questions to ask, their sequence, 
the degree of detail sought, the length of the interview, and the wording of actual questions 
(e.g., Patton 1990). In order to write the questions for the survey instrument we started by 
                                                 
558 Nominal and ordinal measurement scales are the most predominantly used in gathering the survey data. 
Whenever deemed appropriate we also asked multi-response questions. Both aspects carry non-trivial 
implications for the statistical treatment of survey data. 
559 TDM encompasses guidelines for the implementation of two crucial processes of the survey design: the 
development of the questionnaire and the administration of the survey. For a complete description of TDM 
procedures see Dillman (1978). 
560 Zikmund (1994, 291) defines construct validity as “the ability of a measure to confirm a 
network of related hypotheses generated from a theory.” In survey-based research the 
questionnaire is viewed as a construct in the sense that, as “[…] a theoretical idea developed to 
explain and to organize some aspects of existing knowledge […]” (American 
Psychological Association 1974, 29). In this sense, the object of the inquiry is tentatively represented as a 
structure of interconnected hypotheses in “a dimension understood or inferred from its 
network of interrelationships” (ibid. 29). 
561 See Babbie (1995, 127-128) 
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reviewing attentively survey-based studies on capital structure. We found out that this 
empirical literature does not, typically, make publicly available the questionnaires used in 
fieldwork.562 Moreover, we were unsuccessful in finding any questionnaire developed to 
study the same, or a similar, topic in banking. Thus, we developed a preliminary version of 
the questionnaire which we pretested in order to identify the questions that respondents 
might have difficulty in understanding or might interpret differently from intended 
(Krosnick 1999; Zikmund 1994), and to calibrate the survey instrument accordingly.  
In developing the questionnaire we assumed that an interview must be limited to 
two hours. Hence, we were forced to trade-off the large array of questions that potentially 
could be included in the questionnaire and those that could yield more insight given the 
time constraint. Thus, important aspects related to, for example, financial contracting, 
security design and maturity choice,563 were only surfaced, since each of them could 
probably deserve of a survey of their own. Moreover, to keep down the length of the 
survey, many questions had to be withdrawn, rewritten, or consolidated with other 
questions. The final product was a twenty five page questionnaire of fifty five questions 
which we append in both its Portuguese and English versions (see Annex 1 and Annex 2). 
In all the questions it seemed appropriate a six points Likert scale was used in order to 
force respondents to discriminate, either positively or negatively, their answers and 
consequently minimizing the tendency for mean answering behavior, typically associated 
with odd Likert scales.564 To avoid response-inducing due to the arbitrary ordering of 
response categories, we adopted the procedure of arranging response items in the 
Portuguese version questionnaire (the one used in the interviews) by alphabetic order.565  
A first pretest of the questionnaire was conducted in September 1998 using its 
English version. Three more pretests were conducted during November 1998 but using the 
Portuguese version of the questionnaire. All four runs of the pretesting were conducted in a 
                                                 
562 To the best of our knowledge Graham and Harvey (2000), Norton (1991, 1989), and Pinegar and 
Wilbricht (1989) are exceptions to the rule. Their papers include questionnaires specifically designed for 
mail-administered surveys of non-financial firms. 
563 These are some of the aspects referred by Stewart Myers at the “Vanderbuilt University Roundtable on the 
Capital Structure Puzzle” under the designation of financing structure by opposition to financial structure. 
564 In designing the questions that require respondents to score using a scale we adopted the following 
semantic descriptors: ‘Strongly Disagree’, ‘Disagree’, ‘Somewhat Disagree’, ‘Somewhat Agree’, ‘Agree’, 
and ‘Strongly Agree’ (Bruner and Hensel 1992, 435). 
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face-to-face interview format to bank executives holding senior positions in their bank’s 
organizational structures, but none at CEO level. 
5.5. SAMPLE DEFINITION 
Given the strategic impact of capital structure choice, we assumed that banks’ 
CEOs were pivotal in the decision-making in this area. Thus, we chose the CEO/bank as 
the unit of analysis in our study. The main criterion for inclusion in the sample was being, 
or had been, a CEO of a Portuguese bank during the period 1989-1998 with tenure of at 
least more than one full year.  
The following criteria were adopted in defining the composition of the target 
population of our examination. First, we excluded the CEOs of all foreign banks,566 since 
we were very skeptical about the possibility of having the opportunity to conduct personal 
interviews to the CEOs of those international banks.  Second, CEOs whose tenure was less 
than an arbitrarily set limit of two years were not included in the target population, because 
we view the horizon of capital structure planning going beyond that time limit. Third, we 
adopted the view that CEOs of banks that at 1998 year-end were incorporated for less than 
two years were also not electable as members of the population. Here the rationale is 
related to the fact that authorities require incorporating banks to hold a minimum amount 
of capital. We assumed that such amount of capital was likely to be adequate for the first 
two years and therefore no capital structure decisions were likely to be taken during that 
period of time. Four, CEOs of mutual banks were not included because of the 
dissimilarities between the objective function of these financial intermediaries when 
compared to banks organized as open-investment corporations.567 Additionally, in the 
Portuguese banking system there is only one ‘true’ mutual bank.568 
For the purpose of identifying the population we performed a documental analysis 
of the composition of banks’ management teams which was available through their annual 
                                                 
565 The English translation of the questionnaire (used for reporting the survey results) keeps the same 
alphabetic order of the Portuguese version. 
566 I.e., banks whose controlling shareholders are non-residents and therefore their capital structure decisions, 
most likely, are taken at international level. 
567 Contrasting with other countries in Portugal the number of banks organized under a mutual form is, 
clearly residual. 
568 “Caixas de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo” conduct a mutual-banking business but al the local level and with a 
scale and scope that hinders their inclusion in the target population. 
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reports.569 With this information we developed a database of bank’s Board of Directors or 
body of governance performing similar functions and having the same accountability 
profile. Based on that data we built the listing of bank’s CEOs.570 Overall the target 
population is composed of 57 CEOs. Our sample includes 51 CEO / bank. Six CEOs were 
unavailable or unwilling to participate in the survey. As expected, the 89.5 percent 
response rate obtained in our survey is substantially higher than the 20.3 percent average 
response rate observed in the capital structure mail-surveys included in Appendix 5.4. 
5.6. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The epistemological nature of the research objectives of this investigation is 
certainly one of the most relevant determinants of statistical methodological choice to 
conduct survey data testing. As previously declared, the main purpose of this empirical 
study is to gather evidence to confirm / infirm several capital structure testable 
propositions as we viewed them adapted to the idiosyncrasies of the banking firm. Since 
the inferential nature of the investigation does not call for the utilization of specialized 
statistical techniques, we assumed the congruence with the purpose of the investigation as 
the main criteria in choosing statistical methods to treat survey data.571 
Survey questionnaires predominantly use nominal and ordinal non-metric 
measurement scales to gather information from respondents.572, 573 These two types of 
measurement scales, however, do not show constant units of measurement; consequently, 
the invariability in the distance between any two adjacent points of such scales it is not 
warranted.574 This innate operating characteristic of both nominal and ordinal scales, 
                                                 
 
569 At the early stages of this research project we mailed all banks operating in Portugal requesting copies of 
their annual reports since 1985 until 1996. Until now the database has been kept updated. 
570 A list with the composition of the population during the period 1989-1998 is annexed as Appendix 4.3 to 
chapter 4. 
571 Survey data may be thought either as a disclosure of respondents’ intentioned behavior (or preferences), 
or to enlighten some of their individual characteristics. However, as pointed out by DeVellis (1991, 8) in 
either of these two circumstances “the relevance or irrelevance of the measure to theory 
is a matter of the investigator’s intent, not the procedures used.”   
572 Stevens (1946) is usually credited for having firstly suggested the following measurement scale typology: 
nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio. 
573 According to (DeVellis 1991, 7) “Measuring elusive, intangible phenomena derived from 
multiple, evolving theories poses a clear challenge to social science 
researchers. Therefore, it is specially important to be mindful of measurement 
procedures and to recognize fully their strengths and shortcomings”. 
574 Such property, as it is widely known, only holds for interval and ratio measurement scales. Basilevsky 
(1994, 501) argues, “ordinal or rank-ordered random variables do not possess the 
property of distance between their particular values. Since ordinal scales are 
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clearly, limits the scope of statistical methods one can employ to treat data.575 Besides 
measurement scales, the distributional properties of data is another critical factor when 
applying either univariate or multivariate statistical techniques.576  
The structure of our survey questionnaire includes non-metric measurement scales: 
nominal and ordinal.577 Consequently, it cannot be guaranteed the invariability of the 
distance between any two adjacent points in these measurement scales. Additional 
statistical computational limitations are associated with our survey design. Among them, 
the inclusion of multi-item response questions (questions 1.2, 18 and 21), and the number 
of observations (51) which sometimes do not comply with requirements of particular 
statistical tests (e.g., questions 10, 12 and 18). 
Although multivariate statistical procedures were natural candidates for analyzing 
survey data, for reasons we assume well established in the literature, classical statistical 
multivariate methods would not fit the purposes of the statistical treatment of our survey 
data. Principal components analysis (PCA) and other factorial models, for instance, are 
essentially exploratory techniques, and thus inappropriate for conducting an inferential 
type of research.578 Factorial confirmatory analysis and structural equation models both 
require the strict compliance with distributional properties and measurement scales that are 
                                                 
only intended to reflect monotonically increasing (decreasing) sequences of 
magnitudes they, together with nominal variables, are at times referred to as 
‘qualitative’ or ‘nonmetric’.” 
575 Dillon and Golstein (1984, 3), for example, suggest that: (1) nominal measurement scales allow the 
computations of the following statistics: number of cases, mode, contingency correlations (chi-square, 
Fisher’s exact test); and (2) ordinal measurement scales allow the computations of the following statistics: 
median, percentiles, rank-order correlation, sign test, run test. 
576 Hair et al. (1998) point out that “measurement scale is critical in determining which 
multivariate techniques are the most applicable to the data.” In the same direction 
Dillon and Goldstein (1984, 2) argue, “Measurement results in various types of scales, and 
the statistical properties of many the multivariate techniques […] rest on the 
explicit assumptions concerning the level of measurement.” 
577 Some ordinal measurement scales were designed using a graphic format to suggest respondents the 
equidistance between contiguous scale response positions. Under this condition, one could presume that an 
ordinal scale might be a reasonable approximation of an interval scale. Questions 4.1, 4.2, 9.2, 9.3, and 12 
provide illustrations. 
578 Standard principal components analysis does not impose the specification of any data distributional 
properties it nevertheless requires data to comply with interval measurement scales. The use of PCA for 
inferential purposes requires the presence of both interval measurement scale data, and multivariate normal 
distributional properties. According to Jolliffe (1986) “the major assumption that x has a 
multivariate normal distribution, is often not satisfied” See, e.g., Jolliffe (1986) for an 
assessment of the limitations of PCA as an inferential tool. 
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not present in our survey data. Using latent variable models, according, e.g,, to Lynn and 
McCulloch (2000) was also limited by the size of our sample. 
The review of survey-based capital structure empirical literature indicates that this 
understanding seems to be shared by a number of other authors since in 17 survey-based 
capital structure papers,579 we were unable to find but one conducting a multivariate 
statistical test to survey data.580 This is also the case of the two most cited papers in this 
literature: Graham and Harvey (2001), and Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989).581 We interpret 
this paucity in conducting multivariate statistical tests to survey data as a result of the 
limitations imposed by the referred above and identified in the literature. 
 Another question related to the statistical treatment of survey data is whether or not 
we should conduct a global statistical treatment of data. Different facts should be taken in 
consideration when analyzing this issue. Among them: (1) the fact that survey instrument 
includes questions of different nature: descriptive, conceptual / theoretical, and control; (2) 
the potential non-compliance with distributional properties of statistical models; (3) the 
fact that propositions included in survey questions were developed under substantially 
different sets of assumptions and yield a diversity predictions;582 and (4) the recognition 
that previous empirical research has found quite a challenge disentangling and isolating the 
effects of those different capital structure hypotheses.583, 584 Focusing on these items, and 
remaining unclear how putting all survey data to simultaneous statistical testing could 
yield a substantive contribution to enhance the relevance of the results, it was considered 
inappropriate to submit data to a global statistical test. 
.  
                                                 
579 See Appendix 2.1 to chapter 2. 
580 Norton (1991) uses factor analysis to study this problem. His results, however, contradict with his own 
previous work using the very same survey data.  
581 According to the Journal of Financial Economics’ website, Graham and Harvey (2001) ranked number 
one on the top ten more requested papers during the January-December 2001 period. 
582 Survey questions inquired about a number of different propositions which the literature typically clusters 
around a number of theoretical determinants of firm capital structure choice. For example, under the taxation 
determinant we queried survey participants about tax hypotheses such as (1) the tax advantage of borrowing 
costs (Modigliani and Miller 1963); (2) the role of investors’ income taxation (Miller 1977); (3) the tax 
advantage of non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). 
583 Several capital structure transactions are explained by competing theories. Signaling, underpricing, free 
cash flow, manager-equityholder and corporate governance theories, are alternative models to explain a 
“pure” capital structure decision, such as a debt-for-equity swap.  
584 See Fama and French (1998) for an account of similar problems in quantitative data capital structure 
research. 
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Overall, the statistical treatment of survey data was planned and executed aiming 
at: (1) fulfilling the inferential purpose of the investigation; (2) focusing on the precedence 
of efficacy over complexity in statistical technique selection; (3) complying with the 
intrinsic nature of the data in terms of their distributional properties and measurement 
scales and their associated problems; and (4) emulating previous empirical work in the 
area. Appendix 5.1 includes a summary of the statistical testing conducted on survey data. 
The disclosure of descriptive statistics related to our sample is somewhat 
constrained by the guarantees of confidentiality given to survey participants. In order to 
provide some descriptive characteristics of surveyed CEOs without compromising those 
guarantees, we appended to this chapter (see Appendix 5.5) three tables including: (1) 
survey summary descriptive statistics; (2) distribution of CEOs’ tenure; and (3) 
CEO/bank’s capital ratio. 
Survey Results 
Metrics of Bank Financial Leverage. Question 1.1 queries survey participants about 
their preferred measures for gauging a bank’s level of financial leverage.585 As suggested 
in both the academic and practitioner banking literatures, capital ratio  defined as the 
relation between equity capital and net total assets  is typically perceived among the 
banking community as the most ‘popular’ measure of financial leverage. Thus, we expect 
capital ratio (irrespective of its valuation framework) to be a popular pick among the CEOs 
included in our sample. Given its conceptual similarity to the regulatory solvency ratio, if 
the survey results confirm this preference, then we would interpret it as an indication of a 
primary concern with regulatory discipline. Further, the selection of a leverage metric in 
which, at least one type of security, is valued at its market price might be interpreted as 
revealing concern with other forms of external discipline, such as the one provided by 
capital markets. Therefore we hypothesize that market valued financial leverage ratios 
should be a preferred measure of CEOs of listed banks. Table 5.1.1 presents the survey 
findings.586 
                                                 
585 As mentioned earlier, an English version of the questionnaire is appended as Annex 2. 
586 Statistical tests were computed using SPSS 10.0 software. 
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Table 5.1.1 
Preferred Measures of Financial Leveragea 
[unit: percent] 
Book value of debt / Book value of equity 11.3 
Book value of debt / Market value of equity 5.6 
Book value of equity / Book value of net total assets 45.1 
Market value of debt / Market value of equity 5.6 
Market value of equity / Book value of net total assets 9.9 
Market value of equity / Market value of net total assets 5.6 
Other 16.9 
a 
In this question multiple response was allowed. A total of 72 responses were registered. Percentages are based upon those 72 responses. Percentages 
may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 
 
We firstly examined the (multiple) preferences of surveyed CEOs concerning the 
measurement of equity financing in bank capital structures. Ignoring valuation 
considerations, data shows that 60.6 percent of CEOs’ choices indicate a preference for the 
‘traditional’ capital ratio yardstick, while 22.5 percent for the debt-to-equity ratio. ‘Other’ 
specified leverage metrics accounts for 16.9 percent of responses. Among the choices 
made under this last category, the solvency ratio (measured either under the rules of the 
1988 Basle Accord or the Portuguese Central bank) was the most popular. Taking in 
consideration these responses makes the percentage of responses indicating CEOs 
preference for the capital ratio to increase to 74.6 percent.587 These results are consistent 
with prior expectations, which identified the capital ratio as a ‘popular’ measure of bank 
financial leverage.588 In terms of valuation preferences  book value versus market value 
 book value-based ratios accounted for 56.3 percent of responses and market value-
based ratios for 26.8 percent.589 These results are consistent with the fact that in the 
Portuguese banking system, during the time period under scrutiny, only a minority of the 
equity shares of banks were publicly traded in organized equity secondary markets, albeit 
the privatization program of state-owned banks occurred during that period of time.590  
We also looked at the distribution of CEO responses on preferred measures of 
expressing financial leverage when sorted by form of ownership  state-owned or 
privately-owned. As shown in Table 5.1.1.1, the capital ratio was selected by 68.4 percent 
                                                 
587 We were able to ‘reclassify’, in terms of their proximity with either the capital ratio metric or debt-to-
equity metric, the leverage measures specified under the ‘Other’ category.   
588 Measuring banks’ financial leverage in terms of book values is a ‘standard’ practice in both bond rating 
and bank capital regulation (e.g., Marcus 1983). 
589 In our criterion a ratio is classified as valued in market terms if any of its components is marked to market. 
590 We consider a bank as state-owned if the State has a controlling stake regardless its size. 
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of the state-owned bank CEOs and by 76.9 percent of privately-owned bank CEOs. In 
terms of the ratio components valuation approach, 65.4 percent of the selections favored 
book value-based ratios and 34.6 percent favored market value-based ratios. 
Table 5.1.1.1 
CEOs Responses to Preferred Measures of Financial Leverage 
CEOs of: Capital  
Ratio 
Debt-to-
Equity 
Book  
Value 
Market 
 Value 
State-Owned Banks     
Number of selections 13 6 18 1 
Percentage 68.4 31.6 94.7 5.3 
Privately-owned Banks     
Number of selections 40 12 34 18 
Percentage 76.9 23.1 65.4 34.6 
 
CEOs’ preferred metric for assessing the use of equity capital in banks’ capital 
structure may be better pursued by focusing on the proportions of CEOs that indicated a 
particular measure, rather than focusing on the total number of selections made in their 
responses. In our view, the first approach biases the results. Because multiple answers were 
allowed in answering this question, this translated into more weight given to responses that 
indicated more than one measure, even if CEOs’ selections all involved the same type of 
ratio or valuation. 
Information in Table 5.1.1.2 summarizes the data about the CEOs who selected 
either capital ratio or debt-to-equity leverage measures, and the CEOs that indicated a 
preference for book value-based ratios or market value-based ratios. Analysis will follow. 
Table 5.1.1.2 
Distribution of CEOs Preferred Measures of Financial Leverage 
CEOs Capital  
Ratio 
Debt- 
to-Equity 
Book  
Value 
Market 
 Value 
Number 45 6 40 11 
Percentage 88.2 11.8 78.4 21.6 
 
To test the (previously formulated) proposition that CEOs of listed banks might 
have a preference for market value-based ratios, we conducted a Fischer (exact) test of 
independence which, at the 5 percent significance level (p-value: 0.0469) provides support 
for our hypothesis.591 
                                                 
 
591 As pointed out in the statistical literature, one of the assumptions of the chi-square test requires a 
minimum threshold for the expected (under the hypothesis of independence) count per cell. Sheskin 1997, 
210), for example, argues that the “expected frequency of each cell in the contingency 
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Sources of External Financing. Question 1.2 aims at gathering and assessing 
information among surveyed CEOs about the most frequently used external financing 
instruments other than common equity capital.592 We would expect answers to this 
question to follow a pattern, when we control for bank ownership and size. The conceptual 
foundation for this conjecture is grounded in ownership and control, and in informational 
considerations. Responses to Question 1.2 Results are tabulated in Table 5.1.2. 
Table 5.1.2 
Sources of External Financing a 
[unit: percent] 
Preferred stock  13.6 
Subordinated debt  24.8 
Interbank loans 15.2 
Bonds 26.4 
Participating bonds593 7.2 
Other 12.8 
a 
In this question multiple response was allowed. A total of 124 responses were registered. Percentages are based upon those 124 responses. 
Percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.
 
 
Responses reveal that the most popular instruments of external financing, excluding 
straight equity capital, are bonds (26.3 percent) and subordinated debt (25.0 percent). 
Interbank financing (excluding short-term borrowing) and preferred stock are indicated as 
equally important sources of banks’ funding. Sources of external financing other than the 
ones included in the questionnaire represent 12.1 percent of responses. Among those 
sources were commercial paper and asset securitization transactions. 
Survey participants include CEOs of both state-owned and privately-owned banks. 
Given the differences in crucial organizational dimensions  such as ownership structure 
                                                 
table is 5 or greater.” Failure to comply with this assumption implies that “the probabilities 
in the chi-square distribution may not provide an accurate estimate of the 
underlying sampling distribution” (ibid. 210). Cochran (1952) suggests a criterion, which requires 
a minimum expected count of 1, and that expects counts below 5 not to be greater than 20 percent. Others 
authors are believed to proclaim that those conditions might be too stringent. For the sake of conformity we 
conducted Fischer (exact) tests in any instances where testing independence was considered as appropriate. 
Since the this test is only available for 2 X 2 contingency tables, every time this requirement was not verified 
we collapsed different categories of a variable. 
592 The set of debt financing instruments besides ‘pure’ debt securities includes a hybrid security  preferred 
stock  which features characteristics of both debt and equity securities.   
593 This type of financial instrument is approximately equivalent to income bonds. It returns to bondholders a 
fixed interest coupon plus a variable payment indexed to bank performance. Specific contractual 
arrangements may vary between issues. Only nationalized banks issued this type of security and conventional 
wisdom seems to indicate that this was a substitute for equity, a form of financing which the government 
almost never provided during the period when banks were state controlled. 
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and control rights  preferred sources of external financing might be expected to be 
different (see Table 5.1.2.1). 
Table 5.1.2.1 
Sources of External Financing 
[unit: percent] 
 Choices of CEOs of: 
 State-Owned 
Banksa  
Privately-
Owned Banksb 
Preferred stock  3.3 16.8 
Subordinated debt  23.3 25.3 
Interbank loans 13.3 15.8 
Bonds 26.7 26.3 
Participating bonds 20.0 3.2 
Other 13.3 12.6 
a In this question multiple response was allowed. A total of 30 responses were registered. Percentages are based upon those 30 responses. Percentages 
may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 
b In this question multiple response was allowed. A total of 94 responses were registered. Percentages are based upon those 94 responses. Percentages 
may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 
 
The data suggests that preferred stock and participating bonds are differently used 
by CEOs of state-owned banks and CEOs of privately-owned banks, whereas subordinated 
debt, bonds, and bank financing appears to exhibit similar patterns of use among those 
CEOs.  
Conventional wisdom would point to firm size as another factor that might impact 
the choice of financing instrument.594  To test the role of bank size (measure by deflated 
total net assets; see Appendix 5.3)595 in the preference for different funding sources, we 
performed a set of logistic regressions. In these regressions we specified the CEOs choices 
of different sources of financing as (binary) dependent variables and size as the 
independent variable.596 Regression results do not provide support for the existence of any 
relationship, at the 5 percent significance level, between bank size and external sources of 
financing. This apparent absence of a relationship may result from the cost advantage that 
Portuguese banks, in general, seem to enjoy in new financing as compared to non-bank 
                                                 
594 Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) suggest that there are economies of scale in issuing public debt. 
595 We computed the 1989-1998 real time-series of banks (total) net assets using the deflator implicit in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Data source: OECD Economic Outlook 66; December 1999. GDP Deflators - 
Annex Table 14: 208-209. 
596 The proxy for bank size was constructed averaging a bank’s real total net assets during CEOs tenure. 
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capital issuers.597 Answers to question 30 (see later) seem to provide some evidence 
consistent with this argument.  
Bank Financial Management Objectives. Question 2 asks CEOs to rate, on a scale 
from 1 (least important) to 6 (most important), the importance assigned to each item in a 
list of banks’ financial management objectives. Overall results are documented in Table 
5.2-A. 
Table 5.2-A 
Banks CEOs Financial Management Objectives 
 Mean Scores 
Achieve and maintain high debt ratings  3.6 
Achieve a capital structure similar to that of other banks  2.5 
Enhance or sustain financial flexibility. Ensure financial independence and survival  4.3 
Maximize the market price of bonds and stock 2.3 
Maximize the market share (in terms of net total assets) 2.4 
Maximize the Price Earnings Ratio  2.1 
Maximize the Return on Investment 3.6 
Maximize the Return on Equity  4.8 
Maximize the growth of earnings per share 3.5 
Maximize shareholders’ returns 4.3 
Maximize the book value of a share of stock 2.8 
Maximize the book value of the bank’s net total assets 2.2 
Maximize the cash flow per share of stock 2.8 
Minimize the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy 3.3 
Minimize the bank’s cost of capital 4.0 
 
Standard finance textbooks point to maximization of shareholders’ wealth as a 
central objective for corporate managers. The responses of CEOs in our sample are 
consistent with that principle. The average score of 4.3 is supportive of the idea that 
Portuguese banks’ CEOs recognize maximization of shareholder return as an important 
goal. 
The objective of maximizing banks’ return on equity (as measured by net income 
related to total equity) received an average score of 4.8.598 This result is not surprising and 
is consistent with the objective of maximizing shareholders’ wealth. To test the hypothesis 
concerning the consonance of these two, we performed a signed rank test for the two 
expected values. The results show, however, that at the 5 percent level the differences in 
                                                 
597 Underlying this argument is the notion that banks, at least in Portugal, appear to exhibit an expertise in 
originating financial assets that give them some issuing cost advantages in their trips to the financial markets. 
598 We estimate the average return on equity (ROE) of Portuguese banks included in our database at 17.0 
percent (standard deviation: 6.5) during the 1989-1998 period. The average return on assets (ROA) was 
estimated at 0.8 percent (standard deviation: 0.2) during the 1989-1998 period. 
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the two sample means are not statistically significant; therefore we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of equal population means. 
The bank CEOs recognized the importance of enhancing and sustaining financial 
flexibility as well as ensuring long-term survival and financial independence (mean score: 
4.3). Similar findings are reported in other survey-based investigations of the managerial 
perspective of capital structure choice (see Graham and Harvey 1999, Norton 1991 and 
Pinegar and Wilbricht 1989). 
It is well known that the minimization of a bank’s cost of capital is achieved when 
the optimal capital structure is attained. Therefore, the average score on this item (4.0) is 
seen as evidence in support of the hypothesis that CEOs consider achieving an optimal 
capital structure as an important objective. 
Splitting the sample by state-owned and privately owned banks. We might 
conjecture that our results could be biased because CEOs of state-owned banks, according 
to the theory, could have different financial management objectives than CEOs of 
privately-owned banks. Thus, to more accurately characterize the objective functions of 
these two groups of managers, we split the sample in two: one for CEOs of state-owned 
banks and another for CEOs of privately-owned banks (see Table 5.2-B).599 
                                                 
599 The criteria to categorize a bank as a state-owned or private-investor owned was based on the documental 
examination of banks’ annual reports and on the financial statement database we build. A bank was 
considered to be state-owned, even in the event of a partly privatized bank, if the majority of ownership of 
residual control belongs to private investors, independent of the presence of any type of protective control 
device such as a ‘golden share’. 
 - 194 - 
Table 5.2-B 
Financial Management Objectives of State-Owned and Privately-Owned Bank CEOs 
 Mean Scores of CEOs of: 
 State- 
Owned Banks 
Privately-
Owned Banks 
Achieve and maintain high debt ratings  3.6 3.6 
Achieve a capital structure similar to that of other banks  2.2 2.6 
Enhance or sustain financial flexibility. Ensure financial independence 
and survival  
 
4.4 
 
4.2 
Maximize the market price of bonds and stock 1.3 2.866 
Maximize the market share (in terms of net total assets) 1.9 2.7 
Maximize the Price Earnings Ratio  1.5 2.46 
Maximize the Return on Investment 3.9 3.4 
Maximize the Return on Equity  4.5 4.9 
Maximize the growth of earnings per share 2.7 3.8 
Maximize shareholders’ returns 3.5 4.7  
Maximize stock book value 2.7 2.8 
Maximize the book value of the bank’s net total assets 1.5 2.56 
Maximize cash flow per share 2.8 2.8 
Minimize the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy 2.5 3.76 
Minimize the bank’s cost of capital 3.1 4.4  
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided tests. 
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests.  66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
 
The average scores on the shareholders’ wealth maximization goal are 3.5 and 4.7 
for CEOs of state-owned and privately-owned banks respectively. To test the hypothesis 
that the CEOs of privately-owned banks are more oriented towards maximizing owners’ 
wealth than are CEOs of state-owned banks, we performed a one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-
Witney rank sum test (of two independent samples).600 At the 5 percent level (p-value: 
0.0468) we found support for the hypothesis. 
The mean scores for “minimizing risk of financial distress and bankruptcy” are 2.5 
and 3.7 respectively, for state-owned and privately-owned banks’ CEOs.601 To test the 
hypothesis that CEOs of state-owned banks are less concerned with financial distress and 
bankruptcy than their privately-owned counterparts, we performed the same one-sided 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Witney rank sum test (of two independent samples), and found support 
for the hypothesis at the 5 percent level (p-value: 0.0234). This is not a surprising result. 
Given their proximity to government, CEOs of state-owned banks may take comfort from 
the presence of the governmental safety-net in the event of a bank crisis. Another 
explanatory factor could be the too big to fail hypothesis (see Tables 6.16 and 6.16.1). 
                                                 
600 The statistical test assumes that the two variables have similarly shaped distributions. 
 - 195 - 
Another possible factor could be the absence of both capital market and market for 
corporate control discipline (see Table 5.4).  
Another interesting finding relates to the attitude of CEOs of state-owned and 
privately-owned banks with respect to minimizing their cost of capital. The average score 
on this item, 3.1 and 4.4 respectively, indicates that CEOs of state-owned banks perceive 
the issue as relatively unimportant, while CEOs of privately-owned banks are much more 
preoccupied with it. To test the hypothesis that CEOs of state-owned banks are less 
concerned with the minimization of capital cost than their privately-owned counterparts, 
we conducted a one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Witney rank sum test of two independent 
samples. At the 5 percent level, we obtained strong evidence in support of our hypothesis 
(p-value: 0.0257). This result is obviously consistent with the finding that that privately-
owned bank CEOs are more concerned with the maximization of owners’ wealth than the 
CEOs of state-owned banks. 
CEOs included in the two subsamples showed a similar level of concern towards 
the enhancement and the sustainability of their banks’ financial slack,602 achieving and 
maintaining favorable bond ratings, as well as maximizing return on investment (ROA), 
stock book value and cash flow per share. 
Splitting the sample by ‘de novo’ versus established banks. As documented in the 
banking literature (see, e.g., DeYoung and Hasan 1998) de novo banks are likely to 
experience a different level and pattern of performance, when compared to established 
banks, at least in the early years of their life cycles.603 These arguments suggest that the 
objective function of CEOs of these two types of banks might differ in some material 
dimensions. Exhibit 5.2-C presents the survey findings. 
                                                 
601 Grossman and Hart (1982) suggested, on the grounds of managerial risk aversion, the bankruptcy risk 
hypothesis. 
602 This term was used by Myers and Majluf (1984, 188) to mean “large holdings of cash or 
marketable securities, or the ability to issue default-risk-free debt.” We use the 
concept to mean financial flexibility that might ensure financial independence and long-term survival. 
603 In this analysis we categorize as ‘de novo’ a bank chartered after 1984, and as ‘established’ a bank 
chartered before 1984. Hunter and Srinivasan (1990) suggest that performance was most directly associated 
with factors within managerial control, such as lending policies, cost control effectiveness, and degree of 
bank capitalization. Further but was not necessarily associated with market structure or environmental 
conditions. 
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Table 5.2-C 
Financial Management Objectives of ‘De Novo’ and ‘Established’ Bank CEOs 
 Mean Scores of CEOs of: 
 De Novo- 
Banks  
Established-
Banks 
Achieve and maintain high debt ratings  2.8 4.3   
Achieve a capital structure similar to that of other banks  2.0 2.8 
Enhance or sustain financial flexibility. Ensure financial independence 
and survival  
 
4.3 
 
4.2 
Maximize the market price of bonds and stock 2.3 2.3 
Maximize the market share (in terms of net total assets) 2.5 2.4 
Maximize the Price Earnings Ratio  2.2 2.1 
Maximize the Return on Investment 3.4 3.8 
Maximize the Return on Equity  4.5 5.0 
Maximize the growth of earnings per share 3.6 3.3 
Maximize shareholders’ returns 4.5 4.2 
Maximize stock book value 2.7 2.9 
Maximize the book value of the bank’s net total assets 2.2 2.2 
Maximize cash flow per share 2.6 3.0 
Minimize the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy 3.3 3.4 
Minimize the bank’s cost of capital 4.3 3.7 
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided tests. 
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests.  66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
 
The evidence provided by our two subsamples seems consistent with the idea that 
profitability is a common concern to both de novo and established banks. The two cohorts 
of CEOs rate the objective of ROE and EPS growth rate maximization at similar levels. 
Differences in mean scores of de novo and established bank CEOs on the 
importance of credit ratings appear to be consistent with the classical argument that there 
are increasing returns to scale in such bond credit quality enhancement. This would 
presumably be more highly valued by CEOs of established banks as suggested by the 
significant difference in the importance assigned to bank reputation by the two cohorts of 
CEOs (see Table 5.5.4). On the other hand, financial flexibility and independence seems to 
be a relevant and shared concern for respondents in both groups.  
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Table 5.2-D 
Financial Management Objectives of ‘Listed’ and ‘Unlisted’ Bank CEOs 
 Mean Scores of CEOs of: 
 Listed  
Banks 
Unlisted 
Banks 
Achieve and maintain high debt ratings  4.6 3.166 
Achieve a capital structure similar to that of other banks  3.0 2.1  
Enhance or sustain financial flexibility. Ensure financial independence 
and survival  
 
4.6 
 
4.1 
Maximize the market price of bonds and stock 3.1 1.866 
Maximize the market share (in terms of net total assets) 2.9 2.2 
Maximize the Price Earnings Ratio  2.8 1.8   
Maximize the Return on Investment 3.9 3.4 
Maximize the Return on Equity  5.4 4.4  
Maximize the growth of earnings per share 4.1 3.1 
Maximize shareholders’ returns 4.8 4.0  
Maximize stock book value 2.9 2.7 
Maximize the book value of the bank’s net total assets 2.5 2.0 
Maximize cash flow per share 3.1 2.7 
Minimize the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy 3.9 2.9 
Minimize the bank’s cost of capital 3.8 4.1 
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided tests. 
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests.  66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
 
Splitting the sample by listed versus unlisted banks. The highest ranked objectives 
by CEOs of listed banks are the maximization of return on equity and maximizing 
shareholders wealth. For listed banks these scores are 5.4 and 4.4, respectively. Achieving 
and sustaining financial flexibility and achieving high bond credit ratings follow next in 
importance for CEOs of listed banks. CEOs of unlisted banks seem slightly more 
concerned with the cost of capital minimization than do their counterparts at listed banks. 
This result is inconsistent with the responses to question 13. There, CEOs of listed and 
unlisted banks showed similar levels of interest in bank costs of capital when compared to 
the industry average, mean scores of 3.4 and 3.3 for listed and unlisted banks respectively. 
A satisfactory explanation for this result was not found, although the evidence on both 
items failed to show statistical significance. 
Under the capital market discipline hypothesis we would expect CEOs of listed 
banks to be more concerned with minimizing of the risk of financial distress and 
bankruptcy than their unlisted counterparts. To test this hypothesis we conducted a one-
sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Witney rank sum test of the two independent samples. We obtained 
a p-value of about 4.2 percent (0.04199), which provides support for the hypothesis at the 5 
percent level of statistical significance. 
Splitting the sample by over-capitalized versus under-capitalized banks. As 
previously discussed (see Appendix 2.1 to chapter 2), a number of authors suggested that 
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an industry average leverage ratio can be rationalized as an appropriate proxy for a target 
capital structure. Thus, we hypothesize that the objectives of capital structure decision-
making by CEOs of banks with different leverage condition might as well be distinct. To 
test this proposition we used data from our banks’ financial statement database to compute 
banks average capital ratio during the tenure of each CEO included in our sample (see 
Appendix 5.3).604 We also calculated the average capital ratio for the sample of banks 
included in our database during the same time period, using it as a proxy for the target 
capital structure (see Appendix 5.3).605 Subsequently, we constructed binary variable 
classifying as ‘over capitalized’ the banks whose average capital ratio during the CEO 
tenure was higher than the industry’s average capital ratio during the same time period. We 
classified as ‘under capitalized’ those banks whose average capital ratio during the CEO 
tenure was lower than the industry’s average capital ratio.606 This partitioning of the 
sample allowed us to use simultaneously qualitative data gathered in our survey and 
quantitative data from banks financial statements. Table 5.2-E presents the results. 
Table 5.2-E 
Financial Management Objectives of ‘Over’ and ‘Under Capitalized’ Bank CEOs 
 Mean Scores of CEOs of: 
 Over-
Capitalized 
Banks 
Under-
Capitalized 
Banks 
Achieve and maintain high debt ratings  3.1 4.2  
Achieve a capital structure similar to that of other banks  2.1 2.9  
Enhance or sustain financial flexibility. Ensure financial independence 
and survival  
 
4.0 
 
4.6 
Maximize the market price of bonds and stock 2.1 2.5 
Maximize the market share (in terms of net total assets) 2.2 2.7 
Maximize the Price Earnings Ratio  1.9 2.5 
Maximize the Return on Investment 3.2 4.1  
Maximize the Return on Equity  4.5 5.1 
Maximize the growth of earnings per share 3.0 4.0 
Maximize shareholders’ returns 4.1 4.6 
Maximize stock book value 2.2 3.5   
Maximize the book value of the bank’s net total assets 1.8 2.7  
Maximize cash flow per share 2.3 3.56 
Minimize the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy 3.0 3.7 
Minimize the bank’s cost of capital 3.7 4.3 
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided tests. 
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests.  66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
 
                                                 
604 We computed weighted (by deflated net total assets) average of capital ratios. 
605 The industry average capital ratio calculation was weighted by the deflated value of net total assets.  
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Evidence shows that the significant differences in financial management objectives 
of ‘over’ and ‘under capitalized’ bank CEOs relate to debt ratings, capital structure 
benchmarking and the maximization of return on investment, stock book value, book value 
of assets and cash flow per share. In all these categories mean scores of CEOs of ‘under 
capitalized’ banks are higher that those of their ‘over capitalized’ counterparts. Results are 
interpreted as consistent with the hypothesis that CEOs of under capitalized banks should 
be more concerned with the disciplinary role of debt. Consequently, we expected that 
group of CEOs as being influenced by variables that relate to capital structure valuation, 
such as credit ratings and comparisons to industry average capital ratio.  
Capital Structure Policy Models. Banks’ capital structure policies can follow 
several alternative models. In question 3 we queried CEOs about their preferred models of 
defining capital structure policy, and attempted to uncover a valid description of capital 
structure policy design for CEOs of Portuguese banks. Miller’s (1977) ’neutral mutation’ 
hypothesis suggests that firms may develop financing habits that tend to “follow the 
lines of least resistance as well as least damage” (Kamath 1997, 335-
6). Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) suggest that the nature of corporate capital 
structure decisions is dynamic rather than static. They point to wide variations in observed 
financing behavior, which might be related to factors such as the current position in the 
firm’s life cycle (e.g., Fluck 1999b), and the firm’s governance structure (e.g., Berger, 
Ofek, and Yermack 1997). CEOs who indicated a preference for defining and maintaining 
a target capital structure were further asked how that target was devised. Alternatives 
included the adoption of the industry’s average capital ratio, the use of a cost-benefit 
analysis of alternative long-term financing strategies, and benchmarking the capital 
structures of competitors.607 These alternatives sort themselves into two capital structure 
approaches  pro-active and reactive, respectively  and may be viewed as competing 
hypotheses worth testing. The results are presented in Table 5.3.1. 
                                                 
606 To implement this procedure we have to use qualitative data gathered in our survey and quantitative data 
from our banks’ financial statements database. 
607 Industry average leverage ratios were suggested as surrogates for firms’ target capital structure by Bowen, 
Daley and Huber (1982), among others. 
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Table 5.3.1 
Prevailing Intention in the Bank’s Strategic Financing Decision-Making 
[unit: percent] 
Follow a previously defined set of guidelines on financing policy  31.4 
Achieve and adhere to a definite target for capital structure 5.9 
Reach an optimal capital structure by comparison of, both, economic costs and 
benefits  
 
39.2 
Keep to the financing pattern historically followed by the bank 2.0 
Follow a pre-determined hierarchy in exhausting the available strategic financing 
sources 
 
21.6 
 
We obtained usable answers to this question from all the CEOs. Overall, 39.2 
percent of the CEOs indicated their preference for a proactive optimal capital structure 
policy. Implementing a previously defined set of guidelines on financing policy was the 
choice of 31.4 percent of the CEOs, whereas, the previously discussed “pecking order” of 
financing was chosen by 21.6 percent of the sampled CEOs. The evidence gathered from 
respondents show that pursuing a reactive industry or competitor target capital structure is 
not a favored policy. Likewise, Miller’s (1977) neutral mutations (i.e., keep the historical 
pattern of financing) hypothesis was indicated by only a miniscule 2 percent of the 
respondents and therefore was disregarded. The evidence suggests that those CEOs who 
follow an optimal capital structure policy seem to prefer a pro-active approach rather than 
a passive one. 
CEOs who selected the “achieve and adhere to a definite target for capital 
structure” option on question 3 were subsequently asked to indicate how their banks’ 
capital structure policies had been defined and the sources of eventual departures from it.  
As pointed out earlier, only 5.9 percent of the respondents (i.e., three CEOs) chose this 
model of capital structure policy. Two of those CEOs selected the option “by means of a 
cost/benefit analysis of alternative financing strategies” to answer question 3.1, and 
“change in the bank’s growth opportunities portfolio” and “a change in [the bank´s] return 
on equity” in responding to question 3.1.1. The other CEO picked “by adopting the 
average financial leverage ratio of the industry” and “change in [the bank’s] return on 
equity” to answer the same questions. 
CEOs that choose “follow[ing] a pre-determined hierarchy in exhausting the 
available financing sources” in question 3 were subsequently asked to spell out that 
hierarchy. Only eleven CEOs did so, and the results (see Table 5.3.2) are contradictory to 
our expectations. 
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Table 5.3.2 
Priority in Exhausting Financing Sources 
[unit: percent] 
Common stock 5.8 
Preferred stock  4.3 
Convertible preferred stock 4.1 
Convertible debt  1.3 
Subordinated debt 5.3 
Straight bonds  3.1 
Retained earnings 4.7 
Participating bonds 1.0 
 
 Using the pecking order theory we would expect retained earnings to be the first 
financing source to be used, followed by the different types of debt instruments. Equity 
capital would be used only as a last resort. The survey results, however, suggest that 
common stock is most favored. Several factors could explain this apparent anomaly. We 
believe that the differences in the informational setting and the governance structure of the 
Portuguese banks run by the surveyed CEOs and the set of assumptions underlying the 
theory are helpful in understanding these results.608  
The sixteen CEOs that in question 3 chose to “follow a previously defined set of 
guidelines on financing policy” were subsequently asked to identify the origin of the 
guidelines that framed their bank’s capital structure policies (see Table 5.3.3).  
Table 5.3.3 
Origin of the Guidelines on Financing Policy 
[unit: percent] 
Proposal from the bank’s financial management  6.3 
Decision of the shareholders general meeting (or equivalent) 43.8 
Board of directors’ deliberation (or similar) 43.8 
Other 6.3 
 
The results show that the “decision of the shareholders general meeting (or 
equivalent)” and “board of directors’ deliberation (or similar)” were the most (and equally) 
important sources of capital structure policy definition. This picture changed significantly 
when we looked at the responses of state-owned and privately-owned bank CEOs. In these 
instances, 55.6 percent of CEOs of state-owned banks indicated that the decision of the 
shareholders general meeting was the main source of capital structure guidance. Board of 
                                                 
 
608 An illustration of our argument is provided by the acknowledgement that, in a sample of 20 equity public 
offerings of Portuguese banks during the 1995-1998 period, we systematically find a rights offer component 
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director deliberation was mentioned in 33.3 percent of the responses. Corresponding 
percentages for the CEOs of privately-owned banks were 28.6 percent and 57.1 percent, 
respectively. State-owned banks could be expected to take their orders from meetings with 
their shareholders, while privately-owned banks would be more likely to formulate capital 
structure policies in board meetings. 
We can conjecture that preferences towards different models of capital structure 
policy may reflect differences in bank ownership; therefore we hypothesize that the 
responses of CEOs of state-owned and privately-owned banks might differentiate 
themselves in this respect. 
Table 5.3.4 
Prevailing Intention in Banks’ Strategic Financing Decision-Making 
CEOs of ‘State-Owned’ and ‘Privately-Owned’ Banks 
[unit: percent] 
 CEOs of:  
 State-Owned 
Banks 
Privately-
Owned Banks 
Follow a previously defined set of guidelines on financing policy  60.0 19.466 
Achieve and adhere to a definite target for capital structure 13.3 2.8 
Reach an optimal capital structure by comparison of, both, economic costs 
and benefits  
 
13.3 
 
50.06 
Keep to the financing pattern historically followed by the bank 0.0 2.8 
Follow a pre-determined hierarchy in exhausting the available strategic 
financing sources 
 
13.3 
 
25.0 
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided tests. 
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests.  66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
 
We interpret this result as a consequence of having in our sample CEOs of state 
owned banks who are likely to be more concerned with institutional discipline than would 
be true of the CEOs of privately-owned banks and listed-banks. This latter group of CEOs 
is more likely to be subject to the disciplinary role of financial markets, as emphasized in 
the agency literature. Thus, it could be conjectured that capital structure decision-making 
within the privately-owned, publicly-traded banks is better aligned with the interests of 
their residual claimholders. 
External Determinants on Bank Capital Structure Decisions. Both internal and 
external factors are, arguably, influential in capital structure decision-making. Question 4 
asked CEOs to appraise the influence of such factors on a scale from 1 (least important) to 
6 (most important) as they impact on capital structure decisions. Categories included in 
                                                 
 
or other feature (such as, conversion of convertible bonds) providing a similar effect in curtailing the 
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these two questions represent concepts and hypothesis that are frequently submitted to 
empirical testing in the capital structure literature (as discussed in Chapter 2). Moreover, 
the evidence amassed in some of those categories provides data for testing associations 
with other responses obtained from survey questions. Results are presented in Tables 5.4-
A, 5.4-B, 5.4-C, and 5.5-D. 
Table 5.4-A 
Influence of External Factors on the Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
 Mean Scores 
Possibility of a takeover bid 1.8 
Change in the ratio of public deficit to gross domestic product  1.5 
Changes in the regulation and supervision framework  4.3 
Private consumption behavior 1.6 
Currency market behavior  1.5 
Capital market performance 3.3 
World economy performance 1.8 
National economy performance  2.9 
Political instability 2.3 
Change in the dynamics of credit demand 3.1 
Change in firms’ and investors’ income taxation 2.8 
Legal restrictions on share repurchases 1.8 
Interest rate changes 2.6 
 
The results, overall, show that changes in a bank’s regulatory and supervisory 
framework are a relevant factor in capital structure decision-making (mean score: 4.2). 
Capital market performance is seen by CEOs as less important (mean score: 3.3) in such 
decisions. Responses on the importance of changes in the dynamic of loan demand as they 
relate to capital structure choice were, on average, rated at 3.0, a weak influence on banks’ 
capital structure decisions. Interestingly, takeover threats are not perceived as a meaningful 
corporate control disciplinary device (average score: 1.8). Both results are in line with 
academic literature, which maintains that regulatory intervention in the banking industry 
may be an effective (if imperfect) substitute for the discipline of both the capital market 
and the market of lending and deposits.609 Additionally, regulatory restrictions on takeover 
activity in banking may account for the CEOs lack of concern about takeover threats (e.g., 
Prowse 1997). This conclusion is also reaffirmed when the sample is divided into CEOs of 
state-owned banks and CEOs of privately-owned banks (see Table 5.4.2).  
                                                 
potential adverse selection effects of the issue. 
609 See chapter 3 for further discussion. 
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Another interesting piece of evidence relates to CEOs views on share repurchases 
restrictions. These are clearly viewed as unimportant, despite the conventional wisdom and 
recent anecdotal evidence on such capital structure activity in the Portuguese banking 
market.610 Changes in macroeconomic and institutional environmental factors included in 
question 4, such as the ratio of public deficit to gross domestic product, private 
consumption behavior, economic performance (domestically and internationally), and 
changes in tax laws (at the bank and investor level), are seen as largely irrelevant to bank’ 
capital structure decisions. The same applies to the remaining enumerated external factors. 
Table 5.4-B 
Influence of External Factors on the Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
 Mean Scores of CEOs of:  
 State-Owned 
Banks 
Privately-
Owned Banks 
Possibility of a takeover bid 1.0 2.166 
Change in the ratio of public deficit to gross domestic product  1.7 1.4 
Changes in the regulation and supervision framework  3.7 4.5 
Private consumption behavior 1.1 1.9   
Currency market behavior  1.0 1.666 
Capital market performance 2.2 3.866 
World economy performance 1.4 2.0   
National economy performance  2.3 3.2  
Political instability 1.8 2.4 
Change in the dynamics of credit demand 2.8 3.2 
Change in firms’ and investors’ income taxation 1.9 3.16 
Legal restrictions on share repurchases 1.0 2.166 
Interest rate changes 1.7 2.966 
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided tests. 
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests.  66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
  
Not surprisingly, CEOs of privately-owned banks showed more concern with the 
influence of capital market performance than the CEOs of state-owned banks, and this 
difference is statistically significant (see legend of Table 5.4-B).611 Overall, CEOs of both 
state-owned banks and privately-owned banks do appear to be not very preoccupied with 
threats of hostile takeover bids. However, the latter group is less unconcerned and this 
difference is also statistically significant (see legend of Table 5.4.2). We interpret this 
result as a consequence of the regulatory intervention in corporate control transactions.612  
                                                 
610 During 1999 in the aftermath of the obliteration of the strategic partnership with Banco Central Hispano, 
BCP bought back a stake of its equity capital higher than the 10 percent limit. Later, part of that stake was 
ultimately placed with other strategic partners. See Banco Comercial Português Annual Report 1999, p.15, 
138. 
611 Statistical testing was performed using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.  
612 See chapter 3 for further details. 
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The examination of the responses of CEOs of listed and unlisted banks provides 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that those CEOs see differently the influence of capital 
market performance on bank capital structure decisions. This is consistent with the 
conventional wisdom that CEOs of listed banks are naturally more preoccupied with their 
stock price movements than unlisted counterparts (see Table 5.4-C). In contrast, we cannot 
find a reasonable explanation for listed and unlisted CEOs perceiving differently the 
effects of changes in currency markets and world economic performance on banks capital 
structure decisions. 
Table 5.4-C 
Influence of External Factors on the Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
 Mean Scores of CEOs of:  
 Listed Banks Unlisted 
Banks 
Possibility of a takeover bid 2.3 1.5 
Change in the ratio of public deficit to gross domestic product  1.6 1.4 
Changes in the regulation and supervision framework  4.1 4.4 
Private consumption behavior 1.7 1.6 
Currency market behavior  1.8 1.366 
Capital market performance 4.1 2.8   
World economy performance 2.2 1.6  
National economy performance  3.3 2.8 
Political instability 2.5 2.1 
Change in the dynamics of credit demand 3.2 3.0 
Change in firms’ and investors’ income taxation 3.3 2.5 
Legal restrictions on share repurchases 2.3 1.5 
Interest rate changes 2.2 2.8 
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided tests. 
6 ignificant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests.  66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. S
. 
 
Are there differences in how external factors affect CEOs of de novo and 
established banks in terms of capital structure decisions? To find out, we partitioned our 
sample by ‘de novo’ and ‘established’ banks. Table 5.4-D tabulates the survey results. 
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Table 5.4-D 
Influence of External Factors on the Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
 Mean Scores of CEOs of:  
 De Novo 
Banks 
Established 
Banks 
Possibility of a takeover bid 2.0 1.7 
Change in the ratio of public deficit to gross domestic product  1.4 1.6 
Changes in the regulation and supervision framework  4.6 4.0 
Private consumption behavior 1.9 1.4 
Currency market behavior  1.5 1.4 
Capital market performance 3.3 3.3 
World economy performance 1.8 1.8 
National economy performance  3.1 2.8 
Political instability 2.3 2.2 
Change in the dynamics of credit demand 3.0 3.1 
Change in firms’ and investors’ income taxation 3.0 2.6 
Legal restrictions on share repurchases 1.9 1.7 
Interest rate changes 3.2 2.06 
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided tests. 
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests.  66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
 
The only statistically significant (p-value: 0.0368) difference between relates to 
their perceptions in respect with the impact of interest rate changes on debt/equity 
decision-making, which is seen as unimportant by established banks CEOs (mean score 
2.0) or trivial by CEOs of de novo banks. 
 Although we did not hypothesized any relationship between the leverage condition 
of banks  over- or under-capitalized in relation to the industry average capital ratio  
and the perceptions of their CEOs about the potential effect of exogenous factors on capital 
structure policy, we conducted Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. These failed to reveal any 
statistical significance at the 5 percent level in two-sided tests. Thus, we are not presenting 
here those results. 
Importance of Capital Market Development Capital Structure Decisions. Financial 
markets in capitalistic countries play an important role in allocating resources. The 
importance varies, however, according to the prevailing national governance system. Table 
5.4.1 documents the results. 
Table 5.4.1 
Relevance of Capital Market Development on Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
[unit: percent] 
Totally irrelevant 9.8 
Largely irrelevant 5.9 
Somewhat irrelevant 7.8 
Somewhat relevant 13.7 
Largely relevant 51.0 
Totally relevant 11.8 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 0.0 
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 As expected, the majority (76.5 percent)613 of the surveyed CEOs indicated that 
capital market level of development was “totally relevant”, “largely relevant” or 
“somewhat relevant” to their capital structure decisions. This result is consistent with 
empirical evidence earlier developed for non-banking firms (e.g., Demirguç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1996). We might have expected this result to be even more robust had our 
sample not included CEOs of government-owned banks for whom capital market 
influences would, arguably, matter less (see Table 5.4.1.1). 
Table 5.4.1.1 
Relevance of Capital Market Development on Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
[unit: percent] 
 CEOs of: 
 State-Owned 
Banks 
Privately-
Owned Banks 
Totally irrelevant 26.7 2.8 
Largely irrelevant 13.3 2.8 
Somewhat irrelevant 13.3 5.6 
Somewhat relevant 26.7 8.3 
Largely relevant 20.0 63.9 
Totally relevant 0.0 16.7 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 0,0 0,0 
 
A one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of independence of mean scores failed 
to detect statistical significance (p-value: 0.0561). A similar result was found when we 
compared the mean scores for listed and unlisted banks (p-value: 0.113). 
Share Repurchases Restrictions on Bank Capital Structure Decisions. As is 
abundantly clear in the corporate finance literature, enforcing statutory restrictions on stock 
repurchase transactions is likely to exacerbate the free cash flow problem, particularly 
among mature banks with excess cash flow.614 Shareholders may be deprived the use of an 
effective mechanism to promote the alignment between insiders’ and outsiders’ objective 
functions. Restrictions on share repurchase could be detrimental to maximizing economic 
value for two additional reasons. First, buying back shares increases insider ownership and 
                                                 
613 A Z-test of a proportion reveals a value statistically above 0.5 at any reasonable level of significance (p-
value: 0.00027). 
 
614 The importance of this public policy issue may be illustrated with case of Japanese authorities that after a 
long period of share repurchase transactions decided in 1995 legalized such transactions. For a rigorous legal 
examination of share repurchase transactions in Portugal and in some continental European regimes see 
Rocha (1994). 
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therefore contributes to a reduction in the agency costs associated with lax managerial 
effort and the excessive use of perquisites. Second, it has already been pointed out that 
share repurchases are an effective instrument in adjusting towards a bank’s optimal capital 
structure. Table 5.4.2.1-A presents the results. 
Table 5.4.2.1-A 
Importance of on Share Repurchases Restrictions on Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
[unit: percent] 
Totally irrelevant 29.4 
Largely irrelevant 17.6 
Somewhat irrelevant 25.5 
Somewhat relevant 25.5 
Largely relevant 0.0 
Totally relevant 0.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 2.0 
 
For a majority (72.5 percent)615 of the respondents, the presence of a share 
repurchase limit was considered irrelevant for capital structure decisions. This result is 
statistically significant (p-value: 0.0021) at any reasonable level of significance. To further 
explore this result, we constructed Table 5.4.2.1-B to separate the responses of CEOs of 
both state-owned banks and privately-owned banks. A first observation reveals a different 
pattern of response. 
Table 5.4.2.1-B 
Importance of on Share Repurchases Restrictions on Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
[unit: percent] 
 CEOs of: 
 State-Owned 
Banks 
Privately-
Owned Banks 
Totally irrelevant 46.7 22.2 
Largely irrelevant 0.0 25.0 
Somewhat irrelevant 40.0 19.4 
Somewhat relevant 6.7 33.3 
Largely relevant 0.0 0.0 
Totally relevant 0.0 0.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 6.7 0.0 
 
Table 5.4.2.1-B shows that CEOs of privately-owned banks CEOs are less 
unanimous about the relative importance of legal restrictions on share repurchases as it 
impacts capital structure decisions. Only two thirds of them (compared to 86.7 percent of 
state-owned bank CEOs) indicate it as irrelevant. It is noteworthy that one third of 
                                                 
615 The aggregate frequencies of ‘totally irrelevant’, ‘largely irrelevant’, and ‘somewhat irrelevant’ responses. 
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privately-owned bank’s CEOs consider legal restrictions on share repurchase to be at least 
somewhat relevant.  
Internal Determinants on Bank Capital Structure Decisions. Question number 5 
queried bank CEOs about the degree of importance they ascribe to a number of internal 
factors that might impact capital structure decisions (see Table 5.5-A).  
Table 5.5-A 
Influence of Internal Factors on the Bank’s Capital Structure Decisions 
 Mean Scores 
Get the bank’s shares listed 3.3 
Ownership structure and managerial control  4.6 
Tax economies related to factors other than debt financing 2.4 
Size of free cash flow 2.1 
Earnings per share (avoid earnings dilution) 2.6 
Historical performance of bank’s shares 2.2 
Dividend policy 3.1 
Investment policy / Growth opportunities 4.0 
Financing viability of strategic objectives 3.7 
Assets’ risk 3.2 
Tax economies associated with debt financing 3.0 
Correct mispricing  in past security issues 2.0 
Issuing costs 1.9 
Bank size 3.3 
Avoid mispricing  in future security issues 1.8 
Covenants in debt financing contracts 1.6 
Rates of taxation on investors’ income 1.9 
Risk and costs of financial distress and insolvency 2.2 
Managerial expectations for bank’s future performance 3.4 
Restructuring of bank’s asset portfolio 2.6 
Bank’s reputation 3.8 
Changes in bank’s level of profitability 2.8 
 
An examination of the overall results show that for survey participants, the most 
important internal factor for banks’ capital structure decisions (with a mean score higher 
than 4) is ownership structure and managerial control. The internal factors regarded as least 
important (with a mean score lower than 2) are, the impact of covenants in debt financing 
contracts, the avoidance of future security issue mispricing, and minimizing floating costs. 
This evidence suggests that the sample’s CEOs are preoccupied with the influence of the 
incentives associated with their banks’ governance arrangements in capital structure 
decision-making, and less concerned with security design and transaction costs of security 
issuance. The CEOs’ relative indifference (mean scores >3 and <4) towards the role of 
bank size, investment policy and growth, reputation, financial slack, managerial 
expectations, dividend policy, business risk, and debt financing tax-shields are also 
noteworthy. 
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Table 5.5-B 
Influence of Internal Factors on the Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
 Mean Scores of CEOs of:  
 State-Owned 
Banks 
Privately-
Owned Banks 
Get the bank’s shares listed 2.9 3.4 
Ownership structure and managerial control  4.1 4.9 
Tax economies related to factors other than debt financing 1.9 2.6 
Size of free cash flow 2.0 2.1 
Earnings per share (avoid earnings dilution) 2.2 2.8 
Historical performance of bank’s shares 1.1 2.666 
Dividend policy 3.5 3.0 
Investment policy / Growth opportunities 3.5 4.2 
Financing viability of strategic objectives 3.0 4.0 
Assets’ risk 3.7 3.0 
Tax economies associated with debt financing 2.7 3.1 
Correct mispricing  in past security issues 1.4 2.3  
Issuing costs 1.1 2.266 
Bank size 3.4 3.3 
Avoid mispricing  in future security issues 1.1 2.1   
Covenants in debt financing contracts 1.0 1.86 
Rates of taxation on investors’ income 1.7 1.9 
Risk and costs of financial distress and insolvency 1.9 2.3 
Managerial expectations for bank’s future performance 3.8 3.2 
Restructuring of bank’s asset portfolio 1.9 2.96 
Bank’s reputation 4.1 3.7 
Changes in bank’s level of profitability 2.5 2.9 
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided test  s.
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests. 66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
 
There were some significant differences between state-owned and privately-owned 
banks with respect to perceptions of the influence of internal factors on bank capital 
structure decisions. CEOs of privately-owned banks were more concerned with (1) the 
historical performance of their banks’ share price; (2) floating costs; (3) the inclusion of 
covenants in debt financing contracts; (4) correcting mispricing in past security issues; (5) 
avoiding mispricing in future issues; and (6) the restructuring of bank assets’ portfolio. 
Nonetheless, while the differences between state and privately-owned banks were 
statistically different, all of these internal factors were deemed as relatively unimportant 
for capital structure decisions by both categories of Portuguese banks.  
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Table 5.5-C 
Influence of Internal Factors on the Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
 Mean Scores of CEOs of: 
 Listed Banks Unlisted 
Banks 
Get the bank’s shares listed 4,6 2,466 
Ownership structure and managerial control  5,0 4,4 
Tax economies related to factors other than debt financing 3,0 2,06 
Size of free cash flow 2,6 1,8  
Earnings per share (avoid earnings dilution) 3,4 2,2   
Historical performance of bank’s shares 2,6 1,96 
Dividend policy 3,2 3,1 
Investment policy / Growth opportunities 4,2 3,8 
Financing viability of strategic objectives 4,4 3,3 
Assets’ risk 3,5 3,0 
Tax economies associated with debt financing 3,7 2,566 
Correct mispricing  in past security issues 2,6 1,76 
Issuing costs 2,2 1,7 
Bank size 3,6 3,2 
Avoid mispricing  in future security issues 2,3 1,6 
Covenants in debt financing contracts 2,2 1,26 
Rates of taxation on investors’ income 2,5 1,5  
Risk and costs of financial distress and insolvency 2,6 1,9 
Managerial expectations for bank’s future performance 3,6 3,3 
Restructuring of bank’s asset portfolio 3,1 2,4 
Bank’s reputation 4,6 3,46 
Changes in bank’s level of profitability 3,8 2,366 
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided test  s.
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests. 66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
  
The analysis of Table 5.5-C leads us to conclude that being the CEO of a listed 
bank is the most relevant discriminating criterion in evaluating the effects of internal 
factors on capital structure decisions. We found statistically significant differences in: (1) 
banks’ listing; (2) debt financing tax-shields; (3) correcting past security’s mispricings; (4) 
investors’ income tax rates; (5) changes in banks’ profitability and reputation; (6) 
covenants in debt financing contracts; (7) historical performance of banks’ stock prices; 
and (8) avoiding earnings per share dilution. These findings are consistent with the 
conventional wisdom that the objective function of privately-owned firms is more 
influenced by market discipline when compared to state-owned firms.  
 We attempted to uncover statistically significant relations between CEOs of ‘de 
novo’ and ‘established’ banks with respect to the presumable influence of banks’ 
endogenous factors on their capital structure policy (Table 5.5-D). 
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Table 5.5-D 
Influence of Internal Factors on the Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
 Mean Scores of CEOs of:  
 De Novo 
Banks 
Established 
Banks 
Get the bank’s shares listed 2.8 3.6 
Ownership structure and managerial control  4.8 4.5 
Tax economies related to factors other than debt financing 2.3 2.5 
Size of free cash flow 1.9 2.3 
Earnings per share (avoid earnings dilution) 2.5 2.7 
Historical performance of bank’s shares 2.0 2.3 
Dividend policy 2.8 3.4 
Investment policy / Growth opportunities 3.8 4.1 
Financing viability of strategic objectives 3.9 3.6 
Assets’ risk 2.8 3.66 
Tax economies associated with debt financing 2.8 3.1 
Correct mispricing  in past security issues 2.0 2.0 
Issuing costs 1.8 1.9 
Bank size 3.3 3.4 
Avoid mispricing  in future security issues 1.8 1.9 
Covenants in debt financing contracts 1.3 1.8 
Rates of taxation on investors’ income 1.5 2.2 
Risk and costs of financial distress and insolvency 1.9 2.4 
Managerial expectations for bank’s future performance 3.1 3.6 
Restructuring of bank’s asset portfolio 2.4 2.9 
Bank’s reputation 3.5 4.26 
Changes in bank’s level of profitability 2.7 3.0 
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided test  s.
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests. 66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
 
CEOs of ‘established’ banks seemed more concerned with the potential influence of 
bank reputation on capital structure decision-making and the difference is significant at the 
5 percent level for a two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (p-value: 0.0500). This result 
suggests, as discussed in Chapter 3, that managers of higher franchise value banks might 
adopt low risk-taking policies in an attempt to prevent losing some (or all) franchise value. 
This kind of risk averse behavior seems more unlikely among managers of ‘de novo’ banks 
since they typically pursue more aggressive growth strategies, at least in the early stages of 
their banks’ life cycles.616 For CEOs of these banks, asset risk appears to be less important 
than for their ‘established’ banks counterparts (p-value: 0.0423). This evidence is 
consistent with our previous argument. 
                                                 
616 Empirical findings by DeYoung and Hasan (1998) indicate that in a large sample of U.S. commercial 
banks, asset growth rates for banks with less than 14 years (‘de novo’ banks) and with more than 14 years 
(‘established’ banks) were estimated at 21.5 percent and 6.6 percent, respectively. ‘De novo’ banks mean is 
statistically larger than the established banks mean at the 1 percent significance level.  
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Table 5.5-E presents the results on the influence of endogenous factors on banks’ 
capital structure decisions. The partitioning of the sample was made using the same binary 
variable  ‘over-capitalized’, ‘under-capitalized’ banks  constructed as we explained 
earlier in this chapter. 
Table 5.5-E 
Influence of Internal Factors on the Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
 Mean Scores of CEOs of:  
 Over-
Capitalized 
Banks 
Under-
Capitalized 
Banks 
Get the bank’s shares listed 2.8 3.9 
Ownership structure and managerial control  4.7 4.6 
Tax economies related to factors other than debt financing 2.2 2.7 
Size of free cash flow 1.6 2.76 
Earnings per share (avoid earnings dilution) 2.5 2.8 
Historical performance of bank’s shares 2.1 2.3 
Dividend policy 3.1 3.2 
Investment policy / Growth opportunities 3.8 4.2 
Financing viability of strategic objectives 3.2 4.4  
Assets’ risk 2.7 3.9   
Tax economies associated with debt financing 2.6 3.3  
Correct mispricing  in past security issues 1.5 2.7   
Issuing costs 1.7 2.0 
Bank size 2.8 3.9  
Avoid mispricing  in future security issues 1.4 2.46 
Covenants in debt financing contracts 1.2 2.06 
Rates of taxation on investors’ income 1.6 2.2 
Risk and costs of financial distress and insolvency 1.7 2.7 
Managerial expectations for bank’s future performance 3.2 3.6 
Restructuring of bank’s asset portfolio 2.2 3.26 
Bank’s reputation 3.4 4.36 
Changes in bank’s level of profitability 2.2 3.6   
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided test  s.
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests. 66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
 
The mean scores whose differences between the two groups of CEOs were found 
statistically significant include: financing viability of strategic objectives, covenants in 
debt contracts, changes in profitability, reputation in product markets, size of free cash 
flow, bank size, asset risk, restructuring of asset portfolio, and security mispricings. 
Although varying in their relative importance (between the two cohorts of CEOs), we 
conclude that the theoretical determinants of firm value  cash flow stream and risk-
adjusted cost of capital  are relevant considerations for capital structure decision-
making. 
Agency Problems. Agency problems arising in the equityholders – managers’ 
contractual relationships are an important consideration in defining and adjusting a capital 
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structure. Questions 6 and 7 address disparate incentives among managers, owners and 
debtholders over managerial decision-making and bank policies. Question 6 deals with one 
such problem  the free cash flow hypothesis  which was first identified by Michael 
Jensen in 1986 (see also Stulz 1990). As earlier discussed (see Chapters 2 and 3), in certain 
instances managers may behave with self-interest and increase their utility (wealth) to the 
detriment of equityholders by overinvesting firms’ free cash flow rather than paying it out 
to owners. The free cash flow theory predicts greater agency costs for diffusely held and 
publicly traded firms that experience overinvestment problems as a result of managerial 
discretion over firm’s free cash flow. These agency costs, arguably, do play a role in 
capital structure policy.617 According to the theory, firms with large free cash flow should, 
ceteris paribus, return excess cash to owners either through share repurchases or specially 
designated dividends. These cash disbursements may be seen as a substitute for stock 
buybacks (Gombola and Liu 1999). An alternative mechanism for reducing this agency 
problem is to leverage up the capital structure, thus soaking up the extra cash in debt 
service payments. If free cash flow is large and repurchase of shares, designated dividends, 
or high debt financing were employed, then we would interpret the circumstances as 
indicating the presence of overinvestment agency costs. 
Table 5.6.1 
Capital Structure Decisions under Large Free Cash Flow 
[unit: percent] 
Anticipated debt repayment  25.5 
Share repurchase 12.7 
New issue of stock 1.8 
New issue of debt 0.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 41.8 
Other 18.2 
 
The results of this question must be viewed in the proper context. First, the 
percentage of CEOs who were either not sure about the answer, had no opinion or 
preferred not to answer, was the largest in the survey results (at 41.8 percent). Second, 
although theory dictates that managers of banks experiencing large free cash flows (FCF) 
should return it to owners, the Portuguese bank context has at least two important 
constraints. First, as previously noted, Portugal enforces a 10 percent (of equity) 
                                                 
617 In this context managers are assume to have negligible ownership holdings. 
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mandatory limit on share repurchases. Second, equity capital of most Portuguese banks is 
not widely held therefore a separation between management and of ownership is usually 
absent. These idiosyncratic features of Portuguese banking undermine the usefulness of the 
data from the two following (sub)questions, not to mention the fact that the majority of 
those surveyed CEOs did not provide usable answers. Results are presented in Tables 5.6.2 
and 5.6.3. 
Table 5.6.2 
Bank’s Ownership Structure under Large Free Cash Flow and New Debt Issuance 
[unit: percent] 
Diffuse, but with major shareholder(s) and limited managerial ownership 11.8 
Diffuse, but with major shareholders(s) and significant managerial ownership 0.0 
Diffuse, no major shareholder(s) and limited managerial ownership 0.0 
Diffuse, no major shareholder(s) and significant managerial ownership 0.0 
Concentrated and limited managerial ownership 11.8 
Concentrated and significant managerial ownership  2.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 60.8 
Other 13.7 
 
Table 5.6.3 
Managerial Behavior under Diffuse Ownership and Large Free Cash Flow and New Debt Issuance 
[unit: percent] 
Propensity for managers to adopt projects with a high risk-return profile 13.0 
Re-equilibrium of managerial engagement-compensation relationship  33.0 
Discretionary fruition of perquisites inherent to the function in office 34.0 
Other 58.1 
 
Impact of Financial Leverage on Investment Policy. Owners may have an incentive 
to transfer wealth to themselves at debtholders expense by taking on excess risk via a 
highly leveraged capital structure. To test this hypothesis, we need to obtain a statistically 
significant proportion of CEOs responding that higher leverage should increase the 
propensity for adopting higher risk-return projects. Question 7.1 addresses this topic and 
Table 5.7.1-A tabulates the responses. 
Table 5.7.1-A 
Impact of Financial Leverage on Investment Policy 
[unit: percent] 
Increased the propensity for adopting higher risk-return projects 0.0 
Increased the propensity for adopting lower risk-return projects 24.0 
No influence 50.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 20.0 
Other 6.0 
 
Half of survey participants viewed the impact of increased financial leverage on 
banks’ investment policy as inconsequential, while 20 percent were unsure or unwilling to 
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answer the question. However, none of the CEOs indicated that financial leverage would 
increase the propensity for undertaking higher risk projects. Twenty four percent indicated 
a preference for undertaking low risk projects in the face of high leverage, suggesting some 
degree of managerial risk aversion. We conclude for the absence of empirical support for 
the hypothesis. 
To search for potential differences between state-owned and privately-owned bank 
CEOs with built Table 5.7.1-B. 
Table 5.7.1-B 
Impact of Financial Leverage in Investment Policy 
[unit: percent] 
 CEOs of:  
 State-Owned 
Banks 
Privately-
Owned Banks 
Increased the propensity for adopting higher risk-return projects 0.0 0.0 
Increased the propensity for adopting lower risk-return projects 14.3 28.6 
No influence 71.4 40.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 14.3 22.9 
Other 0.0 8.6 
 
On average, CEOs of state-owned banks were much less preoccupied with the risks 
of highly leveraged capital structures and more willing to answer this question. They also 
exhibited greater agreement about the “No influence” category (71.4 percent) and were 
therefore more likely to be unconstrained in their growth strategies even when highly 
leveraged. 
Influence of Financial Distress upon Investment Policy. In financial distress 
situations it has been shown that inefficient investment policies may be undertaken. 
Owners are likely to perceive that debtholders may benefit from positive NPV investment 
projects and consequently they may underinvest. To test this hypothesis, we need to obtain 
a statistically significant proportion of CEOs responding that in financial distress new 
stock would not be issued to fund value-enhancing projects. Question 7.2 explores this 
area. Results are included in Table 5.7.2. 
Table 5.7.2 
Influence of Financial Distress upon Investment Policy 
[unit: percent] 
Induced new stock issues to fund enhancing-value projects 26.0 
Did not induce new stock issues to fund generating enhancing-value projects 6.0 
No influence 34.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 20.0 
Other 14.0 
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 A majority of 54 percent considered that a financial distress situation has no 
influence on investment policy (34 percent), or did not provide a usable answer (20 
percent). The number of CEOs indicating that they would not underinvest is 6 percent. 
Thus, the proposition failed to be supported by the evidence.  
Pattern of Debt Issuance. Question 8 queries CEOs about the characterization of 
the pattern of debt issuance followed during their tenure. Underlying this question is the 
observation that one way to leverage-up a bank’s capital structure is through sequential 
debt offerings.  However, under the assumption that debt contracts are not renegotiable, 
this financing behavior could create the agency problem known as claim dilution.618  
Table 5.8 
Pattern of Bank Debt Issuance 
[unit: percent] 
Alternated with stock issues 27.5 
Successive issues 19.6 
Not applicable 39.2 
Other  9.7 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 4.0 
 
Almost 40 percent of the CEOs responses indicated that this query was not 
applicable to the their own bank. Less than 20 percent of the CEOs declared that their 
banks followed a sequential debt issuing. These results are considered inconclusive and 
consequently were not the object of any statistical testing. 
Tax Effects on Capital Structure Decisions. It is often suggested in the literature 
that we should expect income taxes  at both the firm and personal levels  to influence 
capital structure choice. However, theoretical predictions are, in general, not confirmed in 
empirical observation. 
It is also well documented that banks, among other firms, react to major changes in 
income tax laws (e.g., Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson 1990). This finding has provided 
support for a substantial number of empirical tests of the tax hypothesis in the literature. In 
question 9.1 CEOs are questioned about the impact of changes in bank taxation rules on 
their capital structure decisions. 
                                                 
618 See Chapter 2 for further details. 
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Table 5.9.1 
Impact of Changes in Taxation on Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
 Mean scores Percent 
Taxation on dividends  3.3  
Taxation on capital gains earned on bank’s shares 2.8  
Taxation on interest earned on bank’s debt issues 3.4  
Taxation on the bank’s income 4.7  
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  9.8 
Other  5.9 
 
Examination of the survey results suggests that respondents do not perceive tax 
considerations as playing a significant role in banks’ capital structure decisions (see Tables 
5.5.1 to 5.5.3). However, CEOs of privately-owned banks and of listed banks tend to 
ascribe more relevance to the impact of taxation than other respondents. Furthermore, 
those differences are often significant with respect to CEOs of listed and unlisted banks. 
For the former, the importance assigned to the income tax effects of borrowing cost 
payments is not negligible. To test the differences in the mean scores of “Taxation on the 
bank’s income” versus the tax categories that are relevant at the investor level, we 
conducted three Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests. These revealed that the differences are 
statistically significant even at less than 1 percent level of significance (all p-values < 
0.0001). We interpret this outcome as supportive of the tax hypothesis, in the sense that 
CEOs give more importance to the income taxes at the bank level than at the investor level. 
This result is consistent with the evidence provided by CEOs on question 5, dealing with a 
series of internal factors influencing a bank’s capital structure planning. 
Income tax laws at the personal level treat payments to investors in the form of 
dividends, interests or capital gains differently. Miller (1977) argued that differential 
treatment of investors’ taxable income introduces incentives that are likely to affect the 
demand for different types of corporate securities. Hence, taxation at the personal level 
should be incorporated into the corporate capital structure equation. Question 9.2 attempts 
to assess the CEOs’ view about the impact of such differences in taxation at the investor 
level. 
 - 219 - 
Table 5.9.2 
Impact of Differences in Taxation of Investors Returns on Bank Capital Structure Decisions 
[unit: percent] 
Totally irrelevant 11.8 
Largely irrelevant 13.7 
Somewhat irrelevant 11.8 
Somewhat relevant 9.8 
Largely relevant 45.1 
Totally relevant 0.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 7.8 
 
Empirical evidence collected on this question is largely inconclusive in our 
survey619 but seems consistent with previously discussed results (see Question 5).  
Question 9.3 was designed to ascertain the relevance of the third proposition of 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 that, cross-sectionally, firms 
endowed with non-debt-related tax shields should exhibit higher capital ratios, i.e., carry 
relatively less debt in their balance sheets. We queried CEOs about the influence of non-
debt tax shields, such as depreciation and provisions for loan-losses, on banks’ capital 
structure decisions. As discussed earlier, provisions for loan losses are potentially a 
substantial and discretionary source of non-debt income tax relief for banks. Thus we 
should expect banks, ceteris paribus, to resort to debt financing less often if they are 
creating larger loan loss reserves. 
Table 5.9.3 
Role of Non-Debt Tax-Shields on Banks’ Capital Structure Decisions 
[unit: percent] 
Totally irrelevant 11.8 
Largely irrelevant 25.5 
Somewhat irrelevant 7.8 
Somewhat relevant 27.5 
Largely relevant 17.6 
Totally relevant 5.9 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 3.9 
 
The relative importance of fixed assets as a proportion of total assets is quite small 
for Portuguese banks.620 Consequently, annual depreciation tends to be a minor 
                                                 
 
619 We conducted a two-sided Z-test for a proportion to see if we could conclude that either the respondents 
that assigned any degree of relevance or those who did not, were a majority of the valid responses. The test 
failed to provide evidence in that respect. 
620 Author’s estimates indicate that, on average, during the period 1989-1998 fixed assets represented 2.84 
percent of net total assets and their depreciation accounts for 2.57 percent of the total costs for the banks 
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consideration in determining capital structure and, therefore, play a negligible role as a 
debt tax-shield substitute. In contrast, provisions for loan-losses are substantial.621 
Arguably, banks’ CEOs might regard them as a reasonable substitute for debt tax-shields. 
The distribution of the survey responses, however, suggests a mixed picture; 
therefore we must treat these results as inconclusive622 and not providing empirical support 
for the hypothesis. Loan loss reserves may be important for other reasons, but these were 
not tested in our survey. Some arguments might be offered, however, in an attempt to 
better interpret the evidence. For instance, the discretionary part of loan-loss provisions 
might be used for signaling purposes (e.g. Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo 1995; Moyer 
1990).623 Or they may be used as an income smoothing mechanism (e.g., Greenawalt and 
Sinkey 1988). Also, loan-loss provisions might be instrumental in managing a bank’s 
capital base (e.g., Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas 1999). Finally, the change in capital 
regulations also reduces the cost of earnings management, or smoothing.624 In general, 
increasing earnings by reducing loan loss provisions results in a greater reduction in capital 
under the old regulatory regime than under the new regime. This implies that smoothing 
earnings via loan-loss provisions is less costly in the new regime. Affirming the relevance 
of non-debt tax-shields, such as loan-loss provisions, on the bank’s capital structure 
decisions affirms its role as a device for managing earnings.  
According to the tax hypothesis, we should expect, ceteris paribus, some degree of 
indifference in issuing equity or debt securities in a framework of tax neutrality between 
                                                 
 
included in APB’s sample. According to Houston, James and Marcus (1997) banks in the U.S., on average, 
invest in real assets less than 3 percent of their total assets. 
621 Author estimates that, on average, allowances for bad debt and financial investments represented on 
average 11.47 percent of total costs, for the banks included in APB’s sample during the period 1989-1998. 
622 We performed the same statistical test as in the previous question with similar results. See footnote 19. 
623 These authors used samples of U.S. banks. Beaver et al. (1989) suggest that investors interpret an increase 
in loan-loss provisions as a sign of strength. Consistent with this signaling hypothesis, Wahlen (1994) 
documents a positive relation between (unexpected) loan-loss provisions and future pre-loan-loss earnings 
changes as well as contemporaneous stock returns. Beaver and Engel (1996) document that the valuation 
coefficients on the ‘discretionary’ and ‘non-discretionary' components of loan-loss provisions are positive 
and negative, respectively, consistent with the signaling hypothesis. For conflicting evidence see Bishop 
(1996) (for banks), Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen (1995) and Stinson (1993) (for savings and loans). 
624 Current capital adequacy requirements limit the use of loan loss reserves as regulatory capital in two 
ways. First, they are not allowed as primary capital (Tier I). Second, they are only accepted up to 1.25 
percent of risk-weighted total assets. Current rules determine a less negative relationship between capital 
(measured before loan-loss reserves) and loan-loss provisions than the old regime because low-capital banks 
have less incentive to increase loan-loss provisions under the current capital regulations. In addition, the 
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those two financing options. Question 9.4 asks what would happen to the relative use of 
debt and equity financing if a hypothetical change in tax laws allowed dividends payouts to 
be tax deductible, like debt financing costs. See results in Table 5.9.4. 
Table 5.9.4 
Bank’s Security Issuance under Dividend Payout Tax Deductibility 
 Mean score Percent 
Rate of agreement 4.1 70.6 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  29.4 
Degree of agreement: 6  38.9 
Degree of agreement: 5  16.7 
Degree of agreement: 4  0.0 
Degree of agreement: 3  13.9 
Degree of agreement: 2  16.7 
Degree of agreement: 1  13.9 
 
Although the mean score (4.1) reveals some agreement with our hypothesis, CEOs 
have widely different opinions in this question, as shown by the large number of extreme 
responses in Table 5.9.4. One possible explanation is that some banks in the survey have 
special tax situations, which influence their CEOs’ responses. Therefore these results must 
be interpreted cautiously.625 
It is widely accepted that firms react to major changes in corporate income tax 
laws. This understanding provides support for a substantial number of empirical tests of the 
tax hypothesis. In question 9.5 survey participants are asked for their reactions to a 
postulated modification of Portuguese tax laws similar to the U.S. law that eliminated the 
tax allowance on borrowing costs for very long-term maturity debt issuances (more than 40 
years). 
                                                 
current regulations make it less attractive for low capital banks that have exceeded the upper limit on loan-
loss reserves to increase loan-loss provisions any further. 
625 This argument is supported by the large variability in the implicit tax rates as shown for instance in the 
standard deviation (0.177 for a mean of 0.229) computed for a sample of Portuguese banks in 1998. For 
further details see Chapter 4. 
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Table 5.9.5  
Effect of a Change in Debt Tax-Shield Regime 
 Mean score Percent 
Rate of likelihood 4.4 80.4 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  19.6 
Degree of agreement: 6  33.3 
Degree of agreement: 5  33.3 
Degree of agreement: 4  11.1 
Degree of agreement: 3  22.2 
Degree of agreement: 2  8.3 
Degree of agreement: 1  5.6 
 
The mean score (4.4) indicates a moderate concordance with the Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) tax hypothesis. A statistically significant majority of 77.7 percent of the 
valid responses indicates a degree of agreement of 4 or greater. 
Question 9.6 queries CEOs about the influence of tax-loss carryforwards on capital 
structure decisions. Under most taxation regimes, tax-loss carryforwards are a source of 
future tax savings that are achievable via reduction in future taxable income and/or 
marginal tax rates. If taxation is influential in capital structure decision-making, then tax-
loss carryforwards are likely to meaningfully affect a bank’s debt-equity choice. Thus, if 
tax-loss carryforwards are large and greatly reduce future taxable income, then they 
become a substitute for other tax-shields, such as interest expense on debt financing. 
Therefore, a bank earning taxable operating income and carrying tax-loss carryforwards 
would not, all other things being equal, issue additional tax-deductible debt.626 Hence, 
according to the theory, firms in these circumstances may be impelled to reduce their use 
of debt financing as a tax-shield. Question 9.6.1 provides a test to this hypothesis. 
Table 5.9.6 
Impact of Tax-loss Carryforwards on Banks’ Capital Structure Decisions 
[unit: percent] 
Totally irrelevant 7.8 
Largely irrelevant 11.8 
Somewhat irrelevant 9.8 
Somewhat relevant 19.6 
Largely relevant 35.3 
Totally relevant 3.9 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 11.8 
 
                                                 
626 According to the exhaustion of sources of tax economies hypothesis firms that exhausted their sources of 
tax economies or have lower or nonexistent taxable income are less likely to issue debt at margin (MacKie 
Mason 1990). 
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A majority of the respondents (62.5 percent) deemed tax-loss carryforwards as 
relevant for capital structure decisions. A test for the equality of that percentage is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (p-value: 0.0369). This evidence is consistent 
with the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) theory.  
According to that theory, tax-shields provided by interest payments on debt 
financing become much less important once banks are able to offset their income tax 
liability using available tax-loss carryforwards. It might even happen that taxable income 
was totally exhausted by the tax-loss carryforwards and consequently nothing was left to 
offset borrowing costs payments. Thus, we expect that banks holding tax-loss 
carryforwards would prefer, for tax purposes, to issue stock rather then debt. 
Table 5.9.6.1 
Security Issuance of Banks with Tax-Loss Carryforwards 
[unit: percent] 
Stock 67.9 
Debt 7.1 
Indifferent 17.9 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 7.2 
 
In responding to this question, 67.9 percent (p-value 0.0037) of the CEOs indicate 
that banks carrying tax-loss carryforwards in their balance sheets were more likely to issue 
equity securities. Again, the evidence supports DeAngelo and Masulis’ (1980) proposition 
that a firm endowed with tax-shelters other than from borrowing costs could, ceteris 
paribus, issue less debt for the purpose of managing its income tax liability. 
Influence of Capital Markets on the Timing of New Securities Issues. Questions 
10.1 and 10.2 inquiry about the influence of capital market conditions on the timing of a 
new issue of either common stock or debt. Capital market conditions and informational 
asymmetries (e,g. Dierkens 1991), arguably, might affect the timing of a new issue of 
securities. See results in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 
Effect of Capital Market Conditions on the Timing of New Security Offerings 
[unit: percent] 
 Common Stock  Debt 
Totally irrelevant 15.7 5.9 
Largely irrelevant 7.8 7.8 
Somewhat irrelevant 3.9 3.9 
Somewhat relevant 13.7 21.6 
Largely relevant 37.3 51.0 
Totally relevant 3.9 3.9 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 17.6 5.9 
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The value of the chi-square statistic (21.614 with 4 degrees of freedom) suggests 
the existence of a relationship between capital market conditions and the timing of new 
equity and debt offerings (p-value: 0.00024). The literature on the chi-square test requires a 
minimum threshold for the expected count per cell (under the hypothesis of independence). 
This criterion was clearly not met with our original categories. Therefore, we collapsed the 
original categories in order to overcome the problem created by the small number of 
observations. Although this brought us closer to the required criterion, 55.6 percent of the 
cells still had expected frequencies smaller than the minimum threshold (5). Hence, the 
requirement for a chi-square approximation is not strictly met and previous results should 
be interpreted cautiously.  
Influence of Stock Price Performance on the Timing of New Securities Issues. 
Question number 11 looks at the influence of bank stock price performance on the timing 
of new debt or equity offerings. It is often suggested in the literature that managers time 
their decisions to go to the capital markets based upon overall market conditions and their 
own stocks price performance. Table 5.11 addresses this issue. 
Table 5.11  
Effect of Bank Stock Price Performance on the Timing of New Security Offerings 
[unit: percent] 
Totally irrelevant 11.8 
Largely irrelevant 0.0 
Somewhat irrelevant 9.8 
Somewhat relevant 13.7 
Largely relevant 39.2 
Totally relevant 2.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 23.5 
 
Approximately 55 percent of the CEOs considered as “somewhat relevant” or 
higher the effect of a bank’s stock price performance on the timing of new security 
offerings. A Z-test of a proportion shows that the result is statistically significant (p-value: 
0.0104) at the 5 percent level. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that a majority of 50 
percent of the CEOs does not time new security offerings to their stock price performance. 
Influence of Growth Opportunities on New Security Offerings. Question 12 asks 
CEOs how they perceive attractive investment opportunities to affect decisions on new 
financing issues. This topic is also addressed in question 21, which aims at ascertaining the 
effect of new investment opportunities on a budget-constrained bank’s capital structure 
policy. Table 5.12 presents the survey results to this question. 
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Table 5.12 
Influence of Growth Opportunities on New Security Issuance Decision 
[unit: percent] 
Totally irrelevant 13.7 
Largely irrelevant 3.9 
Somewhat irrelevant 7.8 
Somewhat relevant 19.6 
Largely relevant 45.1 
Totally relevant 0.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 9.8 
 
An (exact) Fisher test of independence was conducted to study the association 
between the responses to question 12 and to the effect of the underinvestment problem on 
bank capital structure (question 21). The test was applied to a 2 X 2 contingency table 
constructed as follows: in question 12 we differentiated the CEOs who assigned any degree 
of relevance to investment opportunity set for capital structure decision-making from those 
who did not provide such an indication. Concerning question 21, we distinguished CEOs 
who only indicated that they might consider deviating (temporarily) from the typical 
capital structure or from the traditional financing policy to implement an investment 
opportunity (in a budgetary constrained framework) from CEOs who indicated they would 
take some other action. We hypothesize that CEOs declaring any degree of relevance in 
their response to question 12 were more likely to consider withdrawing (temporarily) from 
prevailing capital structure strategies. The results show some support for this hypothesis. In 
the group of CEOs that indicated investment opportunities were relevant to their banks’ 
capital structure decisions, 63.6 percent admitted a willingness to deviate from the their 
bank’s usual capital structure limits. The corresponding proportion of CEOs who did not 
feel ready to temporarily violate capital structure limits was 33.3 percent. The difference 
between these proportions is significant at a 5 percent significance level (p-value 0.037). 
Thus, we conclude that indeed growth opportunities influence capital structure policy. 
Bank’s Average Cost of Capital versus Industry Average. The evidence presented 
earlier on question 2 showed that minimizing a bank’s (opportunity) cost of capital was a 
relevant consideration in the financial management of a bank. Question 13 asks CEOs to 
compare the perceptions about their own individual banks’ (weighted) average cost of 
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capital relative to what they believed to be the industry average, thus allowing us to infer 
about the difference between the two costs of capital.627 
Table 5.13 
Bank’s Average Cost of Capital versus Industry Average 
 Mean score Percent 
Degree of comparability 3,3 54.9 
Similar  33,3 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  11.8 
 
We performed a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test and did not find any evidence 
(T29=167) that, on average, CEOs perceived the cost of capital of their banks to be either 
above or below the industry average as they estimated it at the time. 
Deadweight Costs of Asymmetric Information. Question 14 attempted to estimate 
the deadweight costs of asymmetric information as perceived by the CEOs queried. We 
asked them to estimate the percentage reduction in the average cost of capital they would 
require in exchange for conveying a piece of private information to market participants 
(including competition). 
Table 5.14 
Estimate of the Deadweight Costs of Asymmetric Information 
 Percent 
Percentage points reduction in the average cost of capital  0.67 23.5 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  76.5 
 
A great majority (76.5 percent) of CEOs was unsure, unable or unwilling to answer 
this question. Consequently we had to drop it from the analysis.  
Bankruptcy Effects on Capital Structure Decisions. As previously observed, under a 
number of legal regimes, insolvency problems of banks are handled using a very specific 
set of rules. It is suggested in the banking literature that this peculiarity might allow a 
bank’s bankruptcy proceedings to be handled more efficiently, perhaps because the rules 
have been so well developed. Therefore it may be hypothesized that this would mean less 
time spent in bankruptcy and less costs involved in that process. To test this hypothesis, 
question 15 asks survey participants how they evaluated the time consumed and costs 
                                                 
627 Several authors (e.g., see Marsh 1982) suggest that the industry average debt ratio (the complement of 
capital ratio) might be an appropriate surrogate for the measurement of the optimal target capital structure 
measure. Similarly, the individual bank’s cost of capital can be related to that of the industry. 
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incurred in the proceedings of a hypothetical bank’s bankruptcy case vis à vis that of a non-
banking firm.  
Table 5.15 
Effects of Insolvency in Bank Bankruptcy Proceedings 
[unit: percent] 
More time consumed and more costs incurred than other kinds of firms 49.0 
More time consumed but less costs incurred than other kinds of firms 3.9 
Less time consumed but more costs incurred than other kinds of firms 5.9 
Less time consumed and less costs incurred than other kinds of firms 9.8 
Same time consumed but more costs incurred than other kinds of firms 0.0 
Same time consumed but less costs incurred than other kinds of firms 0.0 
Same time consumed and same costs incurred as other kinds of firms 2.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 29.4 
 
In responding to question number 15, which queried about attitudes towards the 
threat of insolvency in terms of time consumed and costs involved, 29.4 percent of the 
CEOs answered “Not sure / no opinion” or “Prefer not to answer,” thus severely limiting 
the statistical significance of this response. In contrast with our expectations, 71.4 percent 
of the valid responses indicated the belief that bankruptcy proceeding in the banking 
industry consume more time and involve more costs than is true in similar procedures for 
non-banking firms. That group represented 69.4 percent (p-value 0.0303) of the valid 
responses. While the p-value shows statistical significance at the 5 percent level, caution 
must be exercised here since almost 30 percent of the responses in the survey were not 
usable. 
The too big too fail doctrine is a well-known proposition in the banking literature. 
Question 16 aimed at evaluating the importance assigned by CEOs to the relationship of 
bank size to the likelihood of bankruptcy. The motivation here was to test attitudes towards 
the too-big-to-fail doctrine, which suggests that the direct costs and the negative 
externalities associated with the failure of a particular bank, may induce regulatory and 
supervisory authorities to ‘rescue’ that bank, instead of letting it entering into bankruptcy 
proceedings. Table 5.16-A presents the results. 
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Table 5.16-A 
Impact of Bank Size upon the Risk of Bankruptcy 
[unit: percent] 
Totally irrelevant 2.0 
Largely irrelevant 0.0 
Somewhat irrelevant 0.0 
Somewhat relevant 13.7 
Largely relevant 72.5 
Totally relevant 7.8 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 4.0 
 
More than 94 percent (48 CEOs) of the responses on this question indicated some 
degree (from ‘some’ to ‘total’) of importance to the influence of bank size on the risk of 
bankruptcy. From those CEOs, 37 (i.e., 77 percent of the usable responses) assigned a 
large importance to that influence. To test if this percentage (77 percent) is statistically 
different from one half, we conducted a Z-test of a proportion and found statistical 
significance at any reasonable level (p-value: 0.00026). Therefore we interpret this 
evidence as consistent with the too big too fail proposition. 
However, our previous conclusion does not appear to be challenged when we 
analyze the responses of CEOs of state-owned or privately-owned banks. Table 5.16-B 
presents the results.  
Table 5.16-B 
Impact of Bank Size upon the Risk of Bankruptcy 
[unit: percent] 
 CEOs of:  
 State-Owned 
Banks 
Privately-
Owned Banks 
Totally irrelevant 6.7 0.0 
Largely irrelevant 0.0 0.0 
Somewhat irrelevant 0.0 0.0 
Somewhat relevant 0.0 19.4 
Largely relevant 66.7 75.0 
Totally relevant 20.0 2.8 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 6.7 2.8 
 
A very substantial majority of CEOs assigned large or total importance to the 
influence of bank size on the likelihood of bankruptcy: 86.7 percent of the CEOs of state-
owned banks, and 94.4 percent of the CEOs of privately-owned banks. 
Bankruptcy Costs. It is widely accepted in the literature that an economic 
environment characterized by imperfect and incomplete markets, contains a positive 
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probability of costly bankruptcy.628 How costly remains an empirical question. Question 17 
is a hypothetical inquiry about CEOs estimates of (direct and indirect) bankruptcy costs. In 
this question we asked bank CEOs to estimate of the loss of total net asset value that would 
result from (a hypothetical) bank bankruptcy. Table 5.17 presents the evidence on this 
question. 
Table 5.17  
Estimate of Bankruptcy Costs 
[unit: percent] 
No reduction in the book value of assets 0.0 
0 to 10 reduction in the book value of assets 12.8 
From 10 to 20 reduction in the book value of assets 4.3 
From 20 to 30 reduction in the book value of assets 10.6 
From 30 to 40 reduction in the book value of assets 2.1 
From 40 to 50 reduction in the book value of assets 0.0 
More than 50 reduction in the book value of assets 17.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 53.2 
 
Since bankruptcy costs is a contentious issue (see Chapter 2), it is not surprising 
that more than half (53.2 percent) of surveyed CEOs were unsure, unable or unwilling to 
provide a usable answer. However, no CEO maintained that bankruptcy in banking is 
costless. Given the small number of usable observations and the disparity in the responses, 
no statistical tests were performed on the data. 
Motives for Issuing Convertible Securities. Among the reasons most frequently 
suggested in the literature for a firm issuing hybrid financing instruments such as 
convertible bonds or convertible preferred stock are:629  (1) the potential for reducing 
agency costs associated with equityholder - manager conflicts of interest (e.g., Lewis, 
Rogalski and Seward. 1999, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet 1981); (2) to protect against a 
future drop in stock price; (3) to increase the marketability of the offering (e.g., Amihud 
and Mendelson 1988); (4) to lower issuing costs; (5) for tax considerations (e.g., Houston 
and Houston 1990); and (6) to lower the regulatory costs of primary capital compliance 
(Fields and Webb 1997).  
                                                 
628 See chapter 2 for a general discussion of the bankruptcy problem and chapter 3 for a discussion of the 
topic in the banking habitat. 
629 Mikkelson (1981) provides an empirical examination of the determinants of firms’ convertible bond 
issues. Fields and Webb (1997) look at the valuation effects of the announcements of banks’ (adjustable-rate) 
preferred stock issues. They found those effects to be positive and significant. The finding might be 
interpreted as the positive reaction of banks’ common shareholders to a relatively low-cost way of complying 
with regulatory primary capital requirements avoiding the dilution of common equity voting rights. 
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Question 18 queried the CEOs about their views on the main motives for banks to 
issue convertible securities. Table 5.18-A presents the relative frequencies of the (multiple) 
selection of items of surveyed CEOs. 
Table 5.18-A 
Motives for Banks to Issue Convertible Securitiesa 
[unit: percent] 
The expectation of a successful placement of the issue in the market  8.5 
The expectation of a stock price increase 13.2 
To avoid lowering managerial control  8.5 
To avoid the dilution of shareholder’s ownership 24.5 
To avoid the dilution of managerial ownership holdings 5.7 
To lower financing costs 28.3 
Not applicable 6.6 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 2.8 
Other 1.9 
a In this question multiple response was allowed. A total of 105 responses were registered. Percentages are based upon those 105 responses. Percentages 
may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 
 
Selections of our survey respondents reveal ambivalent opinions about motives for 
issuing convertible securities. We therefore interpret the evidence as suggesting that 
Portuguese banks make these security offerings for a variety of purposes. In 38.7 percent630 
of the CEOs’ responses, agency problems between shareholders and managers, and 
between existing and future shareholders, were cited as the determining factor, followed by 
lower financing costs (28.3 percent). The evidence suggests that expectations of a run-up 
in share price costs play a minor role in the issue of convertibles (13.2 percent). The only 
consideration that was indicated under the ‘other’ category was taxation. This overall 
pattern of results did not change significantly when the sample was partitioned by CEOs of 
state-owned and privately-owned banks, as set forth in Table 5.18-B. 
                                                 
630 This percentage results from adding the relative frequencies of “to avoid lowering managerial control” to 
“to avoid the dilution of shareholder’s ownership” and “to avoid the dilution of managerial ownership 
holdings” categories. 
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Table 5.18-B 
Motives for banks to Issue Convertible Securities 
[unit: percent] 
 Responses of CEOs of: 
 State-owned 
banks a 
Privately-
owned banksb 
The expectation of a successful placement of the issue in the market  18,5 5.1 
The expectation of a stock price increase 3,7 16.56 
To avoid lowering managerial control  0,0 11.46 
To avoid the dilution of shareholder’s ownership 18,5 26.6 
To avoid the dilution of managerial ownership holdings 7,4 5.1 
To lower financing costs 18,5 31.66 
Not applicable 18,5 0.066 
Not sure / no opinion 0,0 0.0 
Prefer not to answer 3,7 2.5 
Other 11,1 1.3 
a In this question multiple response was allowed. A total of 27 responses were registered. Percentages are based upon those 106 responses. Percentages 
may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 
b In this question multiple response was allowed. A total of 79 responses were registered. Percentages are based upon those 106 responses. 
Percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 
  Significant difference at the 5 percent level for one-sided tests.      Significant difference at the 1 percent level for one-sided tests  .
6Significant difference at the 5 percent level for two-sided tests. 66 Significant difference at the 1 percent level for two-sided tests. 
 
When survey respondents were divided into state-owned and privately-owned 
banks, the most that could be said was that the role of convertible securities is viewed 
differently. State-owned respondents identified security marketability, managerial control, 
and bank valuation as important considerations. Privately-owned respondents identified the 
same motives but assigned significantly different priorities to them. Additionally, 
privately-owned banks’ CEOs seemed most cost conscious than their counterparts at state-
owned banks. A Fisher (exact) test reveals that the expectation of a rise in stock price as 
well as the concern with a decline in managerial control and the reduction in financing 
costs, are statistically significant different responses from the CEOs of state-owned and 
privately-owned banks. Although 18.5 percent and 26.6 percent of their answers indicated 
that avoiding the dilution of shareholder’s ownership is a motive to issue convertible 
securities, this result is not significant at the 5 percent level. It should be also noted that 
these two groups of CEOs both appear to be less concerned with lowering managerial 
ownership holdings rather than doing so with shareholders’. No dramatic changes appear 
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when the sample is regrouped by CEOs of listed and unlisted, de novo and established, and 
over- and under-capitalized banks, either.631 
External Financing Signaling Effects. As discussed earlier, when the information 
about a diffusely owned firm’s actual and future performance is unevenly distributed 
among insiders and outsiders, the severity of informational asymmetries, ceteris paribus, is 
contingent on the level of separation between ownership and control (see Chapters 2 and 
3). In these instances, bank management might use the occasion of a new debt or equity 
financing decision to send signals (new information) to capital market suppliers. Existing 
signaling theories in corporate financing (Ross 1977 and Leland and Pyle 1977), which 
were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, describe and explain how a firm in need of external 
funding might signal its true characteristics to capital markets participants. These actions 
aim to preclude either an excessive cost of capital (the deadweight costs of asymmetric 
information) or a low demand for the firm’s securities. These actions might be required 
whenever insiders know more than outsiders about the firm’s true characteristics in terms 
of actual performance and future prospects.632 Questions 19.1 and 19.2 in our questionnaire 
were designed to test of the classical signaling theory of Ross (1977).633 The empirical 
evidence is presented in Tables 5.19.1 and 5.19.2. 
Table 5.19.1 
Signaling Effects of Future Debt Issue Announcement 
 Mean score Percent 
Degree of agreement 4.6 82.4 
Not sure / no opinion  17.6 
Prefer not to answer  0.0 
 
The 4.6 average score from survey participants on this question reveals apparent 
agreement with the hypothesis that debt issues are a vehicle for bank insiders to convey 
their favorable expectations about future performance, and something that should be 
                                                 
631 Because multi-selection was allowed in this question, CEOs that indicated more items have more weight 
in the sample data. This may introduce some distortion in the analysis and therefore caution should be used in 
interpreting the results. 
632 As previously discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, for the disclosure of privileged information to be perceived 
as a credible signal by outside investors it must be costly to the signaler in order to avoid low quality firms to 
mimic the behavior of high quality firms. An illustration of the argument is provided by the case of a firm 
with poor prospects issuing additional debt. In these instances, because increased leverage should raise the 
firm’s probability of bankruptcy (presumably a costly event to insiders), a signaling equilibrium among firms 
with differentiated prospects would arise in the market. 
633 See both Chapters 2 and 3 for an account of the signaling literature. 
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perceived as good news by outside investors. The rationale for this signaling argument is 
deeply rooted in managerial risk aversion as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.    
Table 5.19.2   
Signaling Effects of Future Common Stock Issue Announcement 
 Mean score Percent 
Degree of agreement 1,8 94.1 
Not sure / no opinion  5.9 
Prefer not to answer  0.0 
 
CEOs in our sample do not agree (1.8 average score) that the announcement of a 
future stock issue is a way for managers to signal the capital markets their unfavorable 
expectations about future performance. Sixty percent of the respondents show their total 
disagreement (assigning a score of “1” in their responses) and seventy eight percent show a 
strong disagreement (scoring “1” and “2”). A 95 percent confidence interval for the 
proportion of CEOs suggest that we should expect that at least 66.5 percent of the 
population strongly (“1” and “2”) disagree with the statement. 
To measure the association between the responses to questions 19.2 and 27.1 we 
computed the Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient (corrected for ties). We found 
a negative correlation of 0.435, which is statistically different from zero at the 1 percent 
significance level.634 The degree of association between the two variables shows the 
expected sign, since CEOs who strongly disagree that a new stock issue conveys bad news 
to investors are likely to believe in a positive reaction on stock price after the 
announcement of a new stock issue. 
As discussed earlier, Ross’s model requires the firm to be diffusely owned. 
Therefore, whenever this condition is violated, Ross’s results do not obtain. In contrast, 
Leland and Pyle’s signaling theory635 specifies a concentrated ownership structure with a 
block shareholder in control  the entrepreneur. Thus, the evidence provided in this 
question is consistent with Leland and Pyle’s signaling argument, which predicts (similarly 
                                                 
634 Since we had a prior expectation of a negative correlation we performed a one-tailed test. 
635 In Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signaling theory, a budgetarily constrained entrepreneur needs external 
financing to undertake a profitable investment project (firm) whose profitability and risk characteristics 
capital market participants cannot verify. Because investors are unable to discriminate good from bad 
projects, they are likely to either require an expected return for their funds commensurate with the average 
quality of the projects in the market (consequently underpricing good projects) or refuse to participate in the 
market tout court (see Chapters 2 and 3 for further discussion). 
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to Jensen and Meckling 1976) that managerial ownership holdings are positively related to 
the firm’s market value.636 Therefore, stock price should not decline on the announcement 
of a new equity offering according to our surveyed CEOs.637 These results are consistent 
with the observation that, as indicated earlier, rights offers were the prevailing form of 
raising new equity capital by Portuguese banks during the period 1989-1998. 
Signaling with Differentiated Debt Financing Offerings. In a world of severe 
asymmetric informational problems capital market participants find it difficult to assess the 
true risk characteristics of issuers, and therefore to price securities at their fair value. In 
these instances, a CEO of a financially sound bank might refrain from issuing bonds in 
order to distinguish his bank from financially debilitated banks that have resorted to this 
type of financing. Question 20 is directed at learning whether CEOs might have refrained 
from deciding to issue a particular kind of debt security to signal investors their banks 
financial condition. 
Table 5.20 
Signaling with Differentiated Debt Financing Offerings 
 Mean score Percent 
Degree of possibility 1.7 84.3 
Not sure / no opinion  7.8 
Prefer not to answer  7.8 
 
 In our survey, however, a large majority of CEOs also indicated that they were 
unlikely to avoid issuing the same type of debt securities issued by financially debilitated 
banks. One explanation might be that bond ratings help investors discriminate good quality 
banks from bad quality banks, thereby assuring good quality banks of fairly priced new 
debt offerings. This argument is consistent with the importance CEOs assigned to bond 
ratings in question 2 (see Tables 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3). 
Influence of Underinvestment on Capital Structure. Question 21 asked CEOs about 
their most likely action in case they had an attractive investment opportunity but were 
unable to fund it internally. Myers (1977) showed that adverse selection costs associated 
                                                 
636 As noted in chapter 3, Besanko and Kanatas (1996) hypothesize a relationship between managerial 
stockholdings and voluntary and involuntary security offerings by banks. 
637 Roth and Saporoschenko (1999) provide evidence in support of Leland and Pyle’s (1977) prediction that 
stock prices react positively to large insiders’ stock purchases. 
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with asymmetric information problems could lead managers to forego such profitable 
projects.  
Table 5.21-A 
 The Underinvestment Effect on Banks’ Capital Structurea 
[unit: percent] 
Change the bank’s typical capital structure or traditional financing policy 58.6 
Sell assets 19.0 
Pass on the growth / investment opportunity 8.6 
Reduce dividend payout 8.6 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 5.1 
a In this question multiple response was allowed. A total of 58 responses were registered. Percentages are based upon those 58 responses. Percentages 
may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 
 
Results on this question were analyzed jointly with question 12, which deals with 
the influence of growth opportunities on new security issuance decision. As we reported 
then, we found moderate support for the underinvestment hypothesis. 
Overall, only 8.6 percent of CEOs’ responses indicated foregoing attractive new 
investment opportunities as a preferred choice.638 The majority of the CEOs responses 
(67.2 percent) favored to deviate from the typical financing and dividend policies. Selling 
assets received 19 percent of the responses. 
To further examine the Myers’ underinvestment problem we partitioned our sample 
by CEOs of over and under capitalized banks (see Table 5.21-B). 
Table 5.21-B 
The Underinvestment Effect on Banks’ Capital Structure 
[unit: percent] 
 CEOs of: 
 Over 
Capitalized 
banks  
Under 
Capitalized 
banks 
Change the bank’s typical capital structure or traditional financing policy 61.3 55.6 
Sell assets 19.4 18.5 
Pass on the growth / investment opportunity 6.5 11.1 
Reduce dividend payout 6.5 11.1 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 6.4 3.7 
 
Only 11.1 percent of the CEOs of under capitalized banks indicated that they would 
prefer foregoing attractive investment opportunities rather than deviating from the bank’s 
usual financing policy. This compares to 6.5 percent of CEOs of over capitalized banks. 
                                                 
638 Kamath (1997) reports that in his survey of Chief Financial Officers of NYSE-listed firms, excluding the 
FORTUNE 500 firms and financial intermediaries, 20 percent admitted to underinvest while almost no one 
mention the possibility of resorting to dividends cuts. 
 - 236 - 
However, a significant majority of 67.8 percent (p-value: 0.0030) of this latter group 
admitted deviating from their bank financing and dividend policies in the event of a 
profitable investment opportunity.  A similar percentage (66.1 percent) is reported for the 
CEOs of under capitalized banks. Selling assets was the following favored option, almost 
on evenly by both groups of CEOs. Interestingly, CEOs of over capitalized seemed more 
reluctant in reducing dividend payouts than their counterparts. One possible explanation 
for this finding might be related to the signaling effects of dividend policy.639 These 
findings suggest that when adverse selection costs are present managers may underinvest. 
Influence of Reputation on Capital Structure. In banking literature, reputation is 
hypothesized as a relevant factor for capital structure decisions. Question 22 queried CEOs 
how they perceive the influence of incentives provided by for capital structure decision-
making  reputation hypothesis. Different arguments support the notion that there is a 
relationship between a bank’s capital structure and its reputation in credit and deposit 
markets. In line with Titman’s (1984) theory, we assume that the preponderance of a 
bank’s borrowers and depositors have positive expectations about the viability of the bank. 
Increasing the bank’s financial leverage could raise the probability of financial distress in 
the eyes of financial markets, thus eroding its reputation and hence causing harmful effects 
on the bank’s reputation in the markets for loans and deposits.640 Question 22 asks about 
CEO beliefs towards reputation and degree of financial leverage. 
Table 5.22 
Influence of a Bank Reputation on its Capital Structure Decisions 
[unit: percent] 
Is an incentive for increasing financial leverage 23.5 
Is an incentive for decreasing financial leverage 21.6 
No impact on capital structure 19.6 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 13.7 
Other 21.6 
 
The evidence provided by survey participants does not allow an unambiguous 
examination of the hypothesized relationship between a bank’s reputation and its capital 
structure decision-making. More than 35 percent of the respondents provided valid answers 
                                                 
639 See, e.g., Miller and Rock (1985). 
640 In extremely damaged reputation states we might see bank runs developing. 
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and 21.6 percent indicated their own suggestions under the ‘Other’ category.  We conclude 
that if reputational effects do exist, they might be trivial. 
Security Private Placements. The next two questions queried CEOs beliefs about 
private placements of securities. Table 5.23.1 addresses debt private placements and Table 
5.23.2 equity private placements.641 
Table 5.23.1  
Private Placement of Debt Issues 
Degree of agreement 5.4 68.0 
Not applicable  32.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  0.0 
 
Overall, 68 percent of survey respondents show a high degree of concordance 
(mean score of 5.4) in undertaking private placements of debt issues.  
Table 5.23.2  
Private Placement of Stock Issues 
 Mean score Percent 
Degree of agreement 4.0 44.1 
Not applicable  47.1 
Not sure / no opinion  0.0 
Prefer not to answer  8.8 
 
Table 5.23.2 shows that slightly more than 44 percent of the CEOs of unlisted 
banks would be favorably disposed towards the private placement of equity (mean score of 
4.0). 
It is widely believed that the typical anonymity prevailing in public security 
markets creates the real possibility that investors’ transactions may be made in 
informationally disadvantageous terms. Privately placed debt and equity securities might 
allow investors to gain access to privileged information and, therefore, make better-
informed investment decisions.642 In this situation, the rate of return required by investors 
would be minimized implying the minimization or elimination of the deadweight costs of 
asymmetric information.643 As suggested by a number of authors (e.g., Jensen and 
                                                 
641 In Portugal, at least, private placements of equity are only allowed to privately-held firms. 
642 Under the Portuguese legal framework private placements of stock offerings are only allowed to non-
listed firms. 
643 As shown by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) disclosing information to alleviate the informational gap 
can reduce a firm’s cost of capital by inducing increased demand from large investors. Security market 
watchdogs typically require security private placements to involve a small number of large and well-
informed investors (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman 1998; Brealey and Myers 1996). 
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Meckling 1976), because private placements permit more (and presumably, better) sharing 
of private information with investors, they might help to lower the agency costs of debt 
contracts by the incorporation of less stringent convenants. Since private placements are 
believed to be an effective means of lowering both asymmetric information and agency 
costs,644 we may expect that private placements would be recurrently used to promote 
information flows without releasing sensitive information publicly. Questions 23.1 and 
23.2, question 24, and question 29 aim at testing hypotheses related to these issues. 
Private Placements and Information Sharing. Question 24 tests the hypothesis that 
private placements of securities facilitate the sharing of sensitive private information with 
selected investors without disclosing that information publicly. Campbell (1979), argued 
that firms with valuable private information about their products, processes and 
technologies, which would be costly to reveal to the market, might finance privately to 
avoid disclosing such privileged information to competitors. Table 5.24 explores that 
question with survey participants. 
Table 5.24  
Private Placements as a Means of Sharing Privileged Information 
 Mean score Percent 
Degree of agreement 4.3 82.0 
Not sure / no opinion  10.0 
Prefer not to answer  8.0 
 
A large majority (82 percent) of the bank CEOs indicate some agreement with the 
hypothesis (mean score of 4.3). However, we found a wide variability (standard deviation: 
1.8) in the responses given by surveyed CEOs. Almost an identical score (4.4) is observed 
for CEOs running privately-owned banks (4.4). These empirical findings suggest that costs 
associated with asymmetric information problems in banks’ new security offerings might 
not be as severe as usually hypothesized for non-banking firms.  
Question 25 focuses on the pricing of Portuguese banks’ private placements 
compared to their public offerings. Although there is an information advantage for private 
placements compared to public offerings, conventional wisdom also suggests that because 
of higher liquidity risk, privately placed debt carries a higher interest rate and privately 
                                                 
644 Among others, Myers and Majluf (1984), Campbell and Kracaw (1980), Campbell (1979), and Donaldson 
(1965). 
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placed equity is sold at lower prices when compared to similar public issues. CEOs in our 
survey were queried about the cost of capital implications of going the private placement 
route versus a public offering alternative. 
Table 5.25. 
Comparison of Prices and Returns of Bank Private Placements and Public Offerings 
 Mean score Percent 
Issue price 3.0  
Investors returns 4.2  
Not applicable  35.3 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  13.7 
 
Responses indicate that issue prices (therefore capital cost) tend to be marginally 
lower in private placements (mean score of 3.0). However, investors seems to be better off 
with private placements than with public offerings (mean score of 4.2) for reasons 
discussed earlier. It should be noted that more than one-third of the respondents indicated 
that their banks were not involved in either private or public financing during their tenures 
as CEOs. 
Covenants and Debt Offerings Marketability. Debt issuers might be willing to 
accept the inclusion of restrictive covenants in an attempt to improve the risk and 
marketability of debt security offerings in exchange for a lower cost of funds (e.g. Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). Question 26 tests this hypothesis. The inclusion of covenants in debt 
contracts is a helpful mechanism that lenders can use to reduce some forms of the agency 
costs of debt. Here, CEOs are asked to indicate their degree of agreement (disagreement) 
with the inclusion of covenants in banks debt-financing contracts as a means of enhancing 
the marketability (and lowering the costs) of such debt offerings. 
Table 5.26. 
Inclusion of Covenants in Debt Contracts 
 Mean score Percent 
Degree of agreement 3.3 90.2 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  9.8 
 
More than 90 percent of the CEOs gave usable answers, and the results indicate that 
the inclusion of covenants in bank debt contracts as a means to increase issue marketability 
is not viewed as important by the CEOs (mean score of 3.3). This suggests that either they 
perceive agency costs of debt as low or they can find more efficient ways to deal with the 
problem. 
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Overvaluation Hypothesis. In banking, as recognized by Besanko and Kanatas 
(1996), and Cornett and Tehranian (1994) among others, the presence of mandatory capital 
standards requires a reexamination of Myers and Majluf’s overvaluation hypothesis.645 
Since involuntary stock issues aim at complying with regulatory capital standards, they do 
not convey much new private information to capital market participants, and consequently 
they would not be expected to depress the stock price as much. By contrast, the Myers and 
Majluf model would suggest that voluntary stock issues should be interpreted by external 
investors as a sign that the shares are overvalued at the prevailing market price. This would 
in all likelihood cause a subsequent decline in share price.646 As hypothesized by Myers 
and Majluf (1984), (better informed) insiders generally issue securities when and if they 
believe the firm is overvalued.647 This layout implies a diffuse ownership structure with 
separation of management and control functions. When ownership rights are not separated 
from management control functions, then the presumption that insiders have an 
informational superiority over outsiders clearly does not hold, and the Myers and Majluf 
overvaluation effect would not prevail. If all investors were equally informed, any 
signaling activity would be a unnecessary waste of money. Questions 27.1 and 27.2 were 
designed to test Myers’ overvaluation hypothesis. Table 5.27.1 reports CEOs’ views on the 
stock price reaction to announcements of their banks’ voluntary equity issues. Table 5.27.2 
reports the same evidence for the stock price reaction to announcements of banks’ straight 
debt offerings. 
                                                 
645 Besanko and Kanatas (1996, 173) argue that “the result that the equity issued to comply 
with a capital standard reduces the price of the bank’s stock is reminiscent of 
the Myers and Majluf (1984) result that external financing for firms is costly.”  
646 A different result for involuntary stock issues may be obtainable on the grounds of the agency problem 
emphasized by Jensen and Meckling’s (1976). In the presence of managerial self-interested behavior in 
respect to level of effort overspending on non-pecuniary benefits, insiders do not maximize shareholders 
wealth. In this view, issuing additional equity to comply with regulatory capital adequacy standards might 
exacerbate moral hazard problems of effort-aversion and excessive private consumption of bank’s resources, 
resulting in reduction of the bank’s stock price. 
647 In Myers and Majluf’s (1984) signaling model managers are assumed as maximizing (existing) 
shareholders’ wealth. 
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Table 5.27.1 
Stock Price Reaction to Announcements of Bank (Voluntary) Equity Issues 
 Mean score Percent 
Magnitude of reaction 3.5 62.7 
No change  0.0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  37.3 
 
Almost two thirds (62.7 percent) of the CEOs provided a valid answer to the 
question about the impact on a bank’s share price of the announcement of a (voluntary) 
stock issue. On a scale of 1 to 6 the mean score of 3.5 indicates a point of indifference 
(standard deviation: 0.88). The evidence seems to suggest that CEOs perceive stock price 
reactions to announcements of (voluntary) equity issues as negligible.648 Given the 
idiosyncrasies of Portuguese banks’ ownership structures and their recurrent use of rights 
offers to raise new equity capital, the result is fairly consistent with what the theory would 
predict. 
Table 5.27.2 
Stock Price Reaction to Announcements of Bank (Straight) Debt Offerings 
 Mean score Percent 
Magnitude of reaction 3.0 29.4 
No change  41.2 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  29.4 
 
Forty one point two percent of the surveyed CEOs indicated that they expected no 
change in stock price after the announcement a new debt issue and 29.4 percent were 
unsure, willing or had no opinion. The remaining 29.4 percent envisioned, on average, a 
slight decline (mean score of 3.0) in the same event. The responses of this last group of 
CEOs vary between 2 and 4 (standard deviation: 0.53) revealing a high level of 
consonance. These results are viewed as essentially suggesting no negative stock price 
reaction on the announcements of bank (straight) debt offerings. 
Overall, the results from Tables 5.27.1 and 5.27.2 are not significantly different 
from previous empirical findings. Thus, taking into consideration the context of the survey 
                                                 
648 This evidence is viewed as consistent with Tsangarakis (1996) who report (statistically significant) 
positive abnormal stock returns on the announcement day of rights offerings in Greece, and its inverse 
relation with stock ownership diffusioness. These findings suggest that rights offerings in the Greek 
environment convey positive information about future prospects of issuers.  
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and the results of the statistical test already reported (see question 19.2), we interpret the 
evidence as consistent with the signaling theory literature. 
Motives for Issuing Callable Debt Securities. Financial theory suggests that debt 
security offerings with call features attached may be beneficial for issuers. Among the 
arguments offered in the literature to substantiate such proposition, the uncertainty of 
future interest rates is a popular one.649 Thereby, the use of callable bonds in a firm’s 
financing structure can be justified as helping to mitigate agency costs and information 
asymmetries (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1981). According to conventional wisdom 
those call features allow the issuing firm to take advantage of a future decline in interest 
rates.650 Question 28 looks at this issue. Results are presented in Table 5.28. 
Table 5.28 
Callable Bonds and the Term Structure of Interest Rates 
 Mean score Percent 
Degree of agreement 5.2 88.2 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  11.8 
 
Almost 90 percent of surveyed CEOs declared strong agreement (mean score of 
5.2) with the idea of issuing callable bonds to try to take advantage of favorable 
developments in the term structure of interest rates. In view of this unanimity, no statistical 
test was conducted on this data. 
As discussed earlier, private placements are helpful in lessening the deadweight 
agency and informational costs arising in financial contractual relationships between 
management and outside investors. A similar effect is acknowledged in the literature. 
Information Sharing in Private versus Public Security Offerings. Question 29 
queries CEOs about the extent to which they agree that private placements allow the 
inclusion of less severe restrictive covenants than for public debt offerings due, at least in 
part, to a greater sharing of privileged information with investors. This implied reduction 
in informational asymmetries is likely to induce management to lower its propensity for 
                                                 
649 Additional considerations that might induce firms to issue callable debt are: (1) reduction in agency 
problems associated with information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders; (2) differential risk 
preferences of equityholders and debtholders; (3) managerial signaling; (4) differential tax rates between the 
borrower and the financier; (5) debt maturity preferences; and (6) the opportunity to remove an undesirable 
protective covenant in the bond indenture. 
 - 243 - 
moral hazard behavior and therefore to contribute to the decrease of the agency costs of 
debt.651 
Table 5.29 
Covenants in Private versus Public Security Offerings 
 Mean score Percent 
Degree of agreement 4.3 88.2 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  11.8 
 
The evidence provided by CEOs on this question suggests that, in banking, such 
costs may not be trivial although they may be less severe that would be the case in non-
banking environments. 
Issuing Costs and Financing Policy. Adjusting a firm’s capital structure is costly 
because financial contracting to raise debt and equity capital involves significant direct 
out-of-pocket expenses.652 Simultaneously, it is also a source of benefits associated with 
the minimization of the cost of capital. Thus, we would expect that a bank’s manager 
would compare the transaction costs involved in capital structure adjustments against the 
advantages of moving closer to the optimal capital structure. As observed by Grinblatt and 
Titman (1998), among others, there are economies of scale in securities issuing. The 
conventional wisdom suggests that, on average, Portuguese banks enjoy issuing cost 
advantages over non-banking Portuguese firms. Question 30 asks survey participants about 
the impact of such cost considerations on their issuing policies. Results are presented in 
Table 5.30. 
Table 5.30 
Effect of Issuing Costs on the Bank Financing Policy 
[unit: percent] 
More frequent and bigger issues 2.0 
More frequent and smaller issues 9.8 
Less frequent and bigger issues 31.4 
Less frequent and smaller issues 0.0 
No influence 45.1 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 11.8 
 
                                                 
650 Other reasons for the use of call provisions in bond indentures include the ability to achieve the necessary 
flexibility to restructure its financing structure in the future. Additionally, the possibility of replacing bonds 
with burdensome convenants with less restrictive indentures. 
651 See Chapters 2 and 3 for a discussion of the underlying arguments. 
652 Lee et al. (1996, 16) report that in the U.S. during the 1990-1994 period average total direct costs (as a 
percentage of gross proceeds) of equity offerings was 11 percent for IPOs, and 7.11 percent for SEOs. 3.79 
percent for convertible bonds, and 2.24 percent for straight bonds. 
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Forty-five percent of surveyed Portuguese bank CEOs deemed issuing costs as 
inconsequential. A smaller percentage (31.4 percent), however, indicated that security-
issuing costs would require less frequent “trips” to financial markets and larger scale 
security offerings. We hypothesize that banks are likely to enjoy scale cost advantages in 
security issuing. To investigate this hypothesis we estimated a logistic regression model in 
which we specified the responses “Less frequent and bigger issues” as dependent (binary) 
variable and bank size as independent variable. The regression results did not provide 
evidence in support of the hypothesis.  
The Disciplinary Role of Short-Term Debt Financing. It is widely accept in the 
literature that the severity of equityholder-debtholder conflicts of interest is lower when 
firms use shorter- rather than longer-term debt maturity financing on their balance sheets 
(e.g., Grinblatt and Titman 1998, 568).653 Arguably, shorter-term debt gives fewer 
incentives for owners to attempt to benefit from risk shifting, claim dilution and asset 
substitution. A possible explanation for the argument (as discussed in chapter 3) is 
provided by Flannery (1994, 1986) and Diamond (1991). These authors suggest that rights 
assigned to financiers in debt contract renewal, exposes debtors to increased liquidity 
risk654 and curtails their incentives for behaving opportunistically. Thereby, short-term debt 
has a disciplinary effect in curbing managerial discretion. It may be argued then, that the 
interest of outside investors (either equityholders or debtholders) is served in having a bank 
carry some short-term debt in its capital structure. Question 31 provides a test to the 
hypothesis. Table 5.31 presents the results. 
Table 5.31  
Relevance of Short-Term Debt for Bank Decisions on Capital Structure 
[unit: percent] 
Totally irrelevant 9.8 
Largely irrelevant 17.6 
Somewhat irrelevant 15.7 
Somewhat relevant 39.2 
Largely relevant 11.8 
Totally relevant 3.9 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 2.0 
 
                                                 
653 Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay and Smith (1995) and Myers (1977), among others, argue that longer-
maturity debt financing is more subject to equityholder-debtholder conflicts. 
654 Risk implicit in the unpredictability about the renewing of outstanding short-term debt. 
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Results of this question are somewhat mixed and do not allow us to draw any 
statistically significant conclusions from them. 
Term Structure of Interest Rates and Capital Structure. As explained earlier, riding 
the yield curve is a frequent ‘strategy’ for lowering financing costs and is abundantly 
described in standard finance textbooks (e.g. Grinblatt and Titman 1998, 352-358). 
Question 32 examines the relevance of the term structure of interest rates to banks’ capital 
structure decisions. To illustrate, when the yield curve is upward sloping, banks are likely 
to be willing to rely more aggressively on short-term liabilities than on long-term maturity 
debt. However, when expectations are reversed and rising interest rates is a likely scenario, 
a bank may try to "lock in" low rates by issuing long-term maturity debt. 
Table 5.32 
Relevance of Term Structure of Interest Rates for Bank Decisions of Capital Structure 
[unit: percent] 
Totally irrelevant 0,0 
Largely irrelevant 7,8 
Somewhat irrelevant 3,9 
Somewhat relevant  33,3 
Largely relevant 51,0 
Totally relevant 2,0 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 2,0 
 
A percentage of 86.3 of surveyed CEOs indicated that attempting to take advantage 
of the dynamics of the term structure of the interest rates was important. A Z-test of a 
proportion shows, at any reasonable level of significance (p-value < 0.0001) that we should 
expect the majority banks’ CEOs to exhibit this kind of behavior. Thus, the evidence 
provides support to our hypothesis. 
Targeting Security Offerings. Targeting specific investors segments in the design 
and marketing of security offerings is well-known fact in financing decision-making (e.g., 
Chen and Kim 1980; Kim, Lewellen, McConnell 1979; and Miller 1977). The Motives of 
this targeting are associated with lowering agency and information costs and/or increasing 
the marketability of an issue. In this view, firms choosing a financing strategy might design 
security offerings to attract targeted segments of investors with the goal of lowering 
financing costs. Question 33 is an attempt to test the targeting argument. 
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Table 5.33 
Motives for Targeting New Security Issues and Capital Structure Decisions 
[unit: percent] 
Impact on the yield required by investors 33.3 
Required level of private information disclosure 17.3 
Impact on issue’s price 14.7 
Impact of issuing costs 18.7 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer 12.0 
Other 4.0 
The responses of survey participants indicate that lower financing cost was the 
more important reason for designing a security offering targeting a specific investors 
group. To test the hypothesis that overcapitalized banks might be willing to target their 
security offerings to specific segments of investors in order to lower their required rates of 
return by increasing the sharing of information we conducted a logit regression. We 
specified the responses “Required level of private information disclosure” as dependent 
variable and the capital ratio during the CEO tenure as explicative variable. Regression 
coefficients failed to show statistical significance. 
Intangible Assets and Capital Ratio. Our final question sought the relationship 
between changes in a bank’s intangible asset-base and its capital ratio. As suggested by 
Myers (1984), the greater the proportion of tangible assets a firm has, the greater it can rely 
on debt.  The implication of this argument is that it is risky to heavily rely on debt 
financing for intangible assets, such as front-end growth expenses, research and 
development projects, or advertising campaigns, which can hardly be collateralized. 
Because of financial distress, firms that are more dependent on intangible assets should, 
ceteris paribus, use relatively more equity and less debt. Question 34 asks CEOs to indicate 
how a bank’s capital ratio would be affected if it were to become more dependent on 
intangible assets for its success. The empirical findings of Long and Malitz (1985) provide 
support for Myers’ hypothesis that a firm’s financial leverage is inversely related to its 
intangible asset expenditures, since those are positively associated with new growth 
opportunities. CEOs were queried about the presence, direction, and magnitude of any 
relation between the size of a firm’s intangible asset base and its capital ratio. Results are 
presented in Table 5.34. 
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Table 5.34 
A Bank’s Intangible Asset-Base and its Capital Ratio 
 Average Score Percent 
Degree of increasing variation 4.4 21,6 
Degree of decreasing variation 2.8 37,3 
Unchanged  11,8 
Not sure / no opinion / Prefer not to answer  29.4 
 
A considerable number of CEOs (29.4 percent) were unsure, unable or unwilling to 
answer this question. A total of 70.6 percent of the survey participants did express their 
views, although 11.8 percent said the capital ratio would remain unchanged. From those 
CEOs that acknowledged the existence of such a link, 35.5 percent indicate a (somewhat) 
positive relation (mean score of 4.2 in a scale 1 to 6) and 64.5 percent a (somewhat) 
inverse relation (mean score of 2.9 in a scale 1 to 6). These results seem to contradict the 
theory. Because of the poor collateralization attributes of intangible assets, a more relative 
intensive use of such type of assets, ceteris paribus, would likely determine a less intensive 
use of debt financing and therefore a higher capital ratio. To test the statistical significance 
of these results we performed a Z-test of a proportion to the responses that indicated the 
presence of the hypothesized relationship. At a 5 percent confidence level (p-value: 0.912) 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
In attempting to explain this empirical evidence, we call the attention to the fact 
that fixed  tangible and intangible  assets are relatively small in the Portuguese 
banking industry (and presumably elsewhere) and therefore the potential effect of 
intensifying the use of intangible assets, if any, might be negligible. Additionally, we may 
conjecture that this relation might be idiosyncratic, and therefore elusive to be captured as 
an empirical regularity.Q 
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Appendix 5.1 
Questionnaire Theoretical Validity 
Question Hypotheses 
1.1. Different measures are commonly used to gauge the intensity of capital use 
in a bank financing structure. During your time as CEO which of the 
following did you choose?  
Regulatory discipline. 
Capital market discipline. 
1.2. During your time as CEO which of the following external sources of funds 
were more frequently used? 
Scale effect of security issue costs. 
2. During your time as CEO what importance did you assign to the following 
financial management objectives?  
Firm value maximization. 
Shareholder wealth maximization. 
Financial slack. 
Managerial risk aversion. 
Discipline of debt markets. 
3. During your time as CEO, please identify the prevailing intention in the 
bank’s strategic financing decision-making: 
Trade-off capital structure. 
Optimal capital structure. 
Target capital structure. 
Pecking order. 
Neutral mutations. 
3.2. Please prioritize the long-term financing sources resorted to during your time 
as CEO in terms of their use:  
Pecking order. 
3.3. Please specify the origin of the followed set of guidelines on financing 
policy: 
 
4. During your time as CEO, which of the following external factors has had 
the most important impact on the bank’s capital structure decisions? 
Discipline of the market for 
corporate control. 
Discipline of product market. 
Capital market performance. 
Tax. 
4.1. During your time as CEO how relevant was the development of the 
Portuguese capital market for the bank’s decisions on capital structure? 
Capital market level of 
development. 
4.2. During your time as CEO how important was the existence of a 10% limit on 
share repurchases, as it exists under current Portuguese law, for the bank’s 
decisions on capital structure? 
Free cash flow. 
Underpricing. 
5. During your time as CEO which of the following internal factors has had the 
most important impact on bank’s decisions on capital structure? 
Governance. 
Non-debt tax shields. 
Free cash flow. 
5.1. When free cash flow was large which of the following capital structure 
decisions was made?  
Free cash flow. 
5.2. When free cash flow was large and new debt was issue, how would you 
describe the bank’s ownership structure? 
Free cash flow. 
5.3. When free cash flow was large and new debt was issue, and the ownership 
structure was diffuse, with no major shareholder(s) and limited managerial 
ownership, with which of the following scenarios was most likely 
associated? 
Managerial level of effort. 
Non-debt tax shields. 
Growth opportunity set. 
Corporate tax. 
Security mispricing. 
Size. 
Shareholder-debtholder incentive 
conflicts. 
Investors’ taxation. 
Trade-off. 
Signaling. 
Reputation. 
6. An increase in financial leverage is likely to influence investment policy. If 
so, in which way? 
 
7. Financial distress is likely to impact upon investment policy. If so, in which 
way? 
 
8. During the time span you are referring to, how do you characterize the bank’s 
pattern of debt issuance?  
Claim dilution 
9.1. During your time as CEO how do you assess the impact of changes in the 
following types of taxation on capital structure decisions? 
Tax. 
9.2. During your tenure how do you assess the impact of differences in taxation 
on retained earnings, dividends, interests and capital gains on bank’s capital 
structure decisions?  
Taxation at personal level 
9.3. During your time as CEO how do you evaluate the role of tax economies 
inherent to sources other than the costs of debt financing sources (like 
depreciation and / or loan loss provisions), on bank’s capital structure 
decisions? 
Non-debt tax shields. 
9.4. How could you have agreed issuing more stock, rather than debt, if there had 
been tax allowances on dividend payouts?  
Debt tax shield. 
9.5. How do you rate the likelihood of having issued less debt if have ceased the 
tax allowance on borrowing costs, as happened in USA with very long-term 
maturity debt issuances (more than 40 years)? 
Debt tax shield. 
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9.6. How do you assess the impact of tax-loss carryforwards on bank’s capital 
structure decisions? 
Tax-loss carryforwards. 
9.6.1
. 
What kind of security is a bank with tax-loss carryforwards most likely to 
issue? 
Tax-loss carryforwards. 
10.1. How did capital market conditions affect the timing of a new issue of 
common stock? 
Capital market performance. 
10.2. How did capital market conditions affect the timing of a new issue of debt? Capital market performance. 
11. How did the bank’s stock price performance affect the timing of new security 
(whether common stock or debt) issues? 
Timing. 
12. How did growth opportunities affect the decision of making a new security 
(whether common stock or debt) issue? 
Growth opportunity set. 
13. During your time as CEO how would you rate the bank’s average cost of 
capital in comparison to the industry average? 
Cost of capital 
14. What reduction (in percentage points) in the average cost of capital would 
make you disclosing privileged information to the capital market incurring in 
the risk of revealing to competitors bank’s plans or strategies (like, for 
example, a planned downsizing, or entry in a new venture)? 
Deadweight costs of asymmetric 
information 
15. How would you evaluate the effects of financial distress (or bankruptcy) 
considering that, under Portuguese Law, banks have a specific set of 
procedures to handle these situations (Article No.139, No.2 Decree of Law 
No. 298/92, from December 31)? 
Bankruptcy costs. 
16. How do you assess the impact of bank size  measured as the book value of 
total assets  upon the risk of bankruptcy? 
Too-big-to-fail. 
17. Assuming a hypothetical bankruptcy what is your estimate of its costs  
both direct (e.g., filing and lawyers’ fees) and indirect (e.g., lost business, 
profits and relationships)  in proportion of the book value of the assets?  
Bankruptcy costs. 
18. What are the main reasons for banks, in actual capital market conditions, to 
issue convertible bonds or preferred stock? 
Governance 
Incentives. 
19.1. Would you agree that “the announcement of a long-term debt issue is a way 
for managers to signal to capital markets favorable expectations about the 
bank’s future performance”? 
Signaling. 
19.2. Would you agree that “the announcement of a future stock issue is a way for 
managers to signal capital markets unfavorable expectations about the bank’s 
future performance”? 
Signaling. 
20. Do you believe that the bank should have refrained from issuing bonds in 
order to distinguish itself from other financially debilitated banks that have 
resorted to this type of financing?  
Signaling. 
21. What action would you consider when facing the following scenario: “a new 
growth / investment opportunity cannot be taken without changing the bank’s 
typical capital structure or its traditional hierarchy of sources of financing”?  
Underinvestment. 
22. Reputation of financial institutions in general, and banks in particular, is an 
important asset. How do you describe its influence on capital structure 
decisions?  
Reputation. 
23.1 During your time as CEO the bank may have made private offerings (private 
placements) of debt issues. How did you agree with that practice? 
Debt placement.  
23.2 During your time as CEO the bank may have made private offerings (private 
placements) of stock issues. How did you agree with that practice? 
Equity placement. 
24. Do you agree “private placements of securities might be an efficient way for 
a bank to share private information with investors without publicly disclosing 
privileged information”?  
Information. 
25. How do you compare the prices and the returns of bank’s private placements 
and public offerings? 
Private placement signaling. 
26. Would agree that the inclusion of covenants in a bank’s debt contracts if 
enhances the marketability of its debt issues? 
Shareholder-debtholder . 
27.1. What impact upon a bank’s share price would you typically expect following 
the announcement of a bank’s (voluntary) stock issue?  
Underpricing. 
27.2 What impact upon a bank’s share price would you typically expect following 
the announcement of a bank’s debt issue?  
Underpricing. 
28. Would you issue fixed rate bonds with a call option attached (callable bonds) 
aiming at profiting from an expected decrease in market interest rates? 
Claim dilution 
29. Would you agree with the statement that “typically, private placements of 
securities allow for less stringent covenants than public offers due, at least in 
part, to the former being a more efficient means of sharing information with 
investors”? 
Private placement signaling 
30. Issuing securities (whether stock or debt) is costly. How did these costs affect 
the bank’s issuing policy?  
Flotation costs. 
31. How important was short-term debt in the bank’s decisions of capital 
structure? 
Maturity structure. 
32. What is the relevance of the term structure of interest rates on bank’s capital 
structure decisions? 
Yield curve. 
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33. Why would you favor a new security issue (whether stock or debt) designed 
for specific groups of investors, rather than an indiscriminate placement?  
Clientele effect. 
34. What is your estimate for bank’s capital ratio (Equity-to-Total Assets) in the 
scenario “of bank’s intangible asset-base growth of its relative importance 
due to imperatives of the competitive strategy (e.g., distribution channels 
supported by information technology”?  
Asset intangibility. 
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Appendix 5.2 
Statistical Tests Conducted on Survey Data 
Question Statistical Test 
1.1 
 
Metrics of Bank Financial Leverage  Fischer (exact) test of independence. 
1.2. 
 
Sources of External Financing Set of logistic regressions.  
2 
 
Bank Financial Management 
Objectives  
Signed rank test for two expected values. 
One-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Witney rank sum tests (of two independent samples). 
3 Capital Structure Policy Models  No statistical test was conducted on this data. 
4 External Determinants on Bank 
Capital Structure Decisions 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. 
4.1 Importance of Capital Market 
Development Capital Structure 
Decisions  
One-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests of independence of mean scores 
4.2 Share Repurchases Restrictions on 
Bank Capital Structure Decisions  
Level of significance test.  
5 Internal Determinants on Bank 
Capital Structure Decisions  
Two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (p-value: 0.0500).  
6 
and 
7 
Agency Problems  No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
7.1 Impact of Financial Leverage on 
Investment Policy.  
No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
7.2 Influence of Financial Distress upon 
Investment Policy  
No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
8. Pattern of Debt Issuance  No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
9.1 Tax Effects on Capital Structure 
Decisions  
Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests.  
9.2 Taxation at personal level No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
9.3 Non-debt tax shields No statistical tests were conducted. 
9.4 Debt tax shield No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
9.5 Debt tax shield A test for the equality of a percentage 
9.6 Tax-loss carryforwards A test for the equality of a percentage 
110.
1 
and 
10.2 
Influence of Capital Markets on the 
Timing of New Securities Issues.  
Chi-square statistic  
11. Influence of Stock Price Performance 
on the Timing of New Securities 
Issues.  
Z-test of a proportion  
12 Influence of Growth Opportunities on 
New Security Offerings.  
(Exact) Fisher test of independence  
Difference between proportions 
13 
 
Bank’s Average Cost of Capital 
versus Industry Average.  
 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test  
14 Deadweight Costs of Asymmetric 
Information.  
No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
15. Bankruptcy Effects on Capital 
Structure Decisions.  
Z-test of a proportion 
16. The too big too fail doctrine. Z-test of a proportion.  
17 Bankruptcy Costs. No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
18 Motives for Issuing Convertible 
Securities. 
A Fisher (exact) test  
19.1 
and 
19.2. 
External Financing Signaling Effects.  
 
Confidence interval for a proportion. 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient (corrected for ties) to measure 
association between responses to questions 19.2 and 27.1. 
20 Signaling with Differentiated Debt 
Financing Offerings. 
No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
21 
 
Influence of Underinvestment on 
Capital Structure.  
Results on this question were analyzed jointly with question 12.  
Level of significance of a proportion  
22 Influence of Reputation on Capital 
Structure.  
No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
23 Security Private Placements. Z-test of a proportion. Standard deviation. 
24 Private Placements and Information 
Sharing.  
No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
25 Pricing of Private Placements 
Compared to Public Offerings.  
Z-test of a proportion. 
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26 Covenants and Debt Offerings 
Marketability. 
No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
27 Overvaluation Hypothesis  Tested jointly with question 19.2. 
28 Motives for Issuing Callable Debt 
Securities.  
No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
29 Information Sharing in Private versus 
Public Security Offerings 
No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
30 Issuing Costs and Financing Policy  Logistic regressions 
31 Disciplinary Role of Short-Term Debt 
Financing  
No statistical tests were conducted because of data. 
32 Structure of Interest Rates and 
Capital Structure  
Z-test of a proportion. 
33 Targeting Security Offerings Logit regression.  
34 Intangible Assets and Capital Ratio  Z-test of a proportion. 
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Appendix 5.3 
Average Total Assets, Bank Capital and Industry Capital Ratios during CEOs Tenure 
CEO 
Codea 
Average Total 
Assetsb
 
[unit: 106 PTE] 
Average Bank 
Capital Ratioc 
Average Industry 
Capital Ratiod 
1 1514367 0.0464 0.0693 
2 3084525 0.0704 0.0693 
3 829572 0.0429 0.0723 
4 298172 0.0350 0.0639 
5 524994 0.0527 0.0585 
6 12141 0.3153 0.0482 
7 290817 0.0738 0.0465 
8 80648 0.0681 0.0440 
9 783863 0.0476 0.0594 
10 439028 0.0868 0.0444 
11 619520 0.0587 0.0512 
12 1271808 0.0610 0.0427 
13 562918 0.0409 0.0427 
14 1923500 0.0575 0.0594 
15 2097225 0.0384 0.0446 
16 157264 0.0702 0.0482 
17 250571 0.0288 0.0482 
18 17281 0.2750 0.0465 
19 500253 0.0336 0.0723 
20 546718 0.0623 0.0800 
21 307227 0.0635 0.0440 
22 1021643 0.0660 0.0554 
23 557614 0.0416 0.0501 
24 90939 0.1166 0.0482 
25 708498 0.0359 0.0554 
26 569637 0.0152 0.0465 
27 16529 0.2875 0.0444 
28 1135765 0.0580 0.0723 
29 473584 0.0416 0.0524 
30 29661 0.0945 0.0444 
31 865538 0.0821 0.0800 
32 495396 0.0552 0.0774 
33 165792 0.1299 0.0723 
34 1840135 0.0478 0.0506 
35 52626 0.1573 0.0446 
36 4653560 0.0573 0.0446 
37 362583 0.1402 0.0800 
38 853900 0.0371 0.0440 
39 65257 0.1146 0.0465 
40 52848 0.0567 0.0440 
41 137648 0.0772 0.0549 
42 672571 0.0469 0.0446 
43 295263 0.0405 0.0482 
44 82051 0.2137 0.0639 
45 2553354 0.0272 0.0465 
46 1933902 0.0409 0.0465 
47 591900 0.0440 0.0440 
48 126471 0.1494 0.0444 
49 17077 0.0935 0.0440 
50 103123 0.1147 0.0761 
51 39184 0.2105 0.0823 
a As anonimity and confidentiallity in individual responses was guaranteed to survey participants, 
we assigned a numerical code to each CEOs. Ordering of CEOs was randomized in this table. 
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Appendix 5.4 
Response Rates of Mail-Surveys on Capital Structure 
 
Study 
 
Sample 
Surveys 
mailed 
Response  
Rate 
Baker, Gallagher and Morgan 
(1981) 
Two random samples of 150 stock repurchasing firms each, 
listed on the NYSE.a 
150 
150 
48.7% 
42.0% 
Scott and Johnson (1982) 1979 Fortune 1000’s. 1000 21.2% 
Gitman & Mercurio (1982) CFOsb of the 1980 Fortune 1000s. 1000 17.7% 
Reichert and Moore (1984) May 1980 Fortune 500 list.   
Scott and Petty II (1984)    
Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985) CFOs of 562 firm’s listed on the NYSE during 1983. 562 56.6% 
Norton (1989) 1984 Fortune 500s firms. 500 21%655 
Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) 1986 Fortune 500s firms 500 35% 
Pruitt & Gitman (1991) CFOs 1987 500s firms plus second 500 largest firms drawn 
from Compustat industrial files.  
1000 11.4% 
Norton (1991a) 1984 Fortune 500s firms 500 21% 
Norton (1991b) CFOs of publicly held small firms.656 405 27.2% 
Hittle, Haddad and Gitman (1992) CFOs OTCc 500s firms.657 500 16% 
Jog and Srivastava (1994) CFOs TSE-300 Canadian firms and large foreign-owned and 
private firms operating in Canada (April 1991). 
582 22.9% 
Kester, Chang and Tsui (1994) Executives of 123 listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
(April 1990) 
 
123 
 
69.1% 
 Executives of 140 listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
(November 1992) 
 
95 
 
46.4% 
 Executives of 246 listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
(April 1992) 
 
37 
 
15.0% 
Trahan and Gitman (1995) Fortune 500 largest industrial companies and Forbes 200 best 
small companies. 
  
Kamath (1997) CFOs NYSE (Dec 31, 1988) firms excluding Fortune 500’s 
industrial firms of 1989 and all financial intermediaries 
690 20.6% 
Kester et al. (1997) CEOs CFO’s sample of firms listed on Australian Stock 
Exchange, Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange, Jakarta Stock Exchange, Philippine Stock 
Exchange, Stock Exchange of Singapore 
1298 24,2% 
Babu and Jain (1998) Sample of 1300 companies selected on the basis of stratified 
random sampling from the official directory of the Bombay 
Stock Exchange 
1300 7% 
Jong and Dijk (1998) CFOs of 168 non financial firms listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange in May 1997 
168 61% 
Graham and Harvey (1999) 4400 FEI d corporations. 1998 Fortune 500s, from which 313 
were also 4400 FEI corporations. 
4400 9% 
a New York Stock Exchange 
b Chief Financial Officer. 
c Over-the-Counter market. 
d Financial Executives Institute. 
 
                                                 
655 Because 32 of 1984 Fortune 500’s industrial firms ceased to exist, due to acquisition or liquidation, when 
the survey instrument were actually mailed, the response rate was calculated based on the 468 of these firms 
that were, at the time, still independent (Norton 1989). 
656 Firms were sampled from Inc. 100 (May 1987), Financial World 500 (August 1987), Forbes 200 
(November 1987), and Business Week 100 Best Small Growth Companies (May 1987). Criteria for firm 
inclusion in the sample were different across periodicals. 
657 Largest 500 OTC industrial firms selected from CRSP files sorted based on December 1988 market value 
of equity. 
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Appendix 5.5 
Table 1 
Survey Summary Descriptive Statistics 
Number of CEOs/bank 51 
Number of banks 33 
Median tenure of CEOs (years) 4 
Average tenure of CEOs (years) 4.43 
Standard deviation of tenure of CEOs (years) 1.97 
Minimum tenure of CEOs (years) 10 
Maximum tenure of CEOs (years) 2 
Number of CEOs of state-owned banks 15 
Number of CEOs of Privately-owned banks 36 
Number of CEOs of listed banks 19 
Number of CEOs of non-Listed banks 32 
Number of CEOs of de novo banks 24 
Number of CEOs of established banks 27 
Number of CEOs of underleveraged banks 23 
Number of CEOs of overleveraged banks 28 
Average of banks’ total assets (103 PTE) 719146 
Standard deviation of banks’ total assets (103 PTE) 898592 
Minimum banks’ total assets (103 PTE) 12141 
Maximum banks’ total assets (103 PTE) 4653560 
 
Table 2 
Distribution of CEOs’ Tenure 
Years Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
2 8 15.7 15.7 
3 13 25.5 41.2 
4 7 13.7 54.9 
5 8 15.7 70.6 
6 9 17.6 88.2 
7 3 5.9 94.1 
8 1 2.0 96.1 
9 0 3.9 100.0 
10 2 100.0  
 
Table 3 
CEO/Bank’s Capital Ratio 
Average capital ratio .085 
Standard deviation of capital ratio .068 
Minimum capital ratio .015 
Maximum capital ratio .315 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions  
CHAPTER 6: Summary and Conclusions 
 
“[…] our theories don’t seem to explain actual financing behavior, and it seems 
presumptuous to advise firms on optimal capital structure when we are so far from 
explaining actual decisions” 
 
Stewart Myers, “The Capital Structure Puzzle,” (1984) 
 
 
This chapter summarizes and concludes the dissertation. Results of the 
investigation are summarized in the first section. The second section contains a discussion 
on the conclusions as well as some of their implications. Suggestions for future research 
conclude the chapter. 
6.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Our empirical examination was designed as a comprehensive survey, aiming at 
characterizing, describing and interpreting the Portuguese bank CEOs’ capital structure 
decisions during the 1989-1998 period. In some respects, the objective of our investigation 
is similar to other survey-based studies, such as Graham and Harvey (2001). However, our 
work distinguishes itself from prior research, which pursues the same methodological 
approach, in a number of aspects. First, our survey was conducted in a face-to-face 
interview format rather than administered by mail, as is the case with the majority of 
studies.658 This research design minimized some of the potential methodological problems 
that the survey approach may experience, namely, non-response and response biases. In 
addition, the potential for survey participants interpreting survey questions differently was, 
at least, reduced in our investigation since interviews were conducted by the author. 
Secondly, the study was conducted within a single and relatively homogeneous industry, 
thus avoiding difficulties in controlling the unsystematic effects, inevitably present in 
cross-sectional samples. Third, we were able to survey a sample representing 
approximately 90 percent of the population, which compares with an average 20.3 percent 
response rate in capital structure mail-administered surveys.659 Fourth, although 
                                                 
658 See Appendix 2.1 to Chapter 2 and Appendix 5.4 to Chapter 5 for summaries of survey-based research in 
corporate capital structure. 
659 See Table 5.4 appended to chapter 5. 
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confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed to survey participants we were able to 
control across important bank characteristics: ownership, position in the life cycle, listing 
condition and capitalization. Fifth, the survey was conducted outside the U.S. and 
consequently offered a new opportunity for increasing the generalization power of the 
theoretical propositions submitted to empirical testing. Lastly, we were able to 
simultaneously examine qualitative data obtained from our survey and quantitative data 
drawn from our database. 
We append as Appendix 6.1 a table summing up our main findings in a self-
contained manner. Therefore, only the main results are reviewed here, systematized by 
category of capital structure determinant.  
Overall, our findings suggest that capital structure decisions at the bank level do 
matter. Not surprisingly, the evidence supports the view that managerial strategic financing 
decision-making is not random, as implied by Modigliani and Miller’s irrelevance 
hypothesis. Responses of survey participants show their concern for the implications of 
capital structure decisions on bank valuation. Furthermore, it was also documented that 
capital structure choice, as we hypothesized, shows some (varying) consistency with a 
number of theoretical propositions put forth by scholars. From this we derive the 
implication that the theories that elucidate the debt-equity choice in non-financial firms, 
may prove themselves adequate in explaining bank capital structure decisions, once their 
financial intermediation idiosyncrasies are taken into consideration. 
The acknowledgement that the prevailing ownership structure among Portuguese 
banks is distant from the prototypical Berle and Means diffusely and publicly held firm, 
that usually underlies a number of capital structure theories, was crucial in interpreting 
survey results. Therefore, the informational and governance consequences of this fact had 
to be properly taken into consideration when drawing conclusions from survey data. 
Results suggest that in the managerial perspective embodied in the survey, capital 
structure policy is likely to be more affected by the incentives structure and governance 
control rights underlying the different financing instruments, rather than by the aspects 
related to security design and pricing. In line, signaling, underinvestment and asset 
substitution problems were found to moderately affect the debt / equity choice.  
We did not find evidence consistent with the view that banks’ insiders might 
systematically engage in various forms of excessive risk-taking. Thus, the moral hazard 
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incentives associated with the deposit insurance regime (and other forms of safety net 
guarantees) might be less severe in Portugal than in other countries, such as the U.S. 
Additional explanations may be related to the paucity of “problematic” banks in Portugal, 
as well as to differences in Portuguese deposit insurance regime compared to the U.S. 
Results also show some support for the disciplinary role of debt, capital markets and 
regulatory jurisdiction. However, the strong support received by effect of the too big to fail 
doctrine on capital structure suggests that managerial risk aversion induced by impending 
bankruptcy might be small. 
Problems related to governance issues, such as ownership structure and managerial 
control appear to be of concern for CEOs of Portuguese banks in deciding about capital 
structure. However, takeover threats were not indicated as a concern, perhaps because of 
the presence of regulatory restrictions. Products markets and market for corporate control 
were not found to be effective mechanisms to mitigate conflicts arising in the respective 
agency relationships, and thus to discipline insiders. 
Results also show that, as expected, taxation at the bank level was only moderately 
influential on banks capital structure as well as bankruptcy and financial distress 
considerations. 
Taxation at the personal level, transactions costs, free cash flow considerations, and 
product market were not found to unambiguously affect banks’ capital structure choice for 
reasons related to their financial intermediary role. 
We found little evidence supporting the trade-off and the pecking order capital 
structure policy models. This was not unexpected. Portuguese banks, because they might 
be less exposed to severe undervaluation caused by adverse selection problems, were not 
presumed to follow a hierarchy of financing. Moreover, reported financial flexibility is 
consistent with this interpretation.  
6.2. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The intuition that capital structure choice is likely to assume the form of a trade-off 
between costs and benefits associated with such a decision is a well-known useful and 
appealing concept. Unfortunately, it is manifestly clear that it cannot resolve the central 
problem of identifying and measuring these costs and benefits, thus leaving undetermined 
the economic framework that could explain the capital structure conundrum. We believe 
that there is nothing wrong with the trade-off approach. We also recognize that very 
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important steps have been made in improving our understanding about the influence of 
behavioral considerations  like incentives and governance arrangements  of capital 
structure decisions. The acknowledgement that people, not production functions (or any 
invisible hand) actually make these choices was a significant contribution we owe to 
Michael Jensen and Bill Meckling, among others. The recognition that there are ownership 
rights embedded in the securities sold by firms to manage their capital structures, was 
another important step.660 Yet another was the perception that buyers and sellers of 
securities typically get separated and that this could affect the costless exercise of 
ownership rights.  Finally, the acceptance that individuals in making their choices (firms 
are just real fictions…they do not make decisions!) are unable to behave according to the 
full rationality paradigm, further extended our understanding of economic behavior. This 
accumulated knowledge, however, it is not enough to enable the construction of a 
comprehensive capital structure theory. 
Recently, a new perspective has been emerging. The property rights approach of 
the firm, which views the allocation of ownership under the lens of owner control rights on 
physical assets excluding any other claimholder (Zingales 1998), has been extended. Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) suggest that the firm should be viewed as “a combination of 
mutually specialized assets and people” defining the concept of nexus of 
specific investments as “a network of specific investments that cannot be 
replicated by the market.” Also Myers (1999, 139) came forward to recognize 
that a firm is a “co-investment of human and financial capital.”  
In this framework, capital structure decisions should be primarily determined by 
considerations that relate to incentives and allocation of ownership and control rights. 
Given that, managerial reputation is a central factor in motivating risk-averse corporate 
managers (Fama and Jensen 1983), we should expect their behavior to be also affected by 
problems with their human capital specific investments.  
In our assessment, the empirical findings gathered in our survey are consistent with 
this perspective. Managers appear to be primarily concerned with the influence of the 
incentives associated with the governance arrangements and the control rights allocation 
                                                 
660 Central to this evolution was the residual rights of control concept introduced by Grossman and Hart 
(1986). Williamson (1988, 576) argues that "rather than regard debt and equity as 
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determined by capital structure decision-making.661 Their responses seem to indicate less 
concern with security design, transaction costs and other tactical aspects of the capital 
structure problem.  
This is consistent with Stewart Myers’ viewpoint662 that one possible explanation 
for the capital structure puzzle might be related with the excessive emphasis put on 
financing structure (he called the tactical level of capital structure) in detriment of 
financial structure (he called the strategic level of capital structure).663 As a consequence, 
we might have overlooked the "governance-structure attributes of debt 
and equity" (Williamson 1988, note 17). 
Two concluding remarks follow. The first is to acknowledge that we lack a theory 
with the ability to explain and predict the dynamics of a firm’s capital structure choice 
along its life cycle. This theory should be able to enlighten firm’s debt / equity choice such 
as the decisions to go public and the decisions to go private. The dynamics, over the life 
cycle of the firm, of crucial factors for capital structure choice determine a complex set of 
interactions from where it has been difficult to disentangle the individual components. 
Among those elements is the structure of managerial incentives and therefore managers’ 
motivations and expectations, the organizational form of the firm, as well as its ownership 
structure. The second relates to restrictions to pure capital structure decisions that are 
present when share repurchases are restricted, as it is the case in Portugal. We consider this 
a public policy issue that should deserve, at least, reconsideration at the European Union 
legislative level. European legislators emphasized creditor protection to restrict stock 
buybacks. However, banks’ largest creditors are depositors whose claims typically benefit 
from the protection of the public deposit insurer. Other banks’ debtholders are usually well 
informed and sophisticated investors whom are able to accurately and efficiently appraise 
and price default risk. Furthermore, bank debt offerings are often made under private 
placement arrangements and “sweetened” by rating notations. Moreover, bank insiders if 
                                                                                                                                                    
'financial instruments', they are better regarded as different governance 
structures." 
661 The responses to the motivation to issue convertible securities illustrate this point. 
662 See the 1998 Vanderbuilt University “Roundtable on The Capital Structure Puzzle”, and Myers (1999). 
663 The first of these two aspects is related to an operating view of finance in the sense that the kernel of its 
object is, essentially, an attempt to overcome financial markets incompleteness (we espouse the view that the 
system of financial markets is not complete) through innovative strategies of security design and pricing. See, 
e.g. Allen and Gale (1994), Harris and Raviv (1992) and Ross (1989) among others, provide a thoughtful 
review of this literature. 
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deprived of an effective defense against hostile takeover threats might resort to external 
control mechanisms (such as anti-takeover charter amendments) and insulate themselves 
from the discipline of the market for corporate control. 
Concluding, when we started this dissertation project we formulated some generic 
research questions for this investigation. We first questioned the notion of whether capital 
structure theories were (either implicitly or explicitly) incorporated in the Portuguese bank 
CEOs’ decisions. We also wondered if capital structure managerial decision-making would 
provide empirical support for existing theories. Furthermore, we were also curious about 
the potential determinants of the debt / equity choice. Additionally, the cross-sectional and 
transnational relevance of capital structure theories also concerned us. Lastly, we were 
whether an attempt to approach the capital structure problem as a polar case from a field-
based methodological perspective would yield clearer insights than the ones provided by 
the traditional research paradigm. 
We believe that we have, at least partially, enlightened some of these issues. 
6.3. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
According to Stiglitz’ (1989, note 5) the kernel of capital structure empirical 
analysis is the search for the “verifiability or falsifiability” of extant 
theories.664 In the same vein Fama´s (1990) argues that the development of capital structure 
theory should stem from “refinements and hypotheses for further testing 
suggested by what is learned from empirical work.” In this framework we 
see the complementarity between traditional and field-based research in finance as a 
promising window of opportunity for future research. Empirical results obtained in this 
investigation shed some light into various research questions at both the banking and non-
banking capital structure level. However, they also left important issues unanswered. 
The contrast of capital structures of financial and non-financial firms represents a 
research opportunity that should be pursued in the future, extending the focus of these 
investigation efforts to other empirical realities, such as other industries and countries. 
Further work within the same research design could be pursued surveying CEOs of 
Portuguese non-financial corporations in order to uncover specific patterns of capital 
                                                 
664 See sections 1.1 and 1.2 of chapter 1 for a related discussion. 
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structure choices of those firms and contrast them with the results obtained in the survey of 
Portuguese bank CEOs. 
Other possible ways of fostering the usefulness of survey-based investigation for 
future corporate capital structure research include extending the scope of samples in order 
to try uncovering stronger evidence, and improving the integration of qualitative and 
quantitative data. Although this last approach presents new methodological challenges, it 
may also contribute to overcome some of the known shortcomings of the actual dominant 
paradigm. 
As theoretical literature is still active in proposing new models which could yield 
new hypotheses for firms’ capital structure behavior, this is an important source for new 
testable propositions, which future work could also envisage submitting to test and 
contrasting such theories. Capital structure decisions within internal capital markets, life 
cycle theory of capital structure (Fluck 1999b), and market timing theory of capital 
structure (Baker and Wurgler 2001) are illustrations of some of the most recent and 
promising lines for future research in this respect. Additionally, the scope of the research 
can also be broadened by investigating the role of capital regulatory discipline as a 
determinant of banks’ involuntary capital structure adjustments. 
As mathematical statistics literature develops, other methodological avenues can be 
pursued in future research in this area.665  Specifically, one could think of innovating in the 
design of statistical analysis procedures, such as conducting principal component analysis 
using a statistical procedure that circumvents the potential violation of distributional and 
measurement scale properties. This could be achieved, for example, using a Spearman 
correlation matrix as input instead of the Pearson correlation matrix, since the latter 
requires both normal distributional properties and a ratio measurement scale that typically 
are not present in the ordinal data usually gathered through survey-based research. 
 
                                                 
665 To the extent of our knowledge, this procedure, or a similar one, has not yet been attempted in the 
literature. However, such type of methodological innovation would require a prior knowledge of the 
mathematical properties of the procedure, and the statistical properties of the principal components 
algorithm. 
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Appendix 6.1 
 
Summary of Empirical Evidence 
Theory / Concept Survey Findings 
Regulatory discipline of capital adequacy  3 Some preference for the regulatory capital ratio yardstick 
Capital market discipline hypothesis 3 Preference for market value-based ratios. 
CEOs of listed banks are more concerned with minimizing of 
bankruptcy risk of financial distress and than their unlisted 
counterparts. 
CEOs of privately-owned banks is more influenced by market 
discipline compared to state-owned banks. 
Size effects in debt financing choice ² Not found to be significant. 
Bank Financial Management Objectives. 3 Maximization of shareholder value. 
Enhancing and sustaining financial flexibility.  
Minimization of a bank’s cost of capital. 
Adhering to an optimal capital structure. 
Alignment of manager-owner objective functions 3 CEOs of privately-owned banks are more oriented towards maximizing 
owners’ wealth than are CEOs of state-owned banks. 
CEOs of state-owned banks are less concerned with minimizing risk of 
financial distress than CEOs of privately-owned banks. 
CEOs of state-owned banks are less concerned with the minimization 
of capital cost than their privately-owned counterparts. 
CEOs of both listed and unlisted banks have different levels of interest 
in bank costs of capital when compared to the industry average. 
Reputation hypothesis 3 Significant difference in the importance assigned to bank reputation by 
the novo and established bank CEOs. 
Disciplinary role of debt 3 CEOs of under capitalized banks should be more concerned with the 
disciplinary role of debt. Consequently, we expected that group of 
CEOs as being influenced by variables that relate to capital structure 
valuation, such as credit ratings and comparisons to industry average 
capital ratio.  
Capital structure policy 
 
 
 CEOs indicated a preference for a proactive optimal capital structure 
policy. 
CEOs who follow an optimal capital structure policy seem to prefer a 
pro-active approach rather than a passive one. 
Capital structure policy  Pecking order of financing. 
Influence of capital market level of development on banks’ capital 
structure decisions 
² Capital market development is a influential factor for capital structure 
decisions. 
Share repurchases and capital structure decisions 3 Limitations on share repurchases under current Portuguese law, were 
not considered determinant for bank’s capital structure decisions 
Manager-shareholder agency problems  Free cash flow hypothesis 
Managerial risk aversion; Level of effort/compensation; perquisite 
consumption 
External   factors affecting capital structure decisions 3 Bank regulatory and supervisory framework is a relevant factor in 
capital structure decision-making 
Takeover threats are not perceived as a meaningful corporate control 
disciplinary device 
External   factors affecting capital structure decisions ² Strong evidence of the unimportance of share repurchases restrictions. 
Regulatory intervention in corporate control transactions might explain 
this result. 
Internal factors affecting capital structure decisions 3 CEOs of ‘established’ banks are more concerned with the potential 
influence of bank reputation on capital structure decision-making than 
their peers of ‘de novo’ banks. 
Risk averse behavior is more unlikely among managers of ‘de novo’ 
banks. For CEOs of these banks, asset risk appears to be less important 
than for their ‘established’ banks counterparts 
Impact of Financial Leverage on Investment Policy.  Increased financial leverage is inconsequential for banks’ investment 
policy  
Influence of a state of financial distress and insolvency on bank’s 
investment policy 
 A majority of CEOs considered that a financial distress situation has no 
influence on investment policy. 
Claim dilution  The larger part of CEOs responses indicated that the hypothesized 
sequential pattern of debt offering was not applicable to their banks.  
Influence of taxation on bank’s capital structure decisions 
 
 
3 Respondents do not perceive tax considerations as playing a significant 
role in banks’ capital structure decisions. 
More importance to the income taxes at the bank level than at the 
investor level. 
Moderate concordance with the tax hypothesis in case of the 
modification of Portuguese tax laws to reduce debt tax advantage. 
Influence of taxation on bank’s capital structure decisions  Taxation at the personal level should be incorporated into the corporate 
capital structure equation 
Third hypothesis of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980).  Influence of non-debt tax shelters on bank’s capital structure decisions 
Third hypothesis of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). 3 A majority deemed tax-loss carryforwards as relevant for capital 
structure. 
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Tax loss carryforwards and  capital structure decisions 3 Banks carrying tax-loss carryforwards in their balance sheets were 
more likely to issue equity securities. Evidence supports DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980). 
Stock price performance and the timing of new security issues 3 Relevance of bank’s stock price performance on the timing of new 
security offerings 
Growth opportunities influence on capital structure 3 Growth opportunities influence capital structure policy. 
Moderate support for the underinvestment hypothesis. 
Industry average target capital structure ² Estimate of banks’ average cost of capital compared to the industry 
average 
Impact of financial distress and bankruptcy 3 Bankruptcy proceedings in the banking industry consume more time 
and involve more costs than is true in similar procedures for non-
banking firms 
Too big to fail hypothesis 3 Strong evidence consistent with the too big too fail proposition. 
Estimate of bankruptcy costs  Inconclusive. 
Motivations for issuing convertible securities 3 Agency problems between shareholders and managers, and between 
existing and future shareholders, were cited as the determining factor, 
followed by lower financing costs 
Signaling  theory 3 Results are consistent with the signaling theory that external equity 
financing signaling effects of Leland and Pyle. The rationale for this 
signaling argument is deeply rooted in managerial risk aversion 
Signaling with Differentiated Debt Financing Offerings. 3 A large majority of CEOs also indicated that they were unlikely to 
engage in this signaling activity 
Reputational effects on capital structure policy  Evidence is mixed in relation to the influence of reputation on deposit 
and credit markets. If reputational effects do exist, they might be trivial. 
Security private placements and capital structure decisions 3 High degree of concordance in undertaking private placements of debt 
issues. Lower concordance with private placements of equity. 
Security private placements and private information sharing 3 Costs associated with asymmetric information problems in banks’ new 
security offerings might not be as severe as usually hypothesized for 
non-banking firms.  
Comparison of prices and returns of bank’s private placements and 
public offerings 
 Responses indicate that issue prices (therefore capital cost) tend to be 
marginally lower in private placements (mean score of 3.0). However, 
investors seems to be better off with private placements than with 
public offerings (mean score of 4.2) 
Marketability hypothesis (covenants; targeting) 3 Covenants in bank debt contracts, as a means to increase issue 
marketability is not viewed as important by the CEOs. 
Undervaluation hypothesis 3 Stock price reactions to announcements of (voluntary) equity issues as 
negligible Stock price reactions to announcements of bank (straight) 
debt offerings are interpreted as no.  
Callable debt and capital structure 3 Strong support for the hypothesis that issuing callable bonds may bring 
advantages in case of favorable developments in the term structure of 
interest rates. 
Private placements, covenants and information sharing with investors 3 Agency costs of debt less severe that for non-banking firms. 
Issuing costs, frequency and size of security issues. 
 
3 Issuing costs are inconsequential for capital structure. 
Issuing costs would require less frequent “trips” to financial markets 
and larger scale security offerings. 
Scale cost advantages in security issuing ² The regression results did not provide evidence in support of the 
hypothesis. 
The disciplinary role of short-term debt financing.  Role of short-term debt financing on capital structure policy. 
Riding the yield curve hypothesis. 3 Significant percentage indicated that attempting to take advantage of 
the dynamics of the term structure of the interest rates was important. 
Thus, the evidence provides support to our hypothesis. 
Targeting security offerings. ² Overcapitalized banks might be willing to target their security offerings 
to specific segments of investors in order to lower their required rates 
of return by increasing the sharing of information. 
Assets tangibility and financial leverage ² A more relative intensive use of such type of assets, ceteris paribus, 
would likely determine a less intensive use of debt financing and 
therefore a higher capital ratio. 
3- Indicates statistically significant support; ²- Indicates absence of statistical significance;  - Indicates inconclusive evidence. 
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As Decisões de Estrutura de Capital dos Bancos Portugueses: 
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Mário Coutinho dos Santos 
 
Nome:  
 
 
Banco: 
 
 
Local:                                                                        Data: 
 
 
 
 
A – Caracterização da Política de Estrutura da Capital  
 
 
Durante o período de desempenho das suas funções de chefia do órgão de gestão do Banco, o 
mix de acções e títulos de dívida emitidos com o fim de financiar os activos da instituição, 
naturalmente evoluiu.  
Durante tal período, alguma vez foi explicitamente definida uma política de estrutura de 
capital para o banco?  
Se respondeu afirmativamente, poderá enumerar e descrever sinteticamente as características 
estruturantes dessa política de estrutura de capital do banco?  
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Mário Coutinho dos Santos 
B – Compreensão das determinantes das decisões de estrutura de capital durante o período 
em análise 
 
1.1. Diferentes indicadores são comummente usados para medir a intensidade da utilização de capital na estrutura 
de financiamento de um banco. Durante o período de desempenho de funções qual dos indicadores enumerados 
mereceu a sua preferência? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Valor contabilístico da dívida / Valor contabilístico do capital próprio 
Valor contabilístico da dívida / Valor de mercado do capital próprio 
Valor contabilístico do capital próprio / Valor contabilístico do activo total líquido 
Valor de mercado da dívida / Valor de mercado do capital próprio 
Valor de mercado do capital próprio / Valor contabilístico do activo total líquido 
Valor de mercado do capital próprio / Valor de mercado do activo total líquido 
Outra (por favor descreva): 
 

 
1.2. Um banco, como qualquer outra empresa, utiliza recursos financeiros alheios (usualmente de longo prazo) 
obtidos através da decisão intencionada e discricionária dos órgãos de gestão em contrair endividamento. Durante 
o período de desempenho de funções indique os componentes desse endividamento mais frequentemente 
utilizados:  
Assinale com [ X ] as suas escolhas 
 
Acções preferenciais 
Empréstimos subordinados 
Financiamento bancário 
Obrigações 
Títulos de participação 
Outro (por favor identifique): 
 

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2. Durante o período de desempenho de funções que grau de importância atribuiu, predominantemente, aos 
objectivos da gestão financeira do banco a seguir enumerados. Atribua o grau de importância relativa numa escala 
de [1] a [6].  
Escala de: [ 1 ] “menos importante” a [ 6 ] “mais importante” 
 
Alcançar  e manter elevadas notações de rating da dívida 
Apresentar uma estrutura de capital similar à de outros bancos 
Criar ou manter flexibilidade financeira assegurando a disponibilidade de fundos, a independência   
financeira sustentada e a sobrevivência a longo prazo 
Maximizar a cotação dos títulos do banco (acções e obrigações) transaccionados em mercados organizados  
Maximizar a quota de mercado (em termos de activos totais líquidos) 
Maximizar a relação “cotação / resultado por acção” (PER) 
Maximizar a rendibilidade do activo total (resultado líquido / activo total líquido)  
Maximizar a rendibilidade do capital próprio (resultado líquido / capital próprio)  
Maximizar o crescimento dos resultados por acção 
Maximizar o retorno dos accionistas do banco (mais valias + dividendos) num dado horizonte temporal 
Maximizar o valor contabilístico da acção 
Maximizar o valor contabilístico do activo total líquido do banco 
Maximizar o valor do cash flow por acção 
Minimizar a probabilidade de insolvência e de falência 
Minimizar o custo do capital do banco 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

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3. Durante o período de desempenho de funções indique, por favor, a intenção que predominou nas decisões de 
financiamento estratégico da instituição. 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
  
Cumprir um conjunto de princípios orientadores, previamente definido, do financiamento do banco 
(se escolhida, por favor, responda em seguida à questão 3.3.) 
Definir e procurar manter uma estrutura de capital alvo 
(se escolhida, por favor responda em seguida à questão 3.1.) 
Encontrar uma estrutura de capital óptima por comparação entre os respectivos custos e benefícios 
económicos 
Manter o padrão de financiamento historicamente utilizado pelo banco 
Seguir uma hierarquia de exaustão das fontes de financiamento de longo prazo disponíveis para o 
financiamento estratégico do banco 
(se escolhida, por favor, responda em seguida à questão 3.2.) 

Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outra (por favor descreva): 
 

 
(Só se em 3. escolheu “Definir e manter uma estrutura de capital alvo”) 
3.1. Como foi definida a estrutura de capital alvo?  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Adoptando o valor médio sectorial para o indicador “grau de endividamento” 
Pela análise dos custos e benefícios associados a estruturas de capital alternativas 
Por réplica da estrutura de capital de um banco concorrente 
Outra (por favor descreva): 
 

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3.1.1. Que factores, ou circunstâncias, poderão na sua opinião ter justificado o eventual afastamento da estrutura 
de capital alvo do banco? 
Assinale com [ X ] as suas escolhas 
 
A alteração na rendibilidade do activo total (ROA) do banco 
A alteração na rendibilidade do capital próprio (ROE) do banco 
A exaustão das economias fiscais associadas aos custos do endividamento 
A modificação não antecipada na composição da carteira de oportunidades de crescimento do banco 
A variação sustentada na cotação das acções do banco  
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

 
 
(Só se em 3. escolheu “Seguir uma hierarquia de exaustão das fontes de financiamento disponíveis”) 
3.2. Tendo como critério a prioridade de utilização e exaustão, hierarquize, por favor, as fontes de recursos 
financeiros de longo prazo predominantemente utilizadas na política de financiamento do banco.  
Escala de: [ 1 ] “menos prioritária” a [ 6 ] “mais prioritária”  
 
Acções ordinárias  
Acções preferenciais 
Acções preferenciais convertíveis 
Dívida convertível em acções 
Dívida subordinada 
Obrigações 
Resultados retidos  
Títulos de participação 
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(Só se em 3. escolheu “Respeitar um conjunto de princípios orientadores, previamente definido, do financiamento do 
banco”) 
3.3. Por favor, indique a fonte responsável pela definição dos princípios da política de financiamento estratégico 
do banco: 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
  
Aprovação de proposta formulada pela divisão funcional de gestão financeira da instituição  
Deliberação da Assembleia Geral de Accionistas (ou estrutura equivalente do sistema de governo do banco) 
Deliberação do Conselho de Administração (ou órgão equivalente) 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

 
 
4. Durante o período de desempenho de funções que factores de índole externa considera de maior influência nas 
decisões de escolha ou ajustamento da estrutura de capital do banco. Atribua o grau de influência relativa numa 
escala de [1] a [6]: 
Escala de: [ 1 ] “menos influente” a [ 6 ] a “mais influente” 
  
A possibilidade de ocorrência de um takeover 
Alteração do peso do défice público no produto interno 
Alterações no quadro regulador e de supervisão da actividade bancária 
Comportamento do consumo privado  
Comportamento do mercado cambial 
Comportamento do mercado de capitais  
Desempenho conjuntural da economia internacional 
Desempenho conjuntural da economia nacional 
Estabilidade política 
Modificação na dinâmica da procura de crédito bancário 
Modificações na tributação do rendimento das empresas e dos investidores 
Restrições legais relativas à aquisição de acções próprias 
Variações nas taxas de juro  
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

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4.1. Durante o período de desempenho de funções qual a relevância atribuída ao nível de desenvolvimento do 
mercado de capitais português para efeitos das decisões de estrutura de capital do banco?  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
4.2. Como qualifica a repercussão nas decisões de estrutura de capital do banco, do limite máximo de 10% 
imposto na legislação Portuguesa à aquisição de acções próprias? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
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5. Durante o período de desempenho de funções que factores de índole interna considerou de maior influência nas 
decisões de escolha ou ajustamento da estrutura de capital do banco. Atribua o grau de influência relativa numa 
escala de [1] a [6]: 
Escala de: [ 1 ] “menos influente” a [ 6 ] “mais influente” 
 
A admissão à cotação das acções do banco num mercado bolsista organizado 
A estrutura accionista e o controlo da gestão da instituição  
A existência de outras fontes de economia fiscal para além do custo do endividamento como, por exemplo, as 
amortizações e as provisões  
A grande dimensão do free cash flow (fundos disponíveis para afectação discricionária dos gestores) 
A influência nos resultados por acção (evitar a diluição) 
A performance histórica da cotação das acções do banco  
A política de distribuição de resultados (nível de retenção de resultados) 
A política de investimento / o aproveitamento de oportunidades de crescimento / investimento 
A viabilização financeira de objectivos estratégicos futuros 
Alteração do nível de risco dos activos (risco de negócio) 
As economias fiscais associadas ao custo do endividamento 
Corrigir mispricings em emissões de títulos passadas  
Custos de emissão de acções e títulos de dívida 
Dimensão do banco (em termos do valor contabilístico do total dos activos) 
Evitar mispricings em futuras emissões de títulos 
Inclusão de cláusulas restritivas em contratos de financiamento subscritos pelo banco 
Mudanças no nível da tributação incidente sobre os investidores nas mais valias, dividendos e juros obtidos 
em títulos emitidos pelo banco  
O risco de dificuldades financeiras e/ou de insolvência e os custos tipicamente associados a tais situações  
Perspectivas dos gestores quanto à performance futura do banco  
Recomposição da carteira de activos do banco 
Reputação do banco junto dos clientes, dos investidores e autoridades de regulação e supervisão 
Variação na rendibilidade do banco 
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5.1. Quando o free cash flow do banco foi de grande dimensão, a que acção subsequente de ajustamento da 
estrutura de capital, tipicamente, se associou?  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Amortização antecipada de dívida 
Aquisição de acções próprias 
Nova emissão de acções 
Nova emissão de dívida 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

 
5.2. Quando o free cash flow do banco foi de grande dimensão e a decisão de estrutura de capital se associou a 
uma nova emissão de títulos de dívida como se caracterizava a estrutura accionista:  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Atomizada, com accionista(s) de referência e com reduzida participação accionista dos gestores  
Atomizada, com accionista(s) de referência e com significativa participação dos accionista gestores 
Atomizada, sem accionista(s) de referência e com reduzida participação accionista dos gestores 
Atomizada, sem accionista(s) de referência e com significativa participação accionista dos gestores  
Concentrada e com reduzida participação accionista dos gestores 
Concentrada e com significativa participação accionista dos gestores 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

 
 
“As Decisões de Estrutura de Capital dos Bancos Portugueses (1989 / 1998)”                                                               
- 325 - 
Mário Coutinho dos Santos 
5.3. Quando o free cash flow do banco foi de grande dimensão e a decisão de estrutura de capital se associou a 
uma nova emissão de títulos dívida e a estrutura accionista do banco se configurava, tipicamente, como atomizada, 
sem accionista(s) de referência e com reduzida participação accionista dos gestores, em que medida a associa aos 
seguintes factores: 
Atribua percentagens que perfaçam 100%  
 
Fruição discricionária de regalias inerentes ao exercício do cargo  
Gestão da relação empenhamento-compensação dos gestores  
Propensão dos gestores para adoptar projectos de mais elevado perfil de risco-retorno  
Outros factores 
 
 
6. A elevação do nível de endividamento é susceptível de influir na política de investimento. Tendo como referência 
o período considerado, como caracteriza a sua influência predominante? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Acentuou a propensão para a adopção de projectos de elevado risco-retorno 
Acentuou a propensão para a adopção de projectos de reduzido risco-retorno 
Não teve qualquer influência 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

 
 
7. Um quadro de debilidade financeira é susceptível de influenciar a política de investimento. Tendo como 
referência o período considerado, como caracteriza essa influência? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Motivou nova emissão de acções para financiar a realização de projectos criadores de valor 
Não motivou nova emissão de acções para financiar a realização de projectos criadores de valor 
Não teve qualquer influência 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

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8. No período considerado como caracteriza a política de emissão de dívida financeira do banco?  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Emissões alternadas com emissões de acções 
Emissões sucessivas 
Não aplicável 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

 
 
9.1. Indique, por favor, a ordem de relevância atribuída à repercussão nas decisões de estrutura de capital do 
banco de alterações nos seguintes tipos de fiscalidade: 
Escala de: [ 1 ] “total irrelevância” a [ 6 ] “total relevância” 
  
Tributação sobre os dividendos distribuídos pelo banco aos accionistas 
Tributação sobre os ganhos de capital (mais valias) obtidos pelos titulares de acções do banco 
Tributação sobre os juros de títulos de dívida pagos pelo banco aos investidores 
Tributação sobre os lucros gerados pelo banco  
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

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9.2. Durante o período de desempenho de funções como avalia a relevância das diferenças na tributação (ao nível 
do investidor) incidente nos resultados retidos, nos dividendos e juros recebidos e das mais valias obtidas, nas 
decisões de estrutura de capital do banco? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
9.3. Durante o período de desempenho de funções como avalia a influência de outras fontes de economia fiscal 
que não o custo do endividamento (por exemplo as amortizações e as provisões para crédito vencido), na tomada 
de decisão de estrutura de capital do banco? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
9.4. Se os dividendos das acções ordinárias e preferenciais fossem fiscalmente dedutíveis, em que medida teria 
concordado com a preferência pela emissão de acções em detrimento de títulos de dívida?  
Escala de: [1] “total discordância” a [6] “total concordância” 
 
Grau de concordância 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
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9.5. Como avalia o grau de possibilidade de poder ter reduzido o recurso ao financiamento por emissão de dívida 
na eventualidade de o custo desse financiamento ter deixado de ser fiscalmente dedutível, a exemplo do que 
aconteceu nos EUA com as emissões de dívida a muito longo prazo (mais de 40 anos)?  
Escala de: [1] “totalmente  impossível” a [6] “totalmente possível” 
 
Grau de possibilidade 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
9.6. Como avalia a relevância que a existência de situações de reporte fiscal de prejuízos poderá, tipicamente, ter 
tido nas decisões de estrutura de capital? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha  
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
(Só se em 9.6. escolheu “Muito relevante” ou “Totalmente relevante”) 
9.6.1. Que tipo de título teria emitido com maior probabilidade um banco que dispusesse de oportunidades de 
reporte fiscal de prejuízos?  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha  
 
Acções 
Títulos de dívida 
Indiferente 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
“As Decisões de Estrutura de Capital dos Bancos Portugueses (1989 / 1998)”                                                               
- 329 - 
Mário Coutinho dos Santos 
10.1. Na sua opinião qual foi, tipicamente, a relevância das condições do mercado de capitais na escolha do 
momento para efectuar uma nova emissão de acções ordinárias?  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
10.2. Na sua opinião qual foi, tipicamente, a relevância das condições do mercado de capitais na escolha do 
momento para efectuar uma nova emissão de dívida? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha  
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
11. Na sua opinião qual foi, tipicamente, a relevância do comportamento da cotação das acções do banco na 
escolha do momento para efectuar uma nova emissão de títulos (acções ou títulos de dívida)?  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
“As Decisões de Estrutura de Capital dos Bancos Portugueses (1989 / 1998)”                                                               
- 330 - 
Mário Coutinho dos Santos 
12. Qual foi relevância que no banco a carteira de oportunidades de investimento disponíveis, tipicamente, 
desempenhou no processo de escolha entre o lançamento de uma nova emissão de acções ou de dívida? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
13. Em termos médios e durante o período considerado como compara o custo médio do capital do banco em 
relação à média do sector?  
Escala de: [ 1 ] “muito inferior” a [ 6 ] “muito superior” 
 
Grau de comparabilidade 
Idêntico 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
14. Qual a magnitude da redução (em pontos percentuais) do custo de capital do banco que o poderia ter levado a 
considerar a possibilidade de revelar informação privilegiada ao mercado de capitais, incorrendo no risco de dar a 
conhecer aos concorrentes, estratégias ou planos do banco (como por exemplo um downsizing, ou uma entrada 
em nova área de negócio)? 
Atribua pontos percentuais ou assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Pontos percentuais de redução do custo de capital do banco 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
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15. Na eventualidade da emergência de um quadro de dificuldades financeiras e / ou de insolvência, como avalia o 
tempo dispendido e os custos suportados entre um banco e uma empresa não-financeira atendendo ao facto de 
aos bancos não se aplicar a Lei de Falências (nº2 do artigo 139º do Decreto-Lei nº 298/92 de 31 de Dezembro)? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Mais tempo dispendido e mais custos suportados 
Mais tempo dispendido e menos custos suportados 
Mais tempo dispendido mas os mesmos custos suportados 
Menos tempo dispendido e mais custos suportados 
Menos tempo dispendido e menos custos suportados 
Menos tempo dispendido mas os mesmos custos suportados 
Mesmo tempo dispendido e mais custos suportados 
Mesmo tempo dispendido e menos custos suportados 
Mesmo tempo dispendido e mesmos custos suportados 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
16. Como qualifica, tipicamente, a relevância da dimensão  medida em termos do valor contabilístico do activo 
total líquido   na probabilidade de falência de um banco?  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
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17. Na eventualidade de uma hipotética falência de uma instituição bancária, qual a sua melhor estimativa para o 
total dos custos, directos (por exemplo, honorários de advogados e custas judiciais) e indirectos (por exemplo, 
perda de relações comerciais, negócios e de lucros), em termos da percentagem da redução do valor contabilístico 
do total dos activos dessa instituição? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Ausência de redução do valor contabilístico do total dos activos 
De 0% a 10% 
De 10% a 20% 
De 20% a 30% 
De 30% a 40% 
De 40% a 50% 
Mais de 50% 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
18. Quais as motivações que entende como mais relevantes para justificar, nas condições de mercado actuais, 
uma emissão de dívida convertível ou de acções preferenciais pelo banco? 
Assinale com [ X ] as suas escolhas 
 
A expectativa de um contributo para uma colocação bem sucedida da emissão no mercado  
A expectativa de uma apreciação da cotação das acções do banco 
Assegurar a manutenção do nível de controlo da gestão do banco pelos gestores 
Evitar a diluição da estrutura accionista 
Evitar a diluição das posições accionistas dos titulares dos órgãos de gestão 
Uma eventual redução do custo de financiamento do emissor  
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

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19.1. Que concordância lhe merece a afirmação: ” o anúncio da decisão de uma futura emissão de dívida de longo 
prazo constitui um veículo para os gestores sinalizarem ao mercado de capitais perspectivas favoráveis quanto ao 
futuro desempenho do banco”?  
Escala de: [1] “total discordância” a [6] “total concordância” 
 
Grau de concordância 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
19.2. Que concordância lhe merece a afirmação: ”o anúncio da decisão de uma futura emissão de acções constitui 
um veículo para os gestores sinalizarem ao mercado de capitais perspectivas desfavoráveis quanto ao futuro 
desempenho do banco”?  
Escala de: [1] “total discordância” a [6] “total concordância” 
 
Grau de concordância 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
20. Como avalia o grau de possibilidade de o banco poder não ter emitido títulos de dívida como forma de se 
distinguir de outro(s) financeiramente debilitado(s) que tipicamente recorre(m) a esse tipo de financiamento?  
Escala de: [1] “totalmente impossível” a [6] “totalmente possível” 
 
Grau de possibilidade 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
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21. Que acção preferiria tomar no seguinte cenário: “uma nova oportunidade de investimento  por exemplo, uma 
aquisição  apenas concretizável com o afastamento da estrutura de capital típica do banco ou com o abandono 
da usual hierarquia de utilização das fontes de financiamento disponíveis”?  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Afastar-se temporariamente da estrutura de capital típica do banco, ou abandonar a hierarquia usual de 
utilização das fontes de financiamento disponíveis  
Alienar activos 
Não concretizar a oportunidade de investimento 
Reduzir o pagamento de dividendos 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

 
 
22. A reputação das instituições que prosseguem a actividade de intermediação financeira junto de, 
nomeadamente, clientes e investidores, constitui um activo importante. Como caracteriza, tipicamente durante o 
período em análise, a sua influência nas decisões de estrutura de capital do banco? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Constitui um incentivo para o estabelecimento de um nível de endividamento mais elevado 
Constitui um incentivo para o estabelecimento de um nível de endividamento mais reduzido 
Indiferente 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

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23.1 Durante o período de desempenho de funções o banco poderá ter procedido à colocação privada de títulos de 
dívida. Qual o seu grau de concordância para com tal prática? 
Escala de: [1] “total discordância” a [6] “total concordância” 
 
Grau de concordância 
Não aplicável 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
(só para bancos não cotados) 
23.2 Durante o período de desempenho de funções o banco poderá ter procedido à colocação privada de acções. 
Qual o seu grau de concordância para com tal prática? 
Escala de: [1] “total discordância” a [6] “total concordância” 
 
Grau de concordância 
Não aplicável 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
24. Qual o seu grau de concordância para com a afirmação: “as colocações privadas de títulos (acções e 
obrigações) podem constituir um veículo apropriado à partilha de informação privilegiada do banco com os 
investidores sem divulgar publicamente tal informação”?  
Escala de: [1] “total discordância” a [6] “total concordância”  
 
Grau de concordância 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
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25. Em termos médios como compara os preços de emissão e os retornos dos investidores de colocações 
públicas e privadas de títulos efectuadas pelo banco? Compare utilizando uma escala de [1] a [6].  
Escala de: [1] “mais reduzido” a [6] “mais elevado” 
 
Preço de emissão 
Retorno dos investidores 
Não aplicável 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
26. Em que medida concorda com a inclusão de cláusulas restritivas em contratos de emissão de dívida 
subscritos pelo banco se tal inclusão incentivasse a receptividade dos potenciais investidores à emissão?  
Escala de: [1] “total discordância” a [6] “total concordância” 
 
Grau de concordância 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
27.1. Que reacção típica espera na cotação das acções do banco após o anúncio de uma nova emissão 
(voluntária) de acções? 
Escala de: [1] “descida acentuada” a [6] “subida acentuada” 
 
Magnitude da reacção 
Reacção inexistente 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
“As Decisões de Estrutura de Capital dos Bancos Portugueses (1989 / 1998)”                                                               
- 337 - 
Mário Coutinho dos Santos 
27.2 Que reacção típica espera na cotação das acções do banco após o anúncio de uma nova emissão de dívida? 
Escala de: [1] “descida acentuada” a [6] “subida acentuada” 
 
Magnitude da reacção 
Reacção inexistente 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
28. Em que medida concordaria com a emissão de obrigações de taxa fixa com cláusula de reembolso antecipado 
tendo como principal objectivo capturar os benefícios de uma eventual variação das taxas de juro de mercado?  
Escala de: [1] “total discordância” a [6] “total concordância” 
 
Grau de concordância 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
29. Que grau de concordância atribui à afirmação: “a colocação privada de títulos favorece a inclusão de cláusulas 
restritivas menos penalizantes para o devedor do que a sua oferta pública devido, pelo menos em parte, a uma 
partilha mais eficiente da informação com os investidores”?  
Escala de: [1] “total discordância” a [6] “total concordância” 
 
Grau de concordância 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
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30. A emissão de títulos (acções ou de dívida) origina custos. Que influência tiveram no período considerado, 
tipicamente, esses custos na frequência e na dimensão das emissões do banco? 
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
Mais frequentes e de maior dimensão  
Mais frequentes e de menor dimensão 
Menos frequentes e de maior dimensão 
Menos frequentes e de menor dimensão 
Não têm influência 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
31. Como avalia, tipicamente, a relevância da dívida financeira de curto prazo nas decisões de estrutura de capital 
do banco?  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
 
 
32. Que relevância atribui à utilização dos efeitos da estrutura temporal das taxas de juro, enquanto potencial 
instrumento para redução do custo do financiamento, nas decisões de estrutura de capital do banco?  
Assinale com [ X ] a sua escolha 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totalmente 
irrelevante 
 
 
Muito pouco 
relevante 
 
Pouco 
relevante 
 
Algo  
relevante 
 
Muito  
relevante 
 
Totalmente 
relevante 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
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33. Que factores o poderiam ter feito preferir uma emissão de títulos (de dívida ou acções) visando um grupo 
homogéneo de investidores a uma outra indiscriminadamente dirigida a todos os potenciais investidores 
interessados? 
Assinale com [ X ] as suas escolhas 
 
O impacto no custo do financiamento 
O impacto no preço da emissão  
O impacto nos custos de emissão 
O nível de informação privilegiada a divulgar publicamente  
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
Outro (por favor descreva): 
 

 
 
34. Qual a sua estimativa para o grau de variação do “rácio de solvabilidade” (capital próprio / activo total líquido) 
num cenário “de crescimento do peso dos activos intangíveis  consequência, por exemplo, da aquisição de uma 
nova rede de distribuição suportada em tecnologias de informação  por imperativo da estratégia competitiva do 
banco”?  
Escala de: [ 1 ] “muito pequeno” a [ 6 ] “muito grande” ou marque [ X ] para outra escolha 
 
Grau de variação ascendente 
Grau de variação descendente 
Inalterável 
Tem dúvidas / Sem opinião 
Prefere não responder 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey Questionnaire (English Version)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank Decisions on Capital Structure: Empirical Evidence for Portugal 
1989 / 1998 
 
 
Questionnaire* 
 
 
 
 
 
Mário Coutinho dos Santos
 
January 1999
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This questionnaire is part of a Ph.D. research project. Please do not cite or use without permission from the 
author. 
 
Mário Coutinho dos Santos  
 
Name:  
 
 
Bank:  
 
 
Address:                                                                                      Date:  
 
 
 
 
 
A – Brief Description of Capital Structure Policy 
 
 
During your period in office as Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the mix of equity and debt 
has presumably varied. 
Did you ever explicitly design a capital structure policy for your bank?  
If so, please specify the most important considerations underlying this policy. 
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B – Understanding decisions on capital structure 
 
1.1. Different measures are commonly used to gauge the intensity of capital use in a bank financing structure. 
During your time as CEO which of the following did you choose?  
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
Book value of debt / Book value of equity 
Book value of debt / Market value of equity 
Book value of equity / Book value of net total assets 
Market value of debt / Market value of equity 
Market value of equity / Book value of net total assets 
Market value of equity / Market value of net total assets 
Other (please specify): 
 

 
1.2. During your time as CEO which of the following external sources of funds were more frequently used? 
Mark with [ X ] your choices 
 
Preferred stock  
Subordinated debt  
Bank financing 
Bonds 
Participating bonds 
Other (please specify): 
 

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2. During your time as CEO what importance did you assign to the following financial management objectives? 
Please rate in a scale from [1] to [6].  
Scale from: [ 1 ] “least important” to [ 6 ] “most important” 
 
Achieve and maintain high bond ratings  
 

Achieve a capital structure similar to that of other banks  
Enhance or sustain financial flexibility, and ensure financial independence and long term survival  
 

Maximize the market price of bonds and stock 
 

Maximize the market share (in terms of net total assets) 
Maximize the Price Earnings Ratio - PER - (share price / earnings per share) 
 

Maximize the Return on Investment (net Income / net total assets) 
Maximize the Return on Equity  (net Income / equity) 
Maximize the growth of earnings per share 
Maximize shareholders’ returns (capital gains + dividends) in a specific time horizon 
Maximize the book value of a share of stock 
Maximize the book value of the bank’s net total assets 
Maximize the cash flow per share of stock 
Minimize the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy 
 
Minimize the bank’s cost of capital 
Other (please specify): 
 

 
“The Capital Structure Decisions of The CEOs of Portuguese Banks during the 1989-1998 Period”                                                            
- 345 - 
Mário Coutinho dos Santos  
3. During your time as CEO, please identify the prevailing intention in the bank’s strategic financing decision-
making: 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
  
Follow a previously defined set of guidelines on financing policy  
(if selected, please proceed to question 3.3.) 
Achieve and adhere to a definite target for capital structure 
(if selected, please proceed to question 3.1.)  
Reach an optimal capital structure by comparison of, both, economic costs and benefits  
Keep to the financing pattern historically followed by the bank 
Follow a pre-determined hierarchy in exhausting the available strategic financing sources 
(if selected, please proceed to question 3.2.) 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 
(Only if “Achieve and adhere to a definite target for capital structure” was chosen in question 3.) 
3.1. How was the target capital structure defined? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
By adopting the average financial leverage ratio of the industry 
By means of a cost / benefit analysis of alternative financing strategies  
 
By taking a competitor’s capital structure as a benchmark 
Other (please specify): 
 

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3.1.1. Were there any relevant deviations from the target capital structure? If so, what explains this? 
Mark with [ X ] your choices 
 
Change in Return on Investment (ROA) 
 

Change in Return on Equity (ROE) 
 
Depletion of tax economies associated with borrowing costs 
Change in the bank’s growth opportunities portfolio 
Enduring change in the bank’s stock price  
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 

 
 
(Only if “Follow a pre-determined hierarchy in exhausting the available financing sources” was chosen in question 3.) 
3.2. Please prioritize the long-term financing sources resorted to during your time as CEO in terms of their use:  
Scale from: [ 1 ] “lowest priority” to [ 6 ] “highest priority”  
 
Common stock 
Preferred stock  
 
Convertible preferred stock 
Convertible debt  
 
Subordinated debt 
Straight bonds  
 
Retained earnings 
Participating bonds 
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(Only if “Follow a previously defined set of guidelines on financing policy” was chosen in question 3.) 
3.3. Please specify the origin of the followed set of guidelines on financing policy: 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
  
Proposal from the bank’s financial management  
 
Decision of the shareholders general meeting (or equivalent) 
Board of directors’ deliberation (or similar) 
Other (please specify): 
 

 
 
4. During your time as CEO, which of the following external factors has had the most important impact on the 
bank’s capital structure decisions? Please rate in a scale from [1] to [6]: 
Scale from: [ 1 ] “least important” to [ 6 ] “most important” 
  
Possibility of a takeover bid 
 

Change in the ratio of public deficit to gross domestic product  
 

Changes in the regulation and supervision framework  
 

Private consumption behavior 
 

Currency market behavior  
 

Capital market performance 
World economy performance 
National economy performance  
 

Political instability 
Change in the dynamics of credit demand 
Change in firms’ and investors’ income taxation 
Legal restrictions on share repurchases 
Interest rate changes 
Other (please specify): 
 

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4.1. During your time as CEO how relevant was the development of the Portuguese capital market for the bank’s 
decisions on capital structure? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
4.2. During your time as CEO how important was the existence of a 10% limit on share repurchases, as it exists 
under current Portuguese law, for the bank’s decisions on capital structure? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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5. During your time as CEO which of the following internal factors has had the most important impact on bank’s 
decisions on capital structure? Please rate in a scale from [1] to [6]: 
Scale from: [ 1 ] “least important” to [ 6 ] “most important” 
 
Get the bank’s shares listed 
 

Ownership structure and managerial control  
 

Tax economies related to factors other than debt financing, e.g., depreciation and bad-loans provisions 
 
Size of free cash flow (cash available for management’s discretionary allocation) 
Earnings per share (avoid earnings dilution) 
Historical performance of bank’s shares 
 
Dividend policy (retention rate) 
Investment policy / Growth opportunities 
Financing viability of strategic objectives 
Assets’ risk (business risk) 
Tax economies associated with debt financing 
Correct mispricings in past security issues 
 

Floating costs 
 

Bank size measured as the book value of net total assets 
Avoid mispricings in future security issues 
Covenants in debt financing contracts 
Rates of taxation on investors’ income (dividends, interest and capital gains) 
Risk and costs of financial distress and insolvency 
Managerial expectations for bank’s future performance 
 
Restructuring of bank’s asset portfolio 
 
Bank’s reputation 
Changes in bank’s level of profitability 
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5.1. When free cash flow was large which of the following capital structure decisions was made?  
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
Anticipated debt repayment  
 

Share repurchase 
New issue of stock 
New issue of debt 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 

 
5.2. When free cash flow was large and new debt was issue, how would you describe the bank’s ownership 
structure? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
Diffuse, but with major shareholder(s) and limited managerial ownership 
 

Diffuse, but with major shareholders(s) and significant managerial ownership 
Diffuse, no major shareholder(s) and limited managerial ownership 
 

Diffuse, no major shareholder(s) and significant managerial ownership 
Concentrated and limited managerial ownership 
Concentrated and significant managerial ownership  
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 

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5.3. When free cash flow was large and new debt was issue, and the ownership structure was diffuse, with no 
major shareholder(s) and limited managerial ownership, with which of the following scenarios was most likely 
associated? 
Input percentages up to a 100% total 
 
Propensity for managers to adopt projects with a high risk-return profile 
Re-equilibrium of managerial engagement-compensation relationship  
Discretionary fruition of perquisites inherent to the function in office 
Other 
 
 
6. An increase in financial leverage is likely to influence investment policy. If so, in which way? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
Increased the propensity for adopting higher risk-return projects 
Increased the propensity for adopting lower risk-return projects 
No influence 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 

 
 
7. Financial distress is likely to impact upon investment policy. If so, in which way? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
Induced new stock issues to fund enhancing-value projects 
Did not induce new stock issues to fund value-enhancing projects 
No influence 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 

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8. During the time span you are referring to, how do you characterize the bank’s pattern of debt issuance?  
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
Alternated with stock issues 
Successive issues 
Not applicable 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 

 
 
9.1. During your time as CEO how do you assess the impact of changes in the following types of taxation on 
capital structure decisions? 
Scale from: [ 1 ] “totally irrelevant” to [ 6 ] “totally relevant” 
  
Taxation on dividends  
 

Taxation on capital gains earned on bank’s shares 
Taxation on interest earned on bank’s debt issues 
Taxation on the bank’s income 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 

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9.2. During your tenure how do you assess the impact of differences in taxation on retained earnings, dividends, 
interests and capital gains on bank’s capital structure decisions?  
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
9.3. During your time as CEO how do you evaluate the role of tax economies inherent to sources other than the 
costs of debt financing sources (like depreciation and / or loan loss provisions), on bank’s capital structure 
decisions? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
9.4. How could you have agreed issuing more stock, rather than debt, if there had been tax allowances on dividend 
payouts?  
Scale from: [1] “strongly disagreement” to [6] “strongly agreement” 
 
Rate of agreement 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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9.5. How do you rate the likelihood of having issued less debt if have ceased the tax allowance on borrowing costs, 
as happened in USA with very long-term maturity debt issuances (more than 40 years)? 
Scale from: [1] “strongly unlikely” to [6] “strongly likely” 
 
Rate of likelihood 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
9.6. How do you assess the impact of tax-loss carryforwards on bank’s capital structure decisions? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
(Only if “Largely relevant” or “Totally relevant” were chosen in question 9.6.) 
9.6.1. What kind of security is a bank with tax-loss carryforwards most likely to issue? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
Stock 
Debt 
Indifferent 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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10.1. How did capital market conditions affect the timing of a new issue of common stock? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
10.2. How did capital market conditions affect the timing of a new issue of debt? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice  
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
11. How did the bank’s stock price performance affect the timing of new security (whether common stock or debt) 
issues? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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12. How did growth opportunities affect the decision of making a new security (whether common stock or debt) 
issue? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
13. During your time as CEO how would you rate the bank’s average cost of capital in comparison to the industry 
average? 
Scale from: [ 1 ] “very inferior” to [ 6 ] “very superior” 
 
Degree of comparability 
Similar 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
14. What reduction (in percentage points) in the average cost of capital would make you disclosing privileged 
information to the capital market incurring in the risk of revealing to competitors bank’s plans or strategies (like, for 
example, a planned downsizing, or entry in a new venture)? 
Input percentage points or mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
Percentage points reduction in the average cost of capital  
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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15. How would you evaluate the effects of financial distress (or bankruptcy) considering that, under Portuguese 
Law, banks have a specific set of procedures to handle these situations (Article No.139, No.2 Decree of Law No. 
298/92, from  December 31)? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
More time consumed and more costs incurred than other kind of firms 
More time consumed but less costs incurred than other kind of firms 
More time consumed and same costs incurred than other kind of firms 
Less time consumed but more costs incurred than other kind of firms 
Less time consumed and less costs incurred than other kind of firms 
Less time consumed and same costs incurred than other kind of firms 
Same time consumed but more costs incurred than other kind of firms 
Same time consumed but less costs incurred than other kind of firms 
Same time consumed and same costs incurred as other kind of firms 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
16. How do you assess the impact of bank size  measured as the book value of total assets  upon the risk of 
bankruptcy? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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17. Assuming a hypothetical bankruptcy what is your estimate of its costs  both direct (e.g., filing and lawyers’ 
fees) and indirect (e.g., lost business, profits and relationships)  in proportion of the book value of the assets?  
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
No reduction in the book value of assets 
0% to 10% reduction in the book value of assets 
From 10% to 20% reduction in the book value of assets 
From 20% to 30% reduction in the book value of assets 
From 30% to 40% reduction in the book value of assets 
From 40% to 50% reduction in the book value of assets 
More than 50% reduction in the book value of assets 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
18. What are the main reasons for banks, in actual capital market conditions, to issue convertible bonds or 
preferred stock? 
Mark with [ X ] your choices 
 
The expectation of a successful placement of the issue in the market  
 

The expectation of a stock price increase 
To avoid lowering managerial control  
 
To avoid the dilution of shareholder’s ownership 
To avoid the dilution of managerial ownership holdings 
To lower financing costs 
Not applicable 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 

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19.1. Would you agree that “the announcement of a long-term debt issue is a way for managers to signal to capital 
markets favorable expectations about the bank’s future performance”? Please rate in a scale from [1] to [6]: 
Scale from: [1] “Strongly disagree” to [6] “Strongly agree” 
 
Degree of agreement 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
19.2. Would you agree that “the announcement of a future stock issue is a way for managers to signal capital 
markets unfavorable expectations about the bank’s future performance”? Please rate in a scale from [1] to [6]: 
Scale from: [1] “Strongly disagree” to [6] “Strongly agree” 
 
Degree of agreement 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
20. Do you believe that the bank should have refrained from issuing bonds in order to distinguish itself from other 
financially debilitated banks that have resorted to this type of financing?  
Scale from: [1] “totally impossible” to [6] “totally possible” 
 
Degree of possibility 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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21. What action would you consider when facing the following scenario: “a new growth / investment opportunity 
cannot be taken without changing the bank’s typical capital structure or its traditional hierarchy of sources of 
financing”?  
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
Change the bank’s typical capital structure or traditional financing policy 
 
Sell assets 
Pass on the growth / investment opportunity 
 
Reduce dividend payout 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 

 
 
22. Reputation of financial institutions in general, and banks in particular, is an important asset. How do you 
describe its influence on capital structure decisions?  
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
Is an incentive for increasing financial leverage 
Is an incentive for decreasing financial leverage 
No impact on capital structure 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 

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23.1 During your time as CEO the bank may have made private offerings (private placements) of debt issues. How 
did you agree with that practice? Please rate in a scale from [1] to [6]: 
Scale from: [1] “Strongly disagree” to [6] “Strongly agree” 
 
Degree of agreement 
Not applicable 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
(Only for non-listed banks) 
23.2 During your time as CEO the bank may have made private offerings (private placements) of stock issues. How 
did you agree with that practice? Please rate in a scale from [1] to [6]: 
Scale from: [1] “Strongly disagree” to [6] “Strongly agree” 
 
Degree of agreement 
Not applicable 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
24. Do you agree that “private placements of securities might be an efficient way for a bank to share private 
information with investors without publicly disclosing privileged information”?  
Scale from: [1] “Strongly disagree” to [6] “Strongly agree”  
 
Degree of agreement 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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25. How do you compare the prices and the returns of bank’s private placements and public offerings? Compare 
using a scale from [1] to [6]: 
Scale from: [1] “lowest” a [6] “highest” 
 
Issue price 
Investors return 
Not applicable 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
26. Would agree that the inclusion of covenants in a bank’s debt contracts if enhances the marketability of its debt 
issues? 
Scale from: [1] “Strongly disagree” to [6] “Strongly agree” 
 
Degree of agreement 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
27.1. What impact upon a bank’s share price would you typically expect following the announcement of a bank’s 
(voluntary) stock issue?  
Scale from: [1] “strongest decline” to [6] “strongest rise” 
 
Magnitude of reaction 
No change 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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27.2 What impact upon a bank’s share price would you typically expect following the announcement of a bank’s 
debt issue?  
Scale from: [1] “strongest decline” to [6] “strongest rise” 
 
Magnitude of reaction 
No change 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
28. Would you issue fixed rate bonds with a call option attached (callable bonds) aiming at profiting from an 
expected decrease in market interest rates? 
Scale from: [1] “Strongly disagree” to [6] “Strongly agree” 
 
Degree of agreement 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
29. Would you agree with the statement that “typically, private placements of securities allow for less stringent 
covenants than public offers due, at least in part, to the former being a more efficient means of sharing information 
with investors”? 
Scale from: [1] “Strongly disagree” to [6] “Strongly agree” 
 
Degree of agreement 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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30. Issuing securities (whether stock or debt) is costly. How did these costs affect the bank’s issuing policy?  
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
More frequent and bigger issues 
More frequent and smaller issues 
Less frequent and bigger issues 
Less frequent and smaller issues 
No influence 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
31. How important was short-term debt in the bank’s decisions of capital structure? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
 
 
32. What is the relevance of the term structure of interest rates on bank’s capital structure decisions? 
Mark with [ X ] your choice 
 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Totally 
irrelevant 
 
 
Largely 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
 
Somewhat 
relevant 
 
Largely 
relevant 
 
Totally  
relevant 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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33. Why would you favor a new security issue (whether stock or debt) designed for specific groups of investors, 
rather than an indiscriminate placement?  
Mark with [ X ] your choices 
 
Impact in the cost of financing 
Required level of private information disclosure 
Impact on issue’s price 
Impact of emission costs 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
Other (please specify): 
 

 
 
34. What is your estimate for bank’s capital ratio (Equity-to-Total Assets) in the scenario “of bank’s intangible 
asset-base growth of its relative importance due to imperatives of the competitive strategy (e.g., distribution 
channels supported by information technology”? 
Scale from: [ 1 ] “very small” a [ 6 ] “very large” or mark [ X ] for other choice  
 
Degree of increasing variation 
Degree of decreasing variation 
Unchanged 
Not sure / no opinion 
Prefer not to answer 
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